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Abstract 
 
This thesis focuses on the communication of climate change in large corporations. 
Over the last 40 years, concern about climate change has increased and climate-
protecting behaviour is now widely advocated by many actors, including businesses. 
This thesis adopts a discursive approach to climate change and aims to understand 
how a particular group of people, namely ‘climate champions’ in large corporations, 
talk and think about climate change in their daily lives.  
The theoretical part of the thesis begins from the assumption that neoliberalism is 
the dominant discourse at the beginning of the twenty-first century. It considers the 
relationship between neoliberalism and the natural world and examines how climate 
change has been discursively constructed in this neoliberal context. The main focus 
of the thesis is the different ways of actually dealing with climate change based on 
the distinction between climate change as a small ‘glitch’ in the neoliberal system 
and climate change as a fundamental problem. The main part of the theoretical 
framework identifies seven climate discourses that are rooted in this distinction. The 
discourses either conform to the principles of neoliberalism (reformist discourses) or 
reject neoliberal ideas (revolutionary discourses). 
Empirically, the project attempts to analyse the everyday communication of climate 
change by using these seven discourses. Specifically, it focuses on the role of 
designated ‘climate champions’ (individuals given responsibility for promoting 
climate protecting behaviour) in large corporations. The thesis uses interviews with 
44 participants to identify which discourses the champions drew upon when they 
talked about climate change. It focuses on the dominance of particular discourses 
and how dominant ideas are reinforced or challenged on a daily basis. The thesis 
concludes that, although reformist discourses were indeed very influential, the 
champions drew upon many different discourses when they promoted climate 
protecting behaviour and discussed climate change. They both reinforced and 
resisted reformist discourses depending on the audience and the context in which 
they were talking. 
  
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For my Grandma, who would have been very proud 
  
iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to begin by thanking my 44 research participants. I am very grateful for 
your time and your willingness to discuss my research. The project was founded on 
your thoughts and experience and, although you remain anonymous, I could not 
have completed the thesis without you.   
I am also indebted to my supervisor and mentor, Dr. Derek Bell. Thank you so much 
for the support you have given me throughout my entire postgraduate career. You 
have provided invaluable advice and guidance, not only on the thesis, but also on 
funding, professional development, career aspirations, and so many silly queries that 
I have lost count. Thank you for having confidence in my ability. I hope I have lived 
up to your expectations. 
I must also express my gratitude to my family, who have read and commented on 
draft chapters and papers, listened to presentations, discussed methodological and 
grammatical issues, and helped me to practise my teaching methods. In particular, I 
would like to thank my parents, who have nurtured my love of learning since the 
moment I picked up my first book. I’m sorry that I took a different name just before 
embarking a doctorate – I will never forget that it is the Vasey genes and work ethic 
that got me here!   
To my husband Martin, words can’t really express the gratitude that I owe you. You 
have been there for me every step of the way, listening tirelessly to my relentless 
stream of ideas, always ready to put things into perspective and offer encouragement 
when it all got too much. Thank you for your unfailing support and endless patience. 
I couldn’t have done this without you.   
And finally, my thanks to Jessica, who has been a constant source of calming 
energy, my Ph.D. companion morning, noon and night and always by my side when 
I needed to walk a while and think. 
Thank you. 
  
iv 
 
Contents 
 
 
Abstract          i 
Dedication          ii 
Acknowledgments         iii 
Contents          iv 
List of Tables          x 
Glossary          xi 
 
Chapter 1  
Introduction: Researching the Problem of Climate Change    1 
1.1 – Climate Change: A Physical and Social Phenomenon    2 
1.2 – The Roots of the Research Project       5 
1.2.1 – The Value-Action Gap       5 
1.2.2 – Individual Behaviour Change      7 
1.2.3 – Neoliberal Governance        8 
1.3 – Approaches to the Problem of Climate Change     11 
1.3.1 – The Political Project       11 
1.3.2 – An Empirical Approach to Climate Change    13 
1.3.3 – A Discursive Approach to Climate Change    13 
1.4 – The Context for the Project       15 
1.5 – Research Questions        16 
1.6 – Chapter Outline          17 
 
Chapter 2 
A Discursive Approach to Climate Change       22 
2.1 – A Discursive Approach        23 
2.1.1 – Features of a Discursive Approach     23 
2.1.2 – Descriptive Discourse Analysis      24 
2.1.3 – Critical Discourse Analysis      25 
2.2 – A Discursive Approach to Climate Change      27 
2.2.1 – Social Constructivism and Climate Change    28 
v 
 
2.2.2 – The ‘Micro’ Politics of Climate Change     32 
2.2.3 – Discursive Work on Climate Change     33 
2.2.4 – Descriptive versus Critical Analysis on Climate Change   36 
2.2.5 – Dealing with Climate Change      37 
2.3 – Business, Behaviour Change and Climate Champions    40 
2.3.1 – Business and Climate Change      40 
2.3.2 – Individual Behaviour Change      43 
2.3.3 – Climate Champions       46 
2.4 – Conclusion          48 
 
Chapter 3 
Discourses of Climate Change        49 
3.1 – Analysing Discourses of Climate Change      50 
3.2 – Analytical Categories        52 
3.3 – The Context of Climate Discourse: Neoliberalism     55 
3.3.1 – Neoliberal Discourse       56 
3.3.2 – Neoliberalism and the Natural World     59 
3.4 – Constructing the Problem of Climate Change     60 
3.4.1 – Scepticism: Not a Problem      61 
3.4.2 – Pessimism: Too Big a Problem      62 
3.4.3 – Reform: A ‘Glitch’ in the System      63 
3.4.4 – Revolution: A Fundamental Problem     64 
3.5 – Dealing with Climate Change: Discourses of Reform    65 
3.5.1 – Ecological Modernisation      66 
3.5.2 – Individualism         69 
3.5.3 – Privatisation        72 
3.6 – Dealing with Climate Change: Discourses of Revolution    74 
3.6.1 – Sufficiency        74 
3.6.2 – Justice         77 
3.6.3 – Deep Ecology        79 
3.6.4 – Democratic Citizenship       81 
3.7 – Conclusion          83 
 
 
vi 
 
Chapter 4 
Methodology and the Research Process      85 
4.1 – The Research Process        86 
4.1.1 – Selecting a Sample        86 
4.1.2 – Asking Questions       88 
4.1.3 – Conducting the Interviews      91 
4.1.4 – Analysing the Data       92 
4.2 – Research Considerations        93 
4.2.1 – Ethics         93 
4.2.2 – The Reliability of Qualitative Data     95 
4.2.3 – The Validity of Qualitative Data      96 
4.2.4 – Internal Validity        98 
4.2.5 – Making Generalisations                             100 
4.3 – Reflections of a Researcher                 102 
4.3.1 – A Starting Point from Nowhere?                102 
4.3.2 – A Critical Approach                             104 
4.4 – Conclusion                               105 
Chapter 5 
The Role of the Climate Champion                 106 
5.1 – Learning about Climate Change                                         108 
5.1.1 – General Knowledge and Scientific Discourse              108 
5.1.2 – Belief, Scepticism, Pessimism                110 
5.1.3 – Objective Climate Knowledge                     114 
5.2 – Constructing the Problem of Climate Change               116 
5.2.1 – A Major Issue?                  117 
5.2.2 – Reforming Society                 118 
5.2.3 – Reforming Business                 119 
5.2.4 – Implications for Action                  120 
5.3 – Translating Knowledge into Action                    121 
5.3.1 – Passivity versus Agency                  122 
5.3.2 – Subjective Climate Knowledge                123 
5.3.3 – Delivering the Climate Change Message               125 
5.4 – Conclusion                               126 
 
vii 
 
Chapter 6 
Motivating Behaviour Change                  128 
6.1 – Identifying Climate Discourses I: Encouraging Action in Others              130 
6.1.1 – Business Buy-in                  130 
6.1.2 – Selling the Issue to Individuals                133 
6.1.3 – …and Concern about the Climate               135 
6.1.4 – Summary                    136 
6.2 – Identifying Climate Discourses II: Personal Motivations for Action              137 
6.2.1 – Profit and Promotion                             138 
6.2.2 – (My) Future Generations                139 
6.2.3 – The Rest of the World                 140 
6.2.4 – Protecting the Planet                 142 
6.2.5 – A Sense of Responsibility                145 
6.2.6 – Summary                  146 
6.3 – Identifying Climate Discourses III: Barriers to Action               147 
6.3.1 – Time and Prioritisation                 148 
6.3.2 – Lifestyle and Aspirations                 150 
6.3.3 – The Right to Self-Rule                             150 
6.3.4 – Summary                  151 
6.4 – Reinforcing Dominant Discourses                 152 
6.4.1 – ‘Appropriate’ Motivations for Action               152 
6.4.2 –‘I Know How This Sounds…’                154 
6.4.3 – Responding to Barriers                  155 
6.5 – Subverting Dominant Discourses                 157 
6.5.1 – Acknowledging Alternative Motivations               157 
6.5.2 – The Problem with Self-Interest                159 
6.6 – Conclusion                   160 
 
Chapter 7 
Acting on Climate Change                   163 
7.1 – Identifying Climate Discourses IV: Appropriate Actions in the Workplace              164 
7.1.1 – The Climate Champion ‘Project’                165 
7.1.2 – Waste                   166 
7.1.3 – Energy                   168 
viii 
 
7.1.4 – Transport                  170 
7.1.5 – Summary                  173 
7.2 – Identifying Climate Discourses V: Changing the Way We Live?              173 
7.2.1 – Fundamental Change: Challenging the Status Quo             174 
7.2.2 – Going ‘Backwards’                 176 
7.2.3 – Doing Something a Bit Different                178 
7.2.4 – Summary                  180 
7.3 – Identifying Climate Discourses VI: The Role of Business, the State             181 
 and ‘the People’             
7.3.1 – Infrastructure, Subsidies and Product Innovation                  181 
7.3.2 – Enforced Action on Climate Change               183 
7.3.3 – Collective Individualism                 185 
7.3.4 – Summary                   187 
7.4 – Reinforcing Dominant Discourses                 187 
7.4.1 – ‘I’m Environmental, but…’                188 
7.4.2 – Successful (‘Acceptable’) Actions               190 
7.4.3 – Rejecting Fundamental Change                192 
7.5 – Subverting Dominant Discourses                 193 
7.5.1 – Change is Possible                 193 
7.5.2 – Challenging Mind-Sets                 195 
7.6 – Conclusion                    197 
 
Chapter 8 
Conclusion: Reforming the Workplace, Changing the World?             199 
8.1 – The Pervasive Effects of Neoliberalism                200 
8.2 – Identifying Climate Discourses and ‘Appropriate’ Behaviour                         203 
8.2.1 – Discourses of Reform                 203 
8.2.2 – Discourses of Revolution                  206 
8.2.3 – Summary                  209 
8.3 – The Climate Champion as a ‘Passive Subject’               210 
8.4 – The Climate Champion as an ‘Active Agent’                212 
8.5 – Final Considerations                  214 
8.5.1 – A Discursive Approach                 214 
8.5.2 – Methodological Limitations                215 
8.5.3 – Further Research and Normative Implications              217 
ix 
 
 
Appendix A - Summary of Analytical Categories and Climate Discourses           220 
Appendix B – Example Climate Champion Report               221 
Appendix C – Preliminary Research: Interviews and Observation              232 
Appendix D – Interview Questionnaire                 233 
Appendix E – Detailed Information on Interviews               234 
Appendix F – Research Paper                              236 
 
References                    257 
  
x 
 
List of Tables  
 
 
 
Table 3.1 – Checklist of elements for the analysis of discourse 
 
 
Table 3.2 – Analytical categories for the analysis of climate discourse 
 
 
Table 4.1 – Climate champion case studies 
 
  
xi 
 
Glossary 
 
CCPC  - Cities for Climate Protection Campaign 
CDA  - Critical Discourse Analysis 
CDM  - Clean Development Mechanism 
CEO  - Chief Executive Officer 
CER  - Certified Emission Reduction   
CSA  - Community Supported Agriculture  
CSR  - Corporate Social Responsibility 
CO2  - Carbon Dioxide 
DECC  - Department for Energy and Climate Change 
DEFRA - Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
DfT  - Department for Transport 
GAP  - Global Action Plan 
GDP  - Gross Domestic Product 
GHG  - Greenhouse Gas   
EM  - Ecological Modernisation 
EU15  - Countries in the European Union prior to the accession of ten     
 candidate countries on 1 May 2004 
ICLEI  - International Council of Local Environmental Initiatives   
IMF  - International Monetary Fund 
IPCC  - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
IR  - International Relations 
MDP  - Measure of Domestic Progress 
M.Sc.  -  Masters in Science 
NGOs  - Non-Governmental Organisations 
N2O  - Nitrous Oxide 
PR  - Public Relations 
xii 
 
REDD+ - Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest      
                                    Degradation  
UN  - United Nations 
UNFCCC - United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
USA  - United States of America 
WTO  - World Trade Organisation 
WWF  - World Wildlife Fund 
  
 1 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 Introduction: Researching the Problem of Climate Change 
 
‘Certainly, we will not get a grasp of whatever is the whole of the matter by microscopic 
recording of face-to-face interaction. However, it may be enough to begin with if we can – for 
the first time – hear the macro order tick’ (Knorr-Cetina 1981, p.42). 
 
 My research interests in the politics of climate change are rooted in a 
longstanding concern about environmental problems more generally. At a young age, 
environmental problems made me very anxious. What do we do if we run out of 
natural resources? How will we cope if the sea levels rise? Am I in any danger? As I 
got older, my concern extended to the wider world. It was unfair that people in 
developing countries would bear the brunt of climate change. It was wrong to destroy 
the natural world. The issue became one of moral significance. I believed that we had 
a responsibility to look after the world and that dealing with climate change would 
require changing the way we currently lived our lives. However, when I began 
researching climate change, I became increasingly aware of the controversy that 
surrounded this issue. The ‘consensus’ about climate science was contested, 
approaches to dealing with climate change were disputed and public opinion about 
the issue appeared to be full of contradictions. 
This background is not intended simply to ‘set the scene’ for my research 
focus. Rather, it is meant to illustrate my initial encounter with different ways of 
thinking about climate change (fear, justice and concern for the natural world) and the 
development of my own epistemological position (from certainty about what was true 
and what should be done to uncertainty about my own knowledge and beliefs). The 
overall purpose of this project is to identify how people talk and think about climate 
change in modern society and how dominant ideas about climate change are 
reproduced or challenged on a daily basis. It is important to begin with my own 
epistemological position because epistemology plays an important role in the project. 
What do we know about climate change and how does the transfer of knowledge 
construct a particular way of thinking and acting in relation to the problem? 
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In this chapter I will begin by outlining the epistemological approach of the 
project. In section 1.1 I will address the science of climate change and discuss the 
distinction between climate change as a physical and social issue. I will argue that 
climate change as a physical process is occurring independent of our interpretation of 
the problem but that the way we understand and deal with climate change is socially 
constructed. The project focuses on the latter of these issues (climate change as a 
social phenomenon) and adopts a constructivist perspective. In the sections that 
follow I will outline the origins and development of the project itself. Section 1.2 will 
introduce three different areas that I initially felt were important for the purpose of 
addressing the problem of climate change: the value-action gap; individual behaviour 
change; and neoliberal governance. I will explain why I was interested in each of 
these areas and the research questions that they presented. In section 1.3 I will discuss 
my own contribution to the literature on climate change and how I have tried to 
develop an original research project that builds on previous work in these three areas. 
Once I had established what I wanted to do it was necessary to find a specific social 
context for the research and section 1.4 will provide a brief outline of this context. 
My research focused on ‘climate champions’ in large corporations. I will explain who 
these people were and why they were relevant to the research I was undertaking. In 
section 1.5 I will introduce the specific research questions that I set out to address and 
in section 1.6 I will provide a chapter outline for the rest of the thesis.                            
 
1.1   Climate Change: A Physical and Social Phenomenon 
For the purpose of introducing the project, I will begin in the way that I first 
encountered the issue: with the science of climate change itself. It was the scientific 
authority of this account that informed my initial understanding and beliefs about 
climate change as an issue. ‘Climate change’ is an alteration in weather patterns over 
an extended period of time. It is primarily caused by the release of gases such as 
carbon dioxide (CO2) and nitrous oxide (N2O) into the atmosphere. This leads to the 
enhanced greenhouse effect and a consequent warming of the Earth, commonly 
known as global warming. The natural greenhouse effect is the process through which 
the Earth’s surface is kept at an average temperature of 14oC. Greenhouse gases 
(GHG) trap enough heat within the atmosphere to maintain a temperature that suits 
life on the planet. When there is an increase in greenhouse gases, however, the 
enhanced greenhouse effect occurs. There is an imbalance between the heat radiating 
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in and out of the Earth’s atmosphere with more being retained. This imbalance leads 
to an increase in the Earth’s average temperature. Over the past few decades there has 
been a warming of the planet due to this enhanced greenhouse effect.  
In its most recent assessment report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) stated that, ‘warming of the planet is unequivocal, as is now evident 
from observations in increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, 
widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global sea level’ (IPCC 2007, p.30). 
These increased temperatures will lead to a variety of impacts on the planet and its 
inhabitants. At a basic level, the increased heat will cause warmer climates, more 
intense heat waves and a consequent increase in heat related deaths. Increased 
temperatures will also foster a favourable environment for the spread of diseases. 
Other direct impacts of the increasing heat will be drought and desertification. In 
terms of more indirect impacts of climate change, a warmer climate will cause the 
melting of polar ice caps and glaciers, which will lead to an increase in sea levels and 
consequent flooding of low lying and coastal areas. Research also indicates that 
higher temperatures will lead to more extreme weather around the world. As a result 
of these impacts, the IPCC predicts that by the middle of the twenty first century 
there will be over one hundred and fifty million environmental refugees. 
In its second assessment report the IPCC outlined some of these major 
changes in the Earth’s climate system and stated that it ‘is unlikely to be entirely 
natural in origin’ (1995, p.22). There was a significant level of uncertainty about the 
influence of human activity on the environment, but it was argued by many scientists 
that the main reasons for climate change were anthropogenic. Twelve years later, the 
most recent report states that warming of the climate ‘is very likely due to the 
observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations’ (IPCC 2007, p.39; 
emphasis in original). According to the confidence ratings of the IPCC, ‘very likely’ 
indicates that the scientists are 90% confident in the accuracy of their findings.  
On the basis of scientific information, my own approach to climate change 
was initially positivist: we can identify the ‘true’ causes of climate change and we can 
‘fix’ the problem with the ‘correct’ approach. We emit too much carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gases and therefore we must change our carbon intensive lifestyle. I 
believed that this was the ‘right’ way to deal with climate change. By the time I began 
writing my thesis, however, I had encountered a myriad of different perspectives on 
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the science of climate change and what should be done about the problem. Hulme 
(2009) considers the evolution of climate change from a scientific to a social issue:    
 
As society has been increasingly confronted with the observable realities of climate change and heard 
of the dangers that scientists claim lie ahead, climate change has moved from being predominantly a 
physical phenomenon to being simultaneously a social phenomenon… Far from simply being a change 
in physical climates – a change in the sequence of weather experienced in given places – climate 
change has become an idea that travels well beyond its origins in the natural sciences (pp. xxv-xxvi).  
 
Hulme argues that this transition of climate change from physical to social 
phenomenon has led to many different ideas about the issue and many different ways 
of thinking about the problem (if indeed it is a problem at all). My research into 
climate change as a social (and political) phenomenon made me question my 
positivist standpoint. If there are so many conflicting ideas about climate change, did 
I have the ‘right’ approach? Did I know the ‘truth’ about climate science? Indeed, 
was there even a ‘truth’ to be discovered?  
However, this did not alleviate the concerns I still had about climate change. 
Regardless of the debates and controversy, I believed that there was a problem and 
that something needed to be done about it. It was my contention then (as it is now) 
that climate change was indeed a ‘real’ problem that was occurring, independent of 
the way in which we interpreted it. The physical processes were objective. It was the 
social processes that were constructed. This is a position that is most commonly 
referred to as ‘critical realism’ and incorporates what Bhaskar (1998) refers to as two 
sides of ‘knowledge’: 
 
Any adequate philosophy of science must find a way of grappling with this central paradox of science: 
that men in their social activity produce knowledge which is a social product much like any 
other…This is one side of ‘knowledge’. The other is that knowledge is ‘of’ things which are not 
produced by men at all: the specific gravity of mercury, the process of electrolysis… (p.16; emphasis 
in original).  
 
Of course, climate change is a slightly more complicated issue than gravity or 
electrolysis because part of the problem is that we are interfering with the physical 
reality. Climate change is not occurring independent of our actions. However, the 
results of our actions, the physical processes, are occurring independent of our 
interpretation of them. We can have objective knowledge about the levels of carbon 
dioxide and the rise in sea levels. It is the social processes that are subject to various 
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different ideas and ways of thinking and it is upon the social processes that this 
project will focus. This is the position I started from when I began the thesis. I wanted 
to carry out research that would consider the controversy surrounding climate change, 
but also possibly have an impact in dealing with, what I believed to be, a ‘real’ 
problem. 
 
1.2   The Roots of the Research Project  
My initial research into climate change generated many different ideas about 
the issue and potential areas for analysis. However, there were three areas that I felt 
were particularly interesting and generated potentially important research questions. 
First, there appeared to be a significant ‘gap’ between commitments to tackle climate 
change and actual action. Why did countries, localities and individuals profess 
concern about climate change but then do nothing to tackle the problem? Second, a 
lot of climate policy and academic research appeared to concentrate on individual 
behaviour change. Did individuals have an important role to play in the mitigation of 
climate change and was individualistic action the best way to deal with the problem? 
Finally, neoliberalism, as an economic and political project, appeared to be having a 
significant impact on the governance of climate change. Why was this the case and 
what impact did it have on how we deal with climate change?  In this section I will 
consider each of these topics. 
 
1.2.1   The Value-Action Gap  
The commitment to tackle climate change is evident at all levels of politics. In 
1992, 154 countries signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). The text of the Convention stated that the parties were 
‘concerned that human activities have been substantially increasing the atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gas emissions’ and that they were ‘determined to 
protect the climate system for present and future generations’ (UNFCCC 1992, p.3). 
The Convention represented the first official political acknowledgment of climate 
change as a human induced threat and the first international commitment to action. 
Over the past 20 years the political commitment to this cause has remained 
strong. There are now 194 signatories to the Convention. Representatives and state 
leaders have met at least once a year since 1995 and 184 of them have ratified the 
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legally binding Kyoto Protocol. At the 2011 Conference of the Parties in Durban, 
statements were heard from over 160 states, which expressed deep concern about the 
problem of climate change and the need for a strong commitment to action (UNFCCC 
2011a). Harris (2009) argues that ‘climate change is now a mainstream part of the 
international politics agenda’ (p.1). 
However, when it comes to implementing these commitments, progress has 
not been significant. The United Nations (UN) website states: ‘the Kyoto Protocol 
sets standards for certain industrialised countries. Those targets expire in 2012. In the 
meanwhile, greenhouse gas emissions from both developed and developing countries 
have been increasing rapidly’ (UN 2011). The binding commitments of Kyoto have 
had little impact internationally, while the Durban Conference did ‘little or nothing to 
reduce emissions and defers action for almost a decade’ (Tollefson 2011, p.299-300). 
At the national level, the failure to meet emissions reduction targets has 
almost become an accepted inevitability. The United States has yet to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol and, at the Durban Conference, Canada became the first country to withdraw 
from the Kyoto Protocol after previously ratifying it
1
. There are examples of 
countries that have achieved their emission targets (including the UK), but they are 
the exception rather than the rule. Lorenzoni and Hulme (2009) claim that, ‘in 
Europe, despite fervent central support for mitigation, only the UK and Sweden are 
on course to meet their Kyoto Protocol commitments’ (p.383). It is fair to claim that, 
‘by any reasonable measure, the steps taken so far to address climate change have 
failed’ (Barrett 2009, p.1). 
The ‘gap’ between values and action is also evident at the individual level. 
Individuals claim that they are committed to the mitigation of climate change, but 
then do not act upon this professed commitment (Blake 1999; Kollmuss and 
Agyeman 2002). According to Hale (2010), ‘the annual survey of public attitudes 
conducted for DEFRA finds consistently high claimed behaviours, in particular on 
recycling, food waste and energy efficiency. The prevalence of these behaviours is 
much less widespread in practice’ (p.261). Research into this gap between attitudes 
and actions has focused on specific areas such as household waste and recycling (Barr 
                                                          
1
 The Canadian Environment Minister was clear that, domestically, Canada would ‘continue to do our 
part to reduce greenhouse gas emissions’ (Kent 2012). 
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et al 2001) and support for climate change policy (Dietz et al 2007). There has been a 
lot of research into the reasons why people express concern about climate change but 
then do not engage in climate-protecting behaviour.  
When I began researching the problem of climate change I was keen to 
contribute to this body of literature. Lorenzoni et al (2007) argue that ‘in relation to 
climate change, there is a need for in-depth research that examines inconsistencies 
and ambiguities in beliefs, values and actions’ (p.448). Like many other scholars, I 
wanted to understand why the value-action gap existed and if it could be addressed. I 
was also interested in the connections between state politics and individual action on 
climate change. If there was a value-action gap at both levels, could the problems be 
attributed to the same or similar factors? 
 
1.2.2   Individual Behaviour Change  
The second area that I was interested in is closely related to the first. It is often 
suggested that the value-action gap can be addressed by finding ways to change the 
behaviour of individuals. Indeed, both national and local government have frequently 
highlighted the importance of individual behaviour change in the implementation of 
climate policy (DEFRA 2007; DEFRA 2008; Southerton et al 2011; DECC 2011). 
A lot of research in this area is rooted in psychology and sociology. For 
example, the work by Barr et al (2001) was based on the value-action gap in the 
context of household waste, but the focus was on environmental values, situational 
variables and psychological variables. How do we use our understanding of these 
factors to change the behaviour of individuals? Similarly, Dietz et al (2007) look at 
the value-action gap in the context of climate policy, but they focus on a combination 
of various social and psychological factors, such as ‘personal character’, ‘trust’ and 
‘future orientation’ (p.191). 
Other research in this area has attempted to provide a more sophisticated 
account of individual behaviour change. In January 2008 DEFRA published a report 
entitled, ‘A framework for pro-environmental behaviours’. Among other things, the 
report outlines DEFRA’s environmental ‘segmentation model’, which ‘divides the 
public into seven clusters each sharing a distinct set of attitudes and beliefs (towards 
the environment, environmental issues and behaviours)’ (p.41). These clusters 
include ‘concerned consumers’, ‘waste watchers’ and ‘positive greens’. Once we 
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identify the motivations of a particular cluster of the population, we can work on 
particular ways to change their behaviour. For example, ‘waste watchers’ are 
concerned with local and national environmental problems rather than global 
environmental issues. One way to motivate this type of person would be to target 
behaviours that ‘relate to their concern about the UK countryside’ such as water 
management in the garden (DEFRA 2008, p.57). Research by other scholars has also 
advocated the importance of a ‘tailored approach’ to behaviour change. Leiserowitz 
(2007) argues that ‘messages about climate change need to be tailored to the needs 
and predispositions of particular audiences’ (p.57). 
The process of individual behaviour change was another area where I felt I 
could engage in interesting and worthwhile research. I could identify different factors 
that prevented behaviour change and investigate how individuals could overcome 
these barriers. This is the kind of work that can ‘provide a useful reference tool for 
policymakers at the local and national level’ (Barr et al 2001, p.2031). The research 
would incorporate my interest in the value-action gap, it could be of theoretical and 
practical importance and it could potentially have a discernible impact on the problem 
of climate change. 
 
1.2.3   Neoliberal Governance 
The final area that I was interested in was the apparent dominance of 
neoliberal policies in the context of the environment. Neoliberalism is an economic 
and political project that advocates free markets, self-interested individualism and a 
minimal role for the state. The term ‘neoliberalism ’can be traced back to the 1930s 
when an economist named Alexander Rustow attempted to ‘indicate the distinction 
between the prevailing pro-collectivist liberal ethos and the principles of traditional 
liberalism’ (Turner 2008, p.4). The theory of neoliberalism rejected the prevailing 
collectivist policies of the time and promoted values such as individual freedom and 
private property rights. However, in the years that followed, most economies retained 
a system of central planning and the regulation of markets. Neoliberalism remained a 
‘minority argument’ (Harvey 2005, p.2). According to Turner (2008) the ‘immediate 
years after the Second World War’ represented ‘liberalism’s darkest hour’ (p.1). 
There was academic interest in the revival of liberalism in the form of the Mont 
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Pelerin Society
2
 but most states adhered to the theory of ‘embedded liberalism’ and 
embraced ‘principles of community, rational planning and institutional design’ 
(Turner 2008, p.1). This system delivered strong economic growth during the 1950s 
and 1960s. However, towards the end of the 1960s, many states were facing high 
unemployment and inflation. The economic crises that followed ‘polarized debate 
between those ranged behind social democracy and central planning…[and] those 
concerned with liberating corporate and business power and re-establishing market 
freedoms’ (Harvey 2005, p. 13). Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, it was the 
latter approach that gradually became dominant. 
According to von Werlhof (2008), ‘the political economy of neoliberalism 
began in Chile in 1973’ (p.95). In the aftermath of a violent political coup, Chile 
experienced the roll-back of community organisations such as health centres and a 
decrease in economic regulation. This ultimately led to the ‘revival of the Chilean 
economy in terms of growth, capital accumulation and high rates of return on foreign 
investments’ (Harvey 2007, p.26). Neoliberal ‘experiments’ followed in several 
countries, including New Zealand and Sweden. Once the ideology was adopted in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, neoliberalism began to exert global influence:      
   It was only when the United States under Reagan and the United Kingdom under Thatcher  
   adopted neoliberal programmes of privatisation, government spending cuts, deregulation and  
   marketization that neoliberalism, sometimes referred to as the ‘Washington consensus’, became  
   dominant (Humphreys 2009, p.320). 
 
Since the 1970s, neoliberal ideology ‘has become the dominant model for political 
economic practice today’ (Mansfield 2004a, p.313).  
Neoliberalism quickly became influential in the realm of environmental 
politics. According to McCarthy and Prudham (2004), ‘free-market environmentalism 
[has] proliferated since the Reagan-Thatcher years, in forms such as tradable emission 
permits, transferable fishing quotas, user fees for public goods, and aspects of utility 
privatization’ (p.279)3. As I began researching the problem of climate change, it 
                                                          
2
 The Mont Pelerin Society represented a ‘small and exclusive group’ of passionate advocates of 
traditional liberal ideals. The society formed in 1947 with Friedrich von Hayek at the centre. Members 
were labelled ‘neoliberal’ due to their adherence to traditional liberalism and ‘those free market 
principles of neo-classical economics’ (Harvey 2005, p.19-20). 
3
 Neoliberal approaches to environmental issues have been labelled in a number of different ways, 
including ‘free-market environmentalism’, ‘neoliberal environmentalism’ and ‘green capitalism’. In 
the context of some analyses the distinction between these terms is important. However, the purpose of 
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became apparent that the issue was being dealt with in a particular way. There was a 
‘prevalence of neoliberal influences on environmental solutions’ (Andrew et al 2010, 
p.612). 
The proliferation of neoliberal environmental governance has become the 
subject of a great deal of controversy. For some theorists, ‘free-market 
environmentalism’ offers us a ‘pragmatic alternative to political environmentalism’ 
(Anderson and Leal 2001, p.viv). According to Anderson and Leal (2001), market 
prices ‘signal increasing scarcity and provide rewards for those who mitigate resource 
constraints by reducing consumption, finding substitutes, and improving productivity’ 
(p.3). Thus, according to proponents of a neoliberal approach, ‘the most effective and 
efficient way to protect the global climate system is to assign property rights for 
greenhouse-gas emissions and to trade these rights on international markets’ (Bailey 
2007, p.431). 
Other theorists are critical of neoliberal approaches to environmental 
problems. Heynon and Perkins (2005) investigate urban private property and the 
‘neoliberalization of nature’. They describe a situation in Milwaukee where Dutch 
elm disease destroyed over 200,000 trees. 99% of the city’s public forest was 
replaced, but only 4% of the city’s ‘urban forest’ was located on public land. It was of 
no real benefit to individual people to replace trees and the government had no 
authority over private land. This meant that many trees were never replaced. Heynon 
and Perkins (2005) accept that the distribution of urban trees may seem like a 
‘mundane’ issue to many people (p.99). However, they argue that this issue is 
symptomatic of neoliberal approaches to the environment more generally. The 
privatisation of land and the prioritisation of property rights over government 
regulation led to further environmental problems. The loss of urban trees 
‘cumulatively affects climate, air quality, and the quality of life’ (p.110). 
Many other academics support this critical position. Dryzek (1996) argues 
that, ‘a predominantly instrumental orientation on the part of human beings in the 
context of their interaction with... the natural world is destructive’ (p.27), while 
Bakker (2007) claims that privatization, ‘introduces a pernicious logic of the market’ 
(p.437). Therefore, ‘the protection of our environment is best served, not by bringing 
the environment into a surrogate version of the commercial world, but by its 
                                                                                                                                                                     
this section is simply to outline the influence of neoliberal governance on environmental issues. I will 
therefore use the terms interchangeably to describe neoliberal environmental governance.    
 11 
 
protection as a sphere outside the world of commodity exchange and its norms’ 
(O’Neill, 1997, p.550). 
I found these debates about neoliberal environmental governance particularly 
interesting. Was this an approach that could effectively deal with a problem such as 
climate change and, if not, why did it remain so prominent in modern society? In 
addition, this area could potentially be linked to the value-action gap and individual 
behaviour change. Prudham (2009) argues that ‘green capitalism’ involves 
‘harnessing capital investment, individual choice and entrepreneurial innovation to 
the green cause’ (p.1595). Could neoliberal ideology and individual behaviour change 
(and choice) be linked to one another and if we were dealing with a value-action gap 
in a world dominated by neoliberal approaches did this mean that neoliberalism was 
indeed failing to solve environmental problems? 
 
1.3   Approaches to the Problem of Climate Change 
When I began the thesis I spent a lot of time researching the three areas 
outlined in the previous section. I thought about the role of neoliberalism and 
individual behaviour change and I developed my own ideas about why people do not 
act on climate change. In this section I will explain how my initial ideas evolved into 
a research project. I began from a normative perspective and in section 1.3.1 I will 
discuss why this approach seemed to be the most appropriate for the project: what 
should we do about climate change? In section 1.3.2 I will explain how my initial 
ideas evolved into more empirical questions: why are particular approaches to climate 
change dominant in modern society?  What effect does this have on the way we deal 
with the issue? Ultimately, I decided to engage in a discursive project. In section 
1.3.3 I will explain why this approach was appropriate and how it related to the three 
different areas in which I was interested. 
 
1.3.1   The Political Project 
There were two main ways in which I could study climate change as a social 
phenomenon: an empirical project or a normative project. Ransom (1997) discusses 
the difference between these two approaches: 
 
 
 
 12 
 
A fundamental distinction in social and political thought is between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’. One of the 
tasks of political science, for example, is to explain how particular societies and institutions actually 
work. Political philosophy produces theories of how the world ought to be, though this task is by no 
means its exclusive domain (p.1). 
 
My initial inclination was to take a normative approach.  How should we deal with 
the issue of climate change? If there is a value-action gap then there must be a 
problem with current approaches and, hence a ‘better’ way to deal with the issue.  
I considered engaging in a critical analysis of neoliberal environmentalism 
and possible alternatives to the neoliberal project. The literature in these areas was 
extensive. Research into neoliberalism had focused on the privatisation of 
environmental resources such as water (Bond 2004; Bakker 2007), the oceans 
(Mansfield 2004a; 2004b) and even the climate itself in the form of carbon trading 
(Lohmann 2010). The theory of ecological modernisation – where environmental 
management is a positive-sum game and pollution prevention pays – had also 
received a lot of attention (Pepper 1999; Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000; Mol 2000; 2002; 
Gibbs 2003; Curran 2009). Finally, many scholars had researched key features of 
neoliberal environmentalism such as ethical consumption (Meyer 2001; Rowlands et 
al 2003; Greenberg 2006) and the individualisation of responsibility (Maniates 2001; 
Kent 2009; Reynolds 2010). A lot of this work considered the role of neoliberalism in 
a specific area and presented a critical analysis of the approach. 
Many other scholars offered alternatives to neoliberalism. It was argued that 
environmental issues such as climate change should be considered in terms of ethics 
(Whitworth 2001; Kamminga 2008), human rights (Woods 2006; Caney 2008), 
responsibility (Brown 2003; Page 2007) and justice (Shrader-Frechette 2002; Maltais 
2008; Parks and Roberts 2010). We should focus on the intrinsic value of nature 
(Haigh and Griffiths 2009; Soper 2000) and we should re-evaluate the neoliberal 
conception of growth and progress (Hines 2003; Seyfang 2005; Hinton and Redclift 
2009). Most of these scholars were engaging in the kind of analysis that I was keen to 
contribute to. They were critiquing current approaches to climate change and/or 
presenting a ‘better’ way to deal with the problem: how the world ‘ought to be’ 
(Ransom 1997, p.1). 
However, as I explored this literature I became increasingly aware of two 
things. First, it would be difficult to make an ‘original’ contribution to such a vast 
 13 
 
body of literature. Second, and perhaps more importantly, this vast array of literature 
did not appear to be making any difference to the dominance of neoliberalism or the 
problem of climate change. The ‘neoliberalization of nature’ did indeed appear to be 
‘fated, inescapable and evolutionary’ (Heynon and Robbins 2005, p.6). 
 
1.3.2   An Empirical Approach to Climate Change 
My interest in the problem of climate change began to evolve as my focus 
shifted to more empirical questions. In the face of such overwhelming criticism, why 
do neoliberal approaches remain so prevalent? If there are so many alternatives to 
neoliberalism, why have we not changed the way we deal with climate change? 
According to Ransom (1997) I had begun my investigation into climate change with 
political philosophy: trying to work out how the world ought to be. As my research 
developed I had moved towards political science, thinking about how things worked 
and why this was the case. 
Ransom (1997) argues that ‘frequently, these two branches of political 
thought… stand in critical relation to each other’ (p.1). I was not convinced that this 
had to be the case. In fact, I saw an important connection between the ‘ought’ and the 
‘is’. Surely, knowing how something ‘is’ is a precondition for working out how it 
should be? How can we challenge the dominance of neoliberalism if we do not know 
why neoliberalism is so dominant? How can we advocate a ‘better’ way of doing 
things if we do not understand why things are the way they are? I therefore decided to 
engage in an empirical project. My research would focus on the world as it was at the 
moment. Why were particular approaches to climate change promoted and others 
neglected? How did the world work in the context of climate change? It was my 
contention that this kind of knowledge could be used to inform more normative work. 
If we know how the world works then we can begin to challenge the dominant (and 
arguably wrong) ways of dealing with climate change. 
 
1.3.3   A Discursive Approach to Climate Change 
I began to explore other research that had considered the dominance and 
reproduction of particular ideas in society. This quickly led me to the work of 
Michael Foucault. Foucault was interested in how things had come to be the way they 
are. He wanted to understand how the world worked and, more specifically, how 
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particular thoughts and ideas had become ‘normal’ or ‘natural’. This resonated with 
the kind of work I wanted to do. How had particular approaches to climate change 
become accepted as ‘normal’? How were these ‘normal’ ideas reinforced in society? 
Foucault argued that ideas are reinforced through the operation of power at different 
sites of interaction. For Foucault (1982), ‘power relations are rooted in the system of 
social networks’ (p.141). When one individual communicates with another (a site of 
interaction) power is exercised through the transfer of knowledge. Therefore, if we 
want to understand how this process works, we must analyse ‘every manner of 
speaking, doing or behaving in which the individual appears and acts as a knowing 
subject’ (Foucault 1984b, p.59). If we want to understand how particular ideas have 
become dominant then we must analyse the reproduction of these ideas and the 
operation of power at the micro level. How were people thinking and talking about 
climate change in everyday life? What ideas were they communicating to other 
people?   
I therefore decided to take a discursive approach to climate change. We can 
understand how meaning (discourse) is constructed by looking carefully at the way 
language is used (discourse analysis). We can understand how and why particular 
approaches to climate change are dominant by analysing everyday communication 
about the problem. The project would not be a Foucauldian analysis of climate 
change, but it would draw on particular aspects of Foucault’s work as well as the 
work of other discursive theorists. 
This approach could potentially incorporate my interest in the value-action 
gap, individual behaviour change and neoliberal environmentalism. First, I could 
study neoliberal environmentalism from a discursive perspective. I could look at 
different perspectives on neoliberalism – ecological modernisation, privatisation, 
justice and consider how these ideas were being used in everyday language. Why are 
some discourses dominant when others were not? Second, I could study individual 
behaviour as a construction of these dominant discourses. How did dominant climate 
discourses construct ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ behaviour? The project would 
not consider how we should deal with climate change. Rather, it would investigate 
how we do deal with climate change and why this is the case. Finally, this could 
potentially provide some insight into the value-action gap. Is the value-action gap a 
result of dominant discourses and the construction of ‘appropriate’ and 
‘inappropriate’ behaviour? The combination of these three areas in a discursive 
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project might act as a first step towards a fuller understanding of the problem of 
climate change.   
 
1.4   The Context for the Project 
A discursive approach involves the analysis of language and communication. 
It was important to find a context where climate change was being discussed on a 
daily basis and where the individuals who talk about climate change appear and act as 
‘knowing subjects’ (Foucault 1984b, p.59). Climate change is a topic of discussion in 
many different areas of society and there was already some discursive research in the 
context of climate change and local policy (Lindseth 2004; Slocum 2004a) and 
climate change and the media (Boykoff 2008; Olaussen 2009). There was also a very 
limited amount of discursive research in the context of climate change and business 
(Livesey 2002; Joutsenvirta 2009). Given the prominence of neoliberalism in the 
project, I decided that business would be a very relevant context for analysis. 
Business is the institution at the heart of the neoliberal project and, as such, it has 
played a prominent role in the development of neoliberal environmental governance. 
Many businesses have made an effort to implement climate-protecting production 
processes and/or invest in environmental products and services (Rhee and Lee 2003; 
Hoffman 2005; Jeswani et al 2008). Large corporations have also played an 
increasingly important role in international climate negotiations (Paterson 2001b; 
Bernhagen 2008). 
In addition, businesses have begun to focus on the internal promotion of 
action on climate change and many large corporations, including Aviva, Coca Cola, 
EDF Energy, Tesco and Virgin, have introduced so-called ‘climate champion’ 
schemes. A ‘climate champion’ is an employee who is given responsibility for 
promoting climate protecting behaviour in the workplace. Champions are provided 
with training on the science of climate change and communication techniques and are 
then expected to promote behaviour change amongst their colleagues. The role is 
voluntary and the schemes are designed to establish a network of individuals to lead 
on environmental initiatives throughout the business. Ideally, these designated 
individuals are strategically located across the company and it is expected that their 
collective effort will help to reduce the overall greenhouse gas emissions of the 
organisation and promote climate-friendly behaviour among employees. 
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 The climate champion scheme appeared to be a very appropriate context for 
the research. Climate champions were individuals who had knowledge about climate 
change and were discussing the issue on a daily basis. By analysing how they 
communicated with their colleagues I could identify the discourses that they were 
drawing on and how these were being reproduced in everyday interactions. Moreover, 
business was a very interesting context for discursive analysis of climate change. If 
we can find resistance to dominant neoliberal discourses at the heart of neoliberalism 
then we might assume that resistance is possible in other contexts. Finally, it appeared 
that this kind of scheme was becoming increasingly popular. I found evidence of a 
climate champion project or something very similar in over 50 businesses across the 
UK. Given their increasing numbers and presumably pro-environmental point of 
view, I felt that gaining access to the champions would be relatively straightforward. 
 
1.5   Research Questions 
On the basis of my approach and the context of the analysis I identified four 
main research objectives for the project: (i) to identify the climate discourses that 
were being used in everyday communication (ii) to understand how dominant climate 
discourses constructed ‘appropriate’/’inappropriate’ ways to talk and think about 
climate change (iii) to analyse how dominant discourses were reproduced and 
reinforced in everyday interactions (iv) to identify possible resistance to dominant 
discourse and analyse how this operated at sites of interaction. 
 
Identifying Climate Discourses 
The first research objective focuses on the different climate discourses that 
were being used by the champions. What discourses did the champions draw upon 
when they talked about climate change as a problem and promoted behaviour change 
in the workplace? Did they draw on different discourses depending on the situation 
and the audience? 
 
Understanding the Discursive Construction of Motivation and Behaviour 
The second research objective focuses on ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ 
ways to talk and think about motivation and behaviour in relation to climate change. 
What kind of motivations did the champions use to encourage behaviour change and 
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what kind of actions did they promote? How were ‘appropriate’ motivations and 
actions constructed by dominant climate discourses? 
 
Analysing the Reproduction of Dominant Discourses 
The third research objective focuses on the reproduction of dominant climate 
discourses. Did the champions act as a ‘passive subject’ by reinforcing dominant 
discourses and how did they do this on a daily basis? Did the reinforcement of 
dominant discourses vary according to context? 
 
Identifying Resistance to Dominant Discourses  
The final research objective focuses on resistance to dominant climate 
discourses. Did the champions have a capacity for resistance as ‘active agents’ and 
did they actually challenge the dominant discourses? If so, how did resistance operate 
at different sites of interaction? 
 
1.6   Chapter Outline 
I have divided my argument into eight chapters. In chapter two I will begin by 
elaborating on the theoretical approach that I introduced in section 1.3.3. I will 
outline a discursive approach to climate change and consider why this approach is 
appropriate for the project. I will discuss the general features of a discursive approach 
and the difference between descriptive and critical discourse analysis. I will then 
consider some of the strengths and weaknesses that might be associated with a 
discursive approach in the context of an issue like climate change. These include the 
constructivist underpinnings of discourse analysis, the analysis of politics at the 
‘micro level’ and the problems associated with agency and prescription. I will argue 
that critical discourse analysis is necessary when researching a social phenomenon 
like climate change. The final part of the chapter will then consider a discursive 
approach in the context of my own project. I will discuss the previous literature that 
has used a discursive approach in related contexts: business and climate change; 
individual behaviour change; and the study of climate champions. I will explain how 
my project will build upon work that has already been done. 
In chapter three I will further develop the theoretical framework of the project 
by providing an account of how we should distinguish different climate discourses. I 
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will begin by considering how we might go about analysing discourse. What do we 
actually look at in order to identify different climate discourses? Drawing on the work 
of Dryzek (1997), I will outline six fundamental components that we can identify as 
constituting any discourse of climate change. For example, I will argue that each 
climate discourse is based on a particular account of human nature and a particular set 
of key values. I will then use this ‘six component’ framework to analyse the discourse 
of neoliberalism. I will argue that neoliberalism has a significant influence on the 
ways in which we deal with climate change and therefore plays an important role in 
all climate discourses. The chapter will then distinguish different discourses of 
climate change. The main focus of the thesis is the different ways of actually dealing 
with climate change based on the distinction between climate change as a small 
‘glitch’ in the neoliberal system and climate change as a fundamental problem. The 
main part of this chapter identifies seven climate discourses that are rooted in this 
distinction. The discourses either conform to the principles of neoliberalism 
(reformist discourses) or reject neoliberal ideas (revolutionary discourses). 
Chapter four will then outline the methodology of the project. I will discuss 
the research process, including how I selected a sample of businesses, the process of 
conducting the interviews, and how I analysed the data. I will also discuss the issues 
of ethics, reliability, validity and generalisability that I faced during the project. 
Finally, I will consider my own role as a researcher and the effect that this may have 
had on the project. Given the normative origins of my research, I was conscious of 
my own potential bias as a self-professed environmentalist and someone who wanted 
to find a ‘better’ way to deal with climate change. I will explain how I dealt with 
these issues and attempted to reduce any influence that my own position might have 
had on the project. 
In chapter five I will begin the empirical analysis. I will consider the role of 
the climate champions in terms of their training, their knowledge and how they 
constructed the problem of climate change. I will argue that most of the champions 
had a good general grasp of the science of climate change and that they drew on 
scientific discourses when they talked about the problem. The majority of the 
champions rejected discourses of scepticism and pessimism. They believed that 
climate change was happening and that we could do something to tackle the problem. 
Moreover, based on scientific facts, many of the champions constructed climate 
change as objectively ‘true’. However, climate change was frequently constructed as 
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a small ‘glitch’ in the neoliberal system rather than a fundamental problem. I will 
argue that this construction of the problem might suggest the prevalence of reformist 
discourses when the champions encouraged climate-protecting behaviour. The 
chapter will also consider how the champions talked about the limitations of their 
role. How should they translate their knowledge and ideas to other people and what 
were the limits of their actions? I will argue the champions’ perception of their role 
was heavily influenced by the neoliberal conception of individual sovereignty and 
rights. Champions who had claimed that climate science was objective were reluctant 
to challenge other people’s beliefs. Climate protecting behaviour had to be 
communicated in a way that did not interfere with the individual’s right to choose. 
This again indicates the dominance of reformist discourses and suggests a limited 
capacity for resistance. 
Chapters six and seven will focus on the promotion of behaviour change. Both 
of these chapters will identify climate discourses and analyse how different 
discourses were reinforced or resisted by the champions. Chapter six will analyse 
motivations for changing behaviour. I will argue that most of the champions talked 
about monetary gains and self-interest when they tried to encourage behaviour change 
in other people. Several champions did talk about ‘doing the right thing’ and a 
concern for the climate itself, but these were often constructed as secondary 
considerations. I will then outline the champions’ own motivations for getting 
involved in the scheme and engaging in climate protecting behaviour. When the 
champions talked about their own motivations they referred to justice, future 
generations and a concern for the natural world. However, they did not feel that these 
were ‘appropriate’ motivations to use with other people. Chapter six will also 
consider barriers to climate protecting behaviour. I will argue that most of the barriers 
that people talked about were rooted in a dominant neoliberal discourse. 
In the second half of chapter six I will look at the reproduction and resistance 
of dominant discourses. I will argue that many of the champions reinforced dominant 
ideas simply by using these to promote behaviour change. Many of them drew on 
revolutionary motivations when they talked about themselves, but they did not 
communicate them to other people and they often constructed them as ‘silly’ or 
‘clichéd’. This further reinforced dominant reformist discourses as the ‘appropriate’ 
way to talk about climate change. Finally, the champions also reinforced dominant 
discourses by responding to neoliberal barriers with reformist solutions. However, 
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there was some evidence of resistance. The fact that the champions did acknowledge 
more revolutionary motivations indicates resistance to dominant ways of thinking. In 
addition, many of them did identify problems with the neoliberal approach and the 
fact that this was perhaps not the ‘best’ way to approach the problem. Resistance did 
occur, but this was very limited. 
Chapter seven will consider the actual actions that were being encouraged by 
the champions. I will identify ‘appropriate’ actions in the workplace and the 
discourses that the champions drew upon when they talked about these actions. I will 
argue that the most ‘appropriate’ actions were small, straightforward and did not take 
up a lot of time (e.g., recycling, switching off monitors). The champions were 
therefore reluctant to encourage fundamental changes to the way people lived. 
Moving to an alternative lifestyle was often considered a step ‘backwards’ in terms of 
commonly accepted notions of ‘progress’. The champions were willing to engage in 
some actions that were a little out of the ordinary, but they were often reluctant to 
promote these actions to other people. Chapter seven will also consider the role of the 
state, business and ‘the people’ in the context of action on climate change. I will 
argue that many participants expected the government to facilitate behaviour change 
through recycling facilities and a strong infrastructure for public transport. Some 
champions also talked about the importance of enforced action on climate change. 
However, this idea was not widely supported. Finally, the champions talked about the 
importance of collective action. Again, however, this was constructed in a particular 
way. We should all work together to tackle climate change, but the construction of 
‘working together’ involved everyone performing individual actions such as recycling 
or using public transport. It did not involve campaigning as a collective force. 
In the second half of chapter seven I will discuss the reinforcement and 
resistance of dominant discourses. I will argue that the champions reinforced 
dominant discourses in several ways. First, they constructed environmental concern 
as a little out of the ordinary. They considered themselves to be environmental, but 
they rejected a revolutionary version of environmentalism, which involved being an 
‘activist’ or a ‘saint’. Second, when they talked about success they referred to small, 
reformist changes. They rejected the idea of fundamental change. The champions did 
engage in a little resistance by talking about the possibility of change and challenging 
mind-sets. However, often this ‘change’ was from pure neoliberalism to reformist 
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accounts of climate change. It was not revolutionary change. In the context of action, 
resistance was again very limited. 
Finally, chapter eight will provide a conclusion to the thesis. I will begin by 
considering the four research questions that were introduced in section 1.5. In answer 
to the first two research questions I will argue that, overall, neoliberal and reformist 
discourses were dominant and that this had a significant effect on the construction of 
‘appropriate’ ways to talk and think about climate change. Specifically, I will return 
to the seven climate discourses that I outlined in chapter three and discuss how each 
of these was used by the champions in their everyday language. I will then consider 
the role of the champions as ‘passive subjects’ or ‘active agents’. In answer to the 
second two research questions I will argue that, in general, the champions did act as 
‘passive subjects’ and reinforce dominant climate discourses. There was some 
capacity for a more subversive role, but this was often limited to particular sites of 
interaction. I will finish the chapter with some final research considerations. I will 
evaluate the success of a discursive approach and discuss some methodological 
improvements that might have strengthened my overall analysis. I will end with some 
ideas for further research and a brief discussion of the normative implications of the 
project.  
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Chapter 2 
A Discursive Approach to Climate Change 
 
The problem of climate change can be studied in two main ways. We can take 
a normative approach: how should things be? Or we can take an empirical approach: 
how do things work? This project focuses on climate change as an empirical problem. 
Why do so many people profess concern about climate change, but then not act in 
climate-protecting ways? Why are neoliberal ideas so prevalent in modern society? 
What effect does this have on the governance of an issue like climate change? 
Specifically, the project takes a discursive approach to climate change. It argues that 
there are lots of different ways of thinking and talking about climate change as a 
social phenomenon. Ideas about climate change are constructed and reinforced on a 
daily basis through the communication of individuals. These discourses of climate 
change then play an important role in the construction of ‘appropriate’ language and 
behaviour. The thesis aims to investigate how people talk about climate change and 
how this language constructs ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ responses to the 
problem. It also focuses on the reproduction or subversion of dominant discourses. 
In this chapter I will outline the foundations of a discursive approach to 
climate change and the way in which it will be used in the project. In section 2.1 I 
will discuss the general features of a discursive approach and distinguish between 
descriptive and critical discourse analysis. In section 2.2 I will consider a discursive 
approach to climate change. I will explain how the features of a discursive approach 
(as outlined in 2.1) are useful in the context of climate change. I will discuss the 
constructivist underpinnings of discourse analysis, the analysis of politics at the 
‘micro level’ and the problems associated with agency and prescription. Throughout 
the section I will look at the strengths and weaknesses of this kind of approach. 
Finally, in section 2.3 I will consider a discursive approach in the context of my own 
project. I will discuss the importance of business, individual behaviour change and 
climate champions and I will explain how my research relates to and builds upon 
previous discursive work in the area of climate change. 
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2.1   A Discursive Approach 
A discursive approach or ‘discourse analysis’ has been widely used in a 
number of academic disciplines. It advocates analysis at the micro level, investigating 
the construction of meaning through language and interaction. For proponents of a 
discursive approach, this level of understanding is a pre-condition for effective 
research. If we can understand how meaning is formed and reinforced in everyday 
interaction we can produce a more comprehensive account of the social world. 
This section will outline the role of a discursive approach in qualitative 
research. In section 2.1.1 I will consider the features that are fundamental to all types 
of discourse analysis, including the theoretical assumptions and the level of analysis. 
In the two sections that follow I will outline two types of discourse analysis: 
descriptive (section 2.1.2) and critical (section 2.1.3). The project will employ critical 
discourse analysis to investigate the problem of climate change, but it is important to 
be clear about the distinction between the approaches. 
 
2.1.1   Features of a Discursive Approach 
There are three features that are common to all types of discourse analysis. 
First, a discursive approach is based on a constructivist understanding of the world. It 
disputes any contention that we can discover the ‘true’ nature of social phenomena. 
Instead, a discursive approach contends that the social world is constructed through 
language and the production of meaning over time. Green (2002) describes 
constructivism as ‘the idea that most socio-political phenomena are constructed 
through human social interaction and the resultant shared understandings of their 
value and meaning, as opposed to being naturally occurring’ (pp.5-6). Discourse 
analysis is a constructivist approach which focuses specifically on language as the 
means through which shared understanding is established. 
Social constructivism moves away from positivism and ‘factual statements 
about the world that can be tested and proven to be true or false’ (Pettenger 2007, 
p.2). It proposes that the answers to social problems and indeed the problems 
themselves are relative to the context in which they are situated. Thus, ‘all forms of 
knowledge are historically relative’ (Downing 2008, p.vii). A discursive approach 
questions the foundations of our knowledge and contests the idea that we can know 
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the ‘truth’ about something. The approach seeks to understand how things become 
accepted as true or false. 
The second feature of a discursive approach is that it analyses the construction 
of reality through language or ‘discourse’, making the general assumption that 
language is constitutive of reality. Reality is socially constructed, but more 
specifically it is constructed through our use of discourse in everyday interaction. 
Language is not a ‘neutral means of reflecting or describing the world’ (Gill 1996, 
p.141). Rather, language plays a role in constructing a particular version of reality as 
‘true’ or ‘correct’. When we study a research problem we must consider how it has 
been constructed through the ‘talk and text’ that are used to describe it (Wetherell et 
al 2001, p.i). At the most basic level, a discourse is ‘a shared way of apprehending 
the world’ which is ‘embedded in language’ (Dryzek 1997, p.8) and discourse 
analysis is ‘the close study of language in use’ (Taylor 2001, p.6). Thus, by looking 
carefully at the way language is used (discourse analysis) we can understand how 
meaning (discourse) is constructed.  
Finally, to investigate the social construction of the world through language, a 
discursive approach encourages analysis at the micro level. It contends that the 
interactions between individuals are a vital area for analysis. This is the site where 
ideas and beliefs are formed and translated. If discourse is ‘an ensemble of ideas, 
concepts and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical 
phenomena’, then it is important to study the sites at which these ideas, concepts and 
categories are put together (Hajer and Versteeg 2005, p.175). Pettenger and Cass 
(2007) claim that the micro level is where ‘politics, economics and science gain value 
and meaning’ (p.244). It is through their everyday interactions and language that 
people make sense of the world and the phenomena that they encounter. If we wish to 
make sense of the world then we must study the site where meaning and sense is 
constructed. 
 
2.1.2   Descriptive Discourse Analysis 
At the most basic level ‘discourse’ is simply a specific group of words 
forming some kind of meaning. Fairclough (1985) claims that when we analyse 
‘discourse’ by this definition we are engaging in ‘basic, non-explanatory’ discourse 
analysis, the goal of which is to ‘describe without explaining’ (p.753). This form of 
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analysis may, for example, highlight the fact that a speaker consistently uses indirect 
forms of request (Fairclough 1985, p.753). It will not seek to investigate why this is 
the case or acquire any further information about the situation. According to Haggett 
and Toke (2006) this approach is often used in social psychology. There is ‘no 
presumption about the nature of social relations...focus remains on form, structure 
and function of language in each instance’ (p.113). 
A local explanatory approach would attempt to go beyond this basic analysis 
by looking at the immediate context of the situation (Fairclough 1985). It may 
acknowledge the age, gender or relationship of the people that are engaged in an 
exchange and the influence that these factors have on their interaction. For example, 
if a person consistently uses deferential language, a local explanatory approach may 
consider the contextual factors of the exchange to determine why this might be the 
case. In this example, deferential language might occur in an exchange between a 
young person and an older person. This approach offers a more sophisticated analysis 
than the descriptive approach, but it remains in the territory of linguistics. 
 
2.1.3   Critical Discourse Analysis 
Critical discourse analysis offers a more in-depth approach. It shares the three 
fundamental components of all discursive approaches. Its theory of knowledge is 
rooted in constructivism, it analyses language as constitutive rather than neutral and it 
focuses on the micro level as the sphere of analysis. However, it goes beyond 
linguistics and description by situating discourse in a wider social setting. The focus 
is on the social situation and how this can be understood through discourse (Haggett 
and Toke 2006, p.113). Critical discourse analysis does not simply investigate how a 
specific ensemble of words creates a specific meaning or set of meanings. Rather, it 
challenges the foundations of our knowledge and questions the power that is implicit 
in the establishment of what is ‘true’ and ‘natural’. It is critical because it is not only 
concerned with how meaning is constructed, but also why one particular meaning 
may feel ‘natural’ when others do not. How does discourse operate to construct 
‘truth’ at the societal level? What role does power play in this process? 
For critical discourse analysis, ‘discourse’ is more than just words and specific 
meaning; it is the rules that underlie meaning and how it can be constructed. A 
discourse is embedded in social relations and is instrumental in constructing 
 26 
 
knowledge that people believe to be ‘true’ and the actions that they understand as 
‘appropriate’. All forms of discourse present reality in a specific way depending on 
the words, ideas and concepts that are employed in speaking. However, for critical 
theorists, the discursive process is more complicated than this. It is not simply a case 
of presenting any version of reality by choosing from an infinite range of ideas, 
concepts and categories. Rather, discourse limits the options that are available to 
construct ideas. Discourse is ‘the unwritten rules and structures which produce 
particular utterances’ (Mills 2003, p.54). It is not just any combination of words to 
produce any arbitrary meaning; it is the rules which dictate what can and cannot be 
said. For critical theorists, ‘discourse’ is imbued with power. It is through the 
successful exercise of power that particular discourses become ‘true’ and specific 
words and actions become ‘appropriate’. Knowledge and power are therefore 
inextricably linked: 
 
By picking out what to emphasise and what to present positively or negatively, knowledge shapes the 
world it describes. Knowledge is linked to power not as a result of some perversion of its true function 
or essence... but as the unavoidable result of its own activity (Ransom 1997, p.19). 
 
Through the communication of a piece of knowledge, power is being exerted on the 
receiver of knowledge through the very act of knowledge giving. It controls them in 
as much as what they are being told is portrayed as ‘true’ and this affects the way 
they see the world. The very exercise of transferring knowledge is imbued with 
power relations. 
Hall (2001) argues that ‘power relations permeate all levels of social 
existence’ (p.77). As the fundamental component of politics, power exists, quite 
explicitly, at the international level and in the relations between the state and its 
citizens. However, power is also prevalent in the relations between individuals. Given 
the constructivist nature of the world, ‘meaning’ and ‘truth’ are invariably subject to 
contestation. Power is therefore exerted through the production of knowledge and 
meaning. We see ‘politics as a struggle for discursive hegemony in which actors try 
to secure support for their definition of reality’ (Hajer 1995, p.59). Successful power 
relations stem from the establishment of a particular version of reality as ‘true’. 
Carabine (2001) claims that, ‘some discourses are more powerful than others and 
have more authority or validity... dominant discourses tell us the “truth”’ (p.275).  
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Critical discourse analysis is interested in this process. How do things become 
established as true? Why do some discourses become dominant? Fairclough (2001) 
claims that critical discourse analysis ‘aims to show non-obvious ways in which 
language is involved in social relations of power and domination and in ideology’ 
(p.229). This kind of exploratory endeavour is evident in the work of other important 
critical theorists, not least Michel Foucault. Foucault aimed to ‘circumvent the 
anthropological universals in order to examine them as historical constructs’ 
(Florence 2003, p.3). He was interested in how things came to be the way they are 
(Ransom 1997, p.2). There are differences between the specific works of critical 
theorists, but this underlying interest in power and the construction of knowledge is 
common to them all. Critical theorists are interested in how ‘truth’ is established and 
how it is maintained. Indeed, van Dijk (2001) claims that, the main preoccupation of 
critical discourse analysis is ‘the role of discourse in the (re) production and challenge 
of dominance’ (p.300). 
For critical theorists the most useful way to explore these processes is to 
analyse interaction at the micro level. According to Rabinow and Rose (2003), 
Foucault did ‘fieldwork in philosophy’ (p.ix). He studied the everyday talk and text 
(the micro) in order to understand how ‘truth’ was created at the societal level (the 
macro). Foucault (1982) argued that ‘we have to refer to much more remote processes 
if we want to understand how we have been trapped in our own history’ (p.128). 
Critical discourse analysis contends that there is a reciprocal relationship between 
everyday communication or action and societal discourses. Critical theorists study 
‘micro events’ and ‘macro structures’ and see ‘the latter as both the conditions for 
and the products of the former’ (Fairclough 1985, pp.739-40). Everyday interaction 
(micro events) contributes to the reproduction of dominant societal discourses (macro 
structures). Conversely, dominant societal discourses limit the options available for 
communication at the micro level. Particular language and actions are ‘appropriate’ 
and therefore available for use because they are congruent with the dominant 
discourse, which tells us the ‘truth’ about what we should say and how we should act. 
Close analysis of the micro level can help us to understand how this process works. 
 
2.2   A Discursive Approach to Climate Change 
In the context of environmentalism, discourse analysis has already been 
widely used. Many studies have considered the general relationship between 
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discourse and the environment (Dryzek 1997; Darier 1999; Fischer and Hajer 1999; 
Harre et al 1999; Hajer and Versteeg 2005; Feindt and Oels 2005). Others have 
focused on a specific environmental or policy issue. These have included 
environmental problems, such as ozone depletion (Liftin 1994) and flooding 
(Penning-Roswell et al 2006), as well as policy issues, such as planning (Sharp and 
Richardson 2001) and local government legislation (Garrison and Massum 2001). 
Work has also considered environmental discourse in the media (Rydin and 
Pennington 2001; Peterson 2007) and critical discourse analysis of eco-tourism 
(Stamou and Paraskevopoulos 2004). 
The discursive work on climate change is less extensive but growing. Studies 
have considered discourse in climate policy (Lindseth 2004; Slocum 2004a; 
Backstrand and Lovbrand 2006; Fletcher 2009; Methmann 2010) and climate 
discourses in the media (Weingart et al 2000; Carvalho 2007; Boykoff 2008; Doulton 
and Brown 2009; Olausson 2009).  In this section I will conduct a critical literature 
review of current discursive work in the area of climate change and address the 
potential strengths and weaknesses of this work. In section 2.2.1, I will consider two 
important criticisms of the relationship between constructivism and climate change. I 
will argue that constructivism is indeed a useful approach to the problem of climate 
change. In section 2.2.2, I will look at the importance of analysing climate change at 
the micro level and in section 2.2.3 I will discuss the work that has already been done 
in this area. Section 2.2.4, will then consider the distinction between descriptive and 
critical analysis and the importance of critical discourse analysis as an approach to 
climate politics. Finally, section 2.2.5, will discuss the role of agency in discourse 
analysis and the prescriptive potential of an empirical project. 
Given the similarity in themes and approaches, the section will also draw on 
discursive work on the environment more generally, where applicable. 
 
2.2.1   Social Constructivism and Climate Change 
All discursive approaches assume a constructivist understanding of the social 
world. This has implications for the applicability of the approach to political 
problems. It has particularly important implications for a political issue like climate 
change. In this section I will consider two potential weaknesses of the approach. First, 
it is argued that constructivism is unhelpful because an approach based on relativism 
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cannot provide definitive solutions. If there is no ‘correct’ way to deal with a social 
problem, then what is the point in researching it? Second, for some people, a 
constructivist approach to knowledge also implies the absence of an objective reality. 
If nothing exists, then it does not make sense to talk about approaches to climate 
change at all. I will respond to both of these criticisms and argue that a constructivist 
approach can be applied to the issue of climate change and can provide some 
important insights into the problem. 
Traditionally, political research has taken a positivist stance: 
 
The political science discipline has consistently aspired to be [such a] scientific community, seeking 
knowledge that is not merely the functionally rational stuff of organized life but the objectively true 
data that facilitates substantive reasoning’ (Ricci 1984, p.17).   
 
The contention of political science was that there was a ‘truth’ to be discovered. The 
social world could be studied in a similar way to the natural world and the role of the 
political scientist was to find an objective way of arriving at definitive conclusions 
about political and social problems (Weisberg 2007). As such, the problem of 
inaction on climate change has been investigated through a number of positivist 
approaches. 
International Relations (IR) scholars have considered the problems inherent in 
international climate negotiations, including procedural issues (Christoff 2010; 
Dimitrov 2010), lack of enforcement (Barrett 2009) and a weak institutional backdrop 
(Haas 2008)
4. At the national level, researchers have cited problems such as ‘short-
termism’ (Carter 2008) and the limited power of governments in the global economy 
(Hale 2010). In addition, social scientists, economists and psychologists have sought 
to understand why individuals do not engage in climate protecting behaviour despite 
professions of concern (Kollmus and Agyeman 2002; Lorenzoni and Pigeon 2006; 
Patchen 2010). This work is all based on the assumption that there is an objective 
reality which can be investigated through the use of positivist tools of analysis. 
Patchen (2010), for example, provides a survey of existing research of people’s 
attitudes towards climate change. The conclusion to his article lists many factors 
which influence the behaviour of individuals and the measures that must be taken to 
                                                          
4
 Haas (2008) notes that the UNFCCC has ‘only 12 senior staff...with a large number of consultants 
and other staff. It has a modest budget of US$ 26 million per year’ and it has ‘few synergies or 
horizontal linkages’ to other international regimes (p.3).  
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remedy these problems. Thus, the identification of definitive problems enables the 
development of authoritative solutions. 
A constructivist approach to climate change challenges the positivist 
assumptions of the aforementioned research. For discursive theorists it is not possible 
to find definitive solutions to political problems because ‘solutions’, and indeed the 
problems themselves, are socially constructed. Discourse analysis centres on the 
‘conviction of the central importance of discourse in constructing social life’ (Gill 
1996, p.141). Rather than looking for particular problems inherent in climate 
negotiations or barriers to individual action, a discursive approach questions the way 
in which climate change is constructed: 
 
Constructivism allows us to view climate change from a new perspective with the hope of uncovering 
processes, actors and structures that have been obscured in the current framing of climate change... 
what is it that we truly know about climate change, and how have we come to know this?  (Pettenger 
2007, p.7). 
 
The main problem with this approach is that it still leaves us with many unanswered 
questions. It cannot offer an objective solution to the problem of climate change in 
the same systematic way positivists might claim to be able to do. However, it does 
remain a useful way to approach the problem of climate change. Despite the positivist 
research that has been conducted on climate change as a political problem, we have 
made little progress towards decreasing or even stabilising carbon emissions. A 
discursive approach suggests that there is perhaps something deeper going on here. 
Hajer (1995) claims that ‘social constructivism and discourse analysis add essential 
insights to our analysis of contemporary environmental problems’ (p.3). By looking 
at the construction of climate change we can question the knowledge that we 
currently have about causes, consequences and solutions. Constructivism can ‘lead us 
to understand how certain meanings have emerged and been framed, while others 
have been obscured’ (Pettenger 2007, p.11). 
Another potential problem with a constructivist approach to climate change is 
that, for some people, constructivism implies the rejection of an objective reality. The 
epistemological position of constructivism (that knowledge is relative) leads to the 
ontological assumption that nothing exists. According to Jones (2002) ‘it is frequently 
assumed that there is an inherent incompatibility between social constructionism and 
environmental concern’ (p.247). This concern has been expressed by a number of 
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scholars. Milton (1996) states: 
 
If the environment were nothing more than a cognitive construct, we could change it by constructing 
different truths, different meanings; we could will environmental dangers out of existence by thought 
alone. Thus, the constructivist model is incompatible with environmental activism, which depends on 
the recognition of an independent reality that can be modified by human actions (p.54).  
 
The fundamental assumption about the problem of climate change is that we are 
modifying independent physical processes. If constructivism does not recognise this 
independent reality then it does not make any sense to talk about a constructivist 
approach to climate change. 
Feindt and Oels (2005) acknowledge this problem and respond to the 
criticism: 
 
Saying that environmental problems are socially constructed does not mean that there are no illnesses, 
malnutrition, loss of species and natural beauty, floods etc. caused by contaminated water and polluted 
air, by drought, logging or a rising ocean level. Instead, it means that there is not one authoritative 
interpretation of these events but multiple contested interpretations (p.162).  
 
A discursive approach does not deny reality. Rather, it argues that the description of 
physical processes is interpretive. Archer et al (1998) assert that ‘science is a social 
product, but the mechanisms it identifies operate prior to and independently of their 
discovery’ (p.xii). Events can occur independently of human interaction with them. 
However, these events are only comprehensible to us through our interpretation of 
them. Wynne (2002) argues that, ‘physical reality still courses through these 
contending and overtly less determinate representations and meanings’ (p.462). A 
discursive approach simply asserts that there can be no one ‘authoritative 
interpretation’ of these processes. Thus, in the context of climate change we adopt ‘an 
ontologically realist yet epistemologically relativist position’ (Jones 2002, p.250). 
These arguments support the critical realist perspective that I adopted at the 
beginning of the thesis. We can take climate change to be an independently ‘real’ 
problem, but then study the construction of climate change as a social phenomenon. 
These latter criticisms about the reality of climate change itself do reinforce 
the earlier weaknesses associated with a discursive approach to political problems. It 
becomes even more difficult to pinpoint a ‘solution’ to the problem. Wynne (2002) 
concedes that ‘to question the existing realist representation of scientific framings of 
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climate change prediction does undermine the realist basis which tells us what should 
be done’ (p.461). However, the contention of discursive theorists is that the 
construction of the problem itself may tell us why certain ‘solutions’ have not worked 
and particular ‘problems’ have appeared entrenched. 
Hence, when we study climate change in this way we acknowledge the 
physical processes, but we focus our analysis on the construction of our knowledge 
about them and the behaviour that follows from this. A constructivist approach to 
climate change allows us to question our own assumptions about the subject and think 
more deeply about the related knowledge and behaviour that we have, thus far, taken 
for granted.  
 
2.2.2   The ‘Micro’ Politics of Climate Change 
A discursive approach to climate change analyses the problem at the ‘micro’ 
level of politics. It argues that politics exists in the contestation of meaning and 
‘truth’ in the everyday communication of individuals. Traditionally, political research 
on climate change has focused on the state as the key actor in climate negotiations 
and policy enforcement. Much has been written about global climate conferences 
(Paterson 2001a; Soroos 2003; Christoff 2010; Dimitrov 2010) and the failure of 
national governments to implement reduction targets (Hulme and Turnpenny 2004; 
Pielke 2009). The role of local government has become increasingly important as a 
subject of research (Hunt 2004; Bulkeley and Betsill 2005). There has also been some 
research into the role of individuals in climate policy. For example, Moser (2006) 
talks about local climate initiatives and argues that ‘none of the mitigation and 
adaptation efforts can succeed without engaging urban residents to support the 
development or realization of such policies’ (p.1). Similarly, Engel and Orbach 
(2008) consider the different reasons for which individuals might support local or 
national climate change policy. 
A discursive perspective does not deny the importance of studying 
international and national climate politics or the relationship between individuals and 
climate policy. However, it contends that all levels of politics can be analysed as 
discursive constructions at the micro level. The Kyoto Protocol was signed on behalf 
of nations but by individuals. It is a group of individuals who attend international 
climate meetings and discuss climate policy and commitments. It is individuals who 
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are asked to change their everyday practices and be more climate friendly. We should 
analyse the everyday communication of climate change because power is inevitably 
exercised through the transfer of ideas: 
 
‘Politics’ here are considered as the management and contestation of policies through social relations 
infused with power, authority and varying perspectives... ‘politics’ involve proposals, ideas, intentions, 
decisions and behaviours with a focus on processes that prop up, challenge, lurk behind, support and 
resist explicit actions (Boykoff et al 2010, p.3). 
 
This kind of power exists in all interactions, whether it is a conversation between two 
heads of state or between two climate champions. Of course, these two situations are 
not the same. An interaction between two climate champions is not subject to the 
same influences and constraints as a conversation between two heads of state. 
However, both of these situations are examples of ‘everyday communication’ in the 
sense that we are analysing an interaction between two specific individuals. In both 
cases we can learn about the transfer of ideas through a close analysis of the language 
that is used and the ideas that are generated. The context of the conversation may be 
different, but the purpose of the analysis is the same. Chilton (2002) argues that, ‘the 
doing of politics is predominantly constituted in language’ (p.3). The construction of 
knowledge and solutions to climate change at all levels of politics is fundamentally 
based on the interaction between individuals and the power struggle over meaning 
and ‘correct’ ideas. If we wish to understand where our knowledge has come from 
and why it is considered common sense we must focus our analysis at the micro level 
of politics. 
 
2.2.3   Discursive Work on Climate Change 
A discursive approach to climate change has been used in a number of 
different areas. One area that has proven particularly popular for this kind of analysis 
is the media. For example, Olaussen (2009) considers media framing of responsibility 
and collective action in the context of climate change. Among other points, he notes 
the ‘numerous similarities between media and international policy discourse on the 
issue of climate change’ (p.432). Doulton and Brown (2009), on the other hand, 
identify discourses of climate change and international development. They categorise 
eight different discourses in this area and compare their basic components. Both of 
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these studies use discourse analysis to investigate how climate change is constructed 
in the media.  
Using the media for discursive research on climate change is useful for several 
reasons. In the modern world, it cannot be denied that the media exerts a great deal of 
influence on many political issues. For example, Herkman (2010) states: ‘there is a 
broad consensus about the inherent connection between today’s parliamentary politics 
and the media’ (p.701). This kind of influence is particularly important in the case of 
an issue like climate change. Doulton and Brown (2009) claim that the media is a 
‘critical arena’ for climate change debate and that ‘what is written in the media 
influences public perceptions and thence policy: it matters’ (p.191). Similarly, 
Boykoff (2008) investigates climate discourse in the context of the media and argues 
that the media ‘significantly influence on-going public understanding of climate 
science and policy’ (p.550). A discursive approach is useful in this context because 
the discourses that are used in the media are influential in the establishment of 
dominant societal discourses. This is the material that people are exposed to on a 
daily basis. It is often where they find the ‘truth’ about the world. The media is also 
useful because the data is so readily available. It is a convenient context that offers an 
important perspective.  
However, there are also some important weaknesses associated with analysis 
of the media. McCombs and Reynolds (2002) investigate the selection process for the 
publication of newspaper articles. They contend that the stories that are chosen are 
frequently the ones which will grab the attention of a reader. They claim that the 
‘result is a limited view of the larger environment, something like the highly limited 
view of the outside world available through a small window’ (p.6). The selection of 
discourses is not only based on the reproduction and challenge of dominance; it is 
influenced by the need to sell newspapers. It could, of course, be argued that this in 
itself is an important consideration for discursive analysis. However, it introduces 
methodological problems for any project that carries out discursive climate research 
in this area. 
Discursive research on climate change has also focused on politics and policy 
at a number of different levels. Lindseth (2004) researches the Cities for Climate 
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Protection Campaign (CCPC)
5
 and takes a constructivist approach to investigate ‘how 
CCPC has constructed the local level as a relevant geographical space for climate 
protection’ (p.326). Slocum (2004a) conducts a similar analysis of the CCPC 
campaign, which focuses on the discursive construction of citizens in local climate 
policy. At the international level, Methmann (2010) investigates the mainstreaming of 
climate change in world politics. He argues that global institutions such as the World 
Bank and the IMF employ particular climate discourses in order to implement 
‘business as usual’ policy (p.369). Fletcher (2009) offers a similar discursive analysis 
at the national level, addressing the role of competing climate discourses in the 
construction of US climate policy. 
These political contexts all offer important perspectives on the climate change 
problem. Hajer and Versteeg (2005) argue that discourses ‘delimit the range of policy 
options and thereby serve as precursors to policy outcomes’ (p.178). Given the 
importance of discourse in the construction of policy, it is vitally important to apply a 
discursive approach to the policy context. This is the context in which decisions about 
climate change are debated and agreed. In sum, media and politics are important areas 
for analysis and have both been researched quite extensively. 
In addition to looking at the areas that have been researched it is also 
important to note the kind of material that is being analysed. Studies have looked at 
‘talk’ through methods such as interviews and participant observation and ‘text’ in 
published documents. For example, Lindseth (2004) and Slocum (2004a) both 
analyse the construction of climate discourse in local policy but they analyse different 
types of material. Lindseth (2004) analyses ‘strategic documents’ that have been 
published by the CCPC campaign (p.326). Slocum (2004a) interviews ‘heads of city 
departments and NGOs that would have some connection with climate change’ 
(p.768). Although, the approach and the area for analysis is the same, these two 
studies can provide different perspectives based on the actual material they are 
analysing. Weingart et al (2000) combines the two approaches because he analyses 
scientific publications, but also carries out ‘extensive interviews with leading German 
climate researchers’ (p.263). His research provides an analysis of climate discourse in 
both ‘text’ and ‘talk’. 
                                                          
5
 The CCPC campaign was a project born out of the International Council of Local Environmental 
Initiatives (ICLEI) which was set up in the 1990s. This global programme invited local councils to join 
together in tackling environmental issues at the local level. 
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2.2.4   Descriptive versus Critical Analysis on Climate Change 
The vast majority of discursive studies on climate change describe their 
methodology as ‘critical’ discourse analysis (CDA). For most of them the essential 
feature of CDA is that ‘texts are considered as they are situated in context’ (Boykoff 
2008, p.555). We could engage in descriptive analysis of a particular text on climate 
change, but this would provide a very limited account of the issue. For example, basic 
descriptive analysis might indicate the repetition of certain words or the frequent use 
of rhetorical devices. A local explanatory approach might consider factors such as the 
author of the document and their age or gender, but it would still concentrate solely 
on the linguistic attributes of the text. As a social issue, climate change is inevitably 
situated in context. We cannot investigate the construction of ideas about the issue 
without considering the social structures in which they are situated. In relation to 
climate change, ‘discourse is more than simply the use of language as a tool for 
communication. Discourse conveys subjectivity, knowledge and power’ (Pettenger 
2007, p.10). 
Critical discourse analysis identifies particular (climate) discourses and 
considers how these discourses are operating in society through the transfer of 
knowledge. For example Bond (2000) identifies environmental discourses in post-
apartheid South Africa. He then considers how these discourses are reinforced in 
society through the ‘growing hegemony of orthodox economic prescription’ (pp.59-
60). Similarly, Backstrand and Lovbrand (2006) identify three climate discourses in 
international policy. They advocate CDA as a ‘useful tool since it enables an analysis 
of the power relationships and conflicting knowledge claims underlying dominant 
narratives on how to manage the global threat of anthropogenic climate change’ 
(p.50). Slocum (2004a) does not explicitly refer to ‘critical discourse analysis’ but she 
does adopt a critical discursive approach. She talks about neoliberal discourse as a 
dominant ideology and analyses the reproduction of this discourse in interview data. 
She argues that neoliberalism is dominant and considers how it operates as a 
‘normalising regime’ (p.765). 
According to van Dijk (2001) the ‘critical presupposition of adequate critical 
discourse analysis is understanding the nature of social power and dominance’ 
(p.301). We must identify (climate) discourses and investigate how these discourses 
operate in society. How is ‘truth’ established and maintained? If a discursive 
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approach is going to be useful in the ways I have suggested in the preceding sections 
then it must necessarily be critical in nature. Descriptive accounts are valuable in 
many contexts, but they cannot reveal the role that dominant climate discourses play 
in the construction of ‘appropriate’ behaviour and they cannot explain the 
construction and maintenance of dominant discourses in society. 
 
2.2.5   Dealing with Climate Change 
So far, this section has attempted to critically analyse the current literature on 
discursive approaches to climate change. I have considered the strengths and 
weaknesses of social constructivism and micro analysis as part of a discursive 
approach to climate change and I have assessed the type of discourse analysis that has 
been carried out by other researchers. This final sub-section will deal with two issues 
which are important in the context of discursive politics in general, but even more 
pertinent to an issue like climate change: the role of agency and the limited 
prescriptive potential of discourse analysis. 
One of the most frequent criticisms of discourse analysis is the lack of 
attention it pays to agency. If discourses construct the language we can use and the 
actions we can carry out, are we simply slaves to discursive structures? This was a 
particular criticism of Foucault’s work. One of Foucault’s unchanging aims was to 
‘learn to what extent the effort to think one’s own history can free thought from what 
it silently thinks and so enable it to think differently’ (Ransom 1997, p.57). Despite 
this aim, critics contend that he did not leave much room for people to think 
differently. Lukes (2004) argues that Foucault takes away the autonomy of the 
subject. If power relations exist in all interactions how can there be any autonomy for 
individuals? He claims that, ‘Foucault undermines the rational, autonomous moral 
agent’ (p.92). This is a potential problem for climate change politics. If dominant 
climate discourses are operating through the construction of ‘appropriate’ language 
and behaviour, how can individuals change their behaviour? Can we challenge 
dominant climate discourses? 
For Foucault (1984a) resistance to dominant discourses was possible. He 
claims that, ‘in power relations there is necessarily the possibility of resistance 
because if there were no possibility of resistance, there would be no power relations 
at all’ (p.34). More specifically, Foucault distinguishes between power and 
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domination. Domination is the relationship between a master and slave where one 
agent forces another to act in a particular way. Relations of power only work if 
people are free and a relation of power is successful only when a free person acts in 
accordance with the dominant discourse (Foucault 1982, p.135). In their discursive 
account of climate change policy, Backstrand and Lovbrand (2006) specifically 
subscribe to a ‘notion of agency’ in discourse analysis. They argue that, ‘political 
power stems from the ability to articulate and set the terms of the discourse’ (p.52). 
Similarly, Slocum (2004a) notes the resistance inherent in climate discourse: 
‘Multiple publics bring different discourses to the fore through avenues other than the 
[Cities for Climate Protection] campaign that will interact with it, potentially 
changing the terms of political discourse in the process’ (p.779). 
Furthermore, the very fact that discourses are constructed indicates that they 
are not immutable; if they are constructed then they can be challenged. Carabine 
(2001) claims that ‘individuals are active agents and discourses are themselves in a 
state of constant reconstitution and contestation’ (p.279). Power relations work 
through us but we are simultaneously reproducing them; we are doing something 
active in this process. This leaves room for resistance and a challenge to the dominant 
discourse. A discursive approach is important because analysis at the micro level 
exposes how dominant discourses are reproduced. It is also likely to indicate signs of 
resistance and evidence of subversive discourses which challenge the established 
‘truths’ surrounding climate change. 
The other issue to be addressed is the prescriptive potential of a discursive 
project. If we accept a constructivist approach to the problem of climate change then 
how can we advocate any kind of solution to the problem? Jones (2002) asks, ‘if 
interests and power relations shape problem definitions, how can convincing cases be 
made for remedial action to prevent environmental problems’ (p.248)? Discursive 
analysis does not advocate a ‘better’ way to do things. The problem of climate change 
and any proposed solutions are social constructions and, as such, they are not ‘right’ 
or ‘wrong’; they are one interpretation of the issue. 
For some, this may be considered a fundamental flaw in the project. What is 
the point of studying discourses of climate change and analysing the reproduction and 
subversion of dominant discourses, if one does not conclude with a prescription for 
improvement? Discourse analysis cannot identify specific problems and suggest 
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potential responses in the same way as the positivist work of Hale (2010) or Patchen 
(2010) claims to do. 
Hajer and Versteeg (2005) claim that when it comes to an issue such as 
climate change, ‘the real contribution of this approach is not to be found in its 
prescriptive force, but in the ability to trace the discursive power struggles underlying 
environmental politics’ (p.181). The point is not to present a ‘better’ version of the 
world or to criticise the way the world is at the moment. Rather, the point is to 
challenge the assumption that this is the way the world has to be. By understanding 
the ‘power struggles’ in debates over climate change we can identify possible 
alternative paths through the history of environmentalism. This is the critical nature 
of the discursive project: 
 
A critique is not a matter of saying things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on 
what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the 
practices that we accept rest’ (Foucault 1981, p.155). 
 
The project is not a critique of dominant climate discourses. It is not engaged in the 
search for better ways to tackle the problem of climate change. It is a critical 
discursive project which seeks to analyse the prevalent discourses of climate change 
and expose these as social constructions. The point is to illustrate the reinforcing 
relationship between the politics of climate change in everyday life and societal 
climate discourses.  The analysis of these relationships addresses the question: how 
does this work? The contribution of a discursive approach lies in its ability to 
illustrate the many potential versions of the world. 
However, that is not to say that the conclusions of a discursive analysis could 
not be applied to a more normative project. A discursive analysis can only tell us how 
power relations operate and how dominant discourses maintain that status. However, 
in doing so, it does challenge the inevitability of dominance and indicates sites of 
resistance. This information could be usefully applied to challenge these forms of 
power. By nature, the conclusions of a discursive project cannot be prescriptive, but 
they can be used as the basis for further critical work with potentially normative 
conclusions. It may be that the project can provide the analytical basis for such a 
normative critique. 
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2.3   Business, Behaviour Change and Climate Champions 
In the remainder of the chapter I will outline my own project. The focus of the 
project is the communication of climate change in large corporations. I will be 
analysing the use of climate discourses in this context and the power relations 
inherent in everyday communication. The context of the project is the business sector 
with a specific focus on designated ‘climate champions’ (individuals who have taken 
on the responsibility of promoting climate protecting behaviour in the workplace). In 
this section I will address three important aspects of this context. In section 2.3.1, I 
will look at the role of business in climate change politics and as a forum for 
individual behaviour change. In section 2.3.2, I will consider the importance of 
individual behaviour change for an issue like climate change. I will argue that, 
although there is a great deal of literature on individual behaviour change, this has not 
been widely addressed through a critical discursive framework. Finally, in section 
2.3.3, I will outline the role of ‘climate champions’ in the research project and as 
agents of change in the context of climate change. The section will draw on my 
previous analysis of discursive work on climate change and indicate the originality 
and significance of this research project. 
 
2.3.1   Business and Climate Change 
The project will apply a discursive approach to climate change in a business 
context. In this section I will consider the relevance of business as a context for 
climate change in general and for the project more specifically. In the modern world, 
business plays an increasingly important role in the problem of climate change. This 
role has been interpreted in several different ways. In a negative sense, business 
contributes to the problem. Large multinational corporations are among the major 
contributors to greenhouse gas emissions. The most recent report from the IPCC 
states that, ‘the largest growth in greenhouse gas emissions between 1970 and 2004 
has come from energy supply, transport and industry’ (IPCC 2007, p.36). 
Multinational corporations, especially those in the energy sector, are responsible for a 
large proportion of these emissions (Sæverud and Skjærseth 2007). In fact, 
‘greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from a selection of Global 500 companies 
approximate that of the USA and the EU15 combined’, while ‘emissions from 
individual companies – excluding emissions from supply chains – compare to that of 
entire nations’ (Patenaude 2011, p.260).  
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In addition, businesses have historically played a role in efforts to prevent 
governmental regulation of greenhouse gas emissions: 
 
In the period leading up to Kyoto a considerable number of large multinationals in particular had 
started to spend much time and effort in trying to influence, both individually and through a range of 
business associations, their government’s stance on an international climate treaty and emissions 
reduction policies. With only some exceptions, companies initially opposed the adoption of such 
measures and regulation (Kolk and Pinkse 2009, p.3). 
 
This oppositional role dominated business strategy towards the environment for over 
a decade. The Global Climate Coalition, for example expressly ‘opposed 
governmental action on climate change, and claimed to represent six million 
companies’ (Hale 2010, p.260). Business both questioned the validity of climate 
science (Grundmann 2007) and stressed the negative economic impact of carbon 
regulations (Kolk and Pinkse 2009). 
More recently, however, many businesses have changed their position in 
relation to climate change. Hale (2010) claims that, ‘there are signs of change... [t]he 
Corporate Leaders Group in the UK has been an influential advocate of progressive 
policy positions, and a range of business coalitions supported specific government 
action at the 2007 global climate change talks’ (p.260). Given their contribution to 
CO2 emissions, large multinationals have come under pressure to ‘do their bit’ toward 
mitigating climate change by reducing their greenhouse gas emissions (Jeswani et al 
2008, p.47). They have responded to this pressure in a number of ways. In the 
political sphere, business has played an increasingly important role in international 
climate negotiations (Bernhagen 2008). Most corporations have also made a 
concerted effort to display ‘environmental excellence’ or ‘minimum harm to the 
environment’ (Rhee and Lee 2003, p.175). Many companies have taken a proactive 
stance to emission reductions (Borial 2006). For example, some companies are 
voluntarily improving their operations by ‘utilizing green materials and processes’ 
(Hoffman 2005, p.24) and some are ‘going “carbon-neutral” by “offsetting” carbon 
emissions that they themselves cannot reduce’ (Llewellyn 2007, p.55). Many large 
companies, including Aviva, BT, Cadbury, Coca Cola, EDF Energy, Tesco and 
Virgin, have also introduced climate champion schemes to promote pro-
environmental change from the ‘bottom-up’. 
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The relationship between business and climate change has been extensively 
researched. Scholars have considered the different ways in which companies 
approach climate change (Pinkse and Kolk 2010; Weinhofer and Hoffmann 2010), 
the success of their efforts (Sæverud and Skjærseth 2007) and their motivations for 
action (Paterson 2001b; van den Hove et al 2002). This final area of research has 
been the subject of some contestation with considerable disagreement about the 
problem of ‘greenwashing’ (Tokar 1997; Beder 2000). In the context of international 
policy, research has included investigation into public-private partnerships 
(Andonova 2010) and the importance of accountability (Clapp 2005). Discursive 
research in this area is available, but is far more limited. 
In 2002, Livesey conducted a discursive study of ExxonMobil’s approach to 
climate change. She analysed a set of corporate documents and identified the way 
climate discourse was used. Her conclusions include an overview of different climate 
discourses (scientific, economic, etc.) but the main objective of the article is to 
compare a discourse analysis approach to a rhetorical approach. She does not explore 
the problem of climate change except as a context for her analysis of methodology. 
Joutsenvirta (2009) conducts a similar project. She investigates the role of a 
‘language perspective’ in the analysis of corporate responsibility, claiming that the 
contribution of this perspective is a ‘neglected issue’ (p.241). Again, her conclusions 
point to the discourses of responsibility that are evident, but her main aim is to 
demonstrate the utility of a language approach. Joutsenvirta (2009) also uses written 
text as her data. She analyses ‘environmental writings from Enso and Greenpeace 
during 1985–2001’ (p.243)6. 
The current project also uses a discursive approach to analyse climate change 
in a business context. Business plays an increasingly important role in addressing the 
problem of climate change and many businesses have implemented environmental 
projects such as the climate champion scheme. A discursive approach in this context 
is both valuable and under-researched. Scholars have considered the importance of a 
discursive approach in the context of climate change and business. However, they 
have not used the approach to analyse how specific environmental schemes operate 
on a daily basis. My project will attempt to use critical discourse analysis to identify 
different climate discourses and how they operate in a business context. I will 
                                                          
6
 Stora Enso is a forest company, which debated with Greenpeace about the use of forests between 
1985-2001. 
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investigate the climate discourses that are drawn upon by the champions to construct 
the problem of climate change and promote individual behaviour change. This not 
only provides a unique perspective on the problem of climate change, it also provides 
an investigation into the role of business as a context for the reproduction or 
resistance of particular climate discourses.  
 
2.3.2   Individual Behaviour Change  
Theories of individual behaviour have played an influential role in 
environmental research for many years. Tribbia (2007) asserts that, ‘researchers from 
a variety of disciplines have examined the internal and external forces that foster and 
constrain an individual’s actions’ (p.239). At the individual level the ‘value-action’ 
gap is regarded as a big part of the problem of climate change. People profess concern 
about the threat of climate change and commit to action, but do not engage in climate 
protecting behaviour (Blake 1999). 
Kollmus and Agyeman (2002) provide an overview of ‘a few of the most 
influential and commonly used frameworks for analyzing pro-environmental 
behavior’ (p.240). Among others, they discuss the ‘information-deficit’ model, which 
assumes that an increase in knowledge about the environment will lead to pro-
environmental behaviour
7. They evaluate the ‘Theory of Reasoned Action’ and the 
‘Theory of Planned Behaviour’, examining the correlation between attitude and 
behaviour
8
 and they outline models of ‘Altruism, Empathy and Pro-social 
behaviour’9. All of these models emphasise specific factors to which we can attribute 
inaction on environmental issues, such as climate change. Similar research has also 
highlighted the importance of ‘practical impediments’ including ‘lack of time, lack of 
money or lack of storage space’ (Blake 1999, p.268), as well as the established 
environmental habits of individuals as barriers to change (Bamberg and Schmidt 
2003). This individualistic approach to behaviour change is still very influential 
(DEFRA 2007; DEFRA 2008; Southerton et al 2011; DECC 2011). 
More recently, however, academics have begun to challenge the dominance of 
an individualistic approach to behaviour change. Shove (2010), for example, 
                                                          
7
 See Burgess et al (1998). 
8
 See Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) and Ajzen and Fishbein (1980). 
9
 For theories of pro-social behaviour see Eisenberg and Miller (1987). For theories of altruism see 
Schwartz (1977) or, more recently, Allen and Ferrand (1999). 
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comments on the ‘potentially useful and influential resources of a vast range of social 
theory that lies beyond the dominant paradigms of economics and psychology’ 
(p.1273-1274). She claims that, rather than focusing our energy on models of ABC 
(attitude, behaviour and choice), we should be ‘diverting resources into the 
development of alternative...models of social change’ (Shove 2010, p.1282). Moloney 
et al (2010) support this position: 
 
The current dominance of the ‘rational choice model’ of consumer behaviour which is reinforced by 
the ‘techno-economic’ model of change prioritises technological solutions and is preoccupied with the 
individualisation of responsibility for environmental problems (p.7622). 
According to both Shove and Moloney et al, we should reject models of incremental, 
behaviour change and, instead, turn our attention to theories of ‘social practice’.   
Theories of practice and ‘performance’ have been used in number of different 
ways. Reckwitz (2002) considers practice theory as a specific branch of cultural 
theory and contrasts it with other theories that fall into this category (e.g., culturalism, 
mentalism, textualism etc.). Other researchers have applied the concepts of ‘practice’ 
and ‘performance’ to areas such as consumption (Warde 2005; Shove 2010) and the 
environment (Shove and Walker 2007; Hargreaves 2011). An emphasis on practice 
rejects ‘individually focused behaviour change’ and ‘begins with the collective or 
social context shaping and framing our daily actions’ (Moloney et al 2010, p.7617). 
This kind of theory has particular relevance for problems such as climate change and 
individual behaviour change. If we are to approach the problem of behaviour change 
we must consider it as a social construction. We must understand how (non) climate 
protecting behaviour is embedded in the historical evolution of social practices and 
the ‘performance’ of everyday (environmental) actions. 
 
The theoretical basis of the current project shares several important features 
with these theories of practice and performance. A discursive approach also 
challenges the individualistic models of behaviour change and advocates a focus on 
the social construction of behaviour. Similarly, in both approaches the individual is 
influenced by social ‘structures’ (practice or discourse) while still exerting a degree of 
agency. According to Hargreaves (2011), practice theory ‘does not…render 
individuals as passive dupes beholden to the dictates of practice, but instead 
conceives of them as skilled agents who actively negotiate and perform a wide range 
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of practices in the normal course of everyday life’ (p.83). In section 2.2.5, I made a 
similar argument about a discursive approach. Discursive power relations work 
through us but we are simultaneously reproducing them; we are doing something 
active in this process. Moreover, both approaches appear ‘to be tied to an interest in 
the ‘everyday’ and ‘life-world’ (Reckwitz 2002, p.244). 
 
However, a discursive approach can be distinguished from ‘practice theory’ in 
two fundamental ways. First, the theories focus on different units of analysis. For 
practice theory, the ‘core unit of analysis’ is ‘the practice itself, rather than the 
individuals who perform them or the social structures that surround them’ 
(Hargreaves 2011, p.82). Discourse analysis, on the other hand, is concerned with the 
interaction between individuals and the construction of shared meaning. The core unit 
of analysis is this ‘site of interaction’ where ‘power relations’ operate in the transfer 
of knowledge (Foucault 1982). Second, in a discursive approach the focus is on 
discourse and language. In practice theory ‘discourse and language lose their 
omnipotent status. Discursive practices are one type of practices among others’ 
(Reckwitz 2002, p.254).   
 
The current project is rooted in a critical discursive understanding of 
behaviour change. In the context of climate change, I would argue that the everyday 
communication of individuals can provide important insights into the problem of 
individual behaviour change. Discursive practices are one practice among others. 
However, they are sufficiently important to justify independent study.  
To some extent, this kind of approach to individual behaviour change has been 
explored. Kenis and Mathijs (2012) also challenge the dominance of individualistic 
models and investigate the importance of discourse, power and knowledge in relation 
to the construction of climate change. However, although they refer to the ‘dominant 
discourse’ (p.57), they do not specifically identify what this is or how it contributes to 
action or inaction on climate change. The role of power and knowledge will be 
investigated in the current project. However, it will be studied as part of the 
reciprocal relationship between societal climate discourses (the macro level) and 
everyday communication (the micro level). In this way, the project will attempt to 
offer an alternative approach to the value-action problem and complement other work 
that has also challenged the individualistic models of behaviour change. 
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2.3.3   Climate Champions 
The role of individuals in promoting change has been the subject of much 
research. There has been considerable discussion of ‘change agents’ in organisational 
studies and social psychologists, among others, have identified various roles that 
individuals can play in the process of social and behaviour change (Caldwell 2003; 
Caldwell 2005). The importance of change agents has been recognised in an 
environmental context. For example, studies have considered the importance of 
grassroots environmental activists (Horton 2006), environmental citizens (Bell 2005) 
and, more recently, celebrity role models in climate campaigns (Boykoff et al 2010). 
The conclusion from Boykoff et al (2010) about these change agents reflects the 
general trend of these studies: 
 
It could be argued that it is precisely this championing of (climate) causes that is needed to pioneer a 
new-millennium reflexivity, usher in meaningful change and inspire emergent engagements and 
movements (p.10). 
 
On this account, individuals can play a key role in the promotion of climate-
protecting social change. 
A small number of studies have specifically examined the role of designated 
climate or environmental champions in large organisations. In 2005, Alexander et al. 
outlined the importance of key individuals in promoting climate-protecting behaviour 
change in local authorities. They identified both formal and informal climate 
champions in Hampshire County Council and interviewed 20 champions. Their 
research focused mainly on the attributes of the champions and provided some useful 
conclusions about the characteristics of climate champions who were successful in 
promoting some change in the organisation. Other studies in this area have focused 
on issues such as the techniques of ‘championing’ (Andersson and Bateman 2000). 
More recently, there have been two studies of environmental champions in the private 
sector (Lewis and Juravle 2010; Gliedt et al. 2010). Lewis and Juravle studied 
‘sustainable investment champions’, while Gliedt et al. studied ‘environment 
champions’. Both studies conducted in-depth interviews and considered the influence 
that champions can have on specific business decisions. Lewis and Juravle focused on 
the promotion of sustainable investment, while Gliedt et al investigated the corporate 
decision to voluntarily purchase premium-priced Green Electricity. Both of these 
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studies conclude that champions can play an important role in encouraging pro-
environmental decisions in a business context. 
Finally, there has been a limited amount of research into environment 
champions and the work of Global Action Plan (GAP)
10
. Hobson (2001; 2003) and 
Hargreaves (2008) have conducted specific research on environment champions in 
the community and the workplace, respectively. Hobson (2001; 2003) carried out 
focus groups and interviews with participants of the Action at Home initiative
11
 
whilst Hargreaves (2008) carried out an extensive ethnographic study of environment 
champions at a large construction company. Both of these studies were concerned 
with the production of pro-environmental behaviour and, in this way, they are the 
most similar to my own project. 
There has been some valuable research into pro-environmental behaviour and 
change agents. This project builds on previous work in several ways. First, the main 
focus of the project is the issue of climate change. Officially, the individuals in my 
study were variously designated as ‘climate champions’, ‘environment champions’, 
‘energy champions’ and ‘sustainability champions’. Indeed, in some cases, this 
flexibility in terminology existed within the same institution but all the champion 
schemes were primarily concerned with climate change. The aim is to study how 
designated climate champions construct the issue of climate change and how they 
approach the problem of stimulating climate-protecting behaviour in their company 
and among their colleagues. Second, the theoretical basis of the project is rooted in 
the discursive construction of climate change as an issue. The project begins with an 
in-depth analysis of climate discourses and uses this theoretical analysis to identify 
climate discourses in everyday language. Finally, the project looks at the role of 
champions in the reproduction of discourse. In section 2.2.5, I argued that discourse 
analysis does allow a ‘notion of agency’ (Backstrand and Lovbrand 2006, p.52). As 
we reproduce discourse we are doing something active and therefore there is always 
the potential for resistance. The thesis considers the role of champions as ‘passive 
                                                          
10 Global Action Plan is an international network of not-for-profit organisations that was founded by 
David Gershon in the United States in 1989-90 (Hargreaves 2008, p.79). GAP offers a fixed term 
programme for behaviour change. Champions are expected to take an audit of areas such as waste and 
energy use and then spend a month promoting good practice in each area. A second audit is taken at 
the end to determine the success of the various initiatives. The general aim is to achieve a reduction in 
carbon emissions through individual behaviour change. 
11
 Action at Home is ‘a 6 month voluntary scheme that aims to encourage changes in individuals’ 
household consumption practices by providing information, support and feedback’ (Hobson 2001, 
p.107). 
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subjects’ or ‘active agents’. Did they reinforce or challenge dominant discourses and 
how did this process operate on a day to day basis? 
 
2.4   Conclusion 
The focus of this project is the communication of climate change in large 
corporations. It is a project that is situated in critical discourse analysis. I am 
interested in the way the champions use climate discourses to communicate about 
climate change and promote behaviour change.  In this chapter I have argued that a 
critical discursive approach has some important advantages in the analysis of climate 
change communication. The interview data from the champions will provide a 
detailed account of climate discourse in everyday language. It will also indicate the 
dominance of particular climate discourses and the connected ‘appropriate’ responses 
to the problem. Analysis of this material is important for three reasons. First, it will 
illustrate the actual climate discourses that are drawn upon by the champions in a 
business context. Second, it will potentially generate insight into the climate 
discourses that construct ‘appropriate’ individual actions on climate change and how 
this process works. Finally, the analysis will indicate any signs of resistance to the 
dominant discourse and the implications this has for the types of actions that are 
encouraged and/or discouraged. This analysis has implications for the effective 
communication of climate change in the workplace and the wider discursive politics 
of climate change. If we can provide an insight into the reproduction and/or resistance 
of dominant climate discourses (how does this work?) then we can potentially apply 
this knowledge to more normative projects (how we can we make things better?). 
 
  
 49 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Discourses of Climate Change 
 
A discursive approach to climate change acknowledges the problems that are 
inherent in climate knowledge and the variety of approaches to dealing with the issue. 
In this chapter I will provide a theoretical analysis of climate change as a constructed 
subject. I will consider the construction of climate change as a problem and I will 
identify seven climate discourses, which will be used as the framework for analysing 
the way that climate champions talk about climate change. I will argue that 
neoliberalism plays an important role in the construction of climate change as a 
problem and the ways in which we attempt to deal with it. 
In section 3.1 I will begin by considering how discourse can be analysed. 
What do we actually look at in order to understand a particular discourse? I will 
consider how other researchers have analysed discourses, specifically focusing on the 
work of Dryzek (1997). In section 3.2 I will explain how I have drawn on Dryzek’s 
approach for my own research. In section 3.3 I will outline the importance of 
neoliberalism as a context for climate discourses. I will analyse neoliberalism as a 
discourse and consider the relationship between neoliberalism and the natural world. 
Section 3.4 will then consider the construction of climate change as a problem. I will 
look at four ways in which the problem is discursively framed: scepticism (not a 
problem); pessimism (an insoluble problem); reformism (a small problem or ‘glitch’ 
in the neoliberal system); and revolution (a fundamental problem with the neoliberal 
system). If climate change is framed in a sceptical or pessimistic way, it is either no 
problem at all or it is an insoluble problem. In either case we cannot examine the 
discursive construction of solutions – because there are none. However, if climate 
change is discursively framed in a reformist or revolutionary way, it is a problem that 
requires or can have a solution. So, we can examine the discursive construction of 
those solutions. 
The rest of the chapter will analyse seven discourses of climate change, which 
provide an account of the problem and how it should be solved. Section 3.5 will look 
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at those that follow neoliberal ideas (reformist discourses) and section 3.6 will look at 
those that reject the basic principles of neoliberalism (revolutionary discourses). 
 
3.1   Analysing Discourses of Climate Change 
Discourse is defined as ‘a shared meaning of phenomena’ (Backstrand and 
Lovbrand 2006, p.51) or ‘a shared way of apprehending the world’ (Dryzek 1997, 
p.8). By drawing on a particular discourse, individuals can form a mutual 
understanding of a given phenomenon.  But how do we identify a particular discourse 
and distinguish it from others? Hajer and Versteeg (2005) offer a definition of 
discourse which provides some insight into this problem: 
 
‘Discourse’ is defined here as an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is 
given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable 
set of practices (p.175). 
 
Each discourse represents a specific set of features which renders it unique and 
identifiable. If we can recognize the fundamental characteristics of a discourse we can 
identify that discourse in language. Dryzek (1997) provides one of the most detailed 
examples of this kind of analysis in an environmental context. He contends that, ‘in 
order to see why and how these discourses have developed, and to what effect, it is 
necessary to pin down their content more precisely’ (p.15). Analysis requires a close 
examination of the basic components that make-up a discourse. Dryzek identifies 
nine environmental discourses and analyses each one of them on the basis of four 
fundamental features (p.18).  
Checklist of elements for the analysis of discourse 
1. Basic Entities Recognised or Constructed 
2. Assumptions about Natural Relationships 
3. Agents and their Motives 
4. Key Metaphors and other Rhetorical Devices 
                                                                                      Table 3.1 
The ‘basic entities’ are ‘the “ontology” of a discourse’ (p.16). These are the 
things that ‘exist’ in a particular account of the world. For example, some discourses 
will recognise ‘humans’ while others will recognise ‘males’ and ‘females’. Some 
discourses will acknowledge the existence of the eco-system as an entity in its own 
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right; other discourses will consider an eco-system solely as a resource. ‘Assumptions 
about natural relationships’ are assertions about, for example, the co-operative nature 
of human beings in social systems or the conflict inherent in the market. ‘Agents and 
their motives’ considers the actors that play a role in a discourse. For example, 
Dryzek talks about ‘rational consumers’, ‘enlightened elites’ and ‘virtuous citizens’ 
(p.17). Finally, Dryzek highlights the importance of the metaphors and rhetorical 
devices being used in discourses. These include, for example, ‘spaceship earth’ and 
the ‘war against nature’ (p.17). These four basic components can then be used to 
analyse any given (environmental) discourse. 
Many subsequent authors have replicated Dryzek’s categorisation of 
environmental discourses (Hulme 2008; Doulton and Brown 2009) and/or drawn 
upon the discourses he sets out (Gray 2000; Carvalho 2007; Santos 2012). For 
example, Doulton and Brown (2009) investigated discourses of climate change and 
international development in the UK press. The analysis was based on Dryzek’s four 
general components but was adapted to suit the purpose of the project. The authors 
argue that, ‘the analysis is of a much more specific issue; consequently the discourse 
components identified are less generalised’ (Doulton and Brown 2009, p.192). In 
particular, they use the component ‘assumptions about natural relationships’ but adapt 
this to be a category about the ‘impacts of climate change... degrees of uncertainty; 
possible solutions’ (Doulton and Brown 2009, p.193). They also complement 
Dryzek’s components with ‘surface descriptors’ (specifying information about the 
newspaper itself) and ‘normative judgements’ (‘what should be done and by whom, 
to solve climate change’) (Doulton and Brown 2009, p.193). Their work is testament 
to the fact that Dryzek’s approach ‘can be usefully adopted for more specific topics’ 
(Doulton and Brown 2009, p.192). 
The thesis will draw on Dryzek’s work in a similar way to Doulton and 
Brown. The specific issue in this case is the communication of climate change in 
large corporations. I am investigating the discourses that are being used by climate 
champions in the workplace. The analysis will be based on a set of fundamental 
components that can be used to identify specific climate discourses. The main 
difference between my research and the work of Doulton and Brown is that their 
analysis of different climate discourses is situated in a particular issue (climate 
change and international development in the UK press). They do not begin by 
addressing a ‘broad platform of universal environmental discourses’ in the same way 
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as Dryzek does (Doulton and Brown 2009, p.192). However, I would argue that 
climate change as a topic is sufficiently important to warrant a detailed analysis of 
climate discourses in the same way as Dryzek investigates environmental discourses. 
I will therefore begin with an analysis of ‘universal’ climate discourses and then draw 
upon these discourses to analyse a specific issue (the communication of climate 
change in large corporations). 
 
3.2   Analytical Categories 
For the purpose of analysis, I have developed a list of six fundamental 
components. To some extent these are based on Dryzek’s four categories; they do 
cover many of the same ideas. However, there are also some important differences. 
Most notably, I have separated ‘key agents and their motives’ into two distinct 
categories and I have combined ‘basic entities’ and ‘assumptions about natural 
relationships’. With reference to the latter, the focus is on four specific entities/two 
specific relationships which are fundamental to the issue of climate change: the 
relationship between the state and the market and the relationship between the 
environment and the economy. I have also added ‘key values’ and ‘account of social 
change’. Both of these components have an important role to play in discourses of 
climate change. Key metaphors and rhetorical devices will be acknowledged as an 
underlying communicative technique in all of these components rather than a distinct 
category in its own right.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                   Table 3.2 
 
 
Analytical categories for the analysis of climate discourse 
1. Relationship between Environment/Economy 
2. Relationship between State/Market 
3. Role of Key Agents  
4. Account of Human Nature/Motivations 
5. Key Values 
6. Account of Social Change 
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Relationship between the Environment and the Economy 
We are dealing with climate change in a neoliberal world. One of the most 
important tensions is the relationship between the natural environment and the man-
made economy. As climate change has become increasingly important as an issue, 
this relationship has been re-evaluated (Gibbs 2003; Curran 2009). Some climate 
discourses focus on the intrinsic value of the natural world while others acknowledge 
the natural world only insofar as it supports the economy. This category does similar 
work to Dryzek’s ‘basic entities’. However, I will also consider the nature of the 
relationship as harmonious, co-operative or one of conflict. 
 
Relationship between the State and the Market 
The relationship between the state and the market is again based on the 
dominance of neoliberalism. The role of these basic entities is fundamental to the way 
climate change is tackled. Neoliberalism does give more credence to the role of the 
state than classical liberal approaches but the market is still paramount (Cerny 2008). 
Climate discourses which focus on reform tend to attribute more importance to the 
ability of the market to deal with the problem. Revolutionary approaches, on the other 
hand, challenge the prominence of the market and focus attention on the role of the 
state as a regulatory body or a sphere for collective action. 
 
Role of Key Agents 
Dryzek (1997) states that all ‘storylines require actors, or agents’ (p.16). This 
component focuses on the agents that play a role in different climate discourses. This 
may be a group of concerned citizens, an environmentally conscious business or a 
self-interested individual. I have intentionally altered Dryzek’s category to focus not 
only on ‘key agents’, but also on the ‘role’ they play. This is important because the 
same key agent could feasibly fulfil two different roles. For example, an 
environmentally conscious consumer is one agent. However, they could fulfil the role 
of passive environmentally conscious consumer by purchasing green products or they 
could ‘rewrite the passive consumer script by asserting themselves as activist 
consumers who bike to work rather than buying more gasoline’ (Slocum 2004a, 
p.779).  
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Account of Human Nature 
This component is linked to the ‘role of key agents’. Dryzek’s combination of 
‘key agents and their motivations’ is reasonable. However, I would argue that, in the 
context of climate change, the motivation of key agents is sufficiently important to 
warrant its own category. Furthermore, the idea of motivations is based on an even 
more fundamental component: accounts of human nature. Human nature is an 
important consideration when analysing the way we approach climate change. De 
Groot and Steg (2007) claim that ‘environmental problems are rooted in human 
values’ (p.331). If we assume human beings are essentially egotistical this will have 
certain implications for the way we would expect them to respond to the issue of 
climate change. If humans are more altruistic we would expect them to respond to 
climate change in a different way. Human nature therefore has important implications 
for discourses of climate change and will be dealt with as a category in its own right. 
 
Key Values 
The final two categories are not specifically based on Dryzek’s work. 
However, they encompass some important ideas in the context of climate change. 
Different climate discourses are based on a multitude of key values. Some discourses 
will focus on quality of life and wellbeing, while others promote the importance of 
growth and accumulation. Some concepts will occur in more than one discourse, but 
will be used in different ways. For example, concepts such as ‘progress’, ‘needs’ and 
‘rights’ are subject to varying definitions and are employed for different purposes. 
Key values play an important role in the overall approach of any climate discourse. 
 
Account of Social Change 
The final component to be considered in each discourse is the account of 
social change. This will be more important in some discourses than it is in others. In 
particular, this component reflects the general difference between discourses of 
reform and discourses of revolution. The former will encourage gradual, incremental 
change; the latter will promote the need for a fundamental overhaul of the current 
system. 
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Categorising Discourse 
The categorisation of discourses is a complicated process. The purpose of the 
foregoing analytical categories is to allow for a thorough and systematic analysis. 
However, there are two issues to consider. First, any distinction drawn between 
discourses will be arbitrary to some extent. Dryzek (1997) contends that, ‘complete 
rupture or discontinuity across discourses is rare, such that interchange across 
discourse boundaries can occur’ (p.8). Backstrand and Lovbrand (2006) note a similar 
difficulty in their analysis of discourses. Discourses overlap and the components of 
one discourse can be similar to those in another. This chapter distinguishes between 
seven discourses of climate change. Overlap will be acknowledged, but I would argue 
that these seven discourses are sufficiently different to justify analysis of each in its 
own right and allow for a useful application to my data. 
Second, there is inevitably more nuance in each of the discourses than can be 
allowed for in such a broad categorisation. Discourses of individualism incorporate 
what could also be discourses of consumerism; discourses of justice include ideas 
about duty and human rights. The categorisation of climate discourse could be further 
divided beyond seven distinct discourses. However, I would argue that investigating 
and applying the components of seven climate discourses is sufficient for a detailed 
analysis of the data. I will retain focus on the main discourses but acknowledge 
further distinctions in the data where it is applicable. 
 
3.3   The Context of Climate Discourse: Neoliberalism 
Before embarking on a discourse analysis of climate change it is important to 
acknowledge the context in which the issue is situated. Neoliberalism is commonly 
accepted as the political and economic ideology for the modern world (Massey 2000; 
Plehwe and Walpen 2005; Jessop 2010). It has enjoyed an unprecedented ascent to 
global dominance and it touches the lives of almost everyone on the planet. Harvey 
(2007) argues that ‘neoliberalization has in effect swept across the world like a vast 
tidal wave of institutional reform and discursive adjustment’ (p.23). As such, 
neoliberalism plays an important role in many current issues, particularly the problem 
of climate change. The aims and values of neoliberalism are widely regarded as a 
major contributory factor to climate change, while neoliberal ideology plays an 
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important role in dominant approaches to dealing with the problem. This section will 
analyse the discourse of neoliberalism, both in general and in relation to climate 
change. The purpose of this is twofold. First, it is important to employ the six 
abovementioned categories and illustrate their use as tools of analysis. The second 
purpose of the analysis is to outline the nature of neoliberalism and to examine the 
relationship between neoliberalism and climate change as the context for the rest of 
the chapter. 
 
3.3.1   Neoliberal Discourse 
Despite the widespread use of the term, there are theoretical disagreements 
over the development and ideological components of the term ‘neoliberalism’. For 
many theorists, neoliberalism can be traced to its 18
th
 and 19
th
 century roots in the 
form of economic liberalism (Turner 2007; Kirk 2008). ‘Old’ and ‘new’ liberalism 
share the same basic components: ‘self-interest and individualism’ and ‘the 
proscription of public (state) interference with market forces’ (von Werlhof 2008, 
p.95). The distinct feature of neoliberalism is the global scope of its influence (Larner 
2003; von Werlhof 2008). For others, neoliberalism exhibits further divergence from 
its liberal roots because it also allows a more active role for the state in ‘designing, 
promoting and guaranteeing the free and efficient operation of the market’ (Cerny 
2008, p.1). There is disagreement over the term and ‘the notion of a consistent set of 
defining material practices and outcomes that comprise neoliberalism is problematic’ 
(McCarthy and Prudham 2004, p.276). However, despite areas of disagreement, there 
are fundamental components that appear in almost all accounts of neoliberalism. 
Turner (2008) argues that, ‘in many respects its various schools meet on common 
ground in terms of their aims, arguments and assumptions, which makes them 
constitute a coherent and distinctive ideology’ (p.6). For the purpose of the thesis I 
will base my own definition of neoliberalism on the areas of ‘common ground’ which 
exist in the various accounts. I will analyse the discourse on the basis of my own 
analytical categories. 
The most important feature of neoliberalism is the emphasis on the market. 
Neoliberalism advocates ‘unencumbered markets and free trade’ (Harvey 2007, p.22) 
and ‘unfettered free markets’ (Andrew et al 2010, p.612). Accordingly, the role of the 
state is minimal. The purpose of the state is to ensure that markets can operate freely. 
For neoliberals, ‘political involvement in economic activity (e.g., regulation of 
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corporations, support for regional industries or particular sectors, or social protection 
for the poor) is just interference in an otherwise natural process’ (Mansfield 2004b, 
p.566). The relationship between the state and the market is not necessarily one of 
conflict but neither is it co-operative. There is not an equal balance of power between 
the two entities. It could be argued, as Cerny (2008) claims, that the state plays a role 
in ensuring the free operation of the market (as distinct from classical liberalism). 
However, this does not mean that there is equality in the state/market relationship. 
The market is the more important entity and the relationship is harmonious to the 
extent that the state accepts the dominance of the market. 
In any account of neoliberalism the key values centre on growth, profit and 
efficiency. The focus on ‘continual growth in both capacity (stock) and income (flow) 
is a central part of the neoclassical growth paradigm’ (Daly, 1996a, p.15). In the past, 
economics was seen as the pursuit of accumulation for the purpose of human 
happiness. Redclift (1984) argues that economics was originally the ‘philosophical 
search for ways of maximising human happiness’ (p.5). In modern society, however, 
the purpose of accumulation is increasingly to achieve accumulation. The economic 
process, ‘rather than being used for the sake of achieving the final goal of life, tends 
to become the final goal in itself. Since output is then not limited by any final goal, 
the desire for it becomes infinite. We get hooked on growth’ (Alonzo-Smith 1996, 
p.183). The role of key agents is inevitably based on these key values. The key agents 
in a neoliberal discourse are businesses and self-interested rational consumers. The 
role of business is to produce goods and services for consumption and to sell these 
commodities for a profit. The neoliberal conception of economic corporations is that 
their main objective should always be the pursuit of profit (Friedman 1962). 
Accordingly, the role of self-interested rational consumers is to consume these goods 
and services in order to generate growth and profit. Inevitably, these features of 
neoliberalism are linked to the importance of the market. Mansfield (2004b) argues 
that, ‘markets are supposed to work through the dynamics of individual decision 
making in competitive settings’ (p.566). The logic of neoliberalism is rooted in 
capitalism more generally. If everyone makes decisions based on their own interests 
the invisible hand of the market leads to the most profitable and efficient outcomes 
(Smith 1976). 
The neoliberal account of human nature underpins many of the other features. 
Read (2009) argues that, ‘it is an ideology that refers not only to the political realm, 
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or to an ideal of the state, but to the entirety of human existence. It claims to present 
not an ideal, but a reality; human nature’ (p.26). Humans are self-interested, utility 
maximisers and, according to Walker (2006), ‘neoliberalism accepts as fact that 
human nature is essentially selfish’ (p.140). For this reason, the market directed, 
profit-driven imperatives of neoliberalism are the most ‘appropriate’ system for 
society. The key values of neoliberalism therefore also incorporate rights of 
individuals to freedom and property (Plehwe and Walpen 2005; Kirk 2008). Self-
interest is paramount and is best served by the priority of the market over the state 
and the individual over the collective. 
Finally, a neoliberal account of social change is rooted in progress, based on 
the key values of growth, accumulation and profit. Pepper (1999) argues that a 
neoliberal definition of progress ‘primarily consist[s] of indefinitely increasing 
material consumption’ (p.28). People should consume as a means to ‘improve’ one’s 
lifestyle (Redclift 1995, p.11). Social change is the outcome of individual choices in a 
competitive market. According to neoliberalism, this process of social change and 
progress will ultimately lead to ‘the good society’ (van Elteran 2009, p.178) or 
‘human well-being’ (Harvey 2007, p.22). 
The idea that neoliberalism has become globally dominant or ‘hegemonic’ is 
widely supported (Larner 2003; Robertson 2004; Barnett 2005; Cerny 2008; 
Humphreys 2009). Indeed, Birch and Mykhnenko (2010) argue that, ‘in the three 
decades since the election of the first ideologically committed neoliberal government 
in May 1979, neoliberalism has gone truly global, reaching every corner of the world’ 
(p.8). If a discourse is ‘a shared way of apprehending the world’ (Dryzek 1997, p.8) 
then neoliberalism is the dominant discourse in modern society. It is the discourse 
that underpins all other ways of thinking: 
 
Neoliberalism has, in short, become hegemonic as a mode of discourse and has pervasive effects on 
ways of thought and political-economic practices to the point where it has become incorporated into 
the commonsense way we interpret, live in, and understand the world (Harvey 2007, p.23). 
 
The ‘pervasive effects’ of neoliberalism have important consequences for the natural 
world, particularly an issue such as climate change. 
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3.3.2   Neoliberalism and the Natural World 
The most widely held assumption about anthropogenic climate change is that 
it is caused by the carbon intensive activities we have engaged in over the last 100 
years: 
 
When a century long trend toward warmer temperatures resumed in the 1980s and then accelerated, 
even casual observers noticed a correlation with population, urbanization, industry, fossil-fuelled 
electrification and transportation, and deforestation (Onuf 2007, p.xii). 
 
These assumptions can be directly related to the relationship between neoliberalism 
and the natural world. In its original form (before the acknowledgement of climate 
change as a problem), this relationship was fundamentally one of conflict. The 
relationship between the environment and the economy was problematic due to the 
components of the neoliberal discourse and the ethos of traditional environmentalism. 
The goals of continual growth and accumulation are contradictory to the logic of 
conservation and frugality necessary for environmental preservation (Meadows et al 
1972). The natural world is valued only as a resource for use in the economy. Dryzek 
(1996) argues that, ‘a predominantly instrumental orientation on the part of human 
beings in the context of their interaction with... the natural world is destructive’ 
(p.27). We have emitted carbon into the atmosphere as if its capacity for absorption 
was limitless. We have not accounted for any damage we have caused. The neoliberal 
account of human nature has encouraged people to focus on their own interests 
without concern for the collective good or the state of the natural world. Kollmus and 
Agyeman (2002) argue that, ‘person’s with a strong selfish and competitive 
orientation are less likely to act ecologically’ (p.244). The role of key agents 
(business, self-interested individuals and rational consumers) has been to continue 
producing and consuming – and, consequently, emitting greenhouse gases. 
Finally, the relationship between the state and the market has meant that 
people have been encouraged to consume freely and excessively without any imposed 
limitations by the state. Hale (2010) claims that neoliberalism imposes ‘ideological 
handcuffs’ on the state (p.257). The values of freedom and rights mean that the state 
is reluctant to interfere in the prerogative of individual interest and choice. 
Furthermore, ‘its role in climate change policy is consistently underplayed’ (Hale 
2010, p.258). The state has been unable to perform its traditional regulatory role and 
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correct the environmental problems caused by the culmination of numerous 
individual acts. 
The contradictory relationship between neoliberalism and environmental 
conservation leads to potentially dangerous consequences. Many argue that this 
dominant discourse is the primary, if not the only, reason for environmental 
problems, such as climate change (Beder 2006; Lohmann 2009; Andrews et al 2010). 
However, despite widespread criticism of the damage that it has caused, 
neoliberalism has remained central to debates about the problem of climate change 
and the way we should deal with it. 
 
3.4   Constructing the Problem of Climate Change 
The problem of climate change ‘first emerged as an issue of public concern 
within the context of the environmental movements of the 1970s and 1980s’ (Jamison 
2010, p.811). Over the past 40 years the issue has become increasingly prominent in 
scientific, political and academic debates. In the first instance, ‘the perception of 
climate change as something dangerous that must be avoided is established in the 
scientific discourse’ (Weingart et al 2000, p.267; emphasis in original). The problem 
of climate change originated in scientific disciplines and is presented in scientific 
language. Moreover, science has played a dominant role in the establishment of 
climate change as a political problem: 
 
The speed with which scientific knowledge of climate change has been translated into an international 
diplomatic consensus is remarkable, if not unprecedented. It is testimony to the authority of science to 
provide legitimacy for political action (Demeritt 2001, p.307). 
 
The scientific findings of the IPCC are acknowledged as an important part of the 
foundations for political consensus on climate change (UNFCCC 2012). 
As an issue in today’s society, climate change can be located in a number of 
different discourses and the problem of climate change is constructed in a number of 
different ways. Science still plays a dominant role in this construction. In its most 
recent assessment report the IPCC stated that, ‘warming of the planet is unequivocal, 
as is now evident from observations in increases in global average air and ocean 
temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global sea level’ (IPCC 
2007, p.30). Furthermore, this warming of the planet and the consequent changes in 
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climate are ‘very likely due to anthropogenic greenhouse gas increases’ (IPCC 2007, 
p.39; emphasis in original). Hence, there is a strong consensus that climate change is 
occurring and that it can be attributed to human activity (King 2004; McMichael 
2006; Pittock 2009; Dessler and Parson 2010). 
However, this is not the only position on climate change. In fact, in many 
ways, the issue is surrounded by controversy. Debate continues over whether or not 
there actually is a problem and, if there is, who should deal with it and how? The 
following sections will outline the construction of climate change as a problem. I will 
consider discourses of scepticism, pessimism, reform and revolution. 
 
3.4.1   Scepticism: Not a problem 
A frequent response to the problem of climate change is that there is no 
problem at all. This reaction can be categorised into two separate discourses: denial 
that climate change is happening and the construction of climate change as a good 
thing. Ereaut and Segnit (2006) analyse media in the UK, including newspapers, radio 
news clips and websites and note the presence of these discourses in modern society. 
They distinguish between two types of scepticism: ‘Rhetorical scepticism’ which is a 
‘non-expert discourse, but one that attacks the expert discourse as “bad science”’ 
(p.16) and ‘expert denial’, ‘characterised by a tendency to construct climate change as 
being predominantly caused by ‘natural’ (in other words, not man-made) factors’ 
(p.17). They also refer to the position that ‘proposes seriously that climate change 
brings benefits’ (p.18) – the ‘warming is good’ discourse. These discourses are 
variously acknowledged by other academics. Jamison (2010) reviews literature on 
‘discourse’ and refers to an ‘oppositional position’ which is associated with ‘self-
proclaimed sceptics’ and denial of the problem (p.811), while Doulton and Brown 
(2009) analyse broadsheet newspapers and describe a discourse of ‘optimism’: 
‘viewing climate change as no problem for development, in fact, if anything, it is seen 
to be beneficial’ (p.194). 
These discourses dispute the construction of climate change as a problem. 
They have been drawn upon in many different contexts. Among the most prominent 
cases of climate change denial have been those associated with industry and ‘big 
business’. Historically, businesses have played a major role in efforts to prevent 
government regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. Hale (2010) claims that, ‘for 
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over a decade, the Global Climate Coalition opposed governmental action on climate 
change, and claimed to represent six million companies’ (p.260). This opposition was 
frequently based on denial of climate change as a problem. For example, van den 
Hove et al (2002) outline the role that the oil industry played in fighting against 
emission regulation, primarily through denial of the science (p.5). Similarly, 
governments (the US as a case in point) have rejected calls for a strong response to 
climate change on the basis of uncertain scientific knowledge (Grundmann 2007, 
p.422). Many commentators draw links between the reluctance to regulate emissions 
and ‘powerful carbon polluters’ short-term interest in squeezing out their profits and 
continuing to burn fossil fuels’ (Charman 2008, p.31). The features of neoliberalism 
are evident in the values and goals outlined in this account of the problem. 
The denial of climate change has also been prominent in the media (Antilla 
2005; Gavin and Marshall 2011) and is evident in surveys of the general public. 
Bulkeley (2000) notes that participants in her research ‘expressed doubt and 
scepticism about the climate change knowledge that they received’ (p.329). 
Scepticism about climate science amongst the general populous is variously attributed 
to factors such as a decrease in the ‘authority of science’ (Berkhout 2010, p.568) and 
a lack of trust in government and science (Hale 2010, p.256). Whatever the reasons 
for this construction of climate change it remains a discourse that is present in 
society. Mckie and Galloway (2007) argue that discourses of scepticism have ‘fading 
salience’ and seem ‘increasingly futile’ (p.368). Despite this, the discourse remains 
and is an important discourse in the construction of climate change as a (non-) 
problem. 
 
3.4.2   Pessimism: Too Big a Problem 
A less prominent discourse is the pessimistic construction of climate change. 
Climate change is constructed as a problem, but it is too big a problem for us to 
handle. This leads to discourses of ‘alarmism’ (Erenaut and Signit 2006), ‘alarmist 
defeatism’ (Hobson and Niemeyer 2011), ‘disaster strikes’ (Doulton and Brown 
2009), ‘catastrophe’ (Lovelock 2006) and ‘looming tragedy’ (Dryzek 1997). Hulme 
(2008) claims that discourses of fear are the ‘increasingly dominant portrayal of 
anthropogenic global climate change’ (p.10). Links are being drawn between extreme 
weather events and changes in the global climate (Epstein 2005; Kafatos et al 2006). 
Scientists refer to ‘tipping points’ (Pittock 2009, p.94) and ‘dangerous interference 
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with the climate system’ (Schneider 2004, p.256) while the media use ‘a quasi-
religious register of doom, death, judgement’ (Erenaut and Signit 2006, p.13). This 
discourse acknowledges the problem of anthropogenic climate change but dismisses 
any action as futile. However, the response from the general public is often not 
consistent with the main messages of this discourse. While surveys report high levels 
of concern about the problem of climate change (Norton and Leaman 2004; 
Lorenzoni and Pigeon 2006; World Bank 2010) this is seldom constructed as urgent, 
or even as the most important problem
12
. Furthermore, according to survey data, 
concern about climate change is rarely constructed as a futile endeavour; most people 
believe that something can be done about it. Patchen (2010) collates a number of 
surveys to report on the efficacy of individuals in dealing with climate change. He 
states that in a 2006 survey of Americans, only 22% felt that it was not possible to 
reduce the effects of global warming at all (p.53).  
A discourse of alarmism is interesting as a way to construct the problem of 
climate change. If we focus on the media then it does appear that the discourse is 
becoming increasingly dominant (Doulton and Brown 2009). However, the increase 
in media alarmism does not directly correlate to concern and resignation in other 
areas of society. 
 
3.4.3   Reform: A ‘Glitch’ in the System 
The constructions of climate change discussed in the previous two sections are 
consistent with the absence of any action to tackle the problem. These discourses 
deny that there is a problem, promote the benefits of climate change or reject the 
possibility that we can do anything about it. In any case, the result is that we do 
nothing differently. The opposite approach is that we do attempt to tackle climate 
change. However, the ways in which we attempt to deal with climate change are 
based on the construction of what the problem is. Starting from the assumption that 
some form of action is necessary and possibly efficacious, there are two fundamental 
ways in which the problem of climate change is constructed. 
                                                          
12
 Norton and Leaman (2004) report that whilst the majority of Britons see climate change as the most 
important environmental issue, it is not considered the most important issue overall: ‘When asked 
which global issue –terrorism, global warming, population growth or HIV/Aids – poses the most 
serious threat, terrorism comes top by some margin. By a factor of almost 2:1, the public see terrorism 
as more important than global warming (48% vs 25%)’ (p.5). 
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The first construction in this context is that there is no fundamental problem 
with the current neoliberal system. There are simply some minor issues that must be 
addressed. In a purely neoliberal discourse, the relationship between the environment 
and the economy is one of conflict. However, discourses of reform contend that 
conflict exists only because there are some issues that have not been taken into 
account. For example, previously, the use of natural resources and carbon sinks was 
not considered as part of any standard economic calculations. Reformist discourses 
acknowledge that this is an important oversight in neoliberal economics. Climate 
change therefore becomes an ‘externality’, a cost that must be incorporated into the 
economic system so that the market can deal with it effectively. Janicke et al (2000) 
argue that, ‘every economic practice causes structural environmental stress in so far 
as without additional cleaning technology, it would cause actual environmental 
damage’ (p.133). If we can employ cleaning technology, we can avoid environmental 
damage and problems such as climate change. 
Jamison (2010) acknowledges this construction of climate change as the 
‘dominant position’. It is associated with belief in climate change and the promotion 
of ‘a substantial lowering of the emissions of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and 
a transition to what has been termed a “low-carbon society”’ (p.811). We have not 
considered the damage we have done. Neoliberalism is not the problem. The problem 
is our failure to recognise the need for cleaner technology and market mechanisms 
that facilitate climate protecting products and behaviour. Once we recognise climate 
change as a problem we can address it within the context of neoliberalism. 
 
3.4.4   Revolution: A Fundamental Problem 
The alternative construction of climate change as a problem is what Jamison 
(2010) refers to as the ‘emergent position’. This construction accepts the problem of 
climate change, but stresses ‘the importance of dealing with climate change in ways 
that take issues of justice and fairness seriously into account’ (p.812). More 
fundamentally, this construction challenges the entire system of neoliberalism and 
encourages completely different ways to tackle the problem. 
The problem of climate change is not about market failures and ‘tweaking’ the 
neoliberal system. Rather, neoliberalism itself is constructed as the fundamental cause 
of the problem. The root causes of climate change are the pursuit of profit, limitless 
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growth and the self-interested orientation of individuals. Neoliberalism cannot be 
expected to solve the problem of climate change when these fundamental principles 
have not changed: 
 
An abundance of eco-political measures are being considered and implemented. Yet the key principles 
governing western practices of production, circulation, exchange and consumption remain immutable. 
The key principles of consumer capitalism, i.e. infinite economic growth and wealth accumulation, 
which ecologists have always branded as fundamentally unsustainable, remain fully in place (Bluhdorn 
and Welsh 2007, p.187). 
 
Lorenzoni et al (2007) support this position arguing that, ‘as an issue linked 
fundamentally to energy consumption, climate change challenges virtually every 
aspect of modern lifestyles and the prevailing paradigm to consume freely’ (p.454). 
The problem of climate change is associated with energy consumption, accumulation 
and waste. Discourses of revolution argue that this construction of the problem is 
fundamental to the ways in which we must deal with it. Any viable solution to the 
problem of climate change must challenge the underlying assumptions of the system 
that created it. 
The rest of the chapter will provide a systematic analysis of seven climate 
discourses that represent different ways of dealing with the problem of climate 
change. The analysis will be based on the six analytical categories outlined at the 
beginning of the chapter. The discourses will be situated in the context of 
neoliberalism and categorised into discourses of reform and discourses of revolution. 
This will reflect the two fundamental ways of constructing the problem. 
 
3.5   Dealing with Climate Change: Discourses of Reform 
Discourses of reform are the dominant ways in which we deal with climate 
change in the modern world. They are based on the construction of the climate 
problem as a small ‘glitch’ in the neoliberal system: 
 
To the extent that neoliberalism, with its calls for letting ‘‘the market’’ address myriad social and 
economic woes, has become the dominant model for political economic practice today, it should be 
expected that environmental governance, too, would be shaped by the neoliberal imperative to 
deregulate, liberalize trade and investment, marketize, and privatize (Mansfield 2004a, p.313). 
 
Discourses of reform are congruent with neoliberal values and are based on 
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incremental change and maintenance of the status quo. I will consider three climate 
discourses in this section: ecological modernisation; individualism; and privatization. 
 
3.5.1   Ecological Modernisation 
The discourse of ecological modernisation (EM) is probably the most well-
known neoliberal response to environmental problems. The most important 
modification to neoliberalism that EM proposes is in its account of the relationship 
between the environment and the economy. In its pure form neoliberalism did not 
acknowledge the existence of the environment as anything more than a resource 
(Blowers 1997). The relationship between the environment and the economy was one 
of conflict. The neoliberal pursuit of continual growth and self-interest was 
contradictory to the traditional environmental ethos of conservation and concern for 
the natural world. As an approach to climate change, EM attempts to alter this 
relationship in three main ways. First, problems such as climate change must be taken 
seriously. Mol and Sonnenfeld (2000) argue that, ‘complete neglect of the 
environment and the fundamental counter-positioning of economic and 
environmental interests are no longer accepted as legitimate positions’ (p.7). Climate 
change cannot be ignored; it is a problem that must be addressed. Second, although 
the environment remains a resource, it must be treated as ‘society’s sustenance base’ 
rather than a limitless supply of materials and sinks (Mol and Spaargaren 2000, p.23). 
The climate is fragile and it must be respected for the important role it plays in our 
lives. We must ensure that the effects of climate change do not harm us and that we 
can continue to use natural resources in a way that meets our needs and wants. 
Finally, and most notably, the relationship between the environment and the economy 
is constructed as one of harmony. Hajer (1995) states that, ‘environmental 
management is seen as a positive-sum game: pollution prevention pays’ (p.3). This 
transformed relationship between the environment and the economy is the ‘distinct 
feature of ecological modernization’ (Backstrand and Lovbrand 2006, p.52). We can 
have a healthy environment and a healthy economy. There is no longer a conflict 
between conservation and growth. Conservation is necessary for a healthy economy 
and careful or ‘managed’ growth is conducive to environmental protection. 
Despite the transformation of this fundamental component, however, many of 
the key features of neoliberalism remain unchanged. The key values of the discourse 
still focus on growth and profit. Pepper (1999) argues that, ‘ecological modernisation 
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sees environmental protection not as an impediment to capital accumulation but as a 
potential source of further accumulation’ (p.3). Similarly, assumptions about human 
nature remain unchanged. EM has proven a very popular approach to climate change 
because, ‘the economic advantages to countries and companies leading the field in 
environmental performance improvements have been recognised as considerable’ 
(Christoff 1996, p.478). Self-interest and the pursuit of profit remain paramount. 
Backstrand and Lovbrand (2006) consider the discourse of EM in the context of 
international climate negotiations. They note that: 
 
The investments in climate mitigation projects in developing countries enabled by the CDM
13
 have 
also been widely embraced by the international business community. CDM projects are commonly 
portrayed as a market opportunity that can boost competitiveness (pp.60-61). 
 
This example also illustrates the continued importance of freedom as a value in this 
discourse. CDM is a popular tool for climate change mitigation because it promotes 
market competition, but also because it does not impose ‘strict targets and timetables 
for a stabilization of greenhouse gases’ (Backstrand and Lovbrand 2006, p.60). 
Given the importance of freedom, the state/market relationship also remains 
largely unchanged from a pure neoliberal discourse. If anything, EM affords more 
power to the market in an environmental context. Since previously climate change 
was not a neoliberal consideration, it was the role of the state to ensure the regulation 
of emissions. As climate change is subsumed into the neoliberal discourse, the role of 
the state becomes further ‘decentralised, flexible and consensual’ (Mol and 
Sonnenfeld 2000, p.7). According to EM, the market can do a more efficient job of 
regulating emissions than the state. There is therefore a ‘move from command and 
control to economic instruments’ (Young 2000, p.12). The relationship between the 
state and the market becomes more co-operative over climate change, but the market 
retains control as the most important entity (Young 2000; Backstrand and Lovbrand 
2006). 
Ecological modernisation is a co-operative venture. Although the balance of 
power is unequal, many key agents play a role in this climate discourse. Government, 
                                                          
13
 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), defined in Article 12 of the Protocol, allows a country 
with an emission-reduction or emission-limitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B 
Party) to implement an emission-reduction project in developing countries. Such projects can earn 
saleable certified emission reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2, which can be 
counted towards meeting Kyoto targets (UNFCCC 2011b).  
 68 
 
business and scientists are all expected to work together to tackle environmental 
problems. Pepper (1999) claims that, ‘technological and managerial experts, 
businesses and industry all become key actors in fulfilling the environmental agenda’ 
(p.3). Climate change can be solved through technological innovation and 
sophisticated management of the environment. 
The discourse of EM necessarily includes an account of social change. It is a 
discourse constructed to incorporate environmental concerns, including climate 
change, into the dominant discourse of neoliberalism. The very essence of the 
discourse is a change from the traditional destructive relationship between the 
environment and the economy. However, this change is consistent with the values of 
neoliberalism. Progress, in terms of material wealth and human well-being, is still 
expected to occur as the outcome of individual choices in a competitive market. The 
difference is that the market must now incorporate environmental concerns: 
 
The assumption here (and the assumptions are usually unquestioned) is that a process of industrial 
innovation encouraged by a market economy and facilitated by an enabling state will ensure 
environmental conservation (Blowers 1997, p. 847).     
 
Hence, science and technology provide ‘innovation’ and the ‘diffusion of new 
technologies’ for environmental protection (Spaargaren 2000, p.325). A neoliberal 
market ensures that this process remains efficient and competitive and profit is 
generated for ‘green’ businesses. However, this account of social change is firmly 
rooted in a tradition of reform. Ecological modernisation has a ‘strong bias in favour 
of consensus and conflict avoidance... it seeks to avoid addressing basic social 
contradictions’ (Reitan 1998, p.15). Environmental problems such as climate change 
are internalised through market mechanisms but the market it not considered as part 
of the problem. This discourse therefore focuses on gradual and incremental change. 
It should be noted that some theorists do acknowledge a stronger version of 
ecological modernisation (Christoff 1996; Hajer 1996; Pepper 1999). The 
components of this altered discourse do allow a stronger role for the state and a more 
radical account of social change. However, for purposes of clarity, I will ‘equate the 
discourse of ecological modernization with the weak version, since it arguably 
represents the predominant discourse in global rhetoric and practice’ (Backstrand and 
Lovbrand 2006, p.53). 
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3.5.2   Individualism 
The discourse of individualism is also based on a reformist account of social 
change. The neoliberal emphasis on growth and consumption remains paramount. 
The main difference between this discourse and ecological modernisation is the locus 
of action and the relative responsibilities of key agents. Individualism concentrates on 
the private sphere and the role of individuals in tackling climate change. Individuals 
can ‘retro-fit their house with compact florescent light-bulbs and shower timers’ 
(Hobson 2008, p.546), they can add green products to their weekly shopping list 
(Seyfang 2005; Greenburg 2006) and they can switch to ‘green’ energy (Rowlands et 
al 2003). Barkenbus (2010) also points out the numerous changes a person can make 
to their driving habits in an attempt to reduce emissions. They can purchase ‘more 
fuel efficient vehicles’ or ‘vehicles that utilize low-carbon fuels (e.g. electricity, 
natural gas, or ethanol)’ or they can ‘operate their current vehicles more efficiently’ 
(p.762). 
The key agents in this discourse are individual consumers acting as neoliberal 
subjects. Their role is to make environmentally friendly purchases, but purchases 
nonetheless. Slocum (2004a) claims that, ‘passivity is the hallmark of the consumer’ 
(p.765). People are not expected to challenge the system; they are expected to make 
environmentally friendly consumption choices. It should be noted that some accounts 
of individualism do afford a slightly more radical role to the individual consumer. 
Clarke et al (2007) argue that, ‘ethical consumption, understood as an organised 
movement, seeks to use everyday consumption as a surface of mobilisation for wider, 
explicitly political aims and agendas’ (p.233). There is an element of ‘citizenship’ in 
the practice of consumption. Consumerism is ‘increasingly seen as a public arena of 
activism and the expression of citizenship’ (Seyfang 2005, p.290). However, Smart 
(2010) acknowledges the complicated relationship between the individual and market 
forces. Although consumers can dictate the success of available products, they can 
only purchase those products that are available (p.37)
14
. Indeed, later in her paper, 
Seyfang (2005) concedes the limits of consumerist action: 
 
A person might choose one brand of washing-machine over another because of its greater energy-
efficiency, but what they cannot easily choose is to purchase collectively and share common laundry 
facilities among a local group of residents. Consumers are effectively locked in to particular 
                                                          
14
 A similar argument is made by both Maniates (2001) and Sanne (2002). 
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consumption patterns by the overarching social structures of market, business, working patterns, urban 
planning and development (p.297). 
 
Hence, an individualistic account of social change is based on small, incremental 
actions that an individual can make without drastic alterations to their way of life. 
Individualism is concerned with maintaining the overall structures of society and 
placing responsibility for problems like climate change on the shoulders of those who 
live and work within that system (Maniates 2001; Kent 2009). Consumption is not 
challenged. Rather, it is framed as an arena for positive individual action, ‘as in calls 
for “green consumption” or the moral imperatives of recycling’ (Conca et al 2001, 
p.1). 
The discourse retains many of the key neoliberal values. The focus is on 
consumption and individual freedom. Hobson (2001) argues that ‘a state of 
“consumer sovereignty” exists, where freedom and consumption are inextricably 
linked’ (p.100). Although the discourse is centred on the responsibility of individuals, 
this is still couched in essentially voluntaristic terms. Kirk (2008) contends that 
‘neoliberal informed approaches to climate change mitigation would favour tools 
such as voluntary eco-consumerism, rather than use of regulatory tools such as tax 
incentives’ (p.161). Accordingly, value is placed on the importance of choice. It is the 
responsibility of the individual to reduce their own carbon emissions, but it remains 
their choice to act (Clarke et al 2007). 
The importance of knowledge is also prevalent in this discourse. The role of 
knowledge in creating climate-protecting behaviour is a subject of some controversy. 
The ‘information deficit’ model of pro-environmental behaviour is ‘based on a linear 
progression of environmental knowledge leading to environmental awareness and 
concern (environmental attitudes), which in turn [is] thought to lead to pro-
environmental behaviour’ (Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002, p. 241). The model has 
been subject to criticism for its tendency to over-simplify the issue (Chess and 
Johnson 2007). However, the provision of information is important in discourses of 
individualism. If people are informed about the benefits of individual action (both for 
themselves and for the climate) they are more likely to act. Proponents of 
individualism often highlight the role of information in encouraging climate-
protecting behaviour (Clarke et al 2007; Barkenbus 2010). 
 71 
 
The account of human nature in this discourse is also consistent with key 
neoliberal values. People are individualistic and materialistic by nature, they ‘respond 
to economic incentives and make rational choices determined by their personal 
preferences and the (predominately economic) constraints they face’ (Berglund and 
Matti 2006, p.555). For this reason, the market still plays a dominant role in the 
discourse of individualism. Marketing strategies and incentives are used to influence 
individual choice. Advertising presents information about the attractiveness of 
‘green’ products, appealing to materialistic and self-interested concerns. Charman 
(2008) enthuses that, ‘environmentally friendly products are hot - the newest 
marketing fad - and already a multibillion dollar market’ (p.31). The individual is the 
most important agent but the market plays a fundamental role, structuring the 
products and choices that are available (Seyfang 2005). The state, on the other hand, 
remains an auxiliary entity. Since the environment is a concern for the market, 
Maniates (2001) claims we have seen a ‘depoliticization of environmental 
degradation’ (p.34). Government climate policy remains, but it is ‘dominated by 
individualistic culture and a market-led approach to sustainable consumption’ 
(Seyfang 2004, p.334). 
The main difference between individualism and ecological modernisation is 
that they attribute the responsibility for dealing with climate change to different 
agents. In an ecological modernisation discourse the onus for action is on business 
and technology; it is located in the realm of production. In a discourse of 
individualism, responsibility lies with the consumer: 
 
Sustainable consumption addresses the ‘demand side’ of the market, just as end of pipe technologies,   
renewable energy and commercial waste management address the ‘supply side’. It places the 
responsibility for change unequivocally within the domain of the individual consumer (Hinton and 
Redclift 2009, p.9). 
 
Rational consumers are expected to make pro-environmental choices and encourage 
the provision of ‘green’ products. 
In this climate discourse, the relationship between the environment and the 
economy is relatively harmonious. Seyfang (2004) claims that there is ‘acceptance of 
certain environmental limits’, but that there is also a ‘reliance on experts to identify 
these as the basis of setting market frameworks’ (p.332). The messages that come out 
of the discourse are very environmentally friendly: ‘live lightly on the planet’ and 
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‘reduce your environmental impact’. However, these sentiments are ‘paradoxically a 
consumer-product growth industry’ (Maniates 2001, p.34). 
 
3.5.3   Privatisation 
The privatisation of nature has received a lot of attention in academia. Studies 
have focused on the commodification of water (Bond 2004; Bakker 2007; Bakker 
2010), the privatisation of oceans and fisheries (Mansfield 2004a; Mansfield 2004b) 
and property rights associated with the environment more generally (O’Neill 2001; 
Castree 2003). Unsurprisingly, the prominence of climate change as an issue has led 
to ‘one of neoliberalism’s potentially greatest class projects: the attempt to privatise 
the climate itself’ (Lohmann 2010, p.78). 
Privatisation is a distinct feature of neoliberalism. It has led to the dissolution 
of the public realm and public services (Clarke 2004, p.27) and the creation of 
markets where they previously did not exist (education, health care, social security, or 
environmental pollution) (Harvey 2007, p.22). As such, reformist approaches to 
climate change do include discourses of privatisation. Strictly speaking it is difficult 
to commodify the climate itself. Lohmann (2010) claims that, ‘the earth’s climate-
regulating capacity is… a quintessential Polanyian “fictitious commodity”’ (p.79). 
However, the problem of climate change is linked to other ‘commodifiable’ 
resources. Trees, for example, have the ‘ability to decrease energy consumption, and 
thus carbon emissions, by moderating temperature extremes’ (Heynon and Perkins 
2005, p.100). Indeed, international initiatives such as REDD+ have involved placing 
a price on the conservation of nature
15
. 
Moreover, pollution itself can be privatised. The trading of carbon emissions 
associated with international climate policy is tantamount to privatising the climate: 
‘‘‘Cap and trade’’ essentially turns pollution into a commodity that the polluters and 
others can sell’ (Charman 2008, p.33). The assumption of this discourse is that the 
unregulated use of common resources, including the atmosphere, has led to 
environmental degradation, including climate change. However, if the natural world 
is privatised, it can be valued and protected. Humphreys (2009) argues that, ‘if forests 
                                                          
15
 Essentially, REDD+ is ‘paying forest owners and users – either through national governments or 
directly – to fell fewer trees and manage their forests better. Famers, companies and forest owners can 
simply sell forest carbon credits and less cattle, coffee, cocoa or charcoal’ (Angelson 2009, p.1). The 
initiative was first introduced in December 2005.   
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are to be conserved they should be given economic value in market mechanisms. 
Forests without economic value will be at risk of deforestation and forest 
degradation’ (p.321). Similarly, ‘market forces will fix the price of carbon emissions 
at a level that will reward low polluters and provide a financial incentive for high 
polluters to invest in clean technology in order to reduce future emissions’ 
(Humphreys 2009, p.321). The relationship between the environment and the 
economy is therefore one of protection. It is necessary to bring the environment into 
the economic calculus to ensure it is valued correctly and not exploited. The key 
values of the discourse are therefore the protection of natural resources based on the 
establishment of private property rights (Bakker 2007, p.432). In addition, neoliberal 
values such as profit and market competition play a role in the climate discourse of 
privatisation. 
The account of human nature in this climate discourse is again based on self-
interest. However, in this case it is directed towards the protection of the natural 
world. As with the discourse of individualism, the concern is with utilizing self-
interest for the benefit of the climate. Hardin (1968) famously stated that, ‘freedom in 
a commons brings ruin to all’ (p.1244). The inclination of every man is to overuse the 
commons for his own individual benefit when the consequences will be shared by all. 
The same is true of the global atmosphere. The effects of climate change are not felt 
proportionally by those who caused the problem. Self-interest therefore dictates that 
we should continue to emit carbon and maintain our own standard of living because 
we will not have to deal directly with the consequences. A discourse of privatisation 
attempts to overcome this problem by introducing a sense of ‘ownership’ over 
environmental problems. If we own something we are more likely to care for it; it is 
in our interest to look after it. O’Neill (2001) cites a famous example of this argument 
in the words of Aristotle: ‘Men pay most attention to what is their own: they care less 
for what is common; or at any rate, they care for it only to the extent to which each is 
individually concerned’ (p.697). If we put a price on pollution or privatise a forest it 
is in the interest of the relevant country or corporation to regulate their emissions or 
take care of the trees. Self-interest is then directed towards temperance and 
preservation. 
The key actors in this discourse are the self-interested individuals and 
corporations who are involved in a system of property rights. The discourse of 
privatisation often plays out at the international level with climate policy translated 
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into market instruments. Bakker (2007) argues that, ‘the Kyoto declaration embodies 
an increasingly dominant philosophy of development... a mode of resource regulation 
which aims to deploy markets as the solution to environmental problems’ (p.432). 
The market again takes power away from the state as property rights and the problem 
of climate change is transferred to the private sector. 
The discourse of privatisation provides an account of social change again 
based on neoliberal values and principles of reform. The underlying mechanisms 
remain the same as they would in a purely neoliberal discourse. Change occurs 
through the aggregation of individual preferences in a competitive market. This is 
particularly important for a discourse of privatisation because the process of 
‘privatising’ the environment is central to the internalisation of environmental 
problems. Placing property rights over trees or carbon emissions is the fundamental 
basis for ‘bring[ing] environmental goods into the market exchange’ (O’Neill 2001, 
p.699). 
 
3.6   Dealing with Climate Change: Discourses of Revolution 
Discourses of revolution represent a fundamental challenge to neoliberalism. 
Proponents of these discourses argue that neoliberalism cannot be expected to deal 
with a problem that it created in the first place: 
 
The greatest challenge of the global environmental crisis is to overturn our historically deeply 
embedded assumption that 'progress' via unlimited exploitation of natural resources is both inevitable 
and desirable (Oosthoek and Gills 2005, p.288). 
 
Climate change is constructed as a problem that is inherent in the neoliberal system. 
As such, revolutionary approaches pose a challenge to the key neoliberal values and 
relationships. I will consider four climate discourses in this section: Sufficiency; deep 
ecology; justice; and democratic citizenship. 
 
3.6.1   Sufficiency 
The discourse of sufficiency is rooted in a fundamental challenge to key 
neoliberal values. Neoliberalism is based upon growth, profit, efficiency and 
accumulation. Therefore discourses of reform draw upon these values as the basis for 
environmental protection. Individualism, for example, promotes ‘green’ consumption. 
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We can continue to consume as long as this is done in an environmentally conscious 
manner. Sufficiency, on the other hand, is concerned with limits, well-being and 
quality of life. Seyfang (2005) considers the difference between these two 
standpoints: 
 
The central point of departure for the alternative approach to sustainable consumption is the question 
of economic growth. Mainstream strategies for sustainable consumption assume this is a necessary 
prerequisite, despite the failings of indicators such as GDP... These alternative sustainable 
consumption proposals entail cutting absolute levels of consumption in order to reduce the ecological 
footprints of modern industrialised societies (pp.298-299).  
 
The discourse therefore challenges the global spread of neoliberal values. For many, 
the defining feature of neoliberalism is its global reach and influence (Larner 2003; 
von Werlhof 2008). Discourses of sufficiency promote the benefits of localisation and 
living lightly on the planet. Hines (2003) claims that, ‘emphasis is not on competition 
for the cheapest, but co-operation for the best’ (p.1). Discourses of sufficiency also 
offer alternative definitions of neoliberal values such as progress and development. 
Mainstream rhetoric concentrates on gross domestic product (GDP) as the measure of 
a country’s development. GDP is the ‘typical index used… to measure progress and 
welfare’ (D’Acci 2011, p.48).  A discourse of sufficiency challenges this default 
position. Daly (1996b) argues that we need ‘development without growth. Growth is 
to get bigger, development is to get different’ (p.268). Sufficiency focuses on quality 
rather than quantity; it considers ‘needs’ as opposed to ‘wants’ (Hines 2000). 
The account of social change is rooted in this alternative conception of 
development and progress. We can address problems such as climate change by 
redefining our goals as individuals and as a society: ‘If “progress” in development did 
not primarily consist of indefinitely increasing material consumption, then “progress” 
would be less likely to constrain global environmental carrying capacity’ (Pepper 
1999, p.29). Proponents of this discourse argue that we need an alternative way of 
gauging progress. Seyfang (2005) suggests that some measure of domestic progress 
(MDP), evaluating happiness and well-being, may be preferable to GDP
16
. This 
redefinition of progress and a localised economy and society would potentially lead 
to a smaller carbon footprint. Barkin (2003) claims that, ‘there would seem on the 
                                                          
16 Since 1950 GDP has rapidly increased, while MDP has ‘barely grown at all’.  In the last 30 years 
GDP has grown by 80% while MDP has fallen (Seyfang 2005, p.299). For further information see 
Jackson (2005b).  
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face of it to be a strong compatibility between this anti-globalization position and the 
demands of dealing with climate change’ (p.9). We can reduce the emissions caused 
by the global transportation of products by buying locally (Seyfang 2008, p.188). We 
can reduce our food miles by shopping at a farmers market (Feagan 2008, p.164) or 
investing in a community supported agriculture scheme (CSA)
17
. 
The account of human nature in this discourse is that individuals can look 
beyond their own self-interest and work towards the common good. Princen (2003) 
argues that a discourse of sufficiency acknowledges the capability of people to 
recognise limits: ‘Sufficiency as an idea is straightforward, indeed simple and 
intuitive, arguably “rational”. It is the sense that, as one does more and more of an 
activity, there can be enough and there can be too much’ (p.43). Individuals are the 
key agents, but their role is to work towards the overall wellbeing of the community. 
Hence, they can recognise the limits of their activities and consider what is best for 
the community rather than for their own personal gain. Hinton and Redclift (2009) 
contend that this ‘alternative discourse…involves frugality, thrift and a kind of 
voluntary austerity’ (p.4). Localisation also constitutes ‘a rearranging of patterns of 
economic interaction that promotes economic integration regionally rather than 
globally’ (Barkin 2003, p.8). Markets are supported by local people (as key agents) 
and the system operates in a sustainable manner. 
The relationship between the state and the market is remarkably similar to 
reformist approaches to climate change. The market maintains the prominent 
position. Indeed, Hines (2003) argues that ‘localisation can be thought of as the flow 
of ideas, technologies, information, culture, money and goods with the end goal of 
protecting and rebuilding economies worldwide’ (p.1). However, the role of the 
market is entirely different to the neoliberal conception of the market. The local 
economy supports the local society and is, in turn, supported by that society.  There is 
no pursuit of unlimited accumulation, as there would be in global markets of 
neoliberalism. 
Given the alternative conception of the market and the key values of this 
discourse, the relationship between the environment and economy is one of harmony. 
                                                          
17 In its simplest form CSA involves local people investing in a farm or crop in advance of the harvest. 
This guarantees an income for the farmer and shares the risk amongst the investors. In return the 
investors get a share of the harvest, often this is a vegetable box but it could also be fruit, eggs or meat. 
(Cox et al 2008, p.204). 
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Resources are not used to excess and the balance of the climate is respected with 
fewer emissions from local, smaller activities (Douthwaite 1999; Schumacher 1999). 
 
3.6.2   Justice 
A justice based approach to climate change challenges the widely accepted 
neoliberal account of human nature and offers an alternative account of social change. 
For many of the reformist discourses we can deal with climate change by appealing to 
self-interest and changing the behaviour of individuals, states and corporations. 
Climate change can be a win-win business; profits can be made through a more 
efficient use of materials and processes. Individuals can reduce their fuel bills and 
improve the local air quality through taking public transport and buying ‘green’ 
products. Reformist accounts of social change rely on incremental alterations based 
on penalties and incentives (Dobson 2007, p.277). A discourse of justice disputes the 
basis of this approach. Climate change is not about self-interest and the inducement 
of climate-friendly behaviour. Fundamentally, climate change ‘is an ethical issue’ 
(Gardiner 2004, p.556). We should not deal with climate change because it will bring 
benefits to us. We should deal with it because it is the right thing to do. For Jamison 
(2010) this discourse epitomises the challenge to neoliberal accounts of social 
change. The ‘emergent position’ accepts the problem of climate change, but stresses 
‘the importance of dealing with climate change in ways that take issues of justice and 
fairness seriously into account’ (p.812). 
The impacts of climate change will be felt disproportionately around the world 
and ‘those who currently emit the most greenhouse gases are not likely those who 
will be most harmed by global warming’ (Brown 2003, p.229). Accordingly, a 
discourse of justice deals with values of fairness, responsibility and rights. Beckman 
and Page (2005) state that, ‘the issues of who (recipients) should get how much 
(pattern) at whose cost (burden bearers) are of great importance for our understanding 
of justice both within and between generations’ (p.528). A discourse of justice 
contends that these are the most important considerations that should be made when 
dealing with climate change. Indeed, one of the most debated issues in international 
climate policy is the question of responsibility in the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions (Soroos 2001; Dimitrov 2010). 
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The fundamental difference between this discourse and more reformist 
accounts is the conception of persons. All individuals are bearers of fundamental 
rights by the very virtue of being human. Whilst neoliberal discourse emphasises the 
right to freedom and property, a justice discourse concentrates on the basic welfare 
rights of individuals. Each person has a right to their most basic needs (e.g., food, 
shelter, security). Accordingly, our approach to the problem of climate change should 
be considered as a matter of human rights: 
 
Persons have a human right not to suffer from the ill-effects of global climate change. Climate change 
undermines persons’ human rights to a decent standard of health, to economic necessities, and to  
subsistence (Caney 2008, p.551).  
 
The conception of individuals in this discourse can also be related to its account of 
human nature. Individuals are not solely self-interested rational consumers. Rather, 
they are capable of acting justly. In fact, it is assumed that ‘the capacity for a sense of 
justice is possessed by the overwhelming majority of mankind’ (Rawls 1999, p.443). 
Thus, we can recognise the justice-based implications of anthropogenic climate 
change and accept some of the responsibility for mitigation. 
Given the emphasis on human rights and human nature, the key agents in this 
account are individuals. However, different theorists place varying degrees of 
importance on gender, race and socio-economic situation. Arora-Jonsson (2011) for 
example, writes about the disproportionate impacts of climate change on women, 
while Barnett (2006) argues that ‘poverty is a key determinant of vulnerability to 
climate change’ (p.123). Discourses of justice also consider the role of future 
generations and non-human nature. 
The relationship between the environment and the economy is an interesting 
aspect of this discourse. The environment is perceived to be more than a mere 
resource as it is in many neoliberal accounts of climate change. In some accounts of 
justice the natural world is deemed to have rights and be worthy of protection on the 
basis of its intrinsic worth (Baxter 2000). However, it is not necessarily the most 
important consideration. In most discourses of justice, the primary focus is on the 
rights and needs of individuals (Thomas and Twyman 2005; Woods 2006; Caney 
2008). That said, it is often the case that protection of the natural world is consistent 
with ideals of justice. Shrader-Frechette (2002) argues that, ‘protection for people and 
planet go hand in hand’ (p.5). In this discourse the harmony between the two entities 
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does not rest on the fact that protection of the natural world can boost the growth and 
profit of the economy. Rather, the premise is that a stable, just economy will be 
naturally lead to a protected and stable climate. 
The relationship between the state and the market is another area that 
represents a challenge to reformist approaches. Although the economy is important, it 
should not be given primacy in the same way it would in neoliberal accounts of social 
change. Bond (2000) argues that a climate discourse of justice, ‘sites the issues of 
ecological damage within a socio-political context first and foremost, and poses firm 
moral and distributional questions about that context’ (p.36). The economy should be 
used to create wealth and prosperity, but it is the role of the state to ensure that this is 
done in a fair and just manner. Many theorists in this area also advocate the 
importance of democracy in accounts of justice: 
 
To correct problems of environmental justice, it will be necessary to improve the principles and 
practices of distributive justice... it will also be necessary to reform the principles and practices of 
participative justice’ (Shrader-Frechette 2002, p.24). 
 
It is important that the benefits and burdens of climate change are fairly distributed 
but it is also important that people are involved in the decision making process. The 
state should therefore play an important role in ensuring both distributive and 
participative justice on the issue of climate change. 
 
3.6.3   Deep Ecology 
The most fundamental challenge that this discourse poses to neoliberalism is 
rooted in the relationship between the environment and the economy. The discourse 
of sufficiency challenged key neoliberal values. It criticised the ever-increasing 
pursuit for growth and profit favouring instead well-being and quality of life. The 
discourse of justice embodied a similar challenge, focusing on values of fairness, 
responsibility and basic human rights. The latter discourse also challenged the 
neoliberal conception of human nature, arguing that principles of justice should 
temper the self-interested imperatives of the neoliberal subject. A discourse of deep 
ecology proposes perhaps the most fundamental challenge to reformist discourses. 
The environment should not be valued as resource for our controlled development or 
as a resource to improve the quality of all human life. Rather, it should be valued 
because it is intrinsically important: ‘Nature and its diversity have intrinsic value 
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irrespective of human uses and interests’ (Dryzek 1997, p.156). Soper (2000) 
considers the relationship between our conception of nature and the way in which we 
treat it: 
 
What bearing do our attitudes to nature, or our ontological conceptions of it, have on the way we treat 
it? Are changed perceptions of its worth always conducive to improved practice? Is the development of 
respect for nature's intrinsic value an essential precondition of such improvement (p.88)? 
 
For advocates of deep ecology, respect for nature’s intrinsic value is indeed a 
precondition of its protection. The relationship between the environment and 
economy is unequal, but it is the environment that is granted more importance. 
The neoliberal relationship between the state and the market is also challenged 
in this discourse with particular criticism of privatisation discourses. There are two 
important reasons for this criticism. First, the natural world is not a commodity. If we 
value something for its intrinsic value then we cannot equate it to a commodity; 
something that is for sale: 
 
Under the self-regulating market of liberal capitalism, market signals alone are necessarily insufficient 
in governing the allocation of nature to meet economic and competing social demands (e.g. for clean 
drinking water) because nature in its various forms is not a commodity, that is, not produced for sale 
(McCarthy and Prudham 2004, p.281). 
 
Second, a climate discourse of deep ecology argues that, even if it were possible to 
commodify nature, this would not result in its protection. The purpose of involving 
the private sector in the protection of the climate is to introduce the logic of the 
market. This will account for environmental damage, such as climate change, and 
incorporate it into the economic calculus. We can prevent damage before it occurs or 
charge countries and corporations for the damage that they cause (Robertson 2004). 
Money can then be re-invested in green technology and carbon offsetting projects. 
However, Bakker (2007) claims that privatization, ‘introduces a pernicious 
logic of the market... answerable to shareholders and with the over-riding goal of 
profit’ (p.437). If nature is only protected as a resource then its protection is subject to 
its value as a resource. Fulcher (2004) argues that it is ‘not the nature of a thing that 
matters but the possibility of making a profit out of it’ (p.14). If it is profitable to cut 
down a forest and use the land to graze cattle or build upon then the ‘over-riding goal 
of profit’ will make that the main consideration. To demonstrate this problem Sagoff 
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(1988) describes a situation near his hometown in the USA. There was a piece of 
protected land on which developers were keen to situate a mall. Despite the protected 
status of the land and the protests of local people, the mall was built, suggesting that 
‘the price that land (or any other resource) might command on the free market 
determines or measures the value of the competing uses to which it may be put’ 
(Sagoff 1988, p.193). A discourse of deep ecology insists on the problems of market 
intervention in natural processes. The state must protect the commons on the basis of 
its intrinsic value. 
An account of social change for this climate discourse is based on 
fundamentally reconceptualising our relationship with the natural world and 
challenging the key values of neoliberalism. The problem of climate change is rooted 
in our valuation of the natural world as a resource. We must consider the problems 
that climate change will cause for the natural world (as encouraged in some 
discourses of justice) and we must approach the problem by protecting the earth on 
the basis of its intrinsic value. In this eco-centric discourse, ‘man should not place 
himself at the centre and regard the value of non-humans as purely instrumental. The 
entire ecosystem with all its living beings should be central’ (Kamminga 2008, 
p.684). Thus, the key agents in this account are eco-systems, non-human nature and 
the natural world more generally. We must approach climate change by challenging 
both the neoliberal conception of the natural world and its account of self-interested 
human nature. 
 
3.6.4   Democratic Citizenship 
A discourse of democratic citizenship has been variously detailed in the 
literature and has some resonance with ‘civic environmentalism’ (Backstrand and 
Lovbrand 2006); ‘environmental citizenship’ (Bell 2005; Dobson 2007); and 
‘democratic pragmatism’ (Dryzek 1997). The discourse puts individuals at the heart 
of solutions to climate change. However, the role of the individual is not as a passive 
consumer or a neoliberal subject. Rather, the individual is a change agent or a citizen. 
In this capacity individuals can put pressure on states and corporations to regulate 
emissions (Hale 2010) and they can implement action at the grassroots of society 
(Horton 2006; Rootes 2007). The work of individuals as change agents is evident in 
many climate initiatives, such as Transition Towns (Ockwell et al 2009) and 
potentially the climate champion programme itself. As citizens, individuals are also 
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expected to deliberate about important climate related issues and agree upon action 
for change: 
 
Rather than being management problems that governments or experts can solve for us, when seen as 
ethical problems, they become problems for us all to address, both as political actors and as everyday 
moral agents’ (Jamieson 1992, p.150). 
 
Our role is to deliberate about the type of society we want to live in and then 
implement action for change. Backstrand and Lovbrand (2006) claim that there is a 
‘participation gap’ in modern society (p.55). We must address this problem in order 
to deal with climate change. 
In this climate discourse the key actors, key values and the account of human 
nature are intertwined. The key values focus on collectivism, responsibility, 
deliberation and the common good. Individuals are constructed as ‘citizens’ who are 
concerned with the common good and the public interest (Dobson 2007). The account 
of human nature therefore challenges the neoliberal focus on self-interest: 
 
On the other hand, we have the citizens, individuals whose decisions are based on a separate set of 
values, with their acts motivated by an altruistic concern for a larger community. That is, they may 
refrain from individual short-term gains if the society at large is better off in the long term (Berglund 
and Matti 2006, p.555). 
 
This concern for the common good generates a collective response to climate change 
and, consequently, an important role for the state. An environmental problem such as 
climate change sits squarely in the sphere of political responsibility and governance. 
Sagoff (1988) argues that, ‘[environmental problems] are primarily moral, aesthetic, 
cultural and political and they must be addressed in those terms’ (p.6). The 
relationship between the state and market is completely unequal. Climate change is 
not an issue for the market to deal with: ‘economics may be able to tell us how to 
reach our goals efficiently, but it cannot tell us what our goals should be or even 
whether we should be concerned to reach them efficiently’ (Jamieson 1992, p.147). 
Making decisions about our shared goals and the kind of society we would like to live 
in is a collective endeavour. According to this discourse it should be done within the 
realm of the state and not on the basis of market indicators. 
The role of the state is not as ‘another’; it is not separate from the general 
population. The state is the embodiment of our collective goals and interests. Indeed, 
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Sagoff (1988) contends that, ‘social regulation expresses what we believe, what we 
are, what we stand for, not simply what we wish to buy as individuals’ (p.17). The 
state is the sphere for collective action and then potentially the enforcement of our 
collective goals. 
The relationship between the environment and the economy is not especially 
prominent in this discourse. The reason for this is that climate change is not 
constructed as an economic issue; it is a political issue. As a discourse of revolution, 
democratic citizenship constructs the problem of climate change as a fundamental 
flaw in the neoliberal system. Contrary to the more dominant reformist approaches, 
democratic citizenship cannot reconcile neoliberal imperatives and approaches to the 
problem of climate change. The account of social change in this discourse is a 
fundamental challenge to neoliberal values and accounts of human nature. 
 
3.7   Conclusion 
The categorisation of climate discourses is a complicated process. The 
distinctions between discourses are contestable and any classificatory scheme will 
exhibit some element of arbitrariness. Inevitably, there will be overlapping 
components and many further internal nuances in each discourse. Individuals can 
draw upon a multitude of discourses at any one time. Moreover, different accounts of 
human nature and the role of key agents are not exclusive. People can be both 
consumers and citizens, appealing to self-interest and altruism depending on the 
situation (Berglund and Matti 2006). Reformist discourses, which draw on neoliberal 
values and ideology, represent the dominant construction of the climate change 
problem as well as the dominant approach to dealing with it. Heynon and Robbins 
(2005) acknowledge that neoliberalism can feel ‘fated and inescapable’ (p.6). 
However, there are also many discourses of revolution which are ‘challenging the 
master narrative of neoliberalism’ (p.7). The problem of climate change and how we 
should deal with it remains an issue of debate and controversy. 
The development of analytical categories and the categorisation of climate 
discourses offers a useful way to analyse the multitude of climate discourses present 
in modern society. In this chapter, I have detailed the analytical approach of the 
project and situated discourses of climate change in the context of neoliberalism as 
the dominant societal discourse. I have considered the construction of climate change 
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as a problem as well conducting a systematic analysis of seven climate discourses
18
. 
This attempt to map the theoretical terrain will be drawn upon in the second half of 
the thesis. I will use both the climate discourses and the analytical categories to 
investigate the communication of climate change in large corporations. 
                                                          
18
 Please see Appendix A for a Summary of Analytical Categories and Climate Discourses 
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Chapter 4 
Methodology and the Research Process 
 
The focus of the project was the everyday communication of climate change. I 
was interested in the climate discourses that were being used by individuals and the 
relationship between micro level interaction and dominant climate discourses. The 
project was organised around the following research objectives: (i) to identify the 
climate discourses that were being used in everyday communication (ii) to understand 
how dominant climate discourses constructed ‘appropriate’/‘inappropriate’ ways to 
think and talk about climate change (iii) to analyse how dominant discourses were 
reproduced and reinforced in everyday interactions (iv) to identify possible resistance 
to dominant discourse and analyse how this operated at sites of interaction. 
The previous three chapters have outlined the context for the research and the 
role of discourse analysis in approaching climate change as a problem. In any 
discursive project the theoretical framework and methodology are closely connected. 
Taylor (2001) claims that ‘it is this theoretical underpinning rather than any sorting 
process which distinguishes discourse analysis’ (p.39). As such, the methodology has 
been discussed to some extent. I have already explained how I will carry out the 
actual research because it is inextricably linked to the way I have theorised the 
problem. However, there are many further methodological issues to consider. This 
chapter will detail the research process and address the potential limitations of the 
project. 
In section 4.1 I will discuss how I selected a sample of participants and 
developed the questions that I would ask them. I will provide details about the 
process of conducting the interviews and how I analysed the data. In section 4.2 I will 
discuss some important research considerations about the strengths and limitations of 
my project. I will focus on the ethics, reliability and validity of the data. I will also 
discuss the problems I faced as I tried to generate a sample of businesses that 
represented different sectors. Finally, section 4.3 will provide some reflections on the  
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research and the challenges I faced as a researcher.  I will consider my own bias as a 
‘self-professed environmentalist’ and the problem I faced as I attempted to reconcile a 
constructivist approach with my desire to ‘make a difference’. 
 
4.1   The Research Process 
This section will provide an overview of the research process documenting the 
decisions and obstacles that I faced over the course of the project. The account is 
mostly chronological. 
 
4.1.1   Selecting a Sample 
The context for the project was businesses with a specific focus on ‘climate 
champions’. My initial research had indicated that ‘climate champion’ schemes were 
increasingly common in many large corporations, as well as other organisations in 
society. I was keen to generate a sample of companies from different business sectors 
that had all implemented some form of ‘climate champion’ scheme. I hoped that the 
representation of different sectors might make the conclusions of the project 
applicable to corporate climate champion schemes more generally. Given the 
increasing prevalence of the ‘climate champion’ scheme I felt this was an attainable 
goal. 
I began the project by using web-based research to identify multinational 
corporations that had climate champion schemes and that were acknowledging or 
actively pursuing environmental goals or objectives. In this preliminary stage I 
mainly used search engines to locate information on, for example, ‘business and 
climate champions’, ‘green businesses’ and ‘business and climate change’. This 
initial research generated information on over 50 businesses. A smaller sample of 
businesses was then selected on the basis of fulfilling at least four out of a list of five 
criteria. In addition, the businesses had to have some form of climate champion 
scheme. The five criteria were: clear evidence of environmental projects (as well as 
the champion scheme); evidence of environmental concern in annual and/or corporate 
social responsibility reports for the past three years; some media coverage for 
environmental activities; links to environmental organisations (e.g., The Climate 
Group, WWF, together.com, etc.); and some form of acknowledgment or award for 
environmental commitments. The use of specific criteria would hopefully allow me to 
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make comparisons between businesses that were similar in terms of their 
environmental commitments. This process narrowed my sample down to 25 
businesses. 
The list of 25 businesses encompassed companies in various sectors, including 
finance, consultancy, energy, retail, media, production and transport. My intention 
was to compile a sample that included businesses in a range of sectors and interview 
champions in each of these businesses. This was not as straightforward as I had first 
assumed. With no prior contacts in the businesses I began from scratch, either calling 
the company switchboard or sending an email to a named environmental contact on 
the website. For the majority of the businesses I could not get past this first obstacle. I 
was frequently directed to websites or annual reports and I received many polite 
declines to my interview invitations. 
However, in eight out of the 25 cases I spoke directly to an environmental or 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) manager who was interested in the research 
and willing to be involved. In all eight cases the manager was keen to discuss my 
research in more detail before I interviewed the champions. Bell (1991) comments on 
the importance of being open with research participants at the beginning of a project: 
 
No researcher can demand access to an institution, an organisation or to materials. People will be doing 
you a favour if they agree to help, and they will need to know exactly what they will be asked to do, 
how much time they will be expected to give and what use will be made of the information they 
provide (p.42). 
 
I travelled to meet six out of the eight managers in person to discuss the aims of my 
project and learn about their own views on climate change and the champion scheme. 
As requested, I contacted the other two managers by telephone. I provided every 
manager with information about the aims of the project and the anticipated length of 
each interview and the project itself. Two of the managers requested feedback about 
the champion scheme and I subsequently offered a similar arrangement to the other 
managers. Korezynski (2004) notes that this is frequently the case when dealing with 
‘gatekeepers’. When negotiating access to an institution, ‘researchers often offer the 
gatekeepers or individuals a benefit that would accrue from access being granted. In 
formal settings this might take the form of a written report of the findings’ (p.3). My 
research would provide the manager with a useful overview of the champion scheme 
from the perspective of those who had been involved. 
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The provision of the report was important for two reasons. In the first instance 
it helped me to gain access to the champions and actually conduct the project. In 
addition, I felt that it added value to the ‘impact’ of my research. A brief report about 
the success and challenges encountered by the champions had the potential to 
improve what I felt to be a worthwhile scheme. The information would help the 
manager to identify strengths and weaknesses and make appropriate changes ‘on the 
ground’. It was agreed that feedback would be subject to the consent of the 
champions themselves
19
. 
The initial purpose of the manager interviews was to discuss access to the 
champions. However, most of the managers were equally happy to engage in a 
detailed discussion about the champion scheme and their own views on climate 
change. These initial interviews provided a wealth of data about climate discourses 
and the process of behaviour change in the workplace. I therefore decided to 
incorporate the ‘manager interviews’ into the main research project20. The sample of 
companies in this stage of interviewing was limited to five sectors (construction, 
consultancy, energy, finance, and retail). 
All eight managers were very helpful, but gaining access to the champions 
remained a challenge. Overall, I managed to secure interviews with champions in four 
out of the eight companies. One of the managers arranged a focus group with his 
champions. A further three managers asked me to get back in touch. Upon further 
correspondence, I was provided with a list of champions to contact. In two out of the 
remaining four businesses the manager decided that it was not feasible for me to 
interview the champions. This was either due to time, resources or distance. The final 
two managers did agree in principle, but further contact was infrequent and a list of 
champions was not forthcoming. The four climate champion case studies were in the 
consultancy, energy and finance sectors. 
 
4.1.2   Asking Questions 
The theoretical underpinnings of the project necessitated the collection of 
qualitative material. I was interested in how the champions approached their role and 
                                                          
19
 Please see Appendix B for an example feedback report. Reports were provided for companies A, B 
and C. The manager from company D requested a transcript of the focus group as an alternative to the 
report. This was provided once the transcription was complete. 
20
 Throughout the analysis I will refer to the language of the ‘champions’. However, I will also include 
responses from the managers where relevant.  
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talked about climate change in everyday interactions. The aim was to provide a 
detailed analysis of the discourses that were being used and how these were (a) 
constructing ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ behaviour and (b) being reproduced or 
subverted through language and behaviour. Detailed qualitative data was a necessity. 
I decided to use interviews for two reasons. The first reason is based on the 
intrinsic value of interviews. Interviews provide a detailed insight into the way people 
think and talk about an issue. Rubin and Rubin (1995) state that, ‘qualitative 
interviewers listen to people as they describe how they understand the worlds in 
which they live and work’ (p.3). Interviews provided a context for the champions to 
report how they were communicating climate change to other people. They also 
allowed me to hear first-hand how the champions themselves talked about climate 
change in our own conversation. The second reason is based on the impracticality of 
alternatives. The alternative to interviews was a more participative approach where I 
would immerse myself in the workplace environment and experience the 
communication of climate change first-hand. This was less feasible given (a) the time 
restrictions on the project and (b) the access issues I had initially encountered with 
the businesses. Even the managers who agreed to be involved were very conscious of 
time constraints and the perceived environmental image of the business. Korezynski 
(2004) notes that gatekeepers such as managers might be ‘concerned about potential 
costs’ of granting access (p.3). In modern society, the environmental image of a 
business is very important and managers are keen to maintain the status of the 
company as ‘environmentally friendly’ (Rhee and Lee 2003). Interviews provided a 
detailed, but not invasive insight into the everyday communication of climate 
change
21
. 
Based on the work of Gillham (2008) I began my research with a very 
informal investigation into the most useful way to conduct the interviews
22
. Gillham 
(2008) promotes the use of ‘trialling’ research questions even before embarking on a 
pilot study: 
 
 
                                                          
21
 It should be noted that Hargreaves (2008) did manage to obtain this kind of access to Environment 
Champions. He engaged in participant observation at a construction company over the course of nine 
months. However, Hargreaves (2008) had previously ‘developed strong links with Global Action Plan’ 
(p.81) and thus did not encounter the same access issues as I had in the business context. In addition, 
by engaging in detailed ethnographic research, Hargreaves was limited to one business as the context 
for his research.  
22
 Please see Appendix C for a full list of preliminary research activities. 
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Make it clear to the people involved what your area of interest is, that you need guidance on the detail 
and will be using what they tell you to develop questions for a questionnaire or similar. What are the 
things they think are important’ (p.47)? 
 
I was put in contact with two climate champions through personal connections and I 
was able to discuss my research in an informal way. I was very clear about my 
research interests but less clear about the actual information that I wished to gain 
from my participants. These informal conversations offered an insight into the role of 
the champion and some perspectives on climate change as an issue. The champions 
were situated in unrelated areas (a hospital and a school), but this did give me a 
starting point for the focus of my interviews. 
I followed this ‘trialling’ phase with a pilot study at Newcastle University. 
Newcastle University has a network of ‘environmental co-ordinators’ who fulfil a 
very similar role to the ‘climate champions’ in my study. I interviewed seven co-
ordinators using the broad set of questions that I had developed from my trialling 
phase. The interview was split into two sections with questions about (a) the role 
itself and (b) general views on climate change. These interviews were transcribed and 
analysed on the basis of my research questions and objectives. The pilot study offered 
a very useful insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the questions I was asking 
and the extent to which they would elicit the kind of information I was interested in. 
In these pilot interviews the actual climate discourses came through very clearly. 
Different discourses were apparent in the way champions talked about their own 
behaviour and motivations as well as the actions they encouraged in the workplace. 
The process of reinforcing and/or subverting dominant discourses was less obvious in 
the data. I used this information to adjust the focus of the interview slightly. For 
example, in the main study, I specifically asked the champions about the possibility 
of change and their successes and failures as facilitators of behaviour change. These 
latter questions were intended to draw out, not only the various climate discourses 
being used, but also the perception of these discourses as ‘normal’ or ‘true’23. 
The pilot data also helped with the continuing development of my theoretical 
framework. For example, champions in the pilot study referred to motivations and 
values that I had, thus far, not considered. Reconciling this data with the literature 
was a useful process. I incorporated new themes and ideas into the development of 
                                                          
23
 Please see Appendix D for the final interview questionnaire.  
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the discourse components and climate discourses. I also became increasingly aware 
of the need to continually reassess the theoretical material in light of the empirical 
analysis. This has been an iterative process over the course of the project. 
Finally, the pilot study indicated the importance of a semi-structured and 
flexible approach. I began with a set of topics that I wanted to cover, but participants 
often moved to a different topic or addressed a later question. Their own thought 
process was a very important part of communication and this was a useful issue to be 
aware of as I began the main interviews. It also gave me the chance to practise my 
interviewing skills and make the most of my time with the participants in the main 
part of my study.  
 
4.1.3   Conducting the Interviews 
Overall, the main project included 44 participants. I interviewed eight 
environmental managers and met with 36 ‘climate champions’. The champions were 
from four different companies and I interviewed between eight and ten champions 
from each. Two of the interviews were conducted with more than one person. In case 
study C two of the champions spoke to me together. In case study D the manager had 
arranged a focus group with eight of the champions. The rest of the interviews were 
with one person at a time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                
                                                                                             Table 4.1 
 
Climate champion case studies 
Business Sector No. of Champions Interviewed 
A Energy 10 
B Finance 8 
C Consultancy 10 
D Finance 8 
E Finance 0 
F Retail 0 
G Construction 0 
H Construction 0 
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Where possible, I travelled to meet the participant and conducted the 
interview in person. Where this was not feasible, the interviews were conducted over 
the phone. 15 of the interviews were conducted over the phone; I met the other 29 
people in person. The interviews ranged in length from 25 minutes for the shortest to 
1hr 20 minutes for the longest. The majority of the interviews were between 50-60 
minutes in length and the shorter interviews tended to be those conducted over the 
phone. 
The manager interviews were conducted between August 2009 and January 
2010. The interviews with the champions were conducted between March 2010 and 
May 2010. With the permission of the participants, all interviews were recorded and 
the data was transcribed for analysis
24
. 
 
4.1.4   Analysing the Data 
I began looking for themes in the data as soon as I conducted the trialling 
phase and pilot study. As stated above, this preliminary analysis helped to develop the 
focus for the interviews as well as the theoretical material. The majority of the 
literature on climate discourses indicated the prominence of neoliberalism in 
approaches to tackling climate change (Mansfield 2004b; Andrew et al 2010). As 
expected, neoliberal themes were also prominent in the preliminary empirical data. 
However, there were many other climate discourses apparent in the data. I used the 
initial analysis alongside the literature to develop themes which could be explored in 
the main project. 
All of the interviews were recorded and transcribed and this allowed for a very 
detailed analysis of the data. Gill (1996) argues that the key to effective discourse 
analysis is immersion in the data (p.144). The recording of the interviews allowed for 
this process of immersion. I was able to frequently listen back to the recordings and 
re-read the transcripts many times. New themes emerged with every reading and this 
meant that analysis of the data was necessarily an iterative process. This is typically 
the case with a discursive approach (Taylor 2001). I documented new ideas as they 
emerged and then revisited earlier transcripts to investigate themes that I had not 
recognised upon initial analysis. 
                                                          
24
 Please see Appendix E for detailed information on the main interviews. 
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The data was coded on the basis of my research questions and preliminary 
analysis. Initially, I used NVivo 8 to systematise and record my ideas. Towards the 
latter part of the project, however, I began to develop these themes and ideas into 
chapters of the thesis. Once I had a clearer idea of the overall structure I used more 
straightforward techniques to organise the data. References and quotes were 
frequently filed into word documents rather than coded in NVivo. The analysis of the 
material began in the summer of 2009 with the pilot data and has continued into the 
very final months of writing up. Given the time constraints and length of the project, I 
have been forced to make some difficult decisions about the material and ideas that 
were included and excluded from the project itself. Many themes and references have 
been recorded and filed for further study at a later date.  
 
4.2   Research Considerations 
In a practical sense, the process of researching companies, making telephone 
calls and setting up interviews was very labour intensive. I spent many hours trying to 
gain access to the appropriate individuals for the project. Alongside this process I was 
conscious of the potential limitations of the research and how I could address these 
issues. In sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 I will discuss issues of ethics and reliability. These 
considerations are similar to most other qualitative projects. In section 4.2.3 I will 
then discuss the issue of validity. I will argue that, in a constructivist project, validity 
must be considered in a particular way. How can we know that we have measured 
something correctly if the phenomenon we are measuring is (arguably) subject to 
interpretation? However, I would contend that some elements of validity can be 
applied to a constructivist project. These will be discussed in section 4.2.4. Finally, 
section 4.2.5 will consider the limitations of the project in terms of making 
generalisations. 
 
4.2.1   Ethics 
On the subject of ethics, Kimmel (1988) states: ‘Since World War II, ethical 
issues in the social sciences have become a topic of growing concern as researchers 
try to ensure that their studies are directed toward worthwhile goals and that the 
welfare of their subjects and their research colleagues are protected’ (p.9). This 
project does not have significant ethical implications. It does not deal with a 
particularly ‘sensitive’ research topic, such as power and sexuality (Gailey and 
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Prohaska 2011), and it does not engage in risky or covert research methods (Labaree 
2002). Nor does it involve ‘vulnerable’, ‘disadvantaged’ or ‘marginalised groups’ 
(Liamputtong 2007, p.1-2). As with any research project, however, there are still 
ethical issues to be considered. 
The research was conducted with 44 ‘human subjects’ and the project was 
thus open to ethical scrutiny in relation to their protection and wellbeing. 
Furthermore, as I was to discover, climate change is a more sensitive issue than may 
first be assumed. In terms of the participants themselves my two main ethical 
considerations were informed consent and anonymity of the data. According to 
Plummer (2001) informed consent is ‘one of the most frequently named ethical 
criteria for research’ (p.223). The eight managers in the project were contacted by 
telephone and agreed to be involved on the basis of my explanation about the 
research aims. Similarly, the champions were provided with an overview of the 
project and the aims and objectives of the research. In case study D the manager 
arranged a focus group with his champions and acquired informed consent on my 
behalf. In the remaining three case studies, I emailed each champion individually and 
asked if they would be willing to talk to me for approximately an hour about their 
role and their own views on climate change. I was clear about the kind of information 
I was interested in and the purpose of the research. Thirty-six champions agreed to be 
involved in the project on the basis of the information that was provided. All of the 
champions were happy for me to provide feedback to their manager based on their 
own account of the project. Furthermore, all 44 participants consented to the use of 
recording equipment during the interview. 
The second ethical issue was anonymity of the data. For the majority of 
participants, their consent to be involved was subject to my assurance that the data 
would be completely anonymous. This was particularly important for several of the 
managers when it came to granting me access to the business. Throughout the project 
I have removed any information which could reveal the identity of the individual 
participants or the businesses in which they were based. This includes any reference 
to projects or individuals with which they are associated. The only information I have 
included is the sectors of the eight companies and the gender of the participants. 
Businesses are identified as case studies A-H. For purposes of referencing, managers 
are referred to as, for example, ‘A-manager’ or ‘B-manager’. Champions are referred 
to by a case study and a number: ‘A-1’ or ‘B-2’. Data was anonymised as soon as 
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each interview was completed. All recorded material, transcripts and personal details 
or business affiliations were securely stored and password protected. 
The final ethical issue was the nature of climate change as a subject of 
discussion. When I began the project I was aware that climate change was an 
important issue. I was unaware that it could also be a sensitive issue. This became 
apparent in the first interview I conducted with a manager. He argued that you have to 
be careful what you say to people about climate change, ‘cos at the end of the day 
you’re potentially challenging people’s values’ (D-Manager). The status of climate 
change as a ‘taboo’ issue was something that had not emerged in the pilot study data. 
However, over the duration of the interview period, it became increasingly apparent 
that climate change could be a very sensitive topic. This not only became an 
interesting theme for the project, but it also had implications for the way I thought 
about my questions and the responses that I elicited from my participants. In 
particular, this issue was important in terms of the influence I had as a researcher. 
Climate change was not only a political issue which could be studied in everyday 
interactions; it was often a very personal issue, reflecting norms and values that an 
individual held to be important. I was increasingly aware of the potential sensitivity 
of the issue and the importance of remaining as unbiased as possible when discussing 
the issue with my participants. The challenges that I encountered in this respect are 
discussed at length in section 4.2.4. 
 
4.2.2   The Reliability of Qualitative Data 
Reliability is ‘the capacity to produce consistent results’ (Bryman 2001, p.70). 
If a project is reliable then a replica study, under the same conditions, would produce 
the same conclusions. This project is not as reliable as a scientific experiment; it is 
impossible to completely replicate the conditions under which the interviews were 
conducted and the frame of mind of the researcher and the participant on any given 
day. However, each interview was approached in exactly the same way and each 
participant was presented with the same set of questions and topics. The interviews 
were semi-structured and were, therefore, inevitably flexible. Some participants 
brought up later themes at the beginning of the interview and others talked at length 
on one topic. However, all interviews covered the broad range of themes that I 
intended to address and all participants were given the same information and  
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feedback. A far as qualitative data is concerned, I believe that the project is reliable 
and that the study could be replicated with very similar conclusions. 
 
4.2.3   The Validity of Qualitative Data 
Given the constructivist nature of the project, the issue of validity is 
particularly problematic. Bell (1991) explains that validity ‘tells us whether an item 
measures or describes what it is supposed to measure or describe’ (p.51). However, a 
constructivist approach would argue that there is no authoritative account of any 
social phenomena and therefore we cannot ensure that we have accurately described 
anything.  
Potter and Wetherell (2001) claim that in discourse analysis ‘we are not trying 
to recover events, beliefs and cognitive processes from participants’ discourse, or 
treat language as an indicator or signpost to some other state of affairs but looking at 
the analytically prior question of how discourses or accounts of things are 
manufactured’ (p.200). A discursive approach adds a whole new dimension to the 
idea of ‘getting at the truth’ of an account. If discourses are constructed through 
language then, presumably, one champion’s version of events is not a neutral 
reflection of reality. Rather, it is constitutive. It constructs the reality of which it 
speaks (Carabine 2001). We must then question the very idea of ‘truth’. Can 
discursive research ever be valid if there is not an independent reality to measure or 
describe? Furthermore, the interviews used to collect the data for the project could be 
criticised as a method which adds to this problem of ‘getting at the truth’. 
Interviews have been criticised for giving a second hand account of 
information: ‘The shortcomings we attribute to the interview exist when it is used as a 
source of information about events that have occurred elsewhere and are described to 
us by informants’ (Becker and Greer 1969, p.323). The project is therefore faced with 
two potential limitations. First, can we rely on interviews to give us an accurate 
account of the social world and second, if the social world is constructed, is there an 
accurate account to be obtained?  
Becker and Greer (1969) argue that the only way to obtain valid and accurate 
data is participant observation: 
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Participant observation can thus provide us with a yardstick against which to measure the completeness 
of data gathered in other ways, a model which can serve to let us know what orders of information 
escape us when we use other methods (p.322). 
 
The claim is that this research method is the only way to gain a complete account of 
any given social phenomenon. This begs the questions: Did I go far enough with my 
research? Was there more I could have done to address my research questions? 
Ultimately, there is always more that could have been done. With limitless time and 
resources, the research could have been extended in a multitude of ways. However, it 
is important to note several points that support the value of my methodology and the 
research project more generally. 
First, although the main project was based on interviews, during the course of 
the research I was able to engage in a very limited amount of participant observation. 
The climate champion scheme is promoted by an organisation called Global Action 
Plan (GAP) and three out of the four case studies used GAP to help with 
implementation of the scheme. At the beginning of the project I was keen to 
incorporate the training process into my research data and I attempted to set up 
interviews and observation with GAP itself. I was able to attend several GAP training 
events, but these were not directed towards the business sector and ultimately became 
superfluous to the research project. However, for the purposes of methodological 
reflection they did offer some insight into climate change communication from the 
perspective of a participant observer. I encountered many of the same themes at these 
events as I had during my interview process. Although very limited, this did add 
some weight to the data that was being generated by the interviews. 
Second, the use of a focus group in case study D offered another perspective 
on the research data. Devine (2002) claims that focus groups provide ‘interaction 
between participants in a quasi-naturalistic setting – that is not too far removed from 
everyday conversation’ (p.199). The focus group champions spent much of the time 
talking amongst themselves, rather than directing their responses to me. This 
provided a much more relaxed environment for discussion and a great deal of debate 
about the issue of climate change. It did, however, present many of the same themes 
as the interviews and the observation. This further supported the claim that the 
interviews were presenting an ‘accurate’ account of the champion role and their 
everyday interactions. 
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Interviews remain a very important research tool in qualitative analysis. In 
discourse analysis interviews have been ‘extensively used because they allow a 
relatively standard range of themes to be addressed with different participants’ (Potter 
1996, p.129). Interviews allowed me to explore specific ideas and topics with the 
champions. They ensured stronger reliability than observation because I was able to 
replicate the interview setting in each case. Second, although participant observation 
would have allowed a first-hand perspective of the champion schemes, it would not 
have overcome the problem of ‘truth’ as a social construction. A discursive approach 
is constructivist no matter what kind of research methods we employ. Participant 
observation would have offered a first-hand account of how the champions 
constructed climate change in their interactions with colleagues. Interviews offered a 
first-hand account of how the champions constructed climate change in their 
interaction with me. Ultimately, both of these processes provided useful data about 
the communication of climate change. I was able to analyse the construction of 
climate change in everyday language. The problem of ‘truth’ as a construction is an 
essential part of a discursive approach. 
 
4.2.4   Internal Validity 
The validity that I discussed in the previous section is often referred to as 
‘construct validity’ (Robson 1993, p.68). Are we using the right tools to generate the 
conclusions we are looking for? I have argued that this idea is problematic for a 
constructivist project. However, Robson (1993) also introduces the idea of ‘internal 
validity’. Rather than being concerned with a valid measure (the interview process 
and the questions I was asking), internal validity is concerned with causal 
relationships and the claims researchers make about their work (Robson 1993, p.69). 
Internal validity ensures that the claims that are made about the conclusions of a 
project are ‘true’ in the sense that they have not been affected by other factors 
throughout the research process. Essentially, the researcher must consider factors that 
may have affected their research results, including their own influence as a 
researcher. I would argue that this kind of validity is applicable to a constructivist 
project in much the same way as it would be in any other qualitative project. 
There are a number of factors that could affect the internal validity of a 
project. In relation to my own project the main ‘threat to internal validity’ was my 
own influence as a researcher who was investigating the (potentially sensitive) topic 
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of climate change. Bernstein and Dyer (1979) argue that, ‘the presence of the 
interviewer is likely to inhibit responses of which the person thinks the interviewer 
will disapprove’ (p.63). My research interests indicated that my own attitude and 
behaviour was likely to be ‘climate-protecting’. The role of champions was 
specifically to promote climate friendly behaviour. There was inevitably a certain 
level of pressure for the champions to offer a response which they ‘perceive[d] to be 
desirable’ (Devine 2002, p.206).  
Indeed, there were several instances when the champion clarified a statement 
or changed their mind about an answer. One champion was asked about the use of 
public transport and replied: ‘I’m happy to say, ok I’ll take er, I’ll take public 
transport to go to work or I’ll take my bike to work, but I don’* I refu* you know at 
the weekend I like going in the countryside’ (A-1, 858-860)25. The champion changed 
her mind twice about how she would frame her reply, indicating that she was looking 
for the most ‘desirable’ way to present her answer. Another champion was 
embarrassed that there was ‘not a lot’ that she had done to promote environmental 
practices in the office (B-7, 82). 
This issue of researcher influence was a potential problem for the project. 
However, I aimed to maintain internal validity by addressing this issue in several 
ways. First, the issue of climate protecting behaviour as socially desirable was 
incorporated into the main part of the project. I acknowledged any hesitation or 
qualification in the accounts as an important part of the construction of climate 
change as an issue. Second, I was conscious of the way I framed my questions and 
the feedback I gave to the participants during an interview. I tried to avoid positive or 
negative reinforcement of their comments and I refrained from offering my own 
perspective on any of the questions or topics. In hindsight, the pilot study had been a 
very useful process through which to refine this ‘neutrality’ in the interview situation. 
In addition, I think that the interview sample is an important consideration for 
the internal validity of the project. Although, admittedly, there was some qualification 
in the responses of certain champions, it is likely that most of the champions gave 
‘desirable’ responses because they were climate-protecting anyway. The sample 
consisted of self-professed environmentalists who had volunteered to promote climate 
protecting behaviour in the workplace. The majority of them expressed climate-
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 The use of an asterisk in the data indicates an unfinished word.      
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protecting values because those were the values they held. Furthermore, although 
they were generally climate-protecting, many of the champions admitted to some 
environmental ‘failings’ or more ‘self-interested’ reasons for becoming involved in 
the project. They were often embarrassed about these less ‘desirable’ traits, indicating 
that they thought I might disapprove of them, but they did talk about them. For 
example, the champion who was embarrassed still told me about her inability to 
implement climate-protecting practices at work. This does support the internal 
validity of the project. Although, researcher influence was an issue, it was addressed 
through the attempted neutrality of the interviews and the acknowledgment of the 
issue in the project itself. To a large extent, the participants appeared to be honest in 
their responses, despite my potential ‘disapproval’ of what they said. 
The other factor that could affect the internal validity of the project is the 
institutional influence of the various businesses. It is feasible that the institutional 
setting of the participants might have affected the information that they were willing 
to disclose. However, I found that champions talked quite openly about obstacles that 
they faced, individuals who had caused them problems and, for some, the concern 
that the champion scheme was an exercise in public relations. This kind of 
information does indicate a certain degree of honesty from the champions. They felt 
at ease discussing issues of which the business itself would perhaps not approve. The 
assurance of anonymity presumably played an important role in this kind of open 
discussion. 
 
4.2.5   Making Generalisations 
When I began the research project I was keen to generate conclusions that 
could be applied to other businesses and different environmental contexts. As 
explained, my original intention was to select a sample of businesses in different 
sectors so that my research conclusions could be more widely generalised. Given the 
access problems that I faced, the sample of participants did not cover a wide variety 
of business sectors. The case studies with champions covered three different sectors 
(consultancy, energy and finance). The extra manager interviews included the 
construction and retail sectors. The final sample included 24 women and 20 men. 
They were variously located across the UK and represented many different job 
descriptions within the relevant companies. 
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As I have presented papers and chapters from the thesis, the potential for 
generalisations has been subject to some criticism. There are two main limitations in 
this respect. First, if the case studies are not a representative sample of different 
business sectors, how can the conclusions be generalised to the wider business 
context? Second, since the overall project focuses only on the business sector, how 
can we apply the conclusions to society more broadly? 
In hindsight, these limitations were inevitable with the kind of project I 
wanted to undertake. Jaworski and Coupland (2006) claim that with qualitative data, 
it may be ‘necessary to scale back our ambitions in some ways... particularly in 
relation to generalising’ (p.31). Qualitative data provides a detailed picture of a 
particular social phenomenon; it does not offer broad generalisations. However, that 
does not mean that the research lacks value. A detailed qualitative project such as this 
one has much to offer academically and to society more generally. 
First, the project illustrates that a discursive analysis of everyday interaction is 
an important and relatively under-researched approach to the problem of inaction on 
climate change. Although the conclusions of this particular project cannot be simply 
transposed to another part of society, the approach itself can be. The project 
demonstrates the value of this type of approach. The research design could be easily 
replicated to investigate climate champions in other business and other parts of 
society. To this extent, although the conclusions themselves cannot be generalised, 
the theoretical framework and methodology can be. 
Second, the project indicates some important themes which are potentially 
relevant in other parts of society. Analysis of the data has supported the widespread 
assumption that neoliberalism is playing an influential role in approaches to tackling 
climate change. This has been illustrated in research on policy (Andrew et al 2010) 
and local authorities (Slocum 2004a). My research concurs with scholars such as Kirk 
(2008) who have identified neoliberalism in the attitudes and actions of individuals in 
relation to climate change. Given the similarities between my conclusions and the 
conclusions drawn by other scholars, it can be argued that the dominant influence of 
neoliberalism and reformist discourses will extend beyond the business sector. 
Finally, the project provides a foundation for further research. The research 
was intended to be a starting point upon which additional research could be based. 
The project aimed to investigate how dominant discourses are constructing 
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‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ responses to climate change and how these 
discourses are reinforced and maintain their status as ‘true’. Once we understand 
these processes we can potentially use this information to address inaction on climate 
change. 
 
4.3   Reflections of a Researcher 
Social research is a complicated process. Any social research project is rooted 
in the social world and is, thus, subject to ethical challenges, bias and researcher 
influence: 
 
Studies have often been written as if they had been executed by machines: not a hint of the ethical, 
political and personal problems which routinely confront the human researcher and the researched 
subject can be found (Plummer 2001, p.205). 
 
Over the course of the project I faced many challenges and difficult decisions. 
However, the most significant challenge remains my role as researcher. I have faced 
several dilemmas about my own personal perspective on the research problem and the 
implications this has for the way in which I have executed the project. These are 
important issues and they should be addressed as part of the research. The final 
section will provide some reflections on these challenges and the ways in which I 
sought to overcome them. First, I will consider my own influences and biases as a 
self-professed environmentalist researching climate change in a neoliberal world. 
Second, I will address the problems I faced as I tried to reconcile a discursive 
approach with my desire to ‘make a difference’.  
 
4.3.1   A Starting Point from Nowhere?  
In the final stages of the research project I presented some of my findings at a 
climate change workshop. I received a lot of useful feedback and was asked some 
very interesting questions. I had already thought about many of the questions over the 
course of the project, but one member of the audience asked a question that I had not 
considered: If we are all subject to the dominance of a neoliberal discourse, surely 
your own assumptions are rooted in the same framework. What effect does this have 
on the way that you ask questions, critique the literature and analyse the data? It was 
a very good point. Just because I had identified the dominant discourse did that mean 
I could step outside of it?  Carabine (2001) argues that ‘it is sometimes difficult to 
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identify discourses within which we ourselves are immersed, or that we agree with, or 
which we accept as “taken for granted” or common sense’ (p.288). I had identified 
the dominant or ‘taken for granted’ discourse, but had I purged myself of its influence 
and was that something that I could do or wanted to do? 
This issue reinforced another problem with which I had been struggling. As a 
self-professed environmentalist, what kind of bias was I adding to a project about 
climate change? Essentially, these two questions were part of the same problem. As 
researchers how much of ourselves do we put into the research? This is a subject of 
some debate. For Wetherell (2001) researcher bias can affect the value of the research 
because ‘the analysts may never be surprised by the data. The world is already known 
and is pre-interpreted in light of the analyst’s concerns’ (p.385). If we allow the 
research to be interpreted according to our own personal perspective then the whole 
project is affected by this problem. We cannot consider an issue objectively if we 
view everything in light of our own personal beliefs and convictions. Antaki et al 
(2003)
26
 contend that this is a frequent problem with many discursive projects: 
 
The analyst might wish to align with the sort of position that the speaker is outlining. The analyst's  
summarising might contain pointed references. It might be said that the speaker 'realises' or 
'appreciates' how relationships need hard work... such language might subtly, or not so subtly, indicate 
that the analyst is aligning himself or herself with the position taken by the respondent.  
 
As discussed earlier, I was conscious about the influence I had on the research 
participants and I aimed to be as neutral as possible throughout the interviews. 
However, it was increasingly apparent that the influence of the neoliberal world in 
which I lived and my own environmental convictions had potentially wider reaching 
effects on the research I was conducting. I did review the literature I had critiqued and 
the chapters I had drafted. I considered the way I had presented my data and the 
conclusions I had drawn. It was difficult to discern if the work was ‘neutral’. 
However, my continuing exploration of this problem elicited different views. 
Rubin and Rubin (1995) argue that ‘neutrality is probably not a legitimate goal in 
qualitative research’ (p.13). Plummer (1991) claims that, ‘to purge research of all 
these “sources of bias” is to purge research of human life’ (p.156). The contention 
from these scholars is that it is impossible to be a neutral or objective researcher. 
There is no ‘view from nowhere’ (Nagel 1986). As social researchers, and human 
                                                          
26
 This paper was published in an online journal and does not include page numbers 
 104 
 
beings, we are rooted in society and therefore inevitably subject to sources of bias. 
The key to valuable research is to acknowledge and evaluate these biases as part of 
the project. Burman (2003)
27
 argues that ‘there is no way of avoiding adopting some 
kind of position. The question therefore is rather which, and on what grounds, is this 
evaluated’.  In writing up the project I have consistently acknowledged the influence 
of neoliberalism on my work and my own biases as someone who cares about 
protecting the climate. I have not attempted to ‘nullify these variables’, but I have 
tried to ‘be aware of, describe publicly and suggest how these have assembled a 
specific “truth”’ (Plummer 2001, p.157). 
 
4.3.2   A Critical Approach 
The second dilemma I faced as a researcher is also rooted in my 
environmental convictions. In this instance it was not based on the problems 
associated with bias, it was based on my desire to ‘make a difference’ in the area of 
climate change. My research in this area was driven primarily by my aspiration not 
only to learn about the problems of inaction on climate change but to use that 
knowledge to implement change. However, this intention to find a ‘better’ way to do 
things was not consistent with a discursive approach. In discourse analysis there is no 
‘right’ or ‘wrong’; there are only different constructions of reality. 
My theoretical framework was rooted in the contention that there was a more 
complicated process operating than simply individual barriers to behaviour change. 
Discourse analysis was a relevant way to analyse these processes and understand how 
we were in the current situation with the problem of inaction on climate change. 
However, it did not offer any solutions that I could incorporate into the project. At the 
beginning of the project I found this very difficult. I wanted to use discourse analysis 
because it was drawing out some very important issues but I was concerned about the 
‘impact’ of my research if I could not offer a prescription for change. 
The reconciliation of these two concerns emerged as I began to clearly define 
the aims of my research. Rather than viewing discourse analysis as an obstacle to 
‘making a difference’, I began to understand it as a ‘stepping stone’ to this end. The 
project is critical in the sense that it questions the foundations of our knowledge about 
climate change. Fairclough (1985) argues that, ‘for critical discourse analysis... the 
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question of how discourse cumulatively contributes to the reproduction of macro 
structures is at the heart of the explanatory endeavour’ (p.753). The conclusions of 
the project tell us how climate discourses construct ‘truth’ in society and the effect 
this has on (in)action on climate change. This knowledge provides a foundation for 
further research. We need to understand how a process works before we can think 
about changing it. The value of my research was rooted in this first step. 
 
4.4   Conclusion 
The duration of the project was 3 years and 10 months, spanning from 
October 2008 to July 2012. My research interests and general aims have remained 
consistent throughout this time. The theoretical framework and empirical analysis 
have been in a state of constant reassessment and development until the very end. I 
faced many challenges during the research process, particularly in terms of access and 
this had implications for any generalisations that could be drawn from the project. 
There were also important considerations in terms of reliability and validity. As with 
any qualitative project, there are limitations to some aspects of the research. 
However, I believe that the project is valuable as a detailed qualitative 
analysis of the climate champion scheme and the relationship between discourse and 
behaviour. I have endeavoured to work through any limitations in the project and 
overcome these obstacles. I have spent a long time considering my own personal 
biases and, although it is not possible for the project to be ‘neutral’, I have 
acknowledged my own position and any influence this may have had on the research. 
Finally, I have reconciled my own critical standpoint with a discursive approach. The 
project is purely explanatory, but my own standpoint is not purely constructivist. It is 
my personal contention that there are better ways to deal with climate change than 
those that currently dominate. It is my hope that an explanatory approach can provide 
a basis for more normative work.   
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Chapter 5 
The Role of the Climate Champion 
 
  According to Alexander et al (2005), ‘in the context of climate change, we see 
the term “champion” as meaning to advocate or promote a cause, particularly a 
worthy one which deserves more than ordinary attention’ (p.25). The initial role of 
the climate champions was to learn about the science of climate change and think 
about techniques for changing behaviour. They were then expected to translate this 
knowledge into action by promoting climate protecting behaviour in the workplace. 
The second half of the thesis will provide a detailed analysis of the 
communication of climate change in the workplace. I will consider the techniques 
that were used by the champions to promote behaviour change by analysing the 
language that the participants used in the interviews. Throughout chapters five, six 
and seven I will draw upon the climate discourses that I discussed in chapter three. 
Chapters six and seven will concentrate on the reformist and revolutionary climate 
discourses as ways of dealing with climate change (as set out in sections 3.5 and 3.6). 
The purpose of these chapters is to analyse the motivations that the champions used 
to change behaviour and the specific actions that they encouraged. I will identify the 
discourses that they drew upon when they communicated with other people. I will 
also look at how the champions reinforced or challenged different climate discourses. 
In this chapter I will provide a background to the forthcoming analysis. I will 
consider climate change as a scientific discourse, the construction of climate change 
as a problem and the role of neoliberalism in constraining what the champions would 
say and do. I will draw upon the ideas that I set out in sections 3.3 and 3.4. I will 
argue that these ‘preliminary’ discourses play an important role in the formation of 
the champions’ knowledge, ideas and the discourses that they drew upon when they 
promoted behaviour change in the workplace. The general dominance of 
neoliberalism can also provide some initial insight into the role of champions as 
passive subjects (reinforcing dominant discourses) or active agents (challenging 
dominant discourses). 
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In section 5.1 I will begin by discussing the champions’ knowledge about 
climate change. What did they think and know about climate science and how did 
they construct this knowledge? I will argue that the majority of champions were 
generally well informed about the science of climate change. Most of them rejected a 
discourse of scepticism and drew upon the authority of a scientific discourse to 
construct their knowledge as ‘true’. They were also confident about the efficacy of 
their efforts and rejected discourses of pessimism. In addition, I will consider the 
construction of climate change knowledge as objective. Many participants 
constructed climate science in this way and talked about the ‘correct’ actions that 
followed from this. 
In section 5.2 I will look at the construction of climate change as a problem, 
focusing on the distinction between climate change as a fundamental problem or a 
small ‘glitch’ in the neoliberal system. I will argue that most champions constructed 
climate change in the latter sense. It was a problem but it could be fixed in the context 
of the current system and indeed we had already made some important progress in 
this area. This construction of the problem begins to suggest the dominance of 
neoliberal ideas and reformist discourses. It is an important precursor to the analysis 
in chapters six and seven. 
Finally, section 5.3 will look at the role of the champion more generally. 
Chapters six and seven will look specifically at what the champions did and did not 
say and do. This section will concentrate on how the champions perceived their 
overall role. How should they translate their knowledge and ideas to other people and 
what were the limits of their actions? I will argue that this perception of the 
champions’ role was heavily influenced by the neoliberal conception of individual 
sovereignty and rights. Champions who had claimed that climate science was 
objective were reluctant to challenge the beliefs of other people. Climate protecting 
behaviour had to be communicated in a way that did not interfere with the 
individual’s right to choose. This again suggests that the forthcoming analysis will be 
dominated by reformist discourses and that the champions’ capacity for resistance is 
potentially very limited. 
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5.1   Learning about Climate Change 
The champions’ first task was to learn about the issue of climate change. 
Everyone who volunteered for the project was expected to attend a training course to 
prepare them for the role. One manager explained what this involved: 
 
It was just around some basic stuff around what is climate change… just the greenhouse effect… what 
things cause greenhouse gases… and all the stuff and getting people just to think about that and then 
getting people to associate that with well what do you do at work… that will be having an impact (D-
manager, 214-226). 
 
The main role of the champions was to translate this knowledge into action. In this 
section I will consider how much the champions knew about climate change and how 
they constructed this knowledge. I will argue that the majority of champions had a 
good basic knowledge of climate science and that they believed anthropogenic 
climate change to be ‘true’, on the basis of an authoritative scientific discourse. 
 
5.1.1   General Knowledge and Scientific Discourse  
The majority of the participants had a good general knowledge about the 
science of climate change. They understood the types of actions that had led to the 
problem such as ‘transport and manufacturing... heating and cooling’ (D-manager, 
219-222). They could also talk accurately about the consequences of climate change 
in the UK: ‘higher temperatures’ (C-5, 436), ‘warmer summers, wetter winters, more 
storms’ (F-manager, 599). In addition, several participants demonstrated quite a 
sophisticated level of knowledge about the subject. One participant explained the 
difference between the natural and the enhanced greenhouse effect: 
 
It happens anyway, erm, but I think, erm... over the last two hundred years we’ve made it, made it 
happen faster. Carbon’s in the atmosphere anyway, but, you know, we’ve tipped the balance, er, 
incredibly, erm, and so what we’ve got to be careful of is that we don’t pass the tipping point where 
things can’t then regenerate (A-6, 411-418). 
 
Another participant acknowledged the potential for different climate scenarios. He 
explained that the UK could get warmer or that ‘if the ice caps melt then all that cold 
water pushes the, er, jet stream further south... Britain is in the perfect situation to end 
up with an ice age’ (A-4, 1008-1013). The champions therefore demonstrated 
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knowledge of different aspects of climate science. They understood actions as causes, 
the effects of these actions and the mechanisms of the climate system. 
Most participants had a good basic grasp of the climate change problem. 
However, confidence about this knowledge varied from person to person. Some 
individuals did feel that they had a good understanding of the issues surrounding 
climate change. One champion said, ‘I’ve read a fair bit about it and I feel my 
understanding’s pretty solid’ (C-9, 815-816). Other champions felt that they had a 
good level of knowledge due to the training they had taken. They said that they had 
‘absorbed so much information’ (B-2, 194-195) and that they had learnt ‘about the 
different aspects of climate change, the influences and the effects and the science 
behind it’ (B-8, 146-147). 
Other champions were less confident about their knowledge on the subject. 
One champion said, ‘I don’t know a lot about the rest of it, I wouldn’t have a clue’ 
(A-10, 443-444). Another said, ‘I hear the phrase, I know it’s bad, that’s probably 
what I can tell you’ (C-10, 813-814). Other champions were very conscious that they 
were not ‘experts’ on the subject. One participant said, ‘although I’ve got a general 
sort of like grasp... erm, on climate change and what it is, erm, I’m no scientist, I 
wouldn’t pretend to try and understand’ (C-3, 521-525). Others concurred saying, ‘it 
goes a little bit over your head, you know’ (A-2, 879). 
In chapter three I argued that the problem of climate change was rooted in a 
scientific discourse. The problem originated in scientific disciplines and is generally 
presented in scientific language. This discourse played a role in the way the 
champions talked about the issue. The champions who felt that they had a good 
understanding of the climate talked about it in scientific language. A-4 referred to the 
mechanics of the jet stream, while A-6 talked about ‘tipping points’ and regeneration 
of the atmosphere. The champions who were less confident about their knowledge 
still drew upon scientific discourse. They said that they did not understand it properly 
because they were not scientists. They did not have the required ‘expertise’ to engage 
in this discourse. 
However, many of the less confident respondents talked accurately about the 
science of climate change at other points during the interview. Champion A-10 
understood the relationship between saving energy and protecting the climate, while 
champion C-10 coherently explained the importance of their carbon footprint in 
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relation to business travel and CO2 emissions. The knowledge was basic, but it 
generally corresponded with prevailing scientific discourse. The implication was that 
proper understanding had to be underpinned by scientific expertise. 
Participants were also asked where their knowledge of climate change had 
come from. For some participants, the climate champion training programme had 
been the main source of information. In Business B, champions had learnt ‘so much 
information on erm the cl*, you know on the sort of, on the actual programme 
itself…about you know sort of the effects of climate change, erm, and all, all of this’ 
(B-4, 99-101). Similarly, champions in the other businesses acknowledged that, ‘it 
was probably [Business A] cos before that I was like, I’m, I wasn’t aware of 
anything’ (A-10, 629-629). Another champion admitted that they had been keen to 
get involved in the programme so that they could acquire more knowledge about 
climate change (A-3, 46-47). 
For many of the respondents, however, their knowledge about climate change 
had also come from their education. For some, this stemmed from primary and 
secondary school where champions remembered doing ‘an environmental project’ (C-
4, 593) or learning about the importance of composting (A-6, 856-859). For others 
they had studied geography at A-level and had been inspired by the environmental 
issues (B-5, 31-32; C-7, 1064-1065). Similarly, several respondents had specific 
qualifications relating to the environment. One manager had ‘an M.Sc in Climate 
Change’ (G-manager, 1235), while one of the champions had a ‘degree in 
environmental management... and a masters in disaster management and sustainable 
development’ (A-4, 2-6). 
The final channel of information for many of the respondents was from media 
and television. A number of respondents mentioned ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ (C-8, 
299-300; B-5, 739) while others talked about newspaper articles and television 
programmes (A-7, 888, B-3, 756-757; B-7, 469-470). The champions had acquired 
knowledge from a range of different sources. 
 
5.1.2   Belief, Scepticism, Pessimism 
The vast majority of the participants did believe in climate change. They 
referred to it as ‘irrefutable’ (C-2, 839) and ‘completely un-debatable’ (B-6, 440). 
Based on their knowledge of the problem, many participants talked about the 
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evidence surrounding climate change. One champion said: 
 
I’ve looked at the evidence I’ve read, I’ve read the papers and that kind of thing and it just seems, you 
know, it seems, the evidence seems so overwhelming that, you know, I think it seems pretty clear to 
me that if we’re not, if we’re not causing it, I don’t see any evidence to say that we’re not (B-6, 448-
453). 
 
The reference to ‘overwhelming’ evidence reiterates the champion’s earlier point 
about the issue being ‘completely un-debatable’. There was no question in his mind 
about whether or not the science of climate change is ‘true’. This was a running 
theme in almost all of the interviews. 
However, discourses of scepticism and pessimism were drawn upon by some 
of the participants. First, there was some scepticism about the issue. One champion 
said, ‘I’m a bit sceptical of the whole... of the whole sort of erm man’s impact on 
climate change’ (D-1, 400-402). Another admitted that he was ‘not a great believer in 
climate change’ (C-8, 223). In addition, some participants talked about previous 
scientific predictions about the environment: 
 
I was aware of those issues [of climate change], in my own mind a little bit sceptical because there was    
something called a, er... Club of Rome report...many years ago which predicted that the world was 
going to run out of all its resources by year 2000 and we haven’t (B-5, 740-745). 
 
Science is not infallible, ‘we do make mistakes’ (C-5, 452-453). These individuals 
did not explicitly reject the science of climate change, but they did point out that 
science was capable of drawing the wrong conclusions because this has been the case 
in the past. 
Ereaut and Segnit (2006) distinguish between several discourses of 
scepticism, including ‘rhetorical scepticism’. ‘Rhetorical scepticism’ is described as 
‘a non-expert discourse, but one that attacks the expert discourse as “bad science”’ 
(p.16). Most of the champions who questioned claims about climate change were 
dubious about the science. This was not strong enough to be an ‘attack’, but it is most 
reflective of this discourse. In fact, the two champions who questioned the science of 
climate change both decided that, on balance, they did subscribe to the consensus 
view: ‘There probably is something going on’ (B-5, 763-764). The other champion 
said, ‘ultimately I do believe that there is a change going on at the moment and, erm, 
that we are... responsible for that change’ (C-5, 453-455). 
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In addition, many of the respondents found the question about belief in 
climate change rather amusing. The response from one champion was, ‘(laughter) 
yes, I do believe in it as it were’ (C-9, 815). Another said, ‘yeah, yes I do believe it so 
I’m not a sceptic (laughter)’ (A-7, 462). The notion of being a ‘sceptic’ was 
considered to be quite funny. In an interview with one champion I mentioned the fact 
that I had met other champions who did not believe in climate change. The participant 
was somewhat dubious about my claim: ‘what like they don’t believe it exists’ (B-2, 
414)? When I confirmed that this was indeed the case he responded with laughter and 
asked, ‘really’ (B-2, 416)? It was difficult for him to imagine that a fellow champion 
did not believe in climate change. 
This bemusement about non-belief was also personally directed at the non-
believers. Champion D-1 was part of the focus group and when I asked about belief 
in climate change the other participants laughed, shook their heads and pointed at this 
individual. The manager confided to me, ‘he’s a non-believer’ (D-manager, 401). The 
champion did not appear to take offense and he was prepared to argue his case. 
However, his views were clearly treated with some disdain by the other people in the 
group. To the rest of the champions belief in climate change was simply a given. The 
other champion who was overtly sceptical concurred with this response. He said that 
his views were a ‘running joke’ to his colleagues (C-8, 224). 
It is not surprising that the participants in the study would believe in the 
problem of climate change. They had volunteered to take on the role and the vast 
majority of them had a prior commitment to climate-protecting behaviour. Moreover, 
the fact that so many of them were ‘believers’ made it even more difficult for them to 
comprehend that some champions were not. They accepted that sceptics existed in 
society, but they were surprised that this should be the case for their fellow 
champions. The two champions who were sceptical argued that they were concerned 
about other environmental issues and that climate-protecting behaviour was good for 
the environment more generally. 
In chapter three I also outlined a discourse of pessimism. Hulme (2008) claims 
that the dominant tone around climate change ‘is one of danger and catastrophe’ 
(p.6). This discourse embodies a ‘strong sense of “giving up” on measures such as 
education and a definite degree of pessimism about the possibility of mitigating 
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climate change’ (Hobson and Niemeyer 2011, p.962). Climate change is too a big a 
problem for us to deal with and therefore action is futile.  
This is another discourse that played a minimal role in the interviews. For 
example, one participant acknowledged that this position was common for many 
people in society: ‘Some people will just, that’s too scary… I’m just gona blank that 
out or that’s so scary God I’m really depressed now I’m just going to go have a 
holiday abroad to cheer myself up’ (D-manager, 437-442). However, it was not a 
common position among the participants in the study. The vast majority of 
respondents talked about the importance of making an effort to tackle climate change. 
Action was not futile and individual behaviour change was an important part of 
addressing the issue. One champion said, ‘I appreciate that what I do is, is part of you 
know a huge, huge issue but if anyb* everybody just changes one thing, you know, 
surely that’s a help’ (B-3, 449-451). Another champion expressed similar sentiments: 
‘it’s a big problem and it needs everyone to chip in’ (C-9, 856). These champions did 
not underestimate the ‘enormity of the challenge’ (Hobson and Niemeyer 2011, 
p.962), but they rejected the argument that ‘the problem is just too big for us to take 
on’ (Ereaut and Segnit 2006, p.14). Something could be done to address the problem 
of climate change and everyone should be acting now to do something about it. 
When I asked about the success of the champion scheme itself, there were 
several participants who expressed a sense of futility. One manager described the 
frequent despondency that he perceived in his champions: ‘“Too hard”, it was our 
catch phrase, “too hard”’ (D-manager, 566). Many of the champions expressed 
similar sentiments. One champion explained that, ‘sometimes you feel like you’re 
knocking your head against a brick wall’ (A-7, 442-443). Another argued that, ‘it is 
difficult when you keep going on and on about things and you just keep hitting a 
brick wall all the time’ (C-8, 648-649). However, these participants still refused to 
engage in a discourse of hopelessness. They did not ‘exclude the possibility of real 
action or agency’ by themselves or those around them (Ereaut and Segnit 2006, p.14). 
The manager added, ‘but what do you do? You know, you kind of just, you can’t just 
walk away from it all’ (D, manager, 566-568). The champions also refused to admit 
defeat arguing that there was ‘no reason to stop’ (A-7, 443).  
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The role of the champions was to encourage action on climate change. It was 
their job to instil a sense of efficacy in those around them. Often this was a challenge 
but the champions continued to believe that action was not futile. 
 
5.1.3   Objective Climate Knowledge  
The vast majority of participants believed in climate change and felt that 
something could be done about the problem. In addition, many of them constructed 
this knowledge as objectively ‘true’. This brings us back to some of the issues I 
considered at the beginning of the thesis: 
 
Is science, in this case the science of climate change, a straightforward activity concerned with          
discovering impartial truth about the world and then disclosing this truth to politicians so that truth-
based policies will follow? Or are there different ways of understanding the abilities and roles of 
science in society? (Hulme 2009, pp.74-75). 
 
In chapter one I outlined my own epistemological position in terms of critical realism. 
The physical processes of climate change are real. They occur independently of our 
interpretation of them. It is the social dimension of climate change that is constructed. 
In chapter two I returned to these epistemological considerations when I talked about 
potential criticisms of a constructivist approach. I argued that, in the context of 
climate change we should adopt ‘an ontologically realist yet epistemologically 
relativist position’ (Jones 2002, p. 250). The thesis focuses on climate change as a 
social phenomenon. 
However, the construction of scientific climate knowledge by the champions 
is still important for two reasons. First, it is a fundamental part of their understanding 
about climate change and the promotion of behaviour change. For many participants 
objective knowledge translated into ‘correct’ actions. Second, when the champions 
talked about their role as a communicator, many of them rejected the idea of objective 
knowledge and ‘correct’ behaviour. The latter point has important implications for 
the limitations of their role and will be discussed in detail in section 5.3.  
The presumed objectivity of climate knowledge was initially evident in the 
way the participants talked about climate scepticism. One of the managers talked at 
length about the debates on climate change: 
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I listened to a sort of debate at the end of yesterday on the radio about climate change and you know it 
is that same shit all the time, you know, is this real and the climate, the natural cycle and all this kind 
of crap that no one disagrees with, erm...but whilst there might be this sort of anti-climate change 
debate still rumbling on there’s still the pro-climate change that isn’t really questionable now (G-
manager, 927-934). 
 
He acknowledges that there are non-believers but he does not accept this as an 
alternative position on the issue. Climate change is not questionable. Sceptics have 
not chosen to believe one thing over another. They have got their facts wrong. 
Another champion expressed his frustration about those who did not believe in 
climate change. He said, ‘it’s really frustrating when you talk to somebody who, who 
says “oh it’s all, it’s a myth”, you know, you can prove that it’s not’ (C-6, 648-640). 
Again, the champion takes an objective position on climate change. He knows it is 
‘true’ because he has proof. The suggestion that climate change is a myth is incorrect. 
In addition, the champions often took an objective position when they 
considered why people did not believe in climate change. Sceptics were said to ‘have 
their fingers in their ears’ (C-9, 1047) or be ‘burying their head in the sand’ (C-6, 
651). These people had not come to a reasoned conclusion about the evidence; they 
refused to listen to reason or to actually look at the evidence. Furthermore, 
participants who had been sceptical in the past referred to their belief in climate 
change as a revelation. They talked about how they had ‘woken up’ (C-2, 564) and 
‘seen the light’ (C-2, 681). One champion said, ‘it’s just ignorance ain’t it, if you 
don’t, if you don’t know anything you become ignorant and then all of a sudden your 
eyes open’ (A-5, 443-445). The champions had not simply changed their minds; they 
had progressed to an enlightened position.  
Consequently, several of them perceived their role to be one of ‘enlightening 
people’ (A-3, 78) and helping them to ‘realise that we do need to change for the 
environment’ (A-9, 420-422). One champion said: 
 
There’s a, there’s a lot of kind of, there’s a lot of scepticism that isn’t nece* isn’t based on those 
individual people actually having a great understanding themselves but more it’s almost like... the 
scepticism is contagious… one person who does think they know what they’re talking about says it to 
another person who says it to another person and, you know, it was important to me to just get the kind 
of message across and sort of get some of the ideas of where it actually comes from into people’s 
heads (B-6, 157-166).  
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Scepticism was rooted in a lack of knowledge and understanding. This champion felt 
it was his role to dispel these myths and help people to understand what is actually 
happening. 
The objectivity of climate change knowledge was then reflected in the way 
participants talked about climate-protecting behaviour. If the knowledge was 
objectively true then this translated into correct and incorrect actions. For example, 
champions talked about people putting waste material in the ‘wrong’ bin. One 
champion talked about leftover food and said people ‘don’t necessarily put the food 
waste in the right place’ (C-2, 206-207). Another explained that when recycling 
facilities were first introduced employees frequently put waste in ‘the wrong boxes’ 
(A-2, 280). In these examples the champions are talking about the failure of people to 
place recyclable waste in a recycling bin. However, there is seldom a mention of 
‘recycling’ and ‘landfill’ bins. Rather, these are ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ bins respectively. 
One of the managers talked about the failure of the UK to implement widespread 
recycling. He compared this to the success in Germany where ‘everything’s done 
correctly’ (B-manager, 798). The system in Germany was not different; it was better. 
They were addressing climate change in the ‘correct’ way.  
Lahsen (2010) argues that the construction of climate change knowledge as 
‘objective’ is a dominant position in current society. The IPCC is commonly 
perceived to be ‘providing objective knowledge’ (p.164). Yearley (2009) supports 
this position arguing that the IPCC ‘legitimated itself in terms of the scientific 
objectivity and impartiality of its members’ (p.396) . The champions drew on this 
scientific discourse in their explanations of climate change. The objectivity of climate 
science then informed us about what we ‘should’ be doing about climate change. 
 
5.2   Constructing the Problem of Climate Change 
When the participants talked about the science of climate change and their 
knowledge of the issue some of them did draw on discourses of scepticism and 
pessimism. However, the majority of the champions argued that climate change was 
true and that action could be worthwhile. Given the role of the champions and the fact 
that they had volunteered for the project, this was to be expected. 
We therefore turn to the construction of the problem. Did the participants 
perceive climate change to be a fundamental flaw in neoliberalism or a small ‘glitch’ 
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in the system? This is important because the construction of climate change as a 
problem will have an effect on how it is dealt with. If the problem is a small ‘glitch’ 
in the system this is likely to lead to reformist approaches. If we are dealing with a 
fundamental problem then this will require a fundamental solution. In section 5.2.1 I 
will argue that many of the participants did claim that climate change was a ‘major 
issue’. They appeared to be constructing the problem of climate change in quite a 
revolutionary way. However, although champions used words like ‘major’ and 
‘fundamental’, this did not necessarily equate to a revolutionary construction of the 
problem. Many champions felt that we were already dealing with climate change in 
the context of neoliberalism. In sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 I will look at this construction 
in the context of society and business respectively. 
 
5.2.1   A Major Issue? 
Participants were asked about the problem of climate change towards the 
beginning of the interviews and initial analysis appeared to reflect quite revolutionary 
discourses. Champions said that it was a ‘major issue’ that ‘impacts everything really’ 
(A-7, 472-473) and that ‘obviously there’s, there’s a huge issue with climate change’ 
(B-4, 549). Reference to the scale of the problem implies that it is fundamental in 
nature, it is not a small ‘glitch in the system’. On the other hand, many participants 
said that it was a big problem, but they did not talk about fundamental change or 
challenging the status quo. In addition, they did not acknowledge any link between 
the problem of climate change and the neoliberal system. This omission is itself 
reflective of more reformist discourses. It was implicit that change would occur in the 
context of our current system. 
In addition, it is important to consider what participants actually meant when 
they talked about a ‘major’ issue. The reference to climate change as a ‘huge’ 
problem does not necessarily reflect a discourse of revolution. Indeed, much of the 
CSR literature constructs climate change as a ‘big’ problem. Strannegard (2000) 
quotes the manager of a manufacturing company in Sweden who argued that 
‘environmental concern will require the greatest fundamental strategic change in the 
modern industrial society’ (p.163). However, he goes on to say that ‘environmental 
activities have to make business sense’ (p.163). Climate change must still be 
addressed in the context of the current system. A ‘major’ problem is not necessarily 
reflective of a revolutionary discourse.  In fact, further analysis of motivations and 
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actions indicated that the ‘huge issue’ of climate change could be addressed through 
‘small changes’ (B-4, 1028). This suggests that champion B-4 was not constructing 
climate change as a revolutionary problem in the first place. To the contrary, I would 
argue that the interviews reflected a very strong reformist account of the climate 
change problem. 
 
5.2.2   Reforming Society 
The construction of climate change in modern society also provides some 
insight into how it is constructed as a problem. In general, climate change was 
constructed as an issue that was already being addressed. If this was the case then it 
was being addressed under the current neoliberal system. Participants argued that 
climate change has become increasingly important in modern society. One manager 
had been in the same role for the past nine years and reported that he had ‘just seen it 
snowball really in those nine years’ (B-manager, 455-456). Another manager 
expressed a similar sentiment: ‘that curve of environmental concern must only be not 
necessarily, exponentially increasing, but certainly increasing faster and faster as 
more and more people jump on the bandwagon’ (G-manager, 837-840). This change 
in attitudes was most strongly expressed by the environmental managers because they 
had often been doing the same role for a number of years. Other managers said that 
there had ‘been a radical change’ (E-manager, 98) and that it had been ‘very fast 
paced’ (C-manager, 732). This position was also supported by the champions. One 
champion claimed that climate change had ‘suddenly become so much more 
important’ (C-7, 730), while another said that, ‘we’re making progress since, you 
know, in the past ten years’ (A-1, 738-739). 
The prominence of climate change as an issue in modern society is well 
supported by the literature. International surveys on climate change report 
‘consistently high and rising public concern across all countries’ (Hale 2010, p.262). 
In a survey of 16 nations an average of 60% of people said that they believed climate 
change to be ‘very serious’, while a further 33% believed it to be ‘somewhat serious’ 
(World Bank 2010). 
For many of the participants, this change in attitudes meant that concern about 
climate change ‘has become mainstream’ (C-2, 849). People generally recognised it 
as a problem that would have to be addressed. One champion argued that it is now 
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‘commonplace if you like’ to engage in climate friendly activities (B-3, 256-257). In 
fact, climate change was now considered to be one of several big societal issues. It 
had ‘come from virtually nowhere a few years ago, in, in polling to, to being at the 
centre stage at the moment’ (F-manager, 315-317). Indeed, McCarthy and Prudham 
(2004) claim that environmental issues such as climate change are already being 
‘assimilated’ into modern neoliberal society (p.279). 
The account set out above does not explicitly construct the problem of climate 
change in a reformist way. However, if climate change has already been assimilated 
into society then it is being constructed as a problem that can be dealt with in the 
context of the current system. When it came to talking about climate change in 
general, none of the champions expressed concern about this. They were pleased that 
climate change was being addressed at all and considered this to be progress. This 
implicit confidence in neoliberalism suggests that climate change was not considered 
to be a fundamental problem requiring fundamental change. 
 
5.2.3   Reforming Business  
Champions were also keen to discuss the place of climate change in a business 
context. They argued that climate change was increasingly important to large 
corporations. This concern included being knowledgeable about the issue. One 
manager talked extensively about business efforts to stay informed: 
 
It’s definitely, definitely shifted and I think businesses, certainly the businesses that [Business C] is 
dealing with, so you know the really biggest global brands, the top businesses think now that it is their 
responsibility they need to have stru* like a clear position on where they stand...on, on climate change 
what their role is within climate change you know they need to be part of the debate and part of the 
dialogue...erm I think that’s, that’s almost a given really (C-manager, 840-850). 
 
It was important that businesses were committed to tackling climate change and 
knowledge of the issue was a key part of this. Knowledge about climate change was a 
prerequisite for any modern business. The manager also argued that CEOs of big 
businesses ‘need to have something vaguely sensible to say about the subject’ (C-
manager, 862-863). It was not enough to pay lip service to the issue; managers had to 
understand the problem and be able to defend their position.  
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Subsequently, climate-protection had become a key part of business aims and 
objectives. The office buildings were ‘obviously, erm, environmentally friendly’ 
because they had ‘been built that way’ (C-3, 195-197). Another champion claimed 
that the building she worked in ‘could not be anymore, erm, green’ (B-1, 132-133). In 
addition, environmental regulations were in place. One manager said ‘it’s an official 
thing now, it’s mandatory, you have to do it’ (D-manager, 488). Similarly, the 
facilities for climate-protecting behaviour had already been put in place. According to 
the champions their workplaces were ‘quite sort of keyed into it’ (A-7, 110) and that 
everything environmental was ‘pretty much done’ (A-10, 43). 
If climate change is an important issue in modern society, it is to be expected 
that it will be an important issue in the business context. Large corporations play a 
key role in the neoliberal world. However, this further reflects the role of reformist 
discourses in the construction of climate change as a problem. If climate change is 
already being addressed by big business then it has already been subsumed into the 
current system. Indeed, McCarthy and Prudham (2004) argue that the ‘incorporations 
of environmentalism into the heart of neoliberalism’s central institutions has done far 
more to smooth the roll out of neoliberalizations than attempts to dismiss or reject 
environmental concerns outright’ (p.279). The incorporation of climate change 
concern into business means that the role of business is reinforced as part of the 
solution rather than challenged as being part of the problem. When they talked about 
the science of climate change, the participants correctly identified causes such as 
‘transport and manufacturing...heating and cooling’ (D-manager, 219-222). However, 
they did not translate this into the construction of climate change as a fundamental 
problem with the current system. Rather, the vast majority of them took the 
‘dominant position’ where the problem is subsumed into the business process 
(Jamison 2010, p.811). It is a ‘glitch’ in the system, which can be addressed by the 
‘tweaking’ of the mechanisms that caused it. 
 
5.2.4   Implications for Action 
The champions did not specifically refer to climate change as a problem of 
reform or revolution. However, their construction of the problem could be discerned 
through the way they talked about climate change as an issue in modern society. It 
was already on the agenda and it was being addressed in businesses. Indeed, the 
climate champion project itself was testament to this. The problem was frequently 
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constructed in the context of the current system. It was referred to as a ‘major’ issue, 
but a ‘major’ issue that required ‘small changes’ rather than a fundamental challenge 
to the status quo. 
We can assume that this construction of the problem had an impact on the 
‘appropriate’ ways to deal with it. The dominance of reformist ideas here suggests 
that reformist discourses will also be prevalent in chapters six and seven. According 
to Oels (2005): ‘Under the auspices of the IPCC, climate change was framed as an 
issue of planetary management that required natural science expertise and a 
technological fix on that basis’ (p.198). The framing of climate change as a reformist 
or ‘management’ problem leads us to the importance of reformist approaches such as 
better ‘management’ of the system.  
 
5.3   Translating Knowledge into Action 
All of the champions received training about the science of climate change 
and were given the opportunity to discuss how they might encourage behaviour 
change amongst their colleagues. When they had completed this training they were 
expected to return to work and implement this knowledge. The champions had been 
given some guidance on useful communication techniques. However, most of them 
had generated their own ideas about how to change behaviour and how this could be 
encouraged at work. 
These individuals worked on their own initiative and their progress (or lack of 
progress) was not specifically monitored by the business. If a climate champion chose 
not to devote time or energy to the role, they were not subject to the kinds of 
sanctions that they would have faced for not doing their ‘job’. It was up to each 
individual champion to set the boundaries of the role and decide how best to deliver 
the message of climate change. 
In this section I will argue that almost every participant in the study was 
cautious about the limitations of their role. They were often unwilling to express their 
own ideas about climate change and they were very reluctant to tell people what they 
should and should not be doing. In section 5.3.1 I will consider the potential role of 
the champions as either ‘passive subjects’ or ‘active agents’. I will discuss how this 
distinction will inform the empirical analysis that follows (in this chapter and 
chapters six and seven). In section 5.3.2 I will argue that, although many champions 
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constructed climate knowledge as objective, they were reluctant to communicate this 
to others. They did not consider it appropriate to talk about ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ 
actions when they interacted with their colleagues. Finally, in section 5.3.3 I will look 
at the delivery of the climate change message. The champions had clear ideas about 
how to deliver it and were keen to ‘raise awareness’ by providing information rather 
than ‘lecturing’ or ‘preaching’. Overall, I will argue that the majority of these 
reported ‘limitations’ were constructed by a dominant neoliberal discourse that 
advocates individual sovereignty and rights.  
 
5.3.1   Passivity versus Agency 
The communication of climate change is not a straightforward activity. Every 
interaction between individuals is the site of power relations. By transferring 
knowledge about climate change the champions were simultaneously reinforcing a 
particular way of thinking about the problem and how it should be addressed. By 
picking out ‘what to emphasise and what to present positively or negatively’ the 
champions were ‘shap[ing] the world’ they were describing (Ransom 1997, p.19). It 
is therefore important to consider the role of the champions as potential ‘change 
agents’. 
‘Change agents’ in this sense does not refer to the ability to successfully 
promote particular mitigating actions. Rather, it refers to the potential for champions 
to challenge the dominant discourses of climate change. Agency exists in the capacity 
to undermine the ‘tyranny of common sense’ (Downing 2008, p.10); to resist the 
status of a dominant discourse as ‘true’ and ‘inevitable’. In the production of 
discourse, individuals can either be ‘passive “subjects” who are the conduits, bearers 
or sites of discourses’ (Caldwell 2007, p.770) or they can be ‘active agents’ who 
ensure that ‘discourses are themselves in a state of constant reconstitution and 
contestation’ (Carabine 2001, p.279). 
The project focuses on four main research questions and the last two are 
rooted in the role of the champion: How did the champions reinforce dominant 
discourses in their everyday interactions? Can we identify resistance to dominant 
discourses and how did resistance operate at sites of interaction? If the champions 
acted as passive subjects then they were reproducing dominant discourses. If they 
were ‘active agents’ then they were resisting these discourses. In the two sections that 
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follow I will consider how the champions embodied these two opposing positions 
when they talked generally about their role and the limitations they faced. 
 
5.3.2   Subjective Climate Knowledge   
In the majority of the interviews, participants constructed knowledge about 
climate change as ‘true’ and ‘objective’. The status of this knowledge as objective led 
to authoritative statements about what we should and should not be doing to tackle 
climate change. The participants talked about ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ bins and ‘correct’ 
and ‘incorrect’ ways to deal with the problem. However, an interesting distinction 
became apparent when they talked about the beliefs of other people. Champions often 
claimed that belief in climate change and climate-protecting behaviour was ‘people’s 
personal preference’ (C-3, 231-232).  
In one of the focus groups the champions constructed climate change as ‘true’ 
by teasing champion D-1, who was sceptical of the issue. As explained in section 
5.1.2, they laughed and shook their heads at him, while the manager stated ‘he’s a 
non-believer’ (D-manager, 401). Later in the interview I asked about their promotion 
of climate-protecting behaviour amongst their colleagues. This prompted the 
following exchange: 
 
615 D-manager: it’s, it’s almost too hard and it’s too personal it’s like politics... 
616 D(7): and religion 
617 M1: and religion and climate change  
618 JS: someone else said that 
619 (Strong agreement from group) 
 
There was a clear reluctance to challenge people on areas that were ‘personal’. These 
included politics, religion and climate change. The implication was that people had 
the right to choose what they believed in relation to these subjects. Climate change 
could be controversial in the same way as politics or religion. This is contrary to the 
initial contention that climate change is a ‘fact’. 
A similar idea emerged when I talked to two of the champions in Business C. 
One of them had constructed climate change as an obvious truth, saying, ‘(laughter) 
yes I do believe in it as it were’ (C-9, 815). He had also claimed that people who did 
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not believe ‘had their fingers in their ears’ (C-9, 1047). The objectivity of this 
knowledge informed the way he talked about climate-protecting behaviour: ‘everyone 
should be doing [it]’ (C-9, 984). However, when we discussed the promotion of 
climate friendly behaviour he agreed with his colleague’s contention that we cannot 
challenge people’s preferences: 
 
1187 C-10: what right do I have to try and persuade them to care everyone’s got a different set of 
1188 morals and principles so 
1189 C-9: yeah 
 
This happened again later in the interview. Champion C-10 said ‘no because, no 
honestly because I know how bad erm like 4x4s are and things and I, it would be a 
moral choice if, even if they were really nice to drive, but you can’t expect other 
people to share the same views… that’s what I think’ (C-10, 1197-1200). Her 
colleague again agreed with this point of view: ‘ditto’ (C-9, 1204). 
These champions argued that everyone has a ‘different set of morals and 
principles’. Despite his earlier claim that climate change was true and we should be 
engaging in climate-protecting behaviour, C-9 does not expect other people to share 
this view. He agrees with C-10 that people have different and equally valid views on 
climate science and individual behaviour. He contradicts his own claim that people 
are just not listening – they have ‘their fingers in their ears’ (C-9, 1047). Rather, he 
argues that they simply have a different opinion. Similarly, the champion who had 
talked about putting waste material in the ‘correct bins’ (A-7, 280), said ‘you know, 
we’re all different, we’re not all going to do, do things the same way’ (A-7, 634-635). 
The subjectivity of climate change knowledge and the freedom to act as we 
wish is reflective of neoliberal discourse. In modern neoliberal society, it is widely 
accepted that climate change is occurring and that it is the result of human activity 
(Yearley 2009; Lahsen 2010). However, individuals are still free to choose their own 
subjective preferences. Neoliberalism places great importance on the right to non-
interference and the freedom of individuals to pursue their own private ends, however 
disparate these may be (Plant 2010). Champions were reluctant to tell people that 
their beliefs were ‘incorrect’ and that they were engaging in the ‘wrong’ behaviour 
even though many of them had already established this position with reference to 
themselves. Kirk (2008) argues that the neoliberal project was intended to ‘entrench 
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individual rights’ (p.160). Individuals have the right to choose their own position on 
climate change despite the ‘facts’ that the champions believe to be ‘correct’. 
This position indicates the dominance of neoliberal discourse in constructing 
the boundaries of the champions’ role and how far they felt they should ‘interfere’ in 
the lives of other neoliberal subjects. It also suggests that, in general, the champions 
were likely to be ‘passive’ rather than ‘active’. Regardless of which of the seven 
discourses was most prevalent in the interviews, we might assume that the champions 
would be reluctant to challenge dominant beliefs about climate change, whatever 
these might be. 
 
5.3.3   Delivering the Climate Change Message 
The champions were reluctant to interfere with people’s rights and freedom to 
choose, but the essence of their role was to change people’s behaviour. In order to 
reconcile these two things the champions were clear about how to deliver the message 
of climate change. In this section I will talk about the reluctance of participants to 
‘preach’ to their colleagues and their contention that behaviour change could be 
achieved by ‘raising awareness’ and ‘providing information’. 
The role of the champion was seen as ‘raising awareness’ (C-4, 34), ‘creating 
that awareness’ (A-8, 127) and ‘trying to educate people’ (C-5, 41-42). The 
champions believed that by providing information about climate change they might 
encourage people to ‘choose’ climate-friendly lifestyles. A small minority of the 
champions did talk about a more direct approach to behaviour change. For example, 
one champion said: 
 
Absolutely yeah, yeah if I thought they were just throwing paper in the bin or something I’d be like 
‘why don’t you recycle that instead’. Yeah absolutely I’d be always like, yeah turning off lights or 
switching thin* appliances off. Yeah definitely I would, yep (C-4, 522-526). 
 
For most of the champions, however, this was not an ‘appropriate’ way to approach 
the subject. They would provide information, but they were very reluctant to push it 
onto other people. One champion stated: 
 
I think this is like kind of the way I like to, er, put it I don’t like preaching to people, erm, but I like to 
give people information so that they are better informed about the, er, the impact of the choices they 
make (C-5, 383-383). 
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Climate protecting behaviour was offered as an option but people were not told what 
they should be doing. Respondents in general would pass ‘on the word without 
actually having to preach’ (A-5, 728). They said that they did not want to ‘lecture 
anybody’ (A-7, 600-601) or ‘preach to other people’ (C-6, 1113). One champion 
claimed that he had ‘never tried to preach to other people’ (B-5, 879). The role of the 
champion was ‘providing the information, raising awareness but not telling people 
what they should be doing’ (C-2, 861-863). In one case I asked the champion what 
she thought people should be doing to tackle climate change. Her response was: ‘to 
start with, I’d never say you should be’ (C-3, 229). 
This reluctance to prescribe (and proscribe) actions further reflected the 
champions’ neoliberal understanding of ethics as subjective – a matter of preference. 
They believed that people should choose what to believe and how to act and this 
informed the way they communicated the message of climate change. This provides 
more evidence of a dominant neoliberal discourse and it also provides further insight 
into the champions as passive or active. Prima facie, it could be argued that providing 
information is less active than actually telling people what to do. The champions 
certainly felt that the latter was more extreme. However, it could be argued that the 
degree of ‘agency’ amongst the champions is also subject to the information they 
were providing. If they were raising awareness about subversive climate discourses 
then this would indeed make them ‘active agents’. In chapters six and seven I will 
explore these roles in more detail as I consider what the champions were actually 
saying to their colleagues and the types of messages that they were delivering. 
 
5.4   Conclusion 
The role of the climate champions was to promote climate-protecting 
behaviour in the workplace. They were expected to learn about the science of climate 
change, think about communication techniques and use their knowledge to implement 
behaviour change amongst their colleagues. Given the discursive nature of the 
project, I have argued that this was not a straightforward activity. Every time the 
champions communicated a piece of information they were constructing a particular 
version of the world.  
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In chapters six and seven I will identify the particular discourses that the 
champions were drawing on when they were talking about climate change. I will 
analyse the specific ways in which they were constructing ‘appropriate’ motivations 
and action. The purpose of this chapter was to provide a background to the 
forthcoming analysis and consider the role of the champions in terms of knowledge, 
belief and limitations. I also considered the ways in which climate change was 
constructed as a problem. 
I argued that the majority of the participants had a good general understanding 
of the science of climate change and that they drew on a scientific discourse when 
they described the problem. They rejected discourses of scepticism and pessimism: 
climate change was real and something could and should be done about it. I then 
argued that the majority of the champions constructed the problem of climate change 
as a small ‘glitch’ in the neoliberal system. It was not a fundamental flaw in the 
current way we live our lives and we were already making some progress in 
addressing it. I suggested that this construction of the problem was likely to lead to 
the dominance of reformist discourses in terms of dealing with climate change. 
Finally, I considered the limitations of the climate champion role. I argued 
that most of the champions were very reluctant to push their own views onto other 
people and tell them what they should and should not be doing. Many champions had 
argued that knowledge about climate change was objective and that this led to 
‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ actions. However, when they talked about other people, the 
champions claimed that belief in climate change and climate-protecting behaviour 
were a matter of personal preference. People should choose what to believe and how 
to act. Moreover, when they talked to people about climate change, the champions 
were careful to avoid ‘preaching’. They were more comfortable simply providing 
information for their colleagues. I argued that these limitations were based on a 
neoliberal conception of rights and the sovereignty of individual choice and that this 
general dominance of neoliberalism further suggested the dominance of reformist 
discourses in terms of dealing with climate change. I also argued that, regardless of 
which discourses were dominant, the reluctance to interfere with people’s beliefs and 
lifestyles, suggested a passive role for the champion in the reproduction of dominant 
discourses.        
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Chapter 6 
Motivating Behaviour Change 
 
  Jackson (2005a) argues that ‘behaviour change is fast becoming the “holy 
grail” of sustainable development policy’ (p.xi). How do we encourage behaviour 
change? How do we motivate people to act on climate change and what are the 
barriers that we face in this task? The champions were given responsibility for 
changing behaviour in the workplace based on a limited amount of training and their 
own initiative. Chapters six and seven will consider how the champions encouraged 
climate-protecting behaviour. What discourses did the champions draw upon when it 
came to different ways of actually dealing with climate change? Did they reinforce or 
challenge dominant discourses when they talked to their colleagues and managers? 
This chapter will focus on motivations and chapter seven will focus on actions. 
In chapter five I provided some background to the role of the champion. I 
argued that most of the champions believed in climate change and felt that something 
could be done about the problem. However, most of them also constructed climate 
change as a small ‘glitch’ in the neoliberal system rather than a fundamental problem. 
I argued that if they constructed the problem in this way then they were likely to draw 
on reformist discourses when they encouraged behaviour change.  
In this chapter I will argue that reformist discourses were indeed very 
prevalent in the interviews. However, the identification of discourses was not a 
straight forward task. When the champions talked about motivation they drew on 
components from both reformist and revolutionary discourses. They mainly used 
reformist ideas to encourage behaviour change in other people and drew on 
revolutionary ideas when they talked about their own motivations. Often, however, 
revolutionary ideas were constrained by reformist or neoliberal notions of 
‘appropriateness’. For example, when some of the champions talked about 
revolutionary motivations (e.g., doing the right thing) they dismissed their own views 
as ‘silly’ or ‘cheesy’. Many champions also combined revolutionary motivations (the 
non-economic value of the natural world) with some form of self-interest (the 
enjoyment they gained from walking in the countryside). Self-interest was very 
marginal in these accounts but it was present. In addition, the champions also talked 
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about the problems associated with self-interest as a neoliberal value. They 
challenged the ‘naturalness’ of reformist ideas when it comes to dealing with an issue 
like climate change. However, they continued to reinforce these values by using self-
interest as a basis for climate-protecting behaviour – highlighting the co-benefits of 
action, such as saving money. There did appear to be some resistance to dominant 
reformist discourses but this was very limited. 
In section 6.1 I will begin the chapter by analysing the arguments that the 
champions used to motivate behaviour change amongst their colleagues and 
managers. I will argue that the vast majority of the champions drew upon the 
components of reformist discourses for this purpose. They relied upon reformist 
values (accumulation, pursuit of profit) and self-interested accounts of human nature 
when interacting with those around them. Some of the champions did refer to more 
revolutionary ideas but there was limited evidence of this across the interviews. 
In section 6.2 I will then consider the motivations of the participants 
themselves. In contrast to the first section, I will argue that the personal motivations 
of managers and champions reflected more revolutionary values (justice, 
responsibility) and drew upon a more altruistic account of human nature. Many 
participants wanted to protect the climate because it was the ‘right thing to do’. 
However, many of the champions also acknowledged some kind of personal benefit 
they would gain from acting on climate change. Section 6.3 will then consider the 
barriers to climate protecting behaviour. What stopped people from acting in a 
climate-friendly way? I will argue that barriers to action were reflective of 
neoliberalism more generally. This might suggest that reformist discourses have not 
addressed the conflict between environment and economy in a satisfactory way. 
Finally, in sections 6.4 and 6.5, I will look at the reproduction or subversion of 
these dominant reformist (or neoliberal) discourses. Having identified different 
climate discourses in the first half of the chapter, I will analyse the operation of these 
discourses in everyday communication. I will argue that the champions reproduced 
the dominant discourses at many different sites of interaction. There was some 
evidence of subversion but this was very limited. 
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6.1   Identifying Climate Discourses I: Encouraging Action in Others 
In this section, I will identify the climate discourses that the champions used 
when they encouraged behaviour change in other people. I will argue that reformist 
discourses played a dominant role in the construction of ‘appropriate’ motivations. 
The champions drew upon reformist values and a reformist account of human nature. 
They talked about the co-benefits of action on climate change and they reported this 
to be the most effective way to change behaviour. In sections 6.1.1 and section 6.1.2 I 
will analyse how the champions encouraged behaviour change when they talked to 
managers as well as their colleagues. In section 6.1.3, I will argue that some of the 
champions did talk about the use of more revolutionary motivations (protecting the 
planet). However, these were often secondary to more reformist ideas. 
 
6.1.1   Business Buy-in 
Champions were expected to implement behaviour change in the workplace. 
An important part of this was convincing management that climate-protecting 
behaviour was a worthwhile pursuit. Champions often required time away from their 
official role, the authorisation to implement changes in the workplace and funding for 
environmental projects. In this section I will analyse the motivations that champions 
used in order to try to change the attitudes of their line managers and those 
responsible for making decisions within the business. In the majority of cases, 
champions appealed to notions of self-interest and profit when they suggested the 
implementation of climate-protecting behaviour. 
Specifically, champions appealed to the economic benefits for their company 
of a green image. One CSR manager talked about the increasing prevalence of 
environmental questions in tendering contracts: 
 
Certainly stuff like this is massively helpful in winning contracts... we’re always updating our kind 
of…status reports… as regards to where we are in the whole climate change arena. So, we’ve got kind 
of a whole band of people that just love this stuff because more and more it’s becoming part of tender 
writing (A-manager, 781-792). 
 
People are increasingly aware of the environmental impact of their actions. 
Companies who portray a green image are more likely to win contracts and therefore 
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increase their profit. One champion pointed out that ‘a lot of the clients have got their 
own green targets so if [Business C] seem to be like in sync with them then we’ll be 
more attractive as a supplier’ (C-10, 92-95). The ‘greening’ of society in general has 
necessitated the ‘greening’ of any successful business. Clapp (2005) argues that 
‘adhering to CSR principles makes “good business sense”’ (p.26). 
For some champions, the importance of a ‘green’ image encouraged a 
sceptical attitude towards their company’s environmental commitments. One 
champion said, ‘a lot of the environment push from the top is from, erm, a, like a PR 
perspective’ (C-10, 85-86). Another agreed that, ‘obviously it’s, it’s sort of PR for 
climate change isn’t it’ (A-3, 519). In this sense, the establishment of the climate 
champion programme itself is, arguably, a means to increase profit (through a green 
image) rather than being directed towards protection of the climate. Despite these 
reservations, the champions maintained that appealing to the economic benefits of 
climate protection was the most effective way to foster behaviour change
28
.  
For this reason they also highlighted the more general economic benefits of 
climate protecting behaviour. The champions attempted to gain ‘buy-in’ from middle 
management by proposing actions that were ‘financially viable’ (C-5, 646) and 
presenting a ‘business case’ for doing them (D-3, 173). One champion explained the 
necessity of this approach: 
 
At first the business wasn’t really aware of the business benefits that it could bring to it. If you were 
doing it then fine, but if anything happened where it needed money or anything else or budget in terms 
of how many people are spending time on it then they had to understand, well, what’s in it for us as 
well as the environment (D-1, 276-281)?  
 
Given this stipulation, it was the job of the champions to work out how a project 
could be profitable for the business. The reduction of CO2 emissions alone was not a 
good enough reason to invest money or time into a project. Young (2000) argues that, 
‘companies do not develop a broader long-term interpretation of their environmental 
responsibilities for altruistic reasons. Their concern is economic self-interest’ (p.20). 
This position is supported by evidence of the kinds of projects that were successfully 
implemented.  
                                                          
28 Hargreaves (2008) made similar observations of the champions in his study.  They felt that ‘the 
appeal to financial values was seen as likely to work well with “the Board”’ (p.145).  
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An example of one successful project was the campaign by a champion to 
reduce the number of journeys done by a delivery van. In the past, the van had done 
several daily trips to and from closely situated depots. The champion suggested that 
the driver could reduce this to one round trip to all of the depots. He acknowledged 
that it was ‘quite a big impact from a cost saving as well as an environmental saving’ 
(B-8, 207-209). The champion had faced no resistance in implementing this ‘cost 
saving’ change. In contrast, a champion who had tried to set up recycling facilities 
had faced insurmountable difficulties. The business reaction to her proposal was, 
‘we’re not going to be paying for recycling and we’re not going to be paying for 
anything’ (A-6, 51-52). The champion could not create a business case for a recycling 
programme that cost money to establish. Motivations for action had to be directed 
towards the economic gains of the business. This was the most effective way to gain 
buy-in from middle management.  
The approach taken by the champions to motivate their business reflects a 
discourse of ecological modernisation (EM). The champions drew upon many of the 
key components of EM to frame their messages about climate change. The most 
fundamental component of this discourse is the reconceptualised relationship between 
the environment and the economy. This relationship is no longer one of conflict. In 
fact, ‘the core message of the theory of EM is that economic development and 
environmental policy can be reconciled; so-called “win–win” opportunities can be 
seized upon’ (Pataki 2009, p.83). This is the message that the champions tried to 
make clear to middle management. 
Indeed, ‘in engaging with the EM agenda, firms achieve financial benefits 
from reduced waste production and greater business efficiency, as well as through the 
creation of new markets’ (Gibbs 2003, p.4). Business had the opportunity to save 
money through the implementation of more efficient processes and to make money 
through their investment in environmental technology or climate-protecting products 
and services. Champions drew on the reconceptualised relationship of the 
environment and the economy to present this win-win idea. Often the focus was on 
saving money rather than making money, but the general message was the same. 
Managers did not need to prioritise economic concerns over the climate because 
protection of the climate would inevitably lead to greater profit. Ultimately, it was in 
their self-interest to pursue environmental objectives. Curran (2009) argues that 
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‘“greening business” becomes good for the economy, good for the environment and 
good for consumers and governments alike’ (p.203). 
More fundamentally, EM contends that a ‘high level of environmental 
protection is a precondition for economic development’ (Reitan 1998, p.5). A 
business stands to make extra money from climate-protecting behaviour, but more 
importantly, it cannot afford to ignore the issue because ‘business ultimately depends 
on the health of the planet and surrounding atmosphere’ (Young 2000, p.2). 
Participants acknowledged that this was an important concern. One manager said, 
‘[Business B] is acutely aware that you know climate change will affect our business 
completely’ (B-manager, 141-142). The issue was not only about increasing profit but 
also about securing the future of the business. 
 
6.1.2   Selling the Issue to Individuals 
Champions drew on similar techniques when they tried to motivate their 
colleagues, to engage in climate-protecting behaviour. Champions had to provide a 
reason for individuals to prioritise climate change. Highlighting the co-benefits of 
action was an effective way to do this. As with their line managers, this had to be 
additional to the benefits of a future stable climate. 
The most effective co-benefit was the prospect of saving money. Champions 
encouraged their colleagues to change their behaviour by pointing out that ‘there may 
be some saving for them’ (A-1,405-406). Another champion told us about her 
communication techniques with colleagues: ‘I’d be saying to them “well do you 
know how much money you’re losing or you’re wasting … you know by keeping that 
appliance on overnight”’ (C-4, 533-535)? The interviewees had no doubt that the 
appeal to economic self-interest could work. As one manager said:  
 
If I can really show people that just by being a little bit smarter you can save £50 a quarter... on your 
electricity then... who wouldn’t jump on the like sustainability, climate change bandwagon… you 
know (G-manager, 1181-1185). 
 
A champion expressed the same idea but more concisely: ‘almost everyone in 
Western society cares about their pennies’ (C-10, 1286-1287). 
The champions also drew on the health benefits of climate-protecting 
behaviour. One champion was very enthusiastic about the co-benefits of cycling. She 
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said, ‘oh it’s much more fun to cycle and, you know, it’s better for your health’ (B-1, 
812-814). These messages applied in the workplace and at home. Colleagues could 
save money on their own electricity bill or that of their company. They could enjoy 
the health benefits of walking or cycling as part of their daily commute or as a 
weekend activity. 
Of course, when it comes to self-interest, there is less inclination to save 
money for the company than there is at home. For this reason many of the champions 
introduced incentives as a motivation for climate-protecting behaviour in the 
workplace. For example, one champion had suggested incentivising double-sided 
printing by providing free ‘pizza for you at lunch on one Friday of every month’  
(A-1, 437). In other companies, ‘freebies’ had included energy drinks as part of cycle 
to work week (Business B) and chocolates for taking part in an online carbon survey 
(Business C). Incentives were an important motivation for behaviour change.  
When the champions interacted with managers they were effectively trying to 
promote changes in the business. For example, some of the champions wanted to 
implement facilities for recycling or change the transport procedures for deliveries. 
These actions involved small changes to the way that the business operated. In 
contrast, when the champions interacted with their colleagues they were trying to 
encourage individual behaviour change. For this reason, when the champions talked 
about motivating colleagues, friends and family, their accounts reflected a discourse 
of individualism. 
Discourses of ecological modernisation and individualism share some 
fundamental components. They are both reformist discourses, which focus on self-
interest as the basis of human nature. However, they differ in their construction of 
key agents. In a discourse of EM corporations and industry are the key agents, 
responsible for pursuing climate friendly business policies and infrastructure. 
Individualism places the responsibility for action with individual rational consumers. 
When the champions talked about saving money on heating bills or using incentives 
to promote behaviour change they were drawing upon the ‘individualised, egoistic 
self-interest’ of an individualism discourse (Clarke et al 2007, p.232). This is slightly 
different to the account of human nature in EM, which is directed towards the 
economic goals of corporations and business more generally. 
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In addition, the champions drew upon the key values of individualism. Again, 
this component is similar across all reformist discourses – individualism, EM and 
privatisation – because they are all rooted in a reformist account of neoliberalism. The 
key values in all three discourses focus on growth, profit and accumulation. In a 
discourse of individualism, people are expected to think like businesses and to pursue 
‘unlimited individual accumulation’ (McCarthy and Prudham 2004, p. 277). G-
manager argued everyone would jump on the ‘sustainability, climate change band 
wagon’ if he could show them how to save money (1181-1185). His argument was 
based on the assumption that most people would be motivated by the prospect of 
saving money. 
Finally, a discourse of individualism highlights the importance of choice as a 
key value. Individuals are free to choose whether or not they engage in climate-
protecting behaviour based on their knowledge of the available options. The role of 
the champions was to provide information for their colleagues so that they could 
choose to act. Most champions did not tell people they should act because it would 
save them money. Rather, they informed them about potential money savings and 
assumed that their self-interested nature and values would lead them to choose 
climate-protecting behaviour. For example, one champion explained that he had 
given out free energy efficient lights bulbs and provided an internal communication 
document about energy savings and fuel bills. He reflected on his efforts saying, ‘I 
think really you just need to give some people a little bit of information and 
encouragement and let them make up their own mind’ (B-5, 884-886). Similarly, 
another champion said ‘when you actually show someone the amount of consumption 
or the amount of savings they could have it, it opens their eyes a little bit’ (A-5, 435-
437). When they tried to encourage behaviour change in those around them, most 
champions framed the issue in the same way. They drew on the components of 
individualism. 
 
6.1.3   …and Concern about the Climate  
For most of the champions reference to accumulation and self-interest were 
the only feasible ways to promote climate-protecting behaviour. However, in a small 
number of cases, the participants did refer to motivations beyond this reformist 
construction. One manager said that her business pursued environmental objectives 
because it was the ‘right thing to do’ (E-manager, 124). If this was the only reason for 
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action then we might consider the role of more revolutionary discourses in this 
account. For example, a justice discourse might consider the ‘ethical dimensions’ of 
climate change (Gardiner 2004, p.556) and the importance of ‘doing the right thing’. 
However, this manager did also acknowledge that ‘we’ve still got to provide a 
quality service; we’ve still got to make sure that we’re priced competitively and all 
those other features need to be in place’ (E-manager, 133-135). Doing the right thing 
was not the only consideration. 
Other participants referred to the importance of preserving the natural world. 
One champion argued that there was a ‘cost saving as well as erm caring for the 
environment’ (C-4, 229). With reference to business incentives, another champion 
explained that ‘the company are saving money and then again we’re sticking to our 
greener opinions’ (A-5, 143-144). These accounts were not about preserving the 
environment because it saves money; they were about saving money and preserving 
the environment. In some ways this construction is similar to an EM discourse. The 
relationship between the economy and the environment was one of harmony. 
However, I would argue that this construction goes beyond ecological modernisation. 
For example, champion C-4 also talked about ‘the importance of the environment in 
our world’ (221). There was some indication that the environment had significance 
beyond its role as a provider of natural resources. There was certainly not enough 
evidence to suggest a discourse of deep ecology, but there was some resistance to the 
strict EM conception of environment/economy. 
It therefore appears to be the case that a small number of champions were 
drawing on components from both reformist and revolutionary discourses when they 
encouraged behaviour change. The components of revolutionary discourses – doing 
the right thing and promoting the intrinsic importance of the planet – were very 
marginal but they were present. 
 
6.1.4   Summary 
When it came to encouraging behaviour change in others the champions 
consistently drew upon reformist climate discourses. Businesses were encouraged to 
pursue environmental objectives because they could save money through more 
efficient processes and climate-protecting projects. Individuals were encouraged to 
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engage in climate-friendly actions because they could save money, improve their 
health and receive incentives or ‘freebies’ in the workplace.  
Other scholars have noted the importance of a win-win approach as a 
motivation for behaviour change. With reference to the general public, Norton and 
Leaman (2004) argue that ‘the key to engaging people – as with business – is to... 
show “what’s in it for them”’ (p.8). Ereaut and Segnit (2006) agree that ‘positive 
climate behaviours need to be approached in the same way as marketers approach 
acts of buying and consuming... treating climate-friendly behaviour as a brand that 
can be sold’ (p.9). Indeed, previous research on climate champions has arrived at very 
similar conclusions. For example, Lewis and Juravle (2010) note the importance of a 
business case for action in the workplace (p.487). This is supported by Andersson and 
Bateman (2000) who report that the champions in their study ‘framed their 
environmental issues as financial opportunities’ (p.565). 
My analysis in this section has come to the same conclusions as previous 
work. Dominant motivations are based on win-win scenarios and co-benefits for 
individuals. However, I have also argued that these ‘appropriate’ motivations are 
constructed by the dominant reformist climate discourses. I have analysed 
‘appropriate’ motivations in the context of my analytical categories and I have argued 
that champions consistently drew upon reformist values and accounts of human 
nature. In the final sub-section I noted that some of the champions also referred to 
more revolutionary motivations. Champions sometimes combined self-interest with 
more altruistic reasons for protecting the climate, such as ‘doing the right thing’. This 
could perhaps indicate some subversion of the dominant discourse. It will therefore 
be discussed in more detail in section 6.5. 
 
6.2   Identifying Climate Discourses II: Personal Motivations for Action 
The champions were confident about the most effective way of encouraging 
others to act on climate change. If they could appeal to self-interest and co-benefits, 
then individuals (and businesses) would be willing to change their behaviour. 
However, when I enquired about their personal motivations for engaging in climate 
protecting behaviour I received a different response. Many of the champions talked 
about future generations, justice, responsibility and the value of the natural world 
when I asked them why they had become involved in the climate champion scheme 
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or what they thought about climate change more generally. There was still reference 
to professional and personal benefits but this was marginal to the more revolutionary 
values and motivations. In this section I will investigate the range of climate 
discourses that were evident in the champions’ personal views on climate change. 
 
6.2.1   Profit and Promotion  
Some of the champions did refer to self-interest when they talked about their 
own motivations for action. Generally, climate-protecting behaviour made sense for 
many people because there were financial implications for reducing energy or 
walking instead of driving. They acknowledged the benefits of ‘saving money’ (A-5, 
786-787). As one champion said, ‘it’s a no brainer’ (A-6, 265). In these cases, the 
champions talked about the same kinds of motivations that they used to encourage 
behaviour change in others. This reflects the reformist components that have been 
discussed at length in the preceding sections. 
More often, however, where motivations were self-interested, they were based 
on the professional advantages attached to the role of ‘climate champion’. Champions 
admitted that, ‘there was probably a part of me hoping to get, erm, some form of, 
erm, corporate recognition’ (A-4, 1124-1125). Volunteers were aware that 
commitment to such a role would ‘look quite good for how I was trying to progress in 
the business’ (B-2, 303-304). In fact, some managers explicitly used this motivation 
to attract volunteers for the project. One manager said that if ‘you have been a 
successful climate champion on that project then fundamentally it becomes sort of, 
part of your business CV’ (G-manager, 513-515). Another said that he emphasised 
the ‘transferable skills’ that came with being a champion (B-manager, 304). 
These motivations reflected a self-interested account of human nature focused 
on personal accumulation (both directly through saving money and indirectly through 
promotion and personal success). Thus, the champions drew upon components of 
individualism when they talked about their own motivations as well as the 
motivations they used to persuade other people. Moreover, to some extent, the 
champions were also reinforcing the structure of the business itself. They were keen 
to get a promotion and move up in the company. They were reinforcing the everyday 
operations of the company and the focus on growth and accumulation. They did not 
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talk about challenging the status quo. Rather, for some participants, the champion 
scheme was a potential way for them to use the current system for their own benefit. 
It is important to note that for most of the champions who talked about profit 
and promotion these were at the bottom of a long list of motivations. However, these 
things were mentioned as personal motivations. 
 
6.2.2   (My) Future Generations 
Concern for future generations was one of the most frequently cited reasons 
for climate-protecting behaviour. One champion said, ‘I try to make a difference for, 
maybe for future generations’ (A-6, 347). Another emphasised ‘the morality of 
having a so* social responsibility for future generations’ (C-3, 565-566). In addition, 
a manager talked about the urgency of action on climate change: ‘The longer we drag 
our feet, erm, maybe not our generation but certainly future generations will, will pay 
for, for our ineptitude really’ (B-manager, 760-762). 
This was a far more revolutionary reason to engage in climate-protecting 
behaviour than saving money or getting promoted. The sentiments expressed here 
reflect components of a justice discourse. According to Page (2007) ‘each generation 
is required by justice to protect the climate system for their successors’ (p.238). 
Indeed, a justice based account of human nature contends that individuals can be 
altruistic in their motivations: 
 
It seems plain that people are motivated by a broad range of concerns, including concern for family 
and friends, and religious, moral, and political ideals. And it seems just as plain that people sometimes 
sacrifice their own interests for what they regard to be a greater, sometimes impersonal, good 
(Jamieson 1992, p.144). 
 
The professed motivations of the champions support Jamieson’s argument. These 
individuals had become involved in the project because they felt a responsibility to 
future generations, which had little to do with any personal benefits they would gain 
from the experience. 
The participants who did talk about future generations often mentioned their 
own family in the same context. One champion said, ‘I thought about my daughter 
growing up and … if I can’t tell her that I knew about these issues and didn’t do 
everything I could to stop it, then I just couldn’t live with that’ (C-6, 875-880). 
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Another talked about her efforts to ‘make the world a better place you know for my 
children and, and ultimately you know future generations’ (E-manager, 405-407). A 
frequently cited motivation was ‘my kids’ (A-3, 52), ‘your children or grandchildren’ 
(A-9, 449) or the fact that ‘I’ve got two kids’ (A-8, 564). 
It might be argued that a concern for our own family is less revolutionary than 
a concern for future generations in a general sense. If the primary motivation was my 
family and my children then this does not reject the reformist concern of ‘care for 
oneself and one’s own’ (Harvey 2005, p.181). However, the fact that concern for ‘my 
children’ was often accompanied by the broader concern for future generations does 
indicate a more altruistic account of human nature. In addition, concern for other 
people (family or future persons) is still more revolutionary than a concern with 
economic prosperity, which would be based on self-interest and personal 
accumulation. 
 
6.2.3   The Rest of the World  
Revolutionary discourses became more clearly evident when the champions 
talked about climate change and the rest of the world. Many participants had thought 
about the effects of climate change on people in developing countries and this was 
often a motivation for action. One champion said, ‘climate change does affect the 
whole world so it’ll either make things worse in Africa or South America’ (A-7, 561-
562). Another champion was very uncomfortable with this prospect: 
 
I don’t like the fact that we just seem to forget about people in other parts of the world and I mean 
climate change is… does look like it’s going to impact some of the poorer parts of the world a lot 
worse than it impacts us, which is really very unfair (B-6, 566-571). 
 
These motivations appear to reflect a discourse of justice. Illsley (2002) explains that 
‘at the heart of the environmental justice movement is a belief in distributive justice 
and a fair allocation of environmental goods’ (p.71). The champions frequently drew 
upon the values of fairness, responsibility and basic welfare rights. One champion 
argued that the living standards in developing countries were ‘unacceptably low’  
(A-4, 584). For this reason poorer countries would be unable to deal with the effects 
of climate change. One champion said, ‘if you live in Bangladesh you know you’ll be 
suffering for everyone else’s emissions and not have the money or the whereabouts to 
do much about it’ (F-manager, 589-592). These people were being denied their basic 
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welfare rights. Participants felt that they had a responsibility to do something about 
this, to not ‘forget about people in other parts of the world’ (B-6, 567). 
However, it is important to consider the type of responsibility that the 
participants were recognising. In the context of climate change, Dobson (2007) draws 
an important distinction between charity and justice: 
 
It is vitally important to see that this is a matter of justice, not of charity. The responsibilities of the 
environmental citizen are not the same as those that follow from the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, 
for example, or from the earthquake a year later in Pakistan/Kashmir. The key difference in my 
relationship to climate change, and to the tsunami or an earthquake, is that I am partially responsible 
for the first and not at all responsible for the second. This prompts very different types of moral 
response. In the case of suffering for which I am not responsible, compassion and charity are 
appropriate responses. In the case of suffering for which I am responsible, justice is the appropriate 
response (p.281). 
 
There was one champion who appeared to construct her concern as one of charity and 
compared climate-related disasters to natural disasters: 
 
Whenever there’s a natural disaster you know all countries seem to pull together to sort of give that 
help don’t they… erm and I think you know obviously more of that to continue erm because nobody 
wants to see somebody else suffer do they? (B-3, 504-510). 
 
This champion recognised that climate change was a bad thing and she was not 
comfortable with the fact people would be adversely affected by it. However, she did 
not construct this as an issue of justice. 
In contrast to this, the majority of the participants felt that ‘justice was the 
appropriate response’. The West had played a central role in causing these climate 
related problems and thus exacerbating the plight of the world’s poorest people. 
Dealing with climate change was indeed a justice based responsibility: 
 
There’s still thousands of kids that die every day because they can’t even put a grain of rice in their 
mouth so I would hardly put the pin the responsibility of climate change on them...so yes it does swing 
back more to the Western world’ (G-manager, 1266-1271). 
 
Other participants expressed similar sentiments. One champions said, ‘you have like 
the more kind of established countries obviously being responsible for a lot of the, the 
current damage’ (C-5, 474-475).  We therefore have a ‘moral obligation to take action 
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because a lot of, a lot of the emissions out there are Western emissions’ (F-manager, 
585-586). The burden of climate change would fall disproportionately on the world’s 
poorest people. This was not fair because they were less able to deal with the problem 
and, more fundamentally, they were responsible for a much smaller proportion of the 
world’s CO2 emissions. 
Kamminga (2008) argues that a justice based approach to climate change 
‘would place the lion’s share of the cost of climate change with the world’s richest 
people’ (p.676). The champions drew upon this justice based approach. They felt that 
they had an obligation to address the problem of climate change because the West 
was responsible for a large proportion of the emissions (polluter pays principle) and 
they were better equipped to deal with it (ability to pay principle). By recognising this 
responsibility the champions were demonstrating that they did indeed have a 
‘capacity for a sense of justice’ (Rawls 1999, p.443), reflecting a more revolutionary 
account of human nature. 
 
6.2.4   Protecting the Planet  
The revolutionary capacity of the champions was also evident in their appeals 
to the importance of nature. In section 6.1.3, I suggested that the protection of the 
planet did play a very marginal role when the champions encouraged behaviour 
change in others. Some champions promoted the intrinsic importance of the 
environment/climate alongside financial or business concerns. This was only a 
consideration in a small number of accounts. 
 However, when I asked about their personal motivations, many participants 
made reference to the importance of the natural world. For some, this was based on 
the enjoyment that they got from being outside. One champion explained that she had 
grown up in the countryside and spent a lot of time outdoors. For this reason she felt 
she had a natural ‘empathy with the environment’ (C-3, 563). Other participants spent 
their spare time ‘visiting nature reserves or walking with my wife or on my own’ (B-
5, 548-549). One champion enthused: ‘I love to be outside’ (B-3, 285-286). These 
champions were rejecting the reformist construction of the natural world. The climate 
should not be protected because it was ‘society’s sustenance base’ (as in an EM 
discourse) (Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000, p.7). Rather, it should be protected because it 
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brought pleasure to people as something beautiful and innately important. They 
prioritised the environment over the economy.  
Many of the champions constructed nature in this way. When they talked 
about their motivations for being involved in the project they referred to the 
‘preservation of the earth’ (A-3, 39) and their desire to ‘like look after... the, you 
know the planet’ (B-7, 288-289). These individuals did not become climate 
champions (or try to reduce their personal carbon emissions) because they thought it 
was the economically rational thing to do. Rather, they implied that nature was 
intrinsically important in and of itself. Indeed, one manager was particularly 
emphatic: 
 
It’s just part of who I am to be perfectly honest, it’s part of my blood, erm...I love, er...I love the 
natural environment, I love, erm, I think seeing pictures of Earth from space is incredible, erm...like 
biological diversity is fantastic, you know, looking at how the planet’s evolved, erm...like the beauty in 
nature is incredible, erm, the fragility of nature is, is so well fragile, erm, and like all that sort of stuff 
really it, it, it is, it’s important to me (G-manager, 1191-1198). 
 
The sentiments expressed by these participants appear to suggest a discourse of deep 
ecology. Deep ecology would construct nature as intrinsically important. This is set 
up in direct opposition to the construction of nature in both pure neoliberal discourse 
and discourses of privatisation. We should not value the forest as a source of profit 
(whether from timber and furniture sales or from schemes such as REDD+). To some 
extent, the champions’ constructions of nature appear to reflect these kinds of ideas. 
They did not want to protect the natural world because it held some form of economic 
value. 
However, the motivations of these champions were not completely selfless. 
For many of them, the non-economic construction of the natural world was 
accompanied by self-interested motivations. They wanted to protect the climate 
because it would have a negative effect on them personally if they could not walk in 
the countryside or enjoy the beauty of nature. Kamminga (2008) argues that, for deep 
ecologists, man should not place himself at the centre of nature (p.684). The climate 
is important whether or not it brings benefits to us personally. Soper (2000) provides 
further insight into this position: 
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Some, moreover, have insisted further that so far from nature's intrinsic value being dependent on 
human valuing, it is human beings themselves who detract from this value in intruding upon it or 
interacting with it. The intrinsic value of wilderness, for example, lies precisely in its being 
uncontaminated by any human intervention (p.87-88). 
 
Most of the champions were not fully engaging with a discourse of deep ecology. 
Their construction of nature remained anthropocentric even though this was not to do 
with its economic value. We can therefore identify a more complicated account of the 
natural world than any one of my seven climate discourses. The champions valued 
the environment as more than an economic resource and some of them did talk about 
the intrinsic importance of the natural world. However, most of these champions 
mentioned some form of pleasure that they would gain from the preservation of 
nature (e.g., country walks or appreciating the natural beauty of the world). This kind 
of discourse might be referred to as ‘anthropocentric environmentalism’ or something 
resembling Dryzek’s environmental discourse of ‘green rationalism’29. 
In addition, some champions talked about the importance of protecting 
wildlife: 
 
For me it’s, I think it’s watching programmes as I’ve been growing up about rainforests and about 
different animals and things like that. Just being really sentimental about animals’ welfare and things 
like that, thinking ‘oh they’re going to have no-where to live (laughs) if we keep doing this 
deforestation and all these kind of things and killing the fish by putting chemicals in the water. I think 
that’s where I started. Like from an early age I thought, ‘oh no I need to do something’ (D-3, 378-386).      
 
Other champions echoed these sentiments. They talked about ‘species of animals 
disappearing’ (A-1, 660) and the importance of ‘looking after the world, looking after 
nature, looking after animals’ (C-8, 630-631). In some ways this would appear to 
reflect a justice discourse, where key values include fairness, responsibility and 
rights. Baxter (2000) argues that ‘nonhuman organisms have a claim in justice 
against moral agents not to deprive them without good moral reason of the 
environmental basis of their continued existence and ability to reproduce themselves’ 
(p.45). Accordingly, champion D-3 does imply a responsibility towards these 
animals: ‘I need to do something’ (386). There were not many champions who 
                                                          
29
 Dryzek (1997) distinguishes between discourses of Green Romanticism, which includes the 
ecocentric ideas of deep ecology and Green Rationalism, which is more anthropocentric. Both of these 
discourses are revolutionary and reject the fundamental structure of modern society. 
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expressed this kind of concern, but those that did appeared to be drawing on the more 
revolutionary components of a justice discourse.  
 
6.2.5   A Sense of Responsibility 
Many champions referred to a sense of responsibility but were unclear about 
what this actually meant. In some cases the term ‘responsibility’ was used in 
conjunction with another discourse. For example, when drawing on components of 
deep ecology, champions talked about having ‘a responsibility... as temporary tenants 
of the earth’ (B-5, 569-570). Similarly, participants talked about having a 
‘responsibility for future generations’ (C-3, 565-566). In these examples the 
responsibility was directed towards a specified ‘other’: the planet or future inhabitants 
of the planet. 
Often, however, there was reference to an unspecified ‘feeling’ of 
responsibility that individuals found difficult to describe. For example, many 
participants talked about ‘doing the right thing’ (E-manager, 403-404) and having a 
‘duty to do something’ (C-10, 949). One champion said, ‘it’s about doing the right 
thing and doing as much of it as possible’ (A-2, 662-663). Champions also talked 
about the guilt that was attached to this responsibility. One said, ‘I just feel like I, I 
should do my bit and I think I’d feel quite guilty if I didn’t (A-10, 319-320). Another 
champion said ‘I think that if I didn’t do my bit then it I would feel guilty about it’ 
(C-10, 957-958). These champions did not elaborate on what ‘doing one’s bit’ might 
entail or why they would feel guilty if they did not. Moreover, there was no sense of 
what the champions were required to do or indeed how much of it would be required 
to avoid these feelings of guilt.  
These sentiments are difficult to analyse because they are not very specific. 
However, they might suggest a discourse of democratic citizenship. Champions felt 
an obligation or a ‘duty’ to do something about the problem of climate change. Wolf 
et al (2009) consider the theoretical arguments surrounding the concept of ‘ecological 
citizenship’ and argue that ‘acting on climate change can be understood as a civic 
responsibility’ (p.504). They champions felt that they should contribute to the 
mitigation of climate change by doing their ‘bit’. If everyone has a ‘bit’ to do, then 
this might suggest a more collective duty towards a problem such as climate change. 
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We could therefore argue that the role of individuals is to be active citizens working 
collectively towards the common good.  
However, it might be the case that the champions were not fully engaging 
with a discourse of democratic citizenship. Dobson and Bell (2006) explain that ‘the 
environmental citizen’s behaviour will be influenced by an attitude that is – in part, at 
least – informed by the knowledge that what is good for me as an individual is not 
necessarily good for me as a member of the social collective’ (p.5). This implies a 
relatively selfless account of human nature. As an environmental (or democratic) 
citizen I will prioritise the interests of the common good above my own self-
interested concerns. The champions did not specifically state that this would be the 
case. Of course we might assume that a collective ‘duty’ to tackle climate change 
would involve sacrifice on the part of an individual but this is not necessarily true. 
In these examples, the ‘role’ of champions as ‘key agents’ is to ‘do their bit’, 
but this might involve individualistic actions that have co-benefits for those who 
engage in them. If this is the case then the account of human nature is not selfless and 
the actions are not collective. This might suggest a discourse that combines 
components of democratic citizenship with components of individualism. Of course, 
at this point these claims are purely speculative. In order to provide a full analysis it is 
necessary to also consider ‘appropriate’ actions. This will be discussed in depth in the 
following chapter. For the purpose of this chapter it is sufficient to say that this ‘sense 
of responsibility’ does, prima facie, suggest a discourse of democratic citizenship. 
 
6.2.6   Summary  
The champions drew on many different discourses when they responded to 
questions about their personal motivations for engaging in climate-protecting 
behaviour. There was some use of reformist discourses but the majority of the reasons 
that they provided were revolutionary in nature. Champions talked about future 
generations, obligations to people in developing countries and the intrinsic value of 
the planet. Often, if a champion made reference to one revolutionary discourse they 
would draw on others as well. So, champions were motivated by  ‘being a parent’ (C-
6, 8)  and having ‘a responsibility for looking after this planet’ (C-6, 1000-1001) or 
they would talk about ‘my kids’ (A-3, 52) and ‘developing countries’ (A-3, 443). In 
addition, when champions talked about their ‘sense of responsibility’ this was often in 
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relation to the natural world (B-5) or future generations (C-3). Participants did have 
some self-interested reasons for engaging in climate-protecting behaviour (saving 
money or getting a promotion) and often revolutionary motivations would be linked 
to some form of personal benefit (appreciating the beauty of nature). Generally, 
however, most of the accounts reflected components of revolutionary discourses. 
 
6.3   Identifying Climate Discourses III: Barriers to Action 
On the subject of sustainable consumption, Hobson (2003) states the 
following: 
 
Often, research into ‘barriers’ to sustainable consumption frame practices in a deterministic fashion, 
seeming to suggest that by adding together a particular practice and its social context, the nature of the 
barrier, and therefore what social action needs to be taken, are immediately apparent (p.103). 
 
In chapter two I argued that this was often a problem with positivist approaches to 
climate change. Research identifies the specific factors that influence people’s 
behaviour and provides a list of measures that can be taken to remedy the problem. In 
this chapter I have argued that identifying the reasons that people do and do not act 
on climate change is more complicated than this. ‘Appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ 
behaviour is constructed through the dominance of particular climate discourses. 
Indeed, Hobson (2003) supports the contention that the mediation of barriers by 
individuals is ‘fundamentally discursive’ (p.103). 
So far, I have identified a contrast in the way the champions constructed 
motivations. When they encouraged behaviour change in others they mainly drew 
upon reformist discourses. When they talked about their own motivations their 
language reflected more revolutionary discourses. In this section I will argue that the 
reported barriers to climate-protecting behaviour were also constructed by dominant 
discourses. However, the dominant discourse in this case was not reformist. Rather, it 
was the more fundamental discourse of pure neoliberalism. This is important because 
it reaffirms the dominance of neoliberalism: a reformed version of neoliberalism is 
prevalent in the promotion of climate-protecting behaviour, but a pure version of 
neoliberalism remains influential in the construction of barriers to climate-protecting 
behaviour. In this section I will analyse three types of barriers to climate-protecting 
behaviour that were apparent in the interviews: time and prioritisation; lifestyle and 
aspirations; and the right to self-rule. 
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6.3.1   Time and Prioritisation 
The champions frequently mentioned lack of time as the most important 
obstacle to climate-protecting behaviour. For the champions themselves, lack of time 
was an obstacle to carrying out their role effectively because, ‘you have to do 
everything in your own time’ (B-1, 1049). Champions also reported time as an 
obstacle for those whom they were trying to influence. Employees were reluctant to 
switch their computers off at the end of the day because ‘it takes too long to boot up 
in the morning’ (A-10, 530-531). They refused to walk between office buildings 
because ‘it takes too long to get to a meeting, a taxi is quicker’ (C-4, 566-567). One 
champion acknowledged that ‘there are so many demands on people’s time, people’s 
energies’ (A-2, 945-946). Indeed, time was often the principal concern for those who 
agreed to participate in the study in the first place. How long would the interview 
last? How much of their time would it take up? The telephone interview with the 
manager in company E provided a particularly illustrative example of this concern. 
She asked if I could go away and look at the company’s environmental reports and 
ring back if I had any further questions. Her explanation for this request was: ‘I’m 
conscious that I have, obviously, you know, time’s precious’ (E-manager, 54-55). 
Underlying the problem of ‘lack of time’ is the relatively low priority attached 
to promoting and performing climate-friendly actions. People did not have time to 
recycle or turn their computer off or be a climate champion because they had more 
important things to do. One CSR manager said, ‘if you’re branch manager, you know, 
it’s about targets and sales’ (D-manager, 166-167). This was echoed by another CSR 
manager: ‘if you’re a project manager and ... someone’s delivered the wrong thing 
and it’s not going together well and the last thing you’re going to be thinking about is 
doing the climate champion part’ (G-manager, 732-737). The primary economic aims 
of the business had to be prioritised over climate change and other environmental 
issues. One manager had responded negatively to the climate champion project 
saying, ‘oh we’ve not got time for that nonsense’ (C-6, 573-574). The champion who 
reported this incident argued that middle management prioritised profit above 
environmental concerns.  They were ‘interested in figures and you know... this [the 
champion project] wasn’t something high on their agenda’ (C-6, 579-581). 
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In addition, the champions themselves were often forced to prioritise the 
responsibilities of their official role over the champion project. In some cases this was 
due to an unavoidable conflict of commitments. One champion explained that he had 
been unable to attend recent champion teleconferences ‘cos I have a conflicting call 
when they have theirs... and I, which I can’t move, it’s a project call’ (C-8, 91-94). 
When it came to prioritising between the two meetings, normal work commitments 
had to come first. 
Moreover, the problem of time was also underpinned by the prioritisation of 
self-interest. One champion described an incident in which a colleague had refused to 
provide written feedback on the climate champion project because they did not ‘have 
time to do that’ (A-1, 328-329). The champion expressed some frustration when she 
relayed this experience: ‘you’re like “hang on you’ve been talking about your new 
perfume to your mates for 20 minutes, you have time to fill in the questionnaire that 
lasts two minutes”’ (A-1, 331-333). Lorenzoni and Pidgeon (2006) use survey data to 
examine how climate change is conceptualised by various ‘publics’ in Europe and the 
USA. They argue that ‘despite the relatively high concern levels detected in these 
surveys, the importance of climate change is secondary in relation to other 
environmental, personal and social issues’ (p.77). This was the case for many of the 
participants and those they were trying to influence. 
The prioritisation of other issues above climate change is not specific to a 
discourse of neoliberalism. However, the reasons for this prioritisation do reflect 
components of a neoliberal discourse.  The managers did not have time for the project 
because they had to pursue neoliberal values of growth and profit. Neoliberal 
economics ‘demands that profit must be maximized within the shortest possible time’ 
(von Werlhof 2008, p.96). The individual who would not fill in the questionnaire 
reflected a neoliberal account of human nature. She was not directly pursuing key 
neoliberal values (although it is arguable that the discussion of perfume reflects 
materialistic consumerism). Rather, she felt she had more important (rationally self-
interested) things to do with her time than engage in behaviour related to the 
protection of the climate. The ‘appropriate’ use of time is constructed by a discourse 
of neoliberalism and therefore has a significant impact on how much time people 
(including the champions themselves) were prepared to dedicate to climate-protecting 
behaviour. 
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6.3.2   Lifestyle and Aspirations 
A neoliberal lifestyle promotes specific goals and aspirations. People (and 
businesses) are self-interested and motivated by the pursuit of economic success and 
accumulation. This has important implications for the type of life they wish to lead 
and the kinds of goals they aspire towards. One manager talked about the lifestyle of 
his employees: 
 
Most of the people who work here are movers and shakers, they’re successful and, you know, very 
motivated people otherwise they wouldn’t be working at [Business D]. Well a measure of your success 
is money and what do you do with your money? You go and spend it. So, we cannot tell people not to 
spend their money. What’s the point of coming to work if you can’t spend the money (D-manager, 
620-626)? 
 
A champion echoed these sentiments: ‘you go to work to earn money so you can buy 
more stuff (laughs) and you know spend more money on getting more stuff’ (D-3, 
669-671). These participants recognised both the non-negotiable ‘materialism’ of 
contemporary UK culture and the role of ‘consumption’ as a ‘status marker’ (Hobson 
2001, p.99; Slocum 2004b, p.415). People felt a great deal of pressure to work 
towards these goals. Lorenzoni et al (2007) make a similar observation in their study 
of barriers to climate-protecting behaviour: 
 
Another form of constraint explicitly identified by many participants was social norms and 
expectations requiring carbon-dependent lifestyles. Socially-acceptable ways of behaving—for 
example, driving to work, frequent long-haul holidays and weekend breaks, leaving appliances on and 
the weekly supermarket shop—in turn become ingrained as unconscious habitual behaviours, making 
them unquestioned and thus more intractable (p.453). 
 
The dominance of neoliberal values and the prioritisation of self-interest leads to a 
carbon-dependent lifestyle that everyone is expected to pursue. 
 
6.3.3   The Right to Self-Rule 
The final barrier that I will discuss is the neoliberal emphasis on the ‘rights, 
freedoms and responsibility of individuals’ (Heynon et al 2007, p.5).  This issue is 
not one that was specifically constructed as a barrier by the champions. As outlined in 
chapter five, the champions believed that there were limits to what they could say to 
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other people and they did not see this as a problem. However, I will argue that it was 
in fact an important barrier to action because it fundamentally affected how the 
champions dealt with the other barriers. 
People were unwilling to change their priorities and their lifestyle, but more 
fundamentally, neoliberal discourse constructs this as the right to ‘self-rule’ (Turner 
2008, p.118). Individuals should be allowed to engage in whatever actions they wish 
as long as this does not interfere with the rights and freedoms of others. This ‘right’ 
has significant implications for the problem of climate change. In the focus group, 
champions discussed the rights of their colleagues to self-rule. One participant said: 
‘every man’s house is his castle so why shouldn’t I be able to do whatever I want in 
my castle’ (D-1, 657-658)? Neoliberal discourse proscribes interference in the lives of 
individuals. This final issue had far-reaching implications for the champions. They 
were tasked with the implementation of behaviour change, but they were expected to 
achieve this is in a neoliberal context. Encouraging people to change their behaviour 
when the dominant discourse proscribes interference in the lives of individuals was a 
significant barrier for the champions themselves. 
 
6.3.4   Summary 
A neoliberal discourse emphasises the rights and freedom of individuals and 
the pursuit of growth, profit and accumulation. Individuals and businesses are free to 
prioritise these values and, indeed, are expected to do so. The purpose of reformist 
discourses is to direct these neoliberal values towards climate-protecting behaviour. 
Reynolds (2010) argues that many behaviour change programmes (including GAP) 
‘help individuals change their behaviours by co-developing a package of services, 
information and support that is relevant to individuals’ wants, aspiration and 
requirements’ (p.42). This is what the champions had done. They had tried to 
motivate individuals by re-directing the components of neoliberalism (e.g. self-
interest) towards climate-protecting goals (promoting the co-benefits of particular 
actions). 
In this section I have argued that the reported barriers to action on climate 
change reflected a discourse of pure neoliberalism. If climate-protecting behaviour 
was not in the interest of an individual then they did not engage in it. The champions 
were reluctant to tell people what they should be doing and therefore, if their 
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colleagues chose not to engage in climate-protecting behaviour, there was little that 
they could do about it. Neoliberalism in its pure form continued to have a significant 
effect on the actions of individuals and the limitations of the champions’ role. 
 
6.4   Reinforcing Dominant Discourses  
In the preceding analysis I have discussed the champions’ efforts to encourage 
climate-protecting behaviour amongst colleagues, friends and family. I have 
identified the various climate discourses that they drew upon during the interviews. 
Taylor and Carroll (2009) argue that ‘normalizing norms encourage subjects to 
become highly efficient at performing a narrowly defined range of practices’ (p.47). 
The champions were subject to these normalising norms. When they encouraged 
behaviour change they drew upon a very limited range of strategies. Reformist 
climate discourses were dominant in most of the interviews. 
In the following two sections I will focus on the reproduction or subversion of 
the identified climate discourses. When the champions interacted with other people, 
did they reinforce these discourses as ‘normal’ or did they attempt to challenge the 
dominance of them? In this section, I will argue that the champions reinforced 
dominant discourses in three ways. First, they drew upon components of reformist 
discourses in order to promote climate-protecting behaviour (section 6.4.1). Second, 
they qualified revolutionary values by constructing them as ‘abnormal’ or out of the 
ordinary (section 6.4.2). Finally, they promoted reformist ideas in response to the 
reported barriers to climate-protecting behaviour (section 6.4.3). 
 
6.4.1   ‘Appropriate’ Motivations for Action 
The analysis shows that reformist discourses were the most prevalent 
throughout the accounts and this in itself is evidence that the champions did reinforce 
these dominant discourses. At many sites of interaction they drew upon the 
components of reformist discourses and thus constructed this as the ‘normal’ or 
‘appropriate’ way to think. In addition, the champions delivered the message of 
climate change in a way that was consistent with neoliberal values. They provided 
information about climate-protecting behaviour rather than ‘preaching’ or ‘lecturing’. 
This was particularly apparent when they interacted with their colleagues. In chapter 
five, I argued that the provision of information could be subversive if the information 
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itself was contrary to the dominant discourse. However, the information that the 
champions provided for their colleagues was about the co-benefits of climate-
protecting behaviour. The delivery of the message was constrained by neoliberal 
discourse and the message itself was based on reformist values. 
In fact, the only time that the champions consistently rejected the dominant 
ideas of reformism was when they discussed their own motivations with me. In their 
day to day interactions with colleagues they frequently reproduced dominant ideas 
about why people should act in a climate-protecting way. For example, when I asked 
one manger about his personal motivations for climate-protecting behaviour he talked 
about the ‘beauty’ and ‘fragility’ in nature (G-manager, 1196). However, when I 
asked him about encouraging change in others he said that it was important to ‘show 
people that just by being a little bit smarter you can save £50 a quarter’ (G-manager, 
1181-1182). Similarly, the champion who felt the unequal burden of climate change 
was ‘really very unfair’ (B-6, 571) also noted the fact that Business B stood to ‘make 
more money because of their improved image and that kind of thing’ (B-6, 722-723). 
In contrast to their own values, these champions drew upon financial incentives to 
encourage climate-protecting behaviour in others. 
Moreover, when champions did make reference to more revolutionary values 
this was constructed as a secondary concern. One champion expressed this very 
explicitly when he said, ‘the big motivation with, er, energy efficiency at home is that 
you save money, you reduce your bills and it’s a secondary outcome that you have 
reduced emissions’ (A-4, 411-413). Similarly, one of the managers said that 
employees ‘could save money and also help the environment at the same time’  
(A-manager, 1313-1314). The concern was self-interest and then protection of the 
atmosphere or the environment more generally. Motivations that reflected reformist 
discourses were used as the primary or even the sole reason for action. 
The reproduction of discourse is a complicated issue. If reformist discourses 
are dominant then it is not surprising that the champions drew upon the components 
of these discourses in their promotion of climate-protecting behaviour. Mills (2003) 
argues that ‘discourse itself structures what statements it is possible to say, the 
conditions under which certain statements will be considered true and appropriate’ 
(p.66). It could be argued that the champions were not reproducing the dominant 
discourse but rather that their language was being constrained by it. The dominance 
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of reformism restricted what the champions could and could not say. However, van 
Dijk (2001) argues that the discursive reproduction of dominance is a two-way 
process: 
 
We distinguish between the enactment, expression or legitimation of dominance in the (production of 
the) various structures of text and talk, on the one hand, and the functions, consequences or results of 
such structures for the (social) minds of recipients on the other (p.303). 
 
A dominant discourse constructs what statements can be said and the repetition of 
those statements simultaneously reinforces them as ‘true’ or ‘natural’ and maintains 
the dominance of the discourse. 
In chapter two I argued that within all discursive constructions there is the 
potential for resistance. Carolan (2003) contends that individuals have ‘agency’ as 
‘movers who are simultaneously constituted by that which they move and constitute’ 
(p.229). At particular sites of interaction the champions had the potential to either 
challenge or reproduce the dominant discourses of climate change. In the majority of 
cases they did the latter. Indeed, the fact that they did express more revolutionary 
values during the interview suggests that they did have the capacity to resist the 
normalising effects of dominant discourses. However, for the most part, they did not 
exercise this capacity for resistance. 
 
6.4.2   ‘I Know How This Sounds…’ 
Some champions also reproduced dominant discourses through the 
construction of their personal motivations. These champions were very careful to 
qualify their revolutionary values. When I asked participants about their motivations 
for being involved in the project they often began by acknowledging the 
unconventional nature of their answers. One champion replied, ‘I know this sounds a 
little bit cheesy, but if I’ve as much as inspired one more person to be more careful 
about their environmental, erm, impact, then it’s probably worth it’ (B-2, 823-826). 
Another said, ‘it sounds silly, but I’m interested in the solar system. I’m interested in 
the preservation of the Earth’ (A-3, 38-39). Many other participants were quick to 
point out that they knew their sentiments were ‘cheesy’ (B-manager, 692), ‘tree-
huggy’ (D-3, 378) or ‘cliché’ (A-8, 202). 
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These individuals were aware that their statements were out of the ordinary 
and they addressed this by being explicitly dismissive of the point they were making. 
Taylor and Carroll (2009) outline the process of ‘naturalization’ and its role in the 
reproduction of dominant discourses: 
 
Naturalization effectively promotes acceptance and conformity with prevailing norms on both an 
individual and societal level. Moreover, the norm provides the grounds not only for distinguishing 
‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ individuals and populations, but also for sanctioning intervention into both in 
order to ensure conformity or bring into conformity, to keep or make normal, and also to effectively 
eliminate the threat posed by resisting individuals and populations (p.53). 
 
By qualifying ‘inappropriate’ statements the champions reinforced the normalising 
effects of the dominant discourse. They distinguished between ‘normal’ and 
‘abnormal’ motivations for climate-protecting behaviour and in doing so they 
effectively ‘eliminated’ any threat that their language may have posed to the ‘normal’ 
reasons for acting. The role of the dominant discourse is to keep certain statements in 
circulation and ‘keep those other statements out of circulation’ (Mills 2003, p.54). 
The champions were again constrained by the dominant discourse whilst 
simultaneously reinforcing it as ‘normal’ or ‘natural’. 
 
6.4.3   Responding to Barriers 
In section 6.3., I outlined the various factors that the champions identified as 
obstacles to climate-protecting behaviour. They talked about lack of time, concern 
with profit and lifestyle aspirations. Some of these factors were obstacles for the 
champions themselves as well as those they were trying to influence. I argued that 
these obstacles reflected a dominant neoliberal discourse. 
In this section I will argue that the response to these obstacles is perhaps the 
most explicit demonstration of the reproduction of dominant reformist discourses. For 
the purpose of this project, climate discourses have been divided into two ‘types’: 
reformist and revolutionary. Thus far, I have argued that reformist discourses were 
the most prevalent in the interviews and that the champions reproduced these 
discourses at various sites of interaction. However, the identification of barriers to 
action is also important because it tells us that the champions had some understanding 
of the problems associated with encouraging climate protecting behaviour. The 
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champions acknowledged that the barriers to behaviour change were rooted in a self-
interested account of human nature and neoliberal values. 
One champion talked about time as a barrier to climate protecting behaviour 
and I asked why she thought this was the case. She responded: ‘(sighs)... I suppose 
the pace of life and the demands on life these days… there’s so many demands on 
people’s time people’s energies’ (A-2, 942-946). However, her response to this 
barrier was not to slow the pace of modern life or reduce the demands on people’s 
time. Her response was to highlight the individual benefits of climate protecting 
behaviour: 
 
In most cases you find that if you change something to the benefit of the environment there’s usually a 
saving there… in terms of in somebody’s pocket quite often, erm, so the more you can incentivise cos 
at the end of the day I don’t mind why people, what they’re... driven by if they make the change 
because it saves them money well... fine (laughs). I’d rather they did it because it also is the right thing 
to do and they believed it was the right thing to do but if we can help people make the change by 
helping save them in their pocket or through other benefits then all the better (A-2, 820-838). 
 
This respondent had identified the problems that can stem from neoliberal values 
(lack of time, low prioritisation of climate change) and suggested that revolutionary 
values (doing the ‘right thing’) would be a better motivation for change. However, 
she still drew upon neoliberal values (e.g., by promoting co-benefits and economic 
incentives) to motivate her colleagues. 
Similarly, another champion identified time as a barrier to climate-protecting 
behaviour: ‘If we were trying to encourage people to not take a taxi you know to a 
meeting to either get the bus or to take public transport instead… they would just say 
“oh it takes too long to get to a meeting a taxi is quicker”’ (C-4, 562-567). Again, 
however, her response to these kinds of problems was not to reduce the 
‘demandingness’ of work. It was to ‘show [them] the, the cost savings that they could 
make… as well as the environmental savings’ (C-4, 493-496). Like A-2, this was 
despite the fact that she had prioritised the environment over cost savings in her 
discussion with me: ‘the importance of the environment in our in our world so the 
difference that we can make in terms of you know recycling or saving energy erm 
also the cost erm implications associated with it’ (C-4, 221-224).  
These champions referred to the problems with reformist motivations and 
identified what they felt was a ‘better’ justification for climate-protecting behaviour. 
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However, they continued to reinforce the dominant climate discourses. They 
responded to the reported barriers by re-directing neoliberal values (e.g., self-interest) 
towards climate protecting behaviour (a reformist approach) rather than challenging 
the underlying problems with the neoliberal system (a revolutionary approach). 
 
6.5   Subverting Dominant Discourses 
Many of the champions appeared to reinforce the dominant reformist 
discourses. However, in this section I will argue that there was some limited evidence 
of subversion. Caldwell (2007) claims that ‘ultimately, all discourses begin to unravel 
once we begin to question claims of self-certainty, truth, power or knowledge’ 
(p.776). When the champions talked about their own motivations they drew upon the 
components of revolutionary discourses. They also argued that the self-interested 
motivations of some champions had led to high attrition levels and internal tensions 
within the climate champion network. In these ways the champions began to question 
any ‘self-certainty’ or ‘truth’ about the most ‘appropriate’ motivations for climate-
protecting behaviour.  
 
6.5.1   Acknowledging Alternative Motivations 
When I asked the champions about their personal motivations for action 
almost all of them drew upon revolutionary climate discourses. They talked about 
their responsibility to future generations and the preservation of the planet. Some of 
them identified the unequal distribution of the impacts of climate change and talked 
about justice and fairness. In addition, many of the champions felt some sense of duty 
to tackle climate change. They wanted to ‘do the right thing’ (E-manager, 403-404; 
A-2, 662-663). These motivations were contrary to the dominant discourses. By 
simply acknowledging revolutionary values and accounts of human nature, the 
champions were challenging the dominance of reformism. 
In section 6.4.2., I explained that, for some champions, the appeal to 
revolutionary values was a source of embarrassment. Participants were concerned that 
they sounded ‘silly’ or ‘cheesy’. However, many champions did not qualify their 
motivations. They were proud of their commitment to climate-protecting actions. One 
champion talked enthusiastically about her involvement in the project: ‘I couldn’t 
have, I couldn’t have not volunteered for it (laughs), er, because that’s me and that’s 
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what I’m about so to have not volunteered I wouldn’t have been true to what I believe 
in’ (A-2, 665-668). Other champions claimed that their commitment to preserving the 
planet had been part of their values from a young age (B-4, 451-452; C-8, 202-203). 
In addition, in the context of the champions’ own values, these revolutionary 
ideas were frequently given priority over more self-interested concerns. For most of 
champions that I interviewed self-interest was either not a consideration or it was at 
the bottom of a long list of motivations for climate-protecting behaviour. For 
example, champions who did talk about promotion were keen to construct it as an 
afterthought to more altruistic reasons. One champion said, ‘this was really, really 
well down the list but a way of maybe raising my own profile’ (C-2, 23-25). Another 
participant offered two reasons for his involvement: 
 
I am passionate about the environment, erm, and my second reason would be because... I knew that 
there’d be a lot of people on the [project] where if I got my face noticed I might be able to move up in 
the company’ (A-3, 360-363). 
 
These individuals admitted that professional development was a consideration but it 
was not the principal reason for action. 
I would therefore argue that the champions did demonstrate the capacity for 
subversive agency, but that this was very limited. Taylor and Carroll (2009) argue 
that, ‘refusing to simply accept what is presented as natural, necessary, and normal… 
presents possibilities for engaging in and expanding the practice of freedom’ (p.46). 
The champions did acknowledge values such as responsibility and present a more 
altruistic account of human nature. To some extent, they did refuse to accept a 
completely self-interested account of human nature as ‘natural, necessary and 
normal’; they chose to draw on more revolutionary components when talking about 
their own motivations. However, these sentiments were limited to the context of the 
interview. The champions told me that they cared about developing countries and the 
natural world, but they did not convey these revolutionary values or accounts of 
human nature to their colleagues, friends or family. The champions therefore 
demonstrated the capacity for subversion, but engaged in a very limited form of 
resistance.  
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6.5.2   The Problem with Self-Interest  
When the champions encouraged climate-protecting behaviour in others they 
frequently did this by outlining the co-benefits that were attached to this behaviour. 
Companies could make a profit through ‘green’ products. Individuals could improve 
their health by cycling to work or save money by turning their heating down. The 
champions mainly drew upon components of reformist discourses to encourage 
behaviour change and, as I argued in 6.4.1, this suggested that they were reinforcing 
the dominant discourse. In many ways, the climate champion project had been 
promoted on the same basis. There were personal benefits to be gained from 
involvement in the network. Indeed, one manager told me that he had explicitly 
highlighted the potential for professional development when he initially advertised 
the role: 
 
The employees, what do they get out of it? How can we, you know, not just make this about climate 
change and um, you know, really kind of emphasise these, these transferable skills and for us that’s 
also been the selling point and we haven’t just banged on about do something for climate change (B-
manager, 300-306).  
 
Some of the champions had acknowledged that this was as selling point for them 
personally but many of them were critical of this kind of motivation. Several 
participants claimed that selfish motivations amongst the champions had led to high 
attrition levels and internal tensions. 
One champion explained her frustration with colleagues who had signed up 
for the programme, but then had done nothing: 
 
You think right great I’ve got these people… you know, involved and they’re enthusiastic and then for 
whatever reason they just don’t do anything and that’s kind of, you wonder whether they volunteered 
just to get time off time off the phone (A-2, 538-546). 
 
Champions in the focus group were equally cynical about people who had 
volunteered to advance their career: 
 
I think some people like D-4 said joined because there was you know personal objectives to try and do 
something above and beyond your own your normal business as usual role and then when you tried to 
get them to give up their lunch hour or to actually go a little bit further and commit a bit more it’s been 
like ‘oh no I’ve got to do this’ and they don’t show up (D-3, 460-469). 
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The champions felt that motivations based on career advancement or time away from 
a monotonous day job had led to a lack of commitment from many volunteers. 
Similarly, the participants talked about internal tensions amongst champions 
who were keen to be credited with the success of particular projects. If an individual 
had implemented climate-protecting practices outside of their assigned remit, they 
were ‘accused of stepping on people’s toes’ (C-8, 168-169). These internal problems 
with the network and high attrition levels were explicitly linked to the self-interested 
motivations of certain volunteers. The fact that the champions made this connection 
does imply some further subversion of dominant discourses. The champions were 
questioning the ‘naturalness’ of co-benefits and career advancement as motivations 
for climate-protecting behaviour.  
The champions drew upon the components of revolutionary discourses to 
justify their own involvement in the project and they highlighted the problems that 
they felt had stemmed from more reformist justifications for involvement. The 
champions undermined the ‘tyranny of common sense’ (Downing 2008, p.10) by 
stopping to think about the consequences of self-interested motivations. Indeed, 
Dobson and Saiz (2005) argue that part of what it might mean to be an environmental 
citizen is to examine the effects of self-interested behaviour on the common good 
objective of sustainable development (p.158). The participants challenged the 
dominant discourses by acting as environmental (or democratic) citizens. 
Again, however, we have to question whether this was a significant challenge 
to the dominant discourses. Despite the identified problems with using co-benefits as 
a motivation, the champions still continued to do this with the people they were trying 
to influence. This inconsistency was also made explicit in my discussion of how the 
champions had responded to barriers to climate-protecting behaviour. They had 
identified problems with self-interest but then used self-interest to encourage change. 
Thus, the champions were willing to challenge the dominant climate discourses at 
some sites of interaction but, in other cases, they continued to reinforce them. This 
might suggest a rather limited capacity for resistance. 
 
6.6   Conclusion 
All of the participants in the study were asked questions about motivations: 
How do you encourage behaviour change in other people? Why do you engage in 
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climate protecting behaviour? Why did you take on the role of climate champion? In 
this chapter I began by identifying the climate discourses that the champions drew 
upon when they talked about motivations. I argued that the champions used reformist 
values and a reformist account of human nature when they encouraged others to 
engage in climate-protecting behaviour. They mostly focused on the co-benefits of 
action, such as saving money. 
I then considered the champions’ personal motivations for action. I argued 
that, in this context, the champions drew upon the components of more revolutionary 
discourses. They talked about justice, responsibility and concern for the natural 
world. There were some examples where the account of human nature appeared to be 
completely altruistic, for example when the champions talked about the effect of 
climate change in developing countries. However, the components of revolutionary 
discourses were often combined with somewhat self-interested motivations. For 
example, the champions were concerned for the natural world but they did talk about 
the pleasure they gained from walking in the countryside. They wanted to preserve 
the planet for future generations but they often constructed this in terms of ‘my 
family’. Champions therefore introduced more revolutionary discourses when they 
talked about their own motivations, but this was combined with some reformist 
components. 
In section 6.3, I considered the reported barriers to climate-protecting 
behaviour. I argued that neoliberalism plays a significant role in constructing barriers 
to action. For example, the champions talked about problems associated with lack of 
time and the prioritisation of other concerns above the climate. This indicates the 
dominance of neoliberalism more generally and suggests that, despite the attempt in 
reformist discourses to reconcile environment and economy, there was still tension 
between neoliberal and environmental values. 
In the second half of the chapter I considered the role of the champions as 
‘passive subjects’ (reinforcing dominant discourses) or ‘active agents’ (challenging 
dominant discourses). I argued that the champions were simultaneously reproducing 
the discourses by which they were constrained. The project applies a critical approach 
to the relationship between ‘micro’ events (including verbal events) and ‘macro’ 
structures ‘which see the latter as both the conditions for and the products of the 
former’ (Fairclough 1985, p.739). In the first instance the champions reinforced the 
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dominance of reformism simply by drawing on the components of reformist 
discourses. They used reformist ideas and therefore constructed them as the ‘normal’ 
way to think about climate change. They also presented these ideas in a way that was 
appropriate to neoliberal values. They provided information rather than ‘preaching’ to 
managers and colleagues. In this way the champions acted as ‘passive subjects’. 
In the final section I argued that there was some limited evidence of 
subversion. The champions drew on many revolutionary ideas when they talked about 
the reasons that they personally engaged in climate-protecting behaviour. They also 
acknowledged some of the problems with self-interest as a motivation. However, it is 
questionable whether either of these examples counts as genuine resistance. Although 
the champions talked about revolutionary motivations, they often qualified these 
sentiments as ‘cheesy’ or ‘silly’ and they did not use them to motivate other people. 
In addition, although they commented on the problems associated with self-interest, 
the champions continued to use self-interest as a way to encourage behaviour change. 
They talked about the co-benefits of action on climate change, such as saving money. 
I would argue that the use of alternative motivations does indicate a limited degree of 
resistance to dominant discourses. The champions did fulfil the role of ‘active agent’ 
to some extent. However, the use of revolutionary discourses appeared to be limited 
to certain contexts (the interview itself) and revolutionary ideas were consistently 
constrained by reformist conceptions of ‘appropriate’ language and behaviour. The 
capacity for resistance did not appear to be significant and reformist discourses 
played a very dominant role throughout the interviews. 
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Chapter 7 
Acting on Climate Change 
 
According to Alexander et al (2005) a ‘champion’ is successful if he can 
‘persuade others to do particular things (reduce energy consumption) through defined 
actions (replace high energy light bulbs) usually with measurable outcomes 
(electricity bill goes down)’ (p.27). Chapter six outlined the motivations that were 
used to foster behaviour change. I looked at the arguments that the champions made 
to ‘persuade’ others to act. In this chapter I will investigate the specific actions that 
were being advocated. I have analysed how the champions were encouraging action. I 
will now focus on what actions were being encouraged. Analysis of these actions will 
offer further insight into the role of dominant and subversive climate discourses. 
Carabine (2001) contends that dominant discourses ‘convey messages about 
what is appropriate behaviour’ (p.273). All of the participants in the study were clear 
about the kinds of actions they were willing to promote and those that they were not. I 
will argue that discourses of reform played the more dominant role in this 
construction. The most popular actions drew on components of reformist discourses. 
The champions encouraged easy, individualistic actions such as recycling (drawing 
on a discourse of individualism) and they talked about the importance of ‘green’ 
technology (drawing on a discourse of ecological modernisation). They also talked 
about offsetting emissions that could not be reduced (drawing on a discourse of 
privatisation). Most champions rejected the possibility of fundamental social change 
and claimed that an alternative lifestyle would require going ‘backwards’ in terms of 
progress.  
However, discourses of revolution were also evident at times in the 
champions’ accounts. These became apparent in response to questions about climate 
change more generally: What should we do to tackle the problem? Whose 
responsibility is it to deal with climate change and what is required? The champions 
talked about a more active role for the state and the importance of collective action. 
However, these revolutionary components were often combined with reformist ideas. 
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For example, the state should provide subsidies so that people could participate in the 
market and purchase ‘green’ products. In addition, reformist ideas were reinforced 
through the rejection of traditional (revolutionary) environmentalism and the 
construction of successful actions. In sum, there was some resistance to dominant 
reformist discourses but this was very limited. 
In section 7.1 I will begin the chapter by looking at ‘appropriate’ actions. 
Specifically, I will consider the nature of the climate champion ‘project’ and the 
actions that the champions promoted in the workplace. I will argue that champions 
drew on the components of reformist discourses in this context. There was some 
reference to revolutionary discourses but these played a marginal role in the accounts. 
In section 7.2 I will then look at ‘inappropriate’ actions. There were certain actions 
that the champions would not engage in themselves nor promote to other people. It 
was generally revolutionary ideas that were constructed as ‘inappropriate’. 
Section 7.3 will then consider the wider conditions for action. I will discuss 
the proposed role for business, the state and ‘the people’ in facilitating climate-
protecting behaviour. I will argue that, in this context, the champions drew on 
components of both reformist and revolutionary discourses. Often they combined 
components from different discourses.  
Finally, in sections 7.4 and 7.5, I will analyse the reinforcement and 
subversion of dominant climate discourses. I will argue that the analysis of actions 
reveals similar patterns to the previous analysis of motivations (in chapter six). 
Champions both reinforced and challenged dominant discourses at different sites of 
interaction. However, resistance was often constrained by dominant reformist ideas. 
For example, the champions talked about changing the way we live, but they drew 
upon a reformist account of social change. They constructed themselves as 
environmental, but rejected the revolutionary construction of the ‘traditional’ 
environmentalist. So, resistance to dominant discourses was therefore very limited 
with respect to climate-protecting actions as well as motivations. 
 
7.1   Identifying Climate Discourses IV: ‘Appropriate’ Action in the Workplace 
In this section, I will begin by discussing the nature of the climate champion 
‘project’. In most cases the project was expected to run for a set amount of time and 
encourage small changes that did not affect the overall structure of the business. I will 
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then analyse specific ‘appropriate’ actions in the following three areas: waste; energy; 
and transport. I will argue that the majority of the champions shared similar ideas 
about what could and should be done in these contexts. Most of the accounts reflected 
reformist climate discourses but the champions did draw on components of 
revolutionary discourses to a limited extent. Towards the end of the section, I will 
analyse the connection between motivations and action. I will argue that most of the 
‘appropriate’ actions were a response to the perceived barriers to climate-protecting 
behaviour. 
 
7.1.1   The Climate Champion ‘Project’ 
In all four companies, the climate champion scheme was seen as a self-
contained ‘project’, which was intended to run for a fixed period and had specific 
objectives. Global Action Plan (GAP) was used by three out of the four companies. 
GAP offers a fixed term programme for behaviour change. Champions were expected 
to take an audit of areas such as waste and energy use and then spend a month 
promoting good practice in each area. A second audit was taken at the end to 
determine the success of the various initiatives. The general aim was to achieve a 
reduction in carbon emissions over a set period of time. 
The services of Global Action Plan were not employed by Business B. 
However, a similar model was used for the project. The champions were sent on a 
training course where they learned about the science of climate change and the 
delivery of behaviour change. Upon their return they were expected to implement 
climate friendly practices in the workplace. They were only asked to retain the role 
for a year. One champion said, ‘they [the company] expect you to be... actually doing 
it for the, for a twelve month period’ (B-8, 410-411). Another reported that, as far as 
they were aware, ‘it only lasted for the one year’ (B-2, 39). Champions in the other 
companies reported similar patterns. One participant said, ‘we did loads of stuff, 
loads of campaigns for six months and then nothing else, you know’ (A-1, 286-287). 
Other champions contended that the project had carried on past the designated ‘end’ 
point (the second audit), but admitted that this was not a continuous process. The 
momentum ‘picked up again and then it died off again’ (A-5, 207). In another 
company it started to progressively ‘tail off’ (C-9, 718). 
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The climate champion scheme was very clearly defined as a ‘project’. It had a 
beginning, an end and a clear set of objectives. The very nature of the scheme 
indicates a strong neoliberal influence. Climate change was an issue that must be 
addressed but it did not necessitate long-term or structural change. According to 
reformist accounts of social change, environmental problems should be addressed 
through incremental, short-term measures. Curran (2009) claims that the discourse of 
ecological modernisation (EM) dismisses ‘radical environmentalism’s demands for 
overhaul of the market’ (p.203). Rather, EM addresses environmental issues ‘without 
introducing the need for fundamental structural change’ (Young 2000, p.20). The 
establishment of the climate champion scheme fits in well with this account of social 
change. The champions did encourage climate-protecting behaviour but their actions 
were not intended to alter any of the established business practices. The structure of 
the project therefore set a precedent for the kinds of actions that the champions were 
willing to promote. 
 
7.1.2   Waste  
The recycling of waste was the most frequently reported action for the 
workplace and at home. Many of the champions had introduced recycling facilities at 
work (A-1, 76-77; B-4, 105-106; C-1, 172) or spent time promoting the correct 
separation of waste materials (A-2, 306-308; D-1, 454-455). In the majority of cases 
recycling was promoted in an office environment. However, champions had also 
implemented this practice in more unusual settings. One company employed 
engineers who spent most of their day driving between assigned jobs. The champions 
had therefore introduced the use of ‘hippo bags’. These can be used on sites and in 
cars or vans to store recyclable material which is collected and later sorted. 
In addition, recycling was often at the top of the list when I asked participants 
about the climate-protecting behaviour they engaged in at home. One champion 
responded by saying ‘erm... gosh, er, where do I start, erm, I recycle as much as I 
can...’ (B-7, 269-270). Another explained that ‘we’ve always recycled as a family’ 
(C-8, 203). In fact, recycling was the first climate-protecting action to be mentioned 
in almost every interview. 
Reducing waste was another action that was encouraged in the workplace. 
Champions talked about saving water (B-5, 516-517; C-2, 114-115), reducing the 
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amount of paper used (A-2, 245; A-7, 130; B-2, 10) and trying to cut down on 
packaging (A-1, 1119-1121; C-8, 663-663). Some participants had also encouraged 
the use of mugs instead of plastic cups in the office (A-10, 221-222; B-6, 126-127; C-
5, 37-38). The practice of reducing waste was mentioned less frequently than 
recycling, but it was considered ‘appropriate’.  
The promotion of recycling and reducing waste materials is mainly situated in 
a discourse of individualism. This discourse concentrates on the role of individuals in 
tackling climate change. A person can undertake actions such as recycling waste or 
printing on both sides of the paper without the need for collaboration or collective 
effort. Indeed, Maniates (2001) claims that ‘recycling is a prime example of the 
individualization of responsibility’ (p.37).  
In addition, these actions are relatively straightforward. One champion talked 
about the ease of recycling in the office. She said ‘if you’re standing next to two bins 
then it’s no additional effort to put it in the right bin’ (C-10, 599-600). The same was 
true for the hippo bags scheme. All recyclable waste was placed in the bags and the 
company who provide them ‘basically recycle our waste’ (A-5, 111-112). This 
involved no extra effort for the people who used the bags. The encouragement of 
small, easy and incremental actions is reflective of an individualistic account of social 
change: ‘individuals and communities might make significant carbon reductions by 
taking small everyday actions, which add up to make a big difference’ (Reynolds 
2010, p.41). 
This also reflects a reformist account of social change more generally. In 
discourses of EM, individualism and privatisation the account of social change is 
based on ‘tweaking’ (making small changes) to the current system. There was no call 
for fundamental changes to everyday business practices or the lifestyle of individuals. 
For example, the employees were encouraged to reduce paper by printing double 
sided and to recycle the documents that they had printed. However, champions did 
not challenge the bureaucratic procedures that generated the need for so much paper 
in the first place. Nor did champions challenge the basis of our ‘throwaway’ society. 
Smart (2010) argues that ‘in a modern consumer society things are not meant to last, 
because each tomorrow will deliver new models and new goods’ (p.85). Some of the 
champions did comment on the wasteful nature of modern society. One champion 
said ‘we’re just living like now much more wasteful than we did like 50 years ago’ 
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(C-5, 523-525). Another commented: ‘I just hate waste. I, I hate walking around and 
seeing people wasting things all over the place’ (B-2, 317-318). However, their 
response to this problem was to ensure that they recycled. Participants did talk about 
reducing waste, but this action was a lot less prevalent. In addition, the reduction of 
waste in the accounts mostly referred to paper or plastic cups in the office. It did not 
challenge modern consumerist society in general. 
 
7.1.3   Energy  
Saving energy in the office was also a top priority for the champions. It was 
commonplace for the champions themselves to turn off appliances that used energy. 
They frequently acknowledged the importance of switching off computers and 
monitors (A2, 132; A4, 94; B4, 1030; C4, 525-526) and turning off lights (A6, 158; 
B6, 116-117). These practices were extended into the home lives of participants. One 
manager was proud to report: ‘when I’m not home everything’s off’ (G-manager, 
1149-1150). Another said, ‘at home I’m forever turning lights off and drawing 
curtains’ (H-manager, 507-508). Champions encouraged their colleagues to engage in 
the same kinds of behaviour at home. They talked about the benefits of ‘loft 
insulation, cavity wall insulation’ (C-1, 200) as well as ‘low energy lights bulbs’ (B-
5, 230-231). In this way, the area of energy reflected similar themes to that of waste. 
A lot of the focus was on small, individual actions that people could undertake in the 
workplace and at home. Responsibility for action was placed upon individuals as the 
key agents. Scerri (2009) considers a discourse of individualism and argues that: 
 
In the place of engaging in a regulating body-politic, individual citizens are called upon to take 
initiatives and shoulder responsibilities themselves... the ethico-political consequences of personal 
actions are effectively subsumed by demands that citizens exercise self-interest as green consumers 
(p.477). 
 
Individualism was also reflected in the way the champions delivered this message. 
The majority of them provided information about saving energy in the hope that their 
colleagues would ‘choose’ to engage in climate-protecting behaviour. Often 
champions would ‘give a fact about energy saving’ (A-3, 140-141) or ‘comparisons 
to like energy savings’ such as ‘how many balloons you could blow up with the 
amount of energy saved’ (A-2, 844-846). One champion had encouraged colleagues 
to switch off monitors by explaining ‘how much energy it wasted over the course of a 
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week’ (C-10, 726). Knowledge is a key value in a discourse of individualism and the 
champions felt this was the most effective way to encourage behaviour change. The 
champions believed that by providing information about climate change they might 
encourage people to ‘choose’ climate-friendly lifestyles. In addition, the practice of 
providing information was the most ‘appropriate’ way to deliver the message. This 
also indicates a dominant neoliberal discourse. 
Other reformist discourses were also evident in the discussion of 
‘appropriate’ actions. Champions talked about energy efficient technology and the 
possibility of offsetting the emissions that were generated through energy use. The 
implementation of energy efficient technology might suggest components of 
ecological modernisation. EM ‘identifies modern science and technology as central 
institutions for ecological reform’ (Mol 1996, p.313). Indeed, Curran (2009) contends 
that technological development sits at the ‘heart’ of ecological modernisation (p.203). 
Thus, the key agents in this discourse include technological and managerial experts as 
well as business and industry (Pepper 1999). The responsibility for action on climate 
change is directed towards these actors.  
Many businesses had implemented energy efficient technology in the 
workplace and this type of action was particularly popular in Business C. The 
champions described ‘environmentally friendly lighting sensors’ (C-3, 32) as well as 
‘energy efficient lighting and heating and that kind of thing’ (C-4, 38-41). Another 
champion had introduced the use of a “bye bye stand-by” tool. She explained that the 
champions ‘plugged all the monitors into those and then at the end of the day each 
area can be controlled by the remote. Rather than constantly battling with people to 
turn off their monitors we just literally switch them off’ (C-7, 115-118).  
Finally, some participants talked about the potential for ‘offsetting’ 
emissions that could not be reduced. One champion described how he had been 
involved in ‘piloting a carbon neutral project’ (C-6, 96). The intention was to 
calculate all of the carbon emissions associated with the project (including energy 
use) and offset these by paying for trees to be planted in a managed forest. Another 
champion explained that the business itself was carbon neutral and therefore 
‘whatever we create carbon wise we offset with something else’ (B-2, 23-24). In the 
latter example, energy use was by far the greatest contributory factor to the overall 
emissions of the business. This environmental impact was addressed through the 
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purchase of ‘carbon offsets’ (CSR Report, Business B). The champions who talked 
about offsetting introduced a discourse of privatisation. We can ‘off-set’ our carbon 
emissions by investing in climate-protecting projects. In this way the market plays a 
prominent role in the commodification of emissions. The atmosphere is protected 
because it is valued as a commodity. We can buy carbon ‘credits’ to off-set the 
pollution that we have caused. Indeed, ‘by 2008 there were about 80 carbon 
investment funds set up to finance offset projects or buy carbon credits’ (Lohmann 
2010, p.87-88).  
When they promoted climate-protecting behaviour in the context of energy 
the champions drew upon the components of all three reformist discourses. 
Individuals were expected to take the majority of responsibility for action but there 
was some emphasis on the role of business and technology to provide the ‘energy-
efficient, ‘‘carbon neutral,’’ non-toxic products’ for them to buy (Charman 2008, 
p.31). Where energy uses could not be reduced, companies and individuals had 
purchased carbon credits in an attempt to off-set the impact that they were having on 
the planet. 
 
7.1.4   Transport  
The area of transport also reflected several different climate discourses and 
some of the champions did draw on revolutionary as well as reformist components. In 
all four businesses, champions had ‘run a few campaigns around travel... particularly 
about cycling and walking to work rather than driving’ (C-4, 48-50). They had also 
encouraged the use of public transport. On the one hand, these actions are small, 
individualistic and relatively straightforward. They appear to reflect a climate 
discourse of individualism where one would choose to ‘ride a bike rather than drive a 
car’ (Maniates 2001, p.35). Employees could choose to take part in a cycle to work 
initiative in their capacity as self-interested rational consumers. 
On the other hand, these actions might be seen as incorporating some 
components of more revolutionary discourses. The common feature of all four 
revolutionary climate discourses of is a focus on fundamental change. Driving to 
work is a ‘socially acceptable way of behaving’ (Lorenzoni et al 2007, p.453). By 
suggesting that people should not drive, the champions were challenging a societal 
norm. They appeared to be promoting quite a revolutionary account of social change. 
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Moreover, they seemed to be encouraging their colleagues to act as citizens rather 
than consumers. Individuals were encouraged to leave their car at home and walk, 
cycle or take the bus to work. Slocum (2004a) argues that ‘citizens can rewrite the 
passive consumer script by asserting themselves as activist consumers who bike to 
work rather than buying more gasoline’ (p.779).  Activist consumers still exercise 
their freedom of choice through the market but sometimes the decision is to not buy. 
This construction of the role of key agents might suggest the influence of a 
democratic citizenship discourse, where individuals play a more active role in 
tackling climate-related problems.  Indeed, the potential role of individuals as 
consumers-citizens has been widely acknowledged in the literature (Parker 1999; 
Slocum 2004a; Seyfang 2005). 
However, I would contend that the ‘appropriate’ actions in the context of 
transport were actually more reflective of reformist climate discourses. The structure 
of these travel campaigns was very similar to the structure of the climate champion 
project more generally. The champions had implemented ‘cycle to work days’ (B-5, 
394) or a ‘pedometer challenge’ (C-4, 65-66). Colleagues were not asked to cycle or 
walk to work every day; they were not expected to fundamentally change an 
established behaviour. This was true in the majority of cases. The short-term nature of 
the campaigns also undermines the role of these individuals as active citizens. 
Employees that cycled to work did not purchase petrol during that particular week, 
but this was a temporary measure. When the campaign ended, they resumed both 
their previous commuting habits and their normal role as passive consumers. 
Furthermore, the transport based actions that were encouraged on a daily 
basis were far less revolutionary in nature. Employees were not asked to give up their 
cars. Instead, the emphasis was on ways to drive more efficiently. Champions talked 
about removing excess weight from cars and vans (A-3, 144-145; A-10, 635-637) and 
checking the pressure of tyres (A-5, 80-81). Colleagues were asked to make small, 
straightforward alterations to their daily driving habits, but they were not expected to 
change the ‘normal’ way they travelled to and from work. Champions also talked 
about the importance of purchasing the right kind of car. They drove ‘a really small 
diesel’ (C-6, 822-823) and they felt that 4x4 vehicles ‘just don’t need to be in this 
country’ (B-4, 813-814). Several champions had considered the purchase of a more 
energy efficient or electric car (C-2, 581-582; C-5, 565-566). Again, consumers are 
‘part of a politics of ethical self-formation that encourages individual responsibility 
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for choices’ (Slocum 2004a, p.767). The champions were concerned that they made 
the right choice for the climate but the decision was about which product to purchase 
rather than whether or not to drive at all. 
In the context of travel, the majority of ‘appropriate’ actions were focused on 
the daily commute. However, some of the champions did talk about the 
environmental impact of flying. Technological innovation was important in this 
context because teleconferencing was a frequently cited alternative to flying: 
 
We’re also looking at ways we can use technology better. So, erm, for example, we just got tele-
presence installed in our office in [Location X]... erm, to try and cut down on the number of people 
who travel back and forth between [Location X] and [Location Y] or [Location X] and [Location Z] 
(C-4, 257-264). 
 
Another champion reported that ‘video conferencing has become a really big thing 
and, erm, [Business C] promoted that, erm, er, rather than people travelling they 
really sort of clamped down’ (C-6, 310-313). The focus on technology again suggests 
the influence of an EM discourse, where technological experts are responsible for 
providing ‘solutions’ to environmental problems.  
However, the promotion of this particular action also provides further insight 
into ‘appropriate’ (and ‘inappropriate’) accounts of social change. If the problem is 
excessive flying, one possible response to this might be to reduce the geographical 
reach of the business. For example, a discourse of sufficiency might promote 
localised trade and business dealings. This would reduce the need for travel in the 
first place. In this discourse, progress would not be dependent on growth and 
globalisation. Rather, ‘regional economic integration’ would be the basis of a stable 
society (Barkin 2003, p.8). This was not a consideration for the champions. In large 
corporations, growth and globalisation are the definition of progress. 
Teleconferencing was the only viable alternative to flying because meetings had to go 
ahead. The values of reformism were paramount in any consideration of social 
change. Overall, the area of transport was heavily influenced by reformist climate 
discourses. 
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7.1.5   Summary 
In this section, I have argued that ‘appropriate’ climate-protecting actions are 
mainly rooted in climate discourses of reform. When the champions encouraged 
behaviour change in their colleagues, friends and family, they promoted low-cost, 
quick and straightforward actions. The emphasis for nearly all of the champions was 
on ‘easy things’ (A-1, 624), ‘straightforward things’ (D-manager, 242), ‘small 
differences’ (A-5, 455), ‘a small change’ (B-3, 454), ‘small steps’ (C-5, 34), ‘baby 
steps’ (H-manager, 253), and ‘quick wins’ (B-6, 784). It is likely that these changes 
were influenced by the nature of the project itself. I suggested that there was some 
evidence of revolutionary discourses (e.g., an active consumer-citizen role) but I 
argued that the construction of the ‘consumer-citizen’ was mainly situated in a 
discourse of individualism. 
In chapter six I argued that the construction of ‘appropriate’ motivations was 
a response to neoliberal barriers to climate-protecting behaviour. If self-interest was a 
problem then we should use self-interested motivations to promote behaviour change 
(e.g., by highlighting the co-benefits of action). The same point can be made in the 
context of ‘appropriate’ actions. If people do not have time to engage in climate-
protecting behaviour (a specific barrier) then we must make climate-protecting 
behaviour quick and easy to engage in (a reformist approach).  
 
7.2   Identifying Climate Discourses V: Changing the Way We Live? 
The champions had encouraged and successfully implemented some climate-
protecting actions at work and at home. However, there were many other actions that 
they had not promoted. Revolutionary changes such as giving up cars or moving 
away from a carbon intensive lifestyle were not mentioned when I asked about the 
success of the champions and the types of actions they had encouraged. During the 
course of the interview, I proceeded to enquire about these more ‘fundamental’ 
changes. Many champions confirmed that these were not ‘appropriate’ suggestions 
for them to make to other people. However, some individuals were prepared to 
consider the need for more revolutionary action. In this section I will analyse more 
revolutionary actions under three sub-headings: fundamental change; going 
‘backwards’; and doing something a bit different. 
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7.2.1   Fundamental Change: Challenging the Status Quo 
The majority of actions that were considered ‘inappropriate’ required a 
fundamental change to lifestyles. One of the most notable examples was the 
suggestion that we should avoid driving. One champion said, ‘we have a love affair 
with our cars. You ask someone to get out of their car they’re going to shake their 
head’ (A-4, 307-309). Another claimed that, ‘we are so dependent on cars in this 
country… you cannot tell people not to use their cars, it’s, it’s almost impossible’ (B-
1, 698-700). In addition, many of the participants owned a car and used it on a regular 
basis. One champion was very emphatic about this: ‘I really like my car, I want to 
keep using my car, I want to keep using a car’ (A-1, 850-851). Similar sentiments 
were expressed in response to the suggestion that we might consider reducing our air 
miles. One champion said that he would not criticise his friends for flying abroad 
because ‘everyone’s going to go on holiday, aren’t they’ (A-3, 420-421)? 
The reluctance to promote and engage in these particular actions was rooted 
in the fact that driving and flying were considered to be an integral part of modern 
society. Driving and flying were thought to be ‘fundamental things’ (C-5, 579) that 
would ‘incur lifestyle change’ if we were to stop doing them (C-10, 987-988). The 
champions did not consider promoting these kinds of actions in the workplace or 
amongst friends and family. They did suggest that people could cycle or walk to 
work, but this was time limited; they did not advocate that people stop driving 
altogether. In some cases, the champions did suggest teleconferencing as a substitute 
for flying to a meeting. However, in many circumstance, flying was thought to be 
unavoidable. One champion explained that the company’s head office was located at 
the other side of the country and sometimes they ‘do have to fly up there’ (A-9, 109). 
The problems associated with fundamental change are well documented in 
the literature. Dietz et al (2007) report that willingness to address climate change 
‘appears to decrease with the difficulty or cost of the proposed action’ (p.186). 
Similarly, Lorenzoni et al (2007) argue that ‘a significant barrier perceived to taking 
action on climate change concerned the prospect of having to change one’s lifestyle’ 
(p.453). Fundamental change appears to be a significant barrier to climate-protecting 
behaviour. However, it can also be argued that the construction of fundamental 
change as ‘inappropriate’ is rooted in the dominance of reformist climate discourses. 
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We can and must address climate change within the current neoliberal system: 
 
Other than amongst deep greens, there is a recognition that any future shift in society and the way in 
which the economy is organised is unlikely to involve radical change, at least in the short- to medium-
term. Over this time scale, market mechanisms will remain dominant and perhaps the best that can be 
expected is a gradual shift towards a more sustainable future (Gibbs 2000, p.11). 
 
Any account of social change should be progressive and based on technological 
innovation (in a discourse of EM) or ‘green’ consumerism (in a discourse of 
individualism).  
In many ways, it is not surprising that fundamental change should be 
constructed as ‘inappropriate’. The ‘appropriate’ actions that were detailed above, 
involve small, incremental changes. It therefore makes sense that big, systemic 
changes would be considered ‘inappropriate’. In fact, many of the participants 
specifically noted this distinction. One champion said, ‘I have big tellies, I have lots 
of light bulbs, but if I can put energy saving light bulbs in… maybe that makes a 
small difference’ (A-5, 317-321). Another champion reflected on the relative ease of 
encouraging different types of actions: 
 
So you could say never flying again that would make a massive impact if loads and loads of people did 
that but actually having people who are willing to give up their one week in the sunshine a year which 
is what they work for all year and what they look forward to, I think trying to influence people to 
change that behaviour is a lot harder than saying… put energy saving light bulbs in (D-3, 562-569). 
 
The champions were willing to engage in small, easy changes such as fitting energy 
efficient light bulbs and they were happy to promote this action to others. They were 
less inclined to undertake behaviour change that would affect their current lifestyle. 
Consequently, they were very reluctant to promote this kind of change to those 
around them. Indeed, D-3 said ‘if I’m not willing to do something myself there’s no 
way I’m going to try and influence anybody else not to’ (915-916). 
In addition, bigger changes such as not flying or reducing consumption are 
less likely to entail co-benefits in the same way as the smaller actions. Not flying 
abroad on holiday may save money for an individual, but they also sacrifice ‘their one 
week in the sunshine a year’ (D-3, 566). The person who does not purchase a plasma 
screen television may benefit financially, but they lose the viewing quality of an 
expensive television and the ‘status’ that is attached to products such as electronic 
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goods (Lorenzoni et al 2007, p.453). Systemic change not only challenges the 
importance of key reformist values (progress, consumption, growth), it also rejects a 
reformist account of human nature. For example, in a discourse of ecological 
modernisation the relationship between the environment and the economy is 
constructed as ‘win-win’: ‘pollution prevention pays’ (Hajer 1995, p.3). The 
protection of the climate does not occur at the expense of business or individual 
interests. However, fundamental change is less likely to provide this win-win 
scenario. There are few extra incentives beyond the primary goal of protecting the 
climate and therefore fundamental actions are often constructed as involving a 
‘sacrifice’. 
Again, it is not surprising that the champions were reluctant to promote these 
actions to other people. The motivations that they drew upon to encourage behaviour 
change were rooted in self-interest and a positive sum-relationship between profit and 
climate protection. Consequently, they were reluctant to encourage actions that were 
in direct opposition to these messages. What is, perhaps, more surprising is that the 
champions themselves rejected these fundamental actions. The vast majority of the 
champions drew upon revolutionary discourses when they talked about their own 
motivations for action. Therefore, we might expect that the champions themselves 
would be more willing to engage in actions that did involve some level of ‘sacrifice’. 
This was rarely the case and it might cast some doubt on the sincerity of the 
champions when they talked about their motivations for action. 
 
7.2.2   Going ‘Backwards’  
A related set of ‘inappropriate’ actions were those that were thought to 
involve going ‘backwards’ in terms of progress or development. A reformist account 
of social change is rooted in progress, based on the values of growth, accumulation 
and profit. Pepper (1999) argues that a neoliberal definition of progress ‘primarily 
consist[s] of indefinitely increasing material consumption’ (p.28). People should 
consume as a means to ‘improve’ their lifestyle (Redclift 1995, p.11). Discourses of 
sufficiency, which focus on alternative values (e.g., quality of life, localisation, 
MDP
30
), were therefore rejected by many of the champions. 
                                                          
30 Measure of domestic progress: An indicator which ‘redefines “progress” and “wealth” and creates 
new national accounting mechanisms to reflect well-being’ (Seyfang 2005, p.299).  
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Champions found it difficult to accept any notion of change that could not be 
reconciled with a reformist definition of progress. One champion said ‘we’re not 
going to go back to just living on small little farms growing our own vegetables’ (C-
5, 557-559). Another champion considered the possibility of reduced packaging: 
 
I just think either you get rid of the packaging totally and you go back to sort of I don’t know sort of 
like well like the 1940s (laughs) I was going to say, erm, you know where brown paper packaging or 
whatever or, erm, you know you find a way to recycle things (B-4, 749-756). 
 
These champions found it difficult to envisage a society that was not based on mass 
production and consumption. A more localised approach to living is a challenging 
idea given the global reach of products and services in the modern world. In a 
neoliberal society, individuals are encouraged to aspire towards growth and 
accumulation; an ‘appropriate’ account of social change should fit with these values. 
This leads to the suggestion by the second champion that we ensure packaging can be 
recycled once we have consumed the products it contains. Similar sentiments were 
expressed by one of the managers who said that he was ‘not predicting for one 
moment that because of climate change we have to all go back to living in caves’ (F-
manager, 704-705). 
The consistent feature in all three of these examples is the rejection of the 
idea that we ‘go back’ to practices that were common in the past. All three 
participants imply that this would be a form of regression. We have reached a 
particular point in our development and it would be unreasonable to go ‘backwards’. 
Soper (2008) acknowledges that this is a common criticism of sufficiency discourses: 
 
It is also necessary to counter the charges of regression and ascetism that have so regularly been 
charged against the green and new consumption movements by those who fear their form of ‘progress’. 
For the idea that these ‘want to take us back to the Stone Age’ not only fails to recognize the avant-
garde quality of the green agenda, it also overlooks the more puritan and ugly aspects of a work-driven 
and materially encumbered existence. (p.578). 
 
Advocates of sufficiency and localisation contend that this is an altogether better way 
to live. Indeed, Seyfang (2005) points out that ‘while GDP has increased rapidly since 
1950, MDP has barely grown at all’ (p.299). Being richer has not necessarily made us 
happier. 
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Most participants in the study rejected the sufficiency discourse. In the 
context of travel, the idea of going back to the way we used to live was found to be 
quite amusing. One champion said, ‘I think our society could carry on you know in 
the same way if people didn’t fly. Yeah Blackpool would probably get more crowded 
at this time of year (laughs)’ (C-9, 1052-1054). Another said ‘erm, you know, you 
can go on holiday to anywhere in the world. Whereas probably before then it was like 
Blackpool or wherever it was (laughs), I suppose’ (B-4, 984-985). We can now 
holiday anywhere in the world. Why would we settle for anything less? 
However, there were some champions who were willing to consider a 
‘smaller’, more localised lifestyle. One champion said ‘So, I would support any sort 
of more community living in a way, I suppose it’s eat local, stay local, travel local... 
live a smaller life not quite... so orientated towards er, erm, erm, consumerism etc.’ 
(A-7, 510-516). This champion drew on key values of a sufficiency discourse, such as 
community and rejected reformist values such as growth and consumerism. However, 
most of the champions rejected this discourse. They could not imagine progress 
without growth and they were not prepared to live a ‘smaller’ life. 
 
7.2.3   Doing Something a Bit Different 
In the majority of cases, the suggestion that we should change the way we 
live was not well received by the participants. However, there were some examples of 
revolutionary actions that were promoted by the champions and accepted by their 
colleagues. In this section I will consider two actions that were reflective of 
revolutionary discourses. Both examples are taken from Business A. 
In one of the offices, many members of staff bought their lunch from a local 
cafe where the food was sold in polystyrene boxes. These could not be recycled and 
the champions therefore tried to introduce the use of Tupperware dishes. Employees 
were encouraged to take their own container to the cafe instead of bringing back the 
non-recyclable box and putting it in the general waste. However, as one champion 
explained, the response to this was not positive: 
 
We thought why don’t we try it and maybe, maybe it’s not that complicated, but the reaction you have 
from people is ‘that’s far too complicated, what are you ask*, what are you, you know, this is too 
different, this is too much’...’this is, I want, you know, how things have always been’...‘I want my 
lunch in a, in my polystyrene box’. So it’s a bit weird (A-1, 1106-1115). 
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For the champions who worked in the office this seemed like a fairly sensible 
suggestion. It was an extension of the accepted environmental message to reduce 
waste. However, for many of the people who were asked to engage in the activity, it 
was not easy or straightforward and they were not prepared to do it.  
The fact that the champions had tried to encourage the action in the first 
place does indicate the influence of more revolutionary discourses in terms of the 
behaviour that they were promoting. There was no incentive or co-benefits attached 
to the use of the boxes and using them required extra effort. People had to remember 
to bring them in to work and then wash them when they were finished. In this way, 
individuals were being asked to embrace the role of an active citizen who is 
‘motivated by an altruistic concern for a larger community’ (Berglund and Matti 
2006, p.555). There was little benefit to the individual person at the time of the act. 
They were expected to engage in the behaviour because it was good for environment. 
Champions that promoted this action drew upon an account of human nature that 
reflected a discourse of democratic citizenship. 
However, most of the time, this account of human nature was rejected by the 
champions in favour of a more self-interested account of human nature (where actions 
required little or no effort and involved co-benefits). It is perhaps then not surprising 
that people were reluctant to engage in this action. Kollmuss and Agyeman (2002) 
argue that ‘egoistic orientation can only be a motivator for pro-environmental 
behaviour as long as the action serves the person’s needs and wants… a strong 
egoistic orientation is counter-productive when the desired behaviour negates a 
person’s needs and desires’ (p.245). The champions’ consistent use of co-benefits 
was counter-productive when they tried to introduce a scheme that did not provide 
any co-benefits for their colleagues. 
The second example in Business A was the introduction of a wormery at one 
of the offices. This system reduced the amount of left-over food being put into the 
general waste. Food scraps were put into the wormery and this was turned into 
compost and liquid feed. This action was again based on an accepted climate 
protecting principle – the importance of recycling waste. However, it involved more 
effort than placing plastic bottles in a recycling bin and it was a little more out of the 
ordinary. Initially, this particular action was not well received by members of staff. 
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Non-champions were asked to store their food waste and from time to time they were 
also expected to check on the worms and drain the liquid feed. One champion said 
that the initial reaction was ‘almost horror’ (A-8, 231). Another champion admitted, 
‘I was thinking, that’s a bit sick’ (A-10, 124). However, once the system had been in 
place for a little while people did become accustomed to it. The first champion 
explained that ‘when they [members of staff] started to do it they realised what it’s, 
what it’s for...erm, so it worked, yeah, people, people do buy into it’ (A-8, 233-235). 
The introduction of a wormery was not a fundamental change in the same 
way as giving up a car, but it was an action that required more effort than some of the 
‘appropriate’ actions outlined above. Food waste had to be separated and stored and, 
in some cases, members of staff were asked to get involved in the maintenance of the 
wormery itself. The promotion of this activity in the first place indicated the 
willingness of some of the champions to do something a little bit different. The action 
presented some of the same issues as the Tupperware dish scheme. There were no 
direct personal benefits for the people who saved their food waste and it required 
additional effort. However, in contrast to the Tupperware scheme, individuals did 
begin to accept the use of the wormery and the benefits it could have for the local 
community and the protection of the climate. This introduces two important points. 
First, champions did have the capacity to think about and promote more revolutionary 
actions (i.e., those that rejected some components of reformist discourse). Second, 
and perhaps more importantly, non-champions could accept these types of actions, 
even if there were no direct benefits for them personally. This might have 
implications for the capacity of non-champions themselves to be active agents and 
subvert dominant discourses. This will be discussed in more detail in section 7.5.   
 
7.2.4   Summary  
Overall, ‘inappropriate’ actions were generally rooted in revolutionary 
climate discourses. The champions did not encourage these kinds of behaviours in the 
workplace and many of them did not consider them at all until they were asked. Many 
of the participants felt that giving up driving and flying or engaging in a less 
consumer based lifestyle required sacrifice and involved regression. These actions 
were contrary to a neoliberal account of human nature and a reformist account of 
social change. There were several participants who were willing to consider the need 
for fundamental change, but they were in the minority. In section 7.2.3 I discussed the 
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introduction of actions that were a ‘little bit different’. Champions in Business A had 
tried to introduce the use of Tupperware dishes to replace disposable packaging and 
they had installed a wormery. The first of these schemes was not well received by 
employees while the second one was gradually accepted over time. I argued that the 
introduction of both schemes indicated some revolutionary ideas by the champions. 
The acceptance of the wormery indicated that revolutionary actions were not always 
‘inappropriate’ and, with a little perseverance, employees might be susceptible to 
other revolutionary ideas. 
 
7.3   Identifying Climate Discourses VI: The Role of Business, the State and ‘the 
People’ 
Participants in the study were also asked about responsibility. Whose 
responsibility is it to deal with climate change and what is required? The responses to 
this question provided some important insights into the construction of ‘appropriate’ 
action. The three main responsible parties were said to be business, government and 
individuals or ‘the people’. Champions talked about who they thought was 
responsible but simultaneously, what these parties should be doing to tackle the 
problem. Government and business were said to be responsible for providing the 
conditions for further action on climate change. In this section I will consider the role 
of these key agents in facilitating action on climate change. I will argue that the 
champions drew on both reformist and revolutionary discourses. In addition, they 
often combined the components from different discourses. 
 
7.3.1   Infrastructure, Subsidies and Product Innovation  
One of the most important reported conditions for action on climate change 
was the provision of suitable facilities and infrastructure. The way the champions 
talked about this particular issue provides us with further insight into the state/market 
component of the climate discourses. Many participants felt that the current 
infrastructure of society was not conducive to climate-protecting behaviour. This was 
particularly apparent when people talked about transport. For example, champions 
did encourage their colleagues to take public transport to work. However, they argued 
that people were reluctant to do this because the transport infrastructure was very 
poor. One champion said ‘people aren’t going to give up their cars at the moment 
because there’s no other way to get around this country. It’s just not, public transport 
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is just a mess’ (C-7, 883-885). One champion explained that she personally could not 
avoid driving to work because ‘there’s no bus route or train route for me to get into 
this office every single day. The only option is to drive’ (A-9, 523-524). Participants 
argued that people could not be expected to change their behaviour unless the 
appropriate infrastructure was in place. 
The participants who talked about infrastructure felt that the provision of a 
comprehensive and reliable transport network was the responsibility of national and 
local government. On the subject of transport, one champion said that behaviour 
change could be encouraged by ‘a government that provi* provided options... so that, 
erm, people can leave the car at home’ (A-6, 537-539). A similar sentiment was 
expressed by one champion in the context of recycling: 
 
So recycling, kerbside recycling, councils should be doing so much more. I live in an area where our 
kerbside recycling is quite good, erm, but it’s not, it’s not as good as it could be, erm, and I know from, 
from other areas in the country that it’s a lot worse than we have here, erm, and that’s something that... 
that the government could do to make it easy for everybody to have an impact (B-1, 666-673). 
 
Recycling facilities were provided in the workplace and the majority of employees 
did recycle their waste. However, people could only be expected to extend this 
behaviour into their personal lives if local councils and national government were 
prepared to put the correct facilities in place. The role of the government was to 
enable action on climate change. It was the state rather than the market that was 
responsible for this task. This was interesting given the general emphasis on 
privatisation in modern society.  We have seen a ‘shift of activities, resources and the 
provision of goods and services from the public sector to the private sector (variously 
described as commercial, corporate, for profit)’ (Clarke 2004, p.32; emphasis in 
original). Given the general dominance of reformist discourses and the push for 
‘economic efficiency, environmental effectiveness and political practicality’ 
(Meadowcroft 2005, p.480), we might have expected participants to suggest the 
provision of more efficient waste and transport services by the private sector. This 
was not the case. 
In some ways this does indicate the influence of more revolutionary 
discourses. For example, in a discourse of democratic citizenship the state is 
responsible for dealing with common goods problems and ‘our climate is now a 
common good because everyone’s well-being depends on it’ (George 2010, p.14). 
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However, although the state was thought to be responsible for the facilitation of 
climate-protecting actions, these actions generally remained rooted in reformist 
discourses. For example, the government should introduce better kerbside recycling 
facilities to enable people to engage in this easy, individualistic action. The 
champions therefore drew upon a revolutionary construction of the state/market 
relationship, but maintained a focus on individuals as self-interested, utility 
maximisers, rather than active environmental citizens. They combined components 
from revolutionary and reformist discourses. 
This combination of discourses was also evident when the champions talked 
about the role of the state in providing subsidies for environmental products. One 
champion talked about his intention to purchase an electric car. He described a 
‘government scheme’ that would introduce quotas and ‘drive… the production’ (C-6, 
839-842)
 31
. Another champion talked about the role of government in the promotion 
of energy efficient technology for the home: ‘I think what will probably happen is 
that the government will stop giving grants for cavity wall and loft insulation after 
2015, erm, and I’m hoping that those grants will move onto renewables’ (A-6, 458-
461). The state did not fulfil the limited role it would play in reformist discourses 
because the introduction of subsidies was interference in the ‘free and efficient 
operation of the market’ (Cerny 2008, p.1). However, reformism did play an 
important role in these examples because the point of the subsidies was to promote 
the purchase of environmental products. Therefore the market still played a dominant 
role in dealing with environmental problems by developing innovative ‘green’ 
products.  
 
7.3.2   Enforced Action on Climate Change  
In other areas of discussion the role of the state was more clearly situated in 
revolutionary discourses. Given the prominence of reformism, I was surprised to find 
that some of the participants were also proponents of enforced action on climate 
change. This idea was introduced, without prompt, during the focus group in  
Business D: 
 
 
                                                          
31
 The Plug-In Car Grant was officially introduced in January 2011. Motorists purchasing a qualifying 
ultra-low emission car can receive a grant of 25 per cent towards the cost of the vehicle, up to a 
maximum of £5,000 (Department for Transport 2011). 
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I think it’s alright saying people have got to change, but we know that people will only change if 
they’re forced to change and you almost need a government that, not a fascist government, but that will 
stand there and say we are going to limit what you do (D-4, 932-936). 
 
Another champion agreed that enforced change ‘would actually make a difference to 
people’ (D-3, 980). This idea provoked an interesting set of responses when I put the 
question to other participants. One manager said ‘so yeah I mean if the carrot doesn’t 
work then it’s time for the stick... it really is, we really are reaching that point’ (B-
manager, 804-807). Similarly, one of the champions talked about enforced water 
charges: ‘I think it’s the same with everything you know, unless we’re charged for it, 
or unless there is a fine, or unless there’s some penalty enforced people are never 
going to take it seriously’ (C-4, 329-332). These champions entertained the idea that 
the state may have an important role beyond its facilitation of the market.  
One champion argued that enforcement was appropriate for some actions, 
but not for others: 
 
Yeah well our council they, they fine you if they find like cos you’ve got different bins for your glass 
and your plastic and that and they fine you if you put... if you put them in different ones. Yeah, so 
something like that’s fair enough cos its just laziness if you don’t put it in the right bin but something 
where they’re forcing you to drive your car at different times and that, no’ (A-10, 489-496). 
 
Interestingly, the champion identifies one action that was generally said to be 
‘appropriate’ (recycling) and one that was not thought to be ‘appropriate’ (giving up 
cars). Enforcement of the former was thought to be acceptable whereas enforcement 
of the latter was not. It could be argued that enforcement is more acceptable in 
relation to actions that are deemed ‘appropriate’. Indeed, several of the participants 
who supported enforced action did talk about recycling. However, none of the other 
participants drew such a clear distinction between the enforcement of different 
actions. It is therefore difficult to draw any firm conclusions about this particular 
idea. 
Overall, support for enforced action was far from unanimous and some 
champions were strongly opposed to ‘big brother legislation’ (A-7, 851), but it was an 
idea that did come up in the interviews, often without prompt. These individuals 
rejected the reformist construction of a minimal state. However, it is difficult to 
identify a specific revolutionary discourse without further information. For example, 
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in a discourse of democratic citizenship ‘social regulation expresses what we believe, 
what we are, what we stand for, not simply what we wish to buy as individuals’ 
(Sagoff 1988, p.17). In a justice discourse, ‘state regulation and even outright controls 
on environmentally damaging activity are willingly recognized as potentially 
beneficial’ (Bond 2000, p.36). The state would play a similarly active role, but this 
would be directed towards the redistribution of environmental goods (or bads).In both 
of these discourses, the construction of the state reflects more revolutionary responses 
to the problem of climate change. 
In addition, the majority of participants agreed that enforced environmental 
legislation was very important in the business context. One champion said that a 
business case was useful but that ‘ultimately you know it should be law that these 
things happen’ (A-4,366-267). Another champion talked about enforced reporting: 
 
I think that business leaders should be made to feel responsible for the impact that that company’s 
having. I actually think that this social report responsibility reporting thing should, should be 
mandatory. Businesses should be forced to report on the impact that they’re having (C-7, 798-803). 
 
The fact that enforcement was also mentioned in relation to business adds further 
support to the argument that revolutionary climate discourses are playing a stronger 
role. Many participants felt that individual action should be enforced by the state 
rather than directed through market incentives. In addition, they believed that 
business (the market itself) should be subject to state regulation. Mol and Sonnenfeld 
(2000) discuss the role of the nation-state in climate discourses of reform, such as 
ecological modernisation. They claim that the emphasis is on ‘less top-down, national 
command-and-control environmental regulation’ (p.6). As discussed in the previous 
two sections, this was certainly the case in many of the interviews. The role of 
government was to facilitate the market. For many of the champions, however, when 
they talked about climate change in a more general way, this was not enough. 
Command and control environmental regulation was also a necessary condition for 
behaviour change. 
 
7.3.3   Collective Individualism 
Revolutionary discourses were also evident when the champions talked 
about the role of individuals or ‘the people’. The role of the champions was to 
encourage individual behaviour change and, naturally, they emphasised the 
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importance of individual action. However, when I asked about what we could do to 
tackle climate change more generally, they responded in a slightly different way. 
Participants still talked about individualistic actions, but this was constructed as a 
collective endeavour. One champion said if ‘everybody just changes one thing you 
know surely that’s a help’ (B-3, 450-451). A manager expressed a similar sentiment: 
 
I like to think well, you know, I’m doing my little bit and hopefully there’ll be, you know, many other, 
you know, thousands of people up and down the country in different countries across the world doing 
their little bit and collec* collectively we are in our way all making a, you know, making a difference’ 
(E-manager, 416-421). 
 
Participants talked about the importance of having ‘a critical mass of people’ (C-3, 
724-725) and tackling climate change ‘as a society and as a community’ (A-7, 745-
746). These individuals appeared to embrace their role as active citizens who would 
act alongside other people for the good of the collective.   
The importance of collective action is well-documented in the literature. 
Rootes (2007) argues that ‘local campaigns are the most persistent and ubiquitous 
forms of environmental contention’ (p.722). Similarly, Hale (2010) contends that this 
kind of collective action is imperative if we are to tackle climate change: ‘We have 
too often sought to influence individual action without fostering the networks that 
will enable a collective shift in attitude or action’ (p.263). However, the participants 
were not referring to direct action campaigns or lobbying the government. Rather, 
they were referring to the culmination of lots of small actions.  These included 
individualised, ‘easy’ actions: ‘turning off their PCs’ (C-3, 168) or ‘double sided 
printing’ (117) as well as ‘green’ consumption choices: ‘lighting sensors’ (C-3, 32) 
and ‘energy efficient cars’ (A-7, 496). 
This might suggest another version of the consumer-citizen that I discussed 
in the section 7.1.4. Individuals are expected to think about the moral implications of 
the choices they make but they should still express these preferences through 
individual action and consumption choices. For the consumer-citizen the ‘mix of 
lifestyle, identity, belief and practice is brought to bear through market mechanisms’ 
(Parker 1999, p.69). The champions appeared to be referring to a similar idea when 
they talked about the importance of collective action. However, I would argue that 
there is a slight, but potentially important difference here. For the consumer-citizen, 
consumption is the primary concern. We adapt our everyday consumption practices to 
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incorporate ‘green’ or ‘ethical’ goods (Seyfang 2005, p.290). For the champions in 
these examples, collective action was the primary concern. Climate change was 
recognised as a problem that required a collective response. Therefore, I would 
suggest that these individuals were acting more like citizen-consumers. They 
recognised the importance of a collective response to climate change first and 
foremost but they could only express this is in the context of individualised and 
consumer-based discourses. Indeed, Sanne (2002) argues that individuals are ‘locked-
in’ to the consumer-based structures of modern society (p.286). Therefore, although 
participants talked about the importance of collectivism, this was constrained by the 
values of more reformist discourses (e.g., consumption, accumulation and choice). 
We see a discourse of democratic citizenship limited by a discourse of individualism. 
 
7.3.4   Summary  
When they talked about the role of government, business and ‘the people’, 
the champions drew upon both revolutionary and reformist discourses. They argued 
that the state was responsible for facilitating action on climate change (a 
revolutionary role) but the actions that required facilitation were generally quite 
reformist in nature (e.g., recycling). The state was also expected to play a relatively 
active role in the provision of subsidies for ‘green’ products but the market retained a 
dominant role in the provision of these products. Many champions talked about the 
importance of enforced action on climate change, but again the specific nature of the 
government’s role reflected more reformist components. The government should fine 
people if they do not recycle their waste. The focus was still on economics and 
financial (dis)incentives. Finally, the champions talked about the importance of 
collective action. This was a revolutionary idea, which implied that the key actors 
would be environmental citizens. However, the role of individuals as active citizens 
was constrained by the individualised actions that they were required to take. Overall, 
the analysis in this section has provided evidence of reformist and revolutionary 
discourses. However, in general, the revolutionary aspects of actions were limited by 
reformist ideas. 
 
7.4   Reinforcing Dominant Discourses 
In the second half of chapter six I discussed how the champions had 
reinforced and subverted dominant ideas about ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ 
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motivations. I argued that there was some resistance to dominant discourses but that 
this was very limited. In section 7.4 and 7.5 I will provide a parallel analysis of 
climate-protecting actions. I will argue that the evidence of reinforcement and 
subversion in this context was very similar. In fact, I will argue that there was even 
less resistance in the context of actions. 
In chapter six I argued that the champions reinforced dominant discourses 
when they reproduced these ‘dominant’ ideas in everyday communication. 
Unsurprisingly, they did something very similar when they promoted particular 
actions. By drawing on the components of reformist discourses they reinforced 
reformist actions as ‘normal’ or ‘natural’. In addition, they responded to neoliberal 
barriers (e.g., lack of time) by promoting reformist actions (those that were quick and 
straightforward).  As discussed in the previous chapter, the champions had been 
‘simultaneously constituted by that which they move and constitute’ (Carolan 2003, 
p.229).  
In this section I will argue that, in the context of actions, many of the 
respondents reinforced dominant reformist discourses in three additional ways. First, 
they qualified their role as an ‘environmentalist’. Second, they identified specific 
boundaries for their actions and drew upon a very narrow of conception of what it 
meant to be ‘successful’ as climate champions. Finally, they rejected the notion of 
fundamental change 
 
7.4.1   ‘I’m Environmental, but…’  
The first area which indicates reproduction of the dominant discourse was 
the way in which the champions constructed themselves. In this section I will argue 
that the champions were committed to the project and their role in encouraging 
behaviour change. However, at the same time, they constructed this general concern 
about climate change as being a little out of the ordinary. Many participants were 
concerned to distance themselves from the image of the traditional environmentalist, 
who is in many ways contrary to the neoliberal values of modern society. They 
qualified their role in the same way that they had qualified their revolutionary 
motivations.  
Many of the champions were concerned about being too political in their 
views and actions. One champion said, ‘I’ve kind of, I’ve always sort of, had a, had a 
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strong interest in environmental issues, erm, not to the point of actually, erm, being 
an activist in any way’ (B-6, 5-7). Political activism was constructed as being at the 
extreme end of environmentalism. This champion was interested in the issues, but he 
hadn’t gone that far. Other champions were quite vehement in their comments on 
environmental activism. One champion stressed that he was ‘by no means an activist 
of any sort’ (C-6, 883-884) while another made clear that she was ‘definitely not like 
one of those protester type people’ (A-10, 355-356). 
According to the literature, an activist may promote collective campaigns on 
climate change (Rootes 2007, p.725) or encourage the development of ‘“action 
networks” that influence individual and community behaviour’ (Hale 2010, p.267). In 
these accounts the role of key agents would be to act as a citizen and collectively 
work towards change. This construction of key agents therefore reflects the 
revolutionary discourse of democratic citizenship. It is contrary to the dominant and 
‘appropriate’ role of key agents (as self-interested rational consumers in a discourse 
of individualism or as technical experts in an ecological modernisation discourse). 
Champions were also aware of the altruistic connotations attached to concern 
for the climate and environment more generally. This construction was again resisted 
by many of the participants. One champion said, ‘I try not to appear too saintly to 
people (laughs)’ (C-2, 510-511). Another claimed that when promoting climate 
protecting behaviour, ‘you do risk that “oh goody two shoes”’ (C-10, 1117). These 
champions recognised that traditional environmentalism reflected a more 
revolutionary account of human nature where ‘self-interested behaviour will not 
always protect or sustain public goods such as the environment’ (Dobson 2007, 
p.280).   The participants therefore reinforced the dominant reformist discourses by 
challenging the components of revolutionary discourses and constructing themselves 
as a new (reformist) kind of environmentalist: 
 
Yes, I care about the environment, yes I’m understanding of climate change, yes I’m understanding of     
sustainability. I’m trying to buck the trend of being that muesli eating, sandal wearing, vegetarian, 
hippy green... I’m trying to represent a new green face to a business (G-manager, 1119-1128). 
 
This manager identified ‘abnormal’ actions that he rejected and constructed his new 
kind of environmentalism in opposition to them. Similarly, one champion stated: 
 
Personally, I am proud of what we’ve done within the Climate Champions and I am proud of what I do 
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personally...cos it’s more than what I did before. It doesn’t mean that I’m going to go all green and 
grow dreadlocks and... stop using electric and showering (laughs) (A-5, 377-383). 
 
The champions were keen to promote action on climate change, but they were not 
comfortable doing it in a way that challenged the boundaries of ‘normal’ behaviour. It 
was much more common for the champions to qualify or limit their role and 
aspirations as champions in this way than it was for them to offer reformist accounts 
of their motives for becoming involved in the champions scheme or caring about 
climate change.  
According to many of the participants, concern about climate change had 
become more ‘mainstream’ (C-2, 849). However, the reconciliation of the 
environment and the economy and the mainstreaming of concern about climate 
change had required a transformation of traditional environmentalism. Thus, the role 
of the champions had to reflect more reformist climate discourses. By ‘present[ing] a 
new green face’ they were reinforcing reformist climate discourses as the ‘most 
credible way of talking green’ (Hajer 1995, p.30).   
 
7.4.2   Successful (‘Acceptable’) Actions 
Towards the end of the interview participants were asked about the success 
of their work. How successful did they feel they had been in the climate champion 
role? This question elicited a variety of responses but it is the construction of success 
itself that is of interest here. First, many of the champions felt that they had been 
successful because there was nothing more to be done in their workplace. Several 
participants talked about the Environmental Management System that was in place in 
their business and the progress that had been made in this area
32
. The majority of 
these individuals referred to the green credentials of the actual buildings they worked 
in. One champion said, ‘the building itself is, erm, you know, obviously, erm, 
environmentally friendly, erm, it’s been built that way’ (C-3, 195-197). Another 
claimed that the building she worked in ‘could not be anymore, erm, green’ (B-1, 
132-133). These businesses were as good as they could possibly be; there was little 
more for the champions to do in this respect. Some champions also made this kind of 
                                                          
32
 An Environmental Management System (EMS) is a systematised programme detailing the ways in 
which a company deals with environmental issues. In September 1996 ISO 14001 was introduced as 
the Environmental Management System standard. In modern society most large corporations are ISO 
14001 certified, including all eight businesses in the current study.   
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argument about the facilities in the workplace. One participant explained that when 
she moved offices there was little for her to do as a champion because everything 
environmental was ‘pretty much done like with the recycling bins and stuff’ (A-10, 
43). Another champion claimed that, everyone in the building was ‘quite sort of 
keyed into it anyway’ (A-7, 110). For example, they had ‘things like all the 
photocopiers where possible were all set to double sided printing’ (A-7, 116-117). 
Other champions talked about successful initiatives that they had been 
responsible for. They had implemented ‘improvements in the recycling’ (C-2, 92) or 
they had been involved in ‘a tree-planting day’ (B-1, 1064-1065). As discussed in 
section 7.1, these actions were all ‘appropriate’ to the dominant discourses. For 
example, in a discourse of individualism the role of key agents is to engage in small, 
incremental actions. Many champions had been successful because they had achieved 
this kind of behaviour change in their colleagues. By talking about success in this 
way the champions reinforced the ‘normalness’ of reformism as an approach to 
climate protecting behaviour. The champions were successful if they had encouraged 
behaviour change within ‘the boundaries of what is acceptable and appropriate’ 
(Carabine 2001, p.275). 
Similarly, champions who felt like they were ‘fighting a losing battle’ (A-3, 
111) had struggled to implement small, individual actions such as ‘checking tyres’ or 
‘taking excess things out of the cars’ (A-3, 144). Champion B-7 was not convinced 
that the project had made ‘that great a difference’ (135). She explained the efforts she 
had made to encourage environmentally friendly procurement in the workplace: ‘I 
was trying to get, erm... them to do sort of like change their cleaning products for the 
whole of... you know the, the, the business’ (56-58). This champion was striving 
towards the use of ‘green’ cleaning products. She felt she had failed because this had 
not been implemented. 
The important point here is not the perceived success or failure of particular 
champions. Instead, it is that the actions they were striving towards reflected 
reformist accounts of social change. Instead of exploring ‘multiple paths to 
sustainability’ (by challenging reformist values) they were ‘obsessing over the 
cobblestones of but one path’ (Maniates 2001, p.38). The champions did not mention 
any failure to bring about systemic change because systemic change was not a 
consideration. As far as they were concerned there were no other ‘paths’ to climate 
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protecting behaviour and by consistently advocating the same ‘path’ they were 
reinforcing this as the only possible goal to strive towards. 
 
7.4.3   Rejecting Fundamental Change  
After we discussed the success of the initiative, participants were specifically 
introduced to the notion of fundamental change. If the only way to deal with climate 
change was to fundamentally change the way we live, did they think this was 
possible? Many of the participants offered a negative response to this question. One 
champion thought that is was not ‘realistic to expect large, the large majority of 
people to make a fundamental shift in the way they live’ (B-5, 819-821). Another 
claimed that people were not ‘prepared to make personal sacrifices’ (C-6, 1044). 
For some champions this was a matter of regret. One champion said she was 
‘worried’ about our inability to change: ‘I’m very worried, the idea of changing 
people’s, changing completely the way they live, that would be very hard’ (A-1, 975-
977). Other champions were equally pessimistic. One replied ‘(sighs) probably not, 
the sad reality is probably not, I don’t believe that there are enough people in this 
world prepared at this point in time to pull in the righ*, same direction’ (C-8, 493-
495). Another said that if fundamental change was required, ‘I think we’re pretty 
doomed’ (C-9, 1019). Many participants had not considered the possibility of an 
alternative way to live and, when I introduced the notion, they dismissed it. May 
(2006) argues that the normalising effects of a dominant discourse can be very 
difficult to resist: 
 
The historical grip of our practices is a tight one... it is precisely the fact that our historical grip holds 
us so tightly that makes it seem to us that we cannot live otherwise than the way we do now, that we 
cannot be something other than what we are (p.21). 
 
Indeed, for some champions, it was difficult to seriously consider the idea of 
fundamental change. One replied: ‘No (laughs), no I don’t, I, I just don’t, I don’t 
believe... you know, I, I don’t believe that we’re anyway near that... and, and will it 
ever happen? My own personal views, no’ (B-3, 677-680). Another said: 
 
Erm... change is a difficult thing and some people say (laughs) that a leopard can’t change its spots, 
erm, but... you know civilisations have changed (laughs) but I don’t kno* I don’t know I, you know, 
erm... I really don’t know (C-3, 730-733). 
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The champions explicitly rejected a radical account of social change. Their ability to 
conceptualise the world was ‘radically limited by the pre-existing field of the 
“thinkable”’ (Downing 2008, p.39). By responding in this way they simultaneously 
reinforced these boundaries. With her contention that ‘a leopard can’t change its 
spots’, champion C-3 implies that we cannot change because our current situation is 
based on our inherent nature.  
Foucault (1984a) argues that in all power relations there is ‘necessarily the 
possibility of resistance’ (p.34). Power is successful precisely because it controls the 
behaviour of a free person. If the controlled person is not free we do not refer to 
power; we refer to domination. However, Foucault (1984a) also admits that ‘in a 
great many cases, power relations are fixed in such a way that they are perpetually 
asymmetrical and allow an extremely limited margin of freedom’ (p.35). To a large 
extent the champions appeared to be very limited in their capacity for resistance. At 
many different sites of interaction participants reinforced the dominant reformist 
discourses as ‘normal’, ‘desirable’ and ‘unavoidable’. 
 
7.5   Subverting Dominant Discourse  
In chapter five I argued that, although reformist discourses did play a 
dominant role, there was some evidence of subversion. This was also the case when 
the champions talked about action and responsibility for climate change. In this 
section I will discuss how some champions subverted the dominant discourses. They 
did believe in the possibility of fundamental change and they talked about 
challenging mind-sets. Both of these things indicate resistance to reformist ideas. 
However, I will argue that this capacity for resistance was very limited. The notion of 
‘change’ was often constrained by reformist definitions and the process of 
challenging mind-sets was limited by the necessarily ‘appropriate’ delivery of the 
climate change message. 
 
7.5.1   Change is Possible 
When I asked the champions about fundamental change many of them 
rejected this idea. They could not contemplate a different way of living. However, 
several of the champions did acknowledge the importance and the possibility of 
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fundamental change. I asked one champion: ‘Do you think we can fundamentally 
change the way we live?’ Her response was: ‘yes... absolutely’ (A-2, 780). One 
champion argued that change ‘is not easy, but it’s not impossible’ (C-5, 557). 
Another champion expressed similar sentiments: ‘it could be done erm, it would take 
a huge shift in attitudes’ (C-7, 878-879). These champions challenged the dominant 
discourses by simply acknowledging that things could be different.  
For these champions, change was about challenging everything: ‘it’s got to 
be intrinsic to people’s everyday thinking… it’s got to be part of what they wake up 
in the morning and it’s part of their thought process in terms of everything they do’ 
(A-2, 597-600). C-5 acknowledged that this kind of change might require giving up 
your car and buying local produce. C-7 said that if we implemented fundamental 
change we would have to ‘actually stop people travelling with work’ (888) and ‘there 
would have to be another way to conduct business’ (890-891). The champions did not 
underestimate the enormity of the challenge, but they did entertain the possibility of 
fundamental change. 
There were other champions who talked about the possibility of change but 
this was not the same fundamental change as the examples in the previous paragraph. 
When I asked one champion about changing the way we live he said, ‘I think we are, 
aren’t we’ (A-3, 513)? He then talked about the importance of being carbon-neutral: 
‘Obviously now if you look at any company worth its salt it’s a carbon neutral 
company or it’s… or it lends itself to the, to the green issue’ (A-3, 515-518). As far as 
this champion was concerned, the fact that companies were now dealing with 
environmental issues was very different to the way things used to be. This champion 
was talking about a reformist construction of social change. Many companies had 
incorporated the environment into their everyday operations but this was a move from 
pure neoliberalism to ecological modernisation. It was not a fundamental challenge to 
the current neoliberal system. Other champions interpreted change in the same way. 
One champion said, ‘I think you know things will change’ (B-3, 475). However, she 
talked about small changes such as recycling. Indeed, when I specifically asked this 
champion about fundamental change she replied, ‘I don’t believe that we’re anyway 
near that’ (B-3, 678). Resistance was evident in a very small number of cases but 
generally the champions either rejected fundamental change or constructed change in 
a reformist way. 
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7.5.2   Challenging Mind-Sets  
In addition, participants talked about challenging the mind-sets of those 
around them. One champion told me about a project she had established to promote 
walking to work. She said, ‘there was great awareness and a great sense of, you 
know, it is ok, you know, I can get to work other ways... instead of, you know, just 
driving so I think that was a good one from that point of view’ (C-4, 79-84). Other 
champions talked about the importance of ‘showing people that you can change your 
bad habits’ (A-1, 409-410) and making people understand that ‘this can work if you 
do it this way’ (A-7, 582). Maniates (2001) argues that change requires ‘undermining 
the dominant frameworks of thinking and talking that make the [individualization of 
responsibility] appear so natural and “common sense”’ (p.44). These champions felt 
that they were promoting an alternative way of acting. They were challenging 
dominant ways of thinking. As one manager said ‘You’ve got to challenge to change’ 
(A-manager, 1148). 
Many of the champions talked about giving people the ‘opportunity’ to act 
on climate change (B-3,147; A-10, 212; C-8, 276). They were introducing the issue 
and encouraging people to think more about what they were doing. One champion 
said that his role was about, ‘getting that change started and just getting people to talk 
about it and make changes like I say even if they’re only little changes’ (A-5, 802-
804). Many champions felt that this kind of approach would lead to cumulative 
action. One manager said he was ‘saving the world one meeting at a time’ (G-
manager, 170-171). Another manager said it was about ‘starting to challenge their 
way of thinking, erm little by little, person by person’ (C-manager, 1232). Champions 
talked about a ‘catalyst effect’ (C-5, 35), a ‘chain reaction’ (A-5, 712) and the 
‘butterfly effect’ (C-9, 1364). The sentiments that were expressed by these champions 
did appear to be a challenge to dominant reformist discourses. They were about 
getting people to think differently and making them consider climate change in their 
daily lives. This kind of approach would gradually change each individual person and 
slowly build a critical mass of individuals.  
However, I would argue that this resistance in constrained by two factors. 
First, although the champions talked about challenging mind-sets, they did not 
actually promote many revolutionary actions. The analysis in sections 7.1 and 7.2 
indicated that reformist discourses played an influential role in the construction of 
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‘appropriate’ actions. Most of the champions rejected fundamental change and 
revolutionary ideas. When many champions talked about ‘challenging mind-sets’ 
they appeared to be talking about a move from pure neoliberal ideas to a reformist 
account of social change. They were asking people to incorporate reformist climate-
protecting behaviour into their (previously non-environmental) daily lives. This might 
be resistance to pure neoliberal ideas, but it is not resistance of the dominant climate 
discourses, which are already reformist. There were some examples where the 
‘challenges’ were slightly more revolutionary. For example, the introduction of the 
wormery and the Tupperware scheme had been a little out of the ordinary. The walk 
to work scheme mentioned by champion C-4 did challenge ‘normal’ daily habits 
(e.g., driving). However, these revolutionary actions played a very small role in the 
accounts. 
Second, the process of ‘challenging mind-sets’ was constrained by the way 
in which the message had to be (appropriately) delivered. The role of the champion 
was to demonstrate the possibilities of action on climate change. Many of them said 
they would ‘lead by example’ (A-3; B-3; B-5). Indeed, one manager argued that 
‘what you do makes them think as much as what you say’ (C-manager, 1207-1208). 
Leading by example may, of course, be an effective way to encourage behaviour 
change. However, it is also based on a neoliberal conception of how the champion 
should interact with other people. Most of the champions felt that it was inappropriate 
to preach to people and therefore their role was about providing information or, in 
this case, leading by example. The potentially revolutionary notion of ‘challenging-
mind-sets’ was limited by the reformist way in which they delivered the message. 
Overall, the champions certainly used language that implied resistance. They 
talked about challenging ideas and introducing new considerations into people’s lives. 
They wanted to change the way people thought about climate change. However, most 
of the champions who used these sentiments were talking about reformist change. 
There were several champions who talked about challenging everything – a 
revolutionary change – but these individuals were in the minority. In addition, almost 
all of the champions delivered the message in a reformist way. Even those who were 
promoting revolutionary actions were reluctant to ‘preach’ about it. Overall, there 
was evidence of resistance but it was very limited. 
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7.6   Conclusion  
The promotion of particular climate-protecting actions is perhaps the most 
fundamental part of the champions’ role. The champions were expected to encourage 
behaviour change in the workplace. In this chapter I have argued that the majority of 
‘appropriate’ actions were rooted in reformist discourses. There was some evidence 
of revolutionary ideas but these were often constrained by reformist notions of 
‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ language and behaviour. 
In section 7.1 I argued that the champions mainly encouraged small, 
straightforward actions. They talked about recycling in the office and the reduction of 
waste from plastic cups and paper. Some champions did promote the use of public 
transport or cycling to work but often this was a ‘cycle to work week’. The 
champions did not promote fundamental or long-term changes to people’s lives. In 
fact, in section 7.2 I argued that the champions were very dismissive of fundamental 
change more generally. They were not happy to give up driving or flying and they did 
not expect other people to engage in these behaviours. In addition, they were 
unwilling to engage in actions that involved going ‘backwards’ to more traditional 
lifestyles.  
In section 7.3 I argued that the champions did draw on some revolutionary 
discourses when they talked about the role of government, business and ‘the people’. 
However, this was often limited by reformist ideas. For example, the champions 
allowed a more active role for the state (enforcing actions), but the specific actions of 
the state were still very reformist (imposing fines and economic disincentives).  
In the second half of the chapter I argued that the champions both reinforced 
and resisted dominant climate discourses. They reinforced dominant reformist 
discourses by claiming to be ‘environmental’, but then distinguishing between 
traditional (revolutionary) environmentalism and a ‘new green face’ (reformist). Most 
champions constructed themselves in the latter sense. I discussed the same kind of 
process in chapter six. Some of the champions talked about revolutionary motivations 
but then qualified these as ‘silly’ or ‘cliché’ (inappropriate). They limited their own 
capacity for resistance by diluting revolutionary sentiments with reformist ideas. 
There was limited evidence of resistance in some of the accounts. In section 7.5 I 
argued that several champions talked about the possibility of fundamental change and 
the importance of challenging (reformist) mind-sets. However, these individuals 
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made-up a very small minority of the interview sample. The overall potential for 
resistance among the champions appeared to be very limited.      
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion: Reforming the Workplace, Changing the World? 
 
  Dryzek (1997) argues that, ‘environmentalism is composed of a variety of 
discourses, sometimes complementing one another, but often competing’ (p.22). 
Hajer (1995) makes a similar claim: ‘if examined closely, environmental discourse is 
fragmented and contradictory’ (p.1). Over the course of the thesis, I have argued that 
the same can be said for climate discourse. In my theoretical framework I identified 
five discursive constructions of the (non-) problem of climate change: the scientific 
account of climate change as a problem; the sceptical denial that climate change is a 
problem; the pessimistic account of climate change as an insoluble problem; the 
reformist construction of climate change as a ‘glitch’ in the neoliberal system; and the 
revolutionary construction of climate change as a fundamental problem of the 
neoliberal system. The main focus of the thesis was ways of dealing with climate 
change. I argued that neoliberalism, as an economic and political project, has a 
significant influence on modern approaches to climate change. I identified seven 
discourses that either conform to the principles of neoliberalism (reformist 
discourses) or reject neoliberal ideas (revolutionary discourses). The reformist 
discourses were ecological modernisation, individualism, and privatisation. The 
revolutionary discourses were sufficiency, justice, deep ecology, and democratic 
citizenship. 
My empirical analysis focused on the communication of climate change in 
large corporations. I interviewed eight environmental/CSR managers and 36 climate 
champions and used my theoretical framework to analyse how they were talking 
about climate change in their daily lives. I argued that climate discourse was indeed 
‘fragmented and contradictory’. The champions (and managers) drew on many 
different discourses when they interacted with the people around them. Overall, 
reformist (or neoliberal) discourses were most dominant throughout the interviews. 
However, the reproduction of discourse was a complicated process and the analysis 
generated many interesting findings. In this final chapter I will provide a summary of 
my main arguments and reflect on the project more generally. 
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The project was organised around four main research questions. In sections 
8.1 and 8.2 I will consider the first two questions. What discourses did the champions 
draw upon in the course of their everyday communication? How did dominant 
discourses construct ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ language and behaviour? In 
section 8.1 I will discuss the role of neoliberalism as the dominant discourse at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century and the effect this had on the champions and the 
project. In section 8.2 I will then consider the seven discourses that I set out in 
chapter three. I will discuss how they were used by the champions when they talked 
about ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ motivations and actions as well as the 
delivery of the climate change message.  
In sections 8.3 and 8.4 I will consider the remaining research questions: How 
did the champions reinforce dominant discourses in their everyday interactions? Can 
we identify resistance to dominant discourses and how did resistance operate at sites 
of interaction? Section 8.3 will consider the role of the champions as ‘passive 
subjects’ (reinforcing dominant discourses) and section 8.4 will consider the potential 
for the champions to be ‘active agents’ (challenging dominant discourses). 
 Finally, section 8.5 will provide some concluding thoughts about the project 
itself. I will discuss the strengths of a discursive approach and the methodological 
limitations of the project. I will argue that the scope of the project could have been 
extended and that the sample of large corporations could have been more 
representative of the business sector. This may have strengthened the analysis and 
final conclusions. I will end with some further research questions and a brief 
discussion of the normative implication of the project. 
 
8.1   The Pervasive Effects of Neoliberalism 
One of the most important conclusions of the project is that neoliberalism is 
indeed ‘hegemonic as a mode of discourse’ (Harvey 2007, p.23). In many ways this is 
not a surprising conclusion. My initial research interests were based on the 
dominance of neoliberal approaches to environmental problems. I expected 
neoliberalism and/or reformist discourses to play a dominant role in the 
communication of climate change. However, what I did not expect was the reach and 
pervasiveness of this dominant discourse.  Neoliberalism has played an important role 
in almost every aspect of the project, both in the guise of reformist discourses and in 
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its pure form. The influence of neoliberalism has frequently diluted the role of more 
revolutionary discourses and it has even had a (surprising) influence on some of my 
actions over the course of the project. 
There have been several places in the analysis where I have identified features 
of a neoliberal discourse rather than a specific discourse of reformism. Despite the 
prevalence of reformist approaches to climate change, a pure (unreformed) version of 
neoliberalism still plays an important role in the communication of climate change 
and the construction of ‘appropriate’ ideas and behaviour. One of the most notable 
examples of a pure neoliberal discourse was the discussion of barriers to climate 
protecting behaviour. The champions talked about the problems associated with time 
and prioritisation and the pursuit of economic success and accumulation. Often 
people did not have time to engage in climate-protecting behaviour because they had 
more important (rationally self-interested) things to do. They were unwilling to 
‘sacrifice’ their carbon dependent lifestyle for the protection of the climate. 
Of course, the purpose of reformist discourses is to re-direct neoliberal values 
towards climate-protecting behaviour – to reform neoliberalism. The champions 
encouraged actions that would be of benefit to people, such as saving money. 
Behaviour change initiatives consisted of small, straightforward actions or time-
limited projects that did not challenge people’s lifestyles. The champions did report 
some success with these initiatives, but many colleagues were still unwilling to 
engage in climate-protecting behaviour. Neoliberalism in its pure form remained 
dominant and posed a significant challenge for the champions. 
Neoliberalism also had an influence on the way the champions perceived their 
own role. Regardless of the type of climate discourses that the champions were using 
they were often constrained by neoliberal ideas about what they could say to other 
people and how they should deliver the message of climate change. This was evident 
when they discussed their own beliefs about climate change. Many champions 
constructed the science of climate change as ‘objective’. We understood the facts 
about climate change and we therefore knew the ‘truth’. Consequently, we knew what 
should be done about the problem. Champions talked about ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ 
responses. Different champions offered different ‘correct’ responses, both reformist 
and revolutionary. However, almost every champion argued that there was a 
boundary between what they thought and what they could say to other people. It was 
 202 
 
not appropriate to tell people what they should believe and how they should act. The 
champions would provide information about climate change and lead by example but 
they would not ‘preach’ to other people. I argued that the champions’ role was 
constrained by a pure neoliberal discourse. Neoliberalism places great emphasis on 
the right to non-interference and the freedom of individuals to choose their own 
subjective preferences. Champions were very reluctant to challenge the ‘rights’ and 
‘freedom’ of other people, despite what they themselves believed about climate 
change. Neoliberalism was very influential in constraining the actions of the 
champions. 
Indeed, as my analysis developed, I realised that this constraining feature of 
neoliberalism had also played a role in my own actions. In chapter four I explained 
that I had supplied three of the participating businesses with reports about the project. 
The provision of the report was important because it helped me to gain access to the 
champions and I felt that it added to the ‘impact’ of my research. The champions 
reported obstacles that they had faced and suggested ways that the project could be 
improved. I was able to compile a report and pass these ideas onto the managers who 
were responsible for the project. 
However, when I began writing up my analysis (after the completion of the 
reports) I noted similarities between my own actions and those of the champions. I 
had presented an accurate account of their ideas (which were mainly reformist), but I 
had omitted my own evaluation of the project and my analysis of ‘appropriate’ and 
‘inappropriate’ behaviour. This was partly due to professional considerations. The 
purpose of the report was not to provide a personal review on behaviour change and 
the managers were not interested in the theoretical implications of my thesis. 
However, upon reflection, I was also conscious of how I framed my ideas. I had not 
challenged the dominant construction of ‘appropriate’ behaviour. I did not offer any 
alternatives to the structure or content of the climate champion project and I did not 
‘preach’ about climate-protecting behaviour. I simply provided information for the 
managers and allowed them choose what to do with it. As a researcher, my role in the 
project was very complicated and it is difficult to draw clear comparisons between 
myself and the champions. However, I would argue that we were all subject to the 
constraining effects of neoliberalism in the general delivery of the climate change 
message. 
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It could, of course, be argued that the pervasiveness of neoliberalism is simply 
a result of the institutional context in which the champions were operating. A critic 
might suggest that it is this institutional context which leads to dominant neoliberal 
discourses rather than any wider discursive processes. This is an important 
consideration for the project. As I suggested in chapter one, business is the institution 
at the heart of neoliberalism and, thus, neoliberalism is likely to play a dominant role 
in the context of large corporations.  However, two points should be considered here. 
First, I would argue that neoliberalism is dominant in the business context, in part, 
because it is dominant in society more generally. Although we would expect a 
neoliberal institution to be neoliberal, research indicates that neoliberalism is 
dominant in many other parts of society (Kirk 2008; Andrew et al 2010). Second, 
analysis of the interviews did indicate that the champions used other climate 
discourses when they communicated with their colleagues. This suggests that the 
institutional context was not the only influence on the champions. Neoliberalism was 
pervasive but the champions did draw on other climate discourses and discourse 
components in their discussions about climate change and climate-protecting 
behaviour.   
 
8.2   Identifying Climate Discourses and ‘Appropriate’ Behaviour  
The main focus of the analysis was the identification of different climate 
discourses. Neoliberalism had a significant effect on the champions and the way they 
talked about climate change. Most notably, the champions either accepted or rejected 
neoliberal principles when they talked about ways of dealing with climate change. In 
this section I will return to my seven climate discourses and discuss how they were 
used in the interviews. I will consider how each climate discourse was drawn upon by 
the champions when they talked about ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ motivations 
and actions. I will also discuss the ways in which the champions imposed limits on 
more revolutionary discourses. 
 
8.2.1   Discourses of Reform 
Reformist discourses played a dominant role in almost every interview. Most 
of the champions constructed the problem of climate change as a small ‘glitch’ in the 
neoliberal system. We could deal with the problem of climate change within the 
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current system and indeed we had already made some progress in this area. 
Consequently, the champions consistently drew on reformist discourses when they 
talked about dealing with the problem of climate change. 
 
Ecological Modernisation 
The discourse of ecological modernisation (EM) played an important role in 
the interviews. The champions used this discourse in the context of motivations and 
actions. Many champions specifically drew on EM when they tried to motivate 
managers in the business. I argued that champions used the reconceptualised 
relationship between the environment and the economy to gain ‘buy-in’ for climate-
protecting initiatives. A healthy environment was a precondition for a successful 
business and companies could protect the climate without sacrificing profit and 
growth. The champions also appealed to the key values of EM. Environmental 
initiatives would save money for the business and potentially lead to further profit. 
EM was most apparent when the champions talked about their managers and their 
business because in a discourse of EM business plays an important role as a key 
agent. 
In addition, EM also played a role in the construction of ‘appropriate’ actions. 
Champions talked about the role of technology in climate-protecting initiatives. We 
could install energy saving light bulbs and use tele-conferencing to reduce our air 
miles. This indicated an EM construction of the state/market relationship (the market 
will lead on ‘green’ innovation) and the role of key agents as technological experts. 
Finally, a discourse of ecological modernisation was also evident in the structure of 
the project itself. Ecological modernisation advocates a very gradual account of social 
change because we can address environmental problems without the need for 
structural change. The climate champion ‘project’ was time-limited with clear 
boundaries. The role of the champions was to introduce small changes (e.g., printing 
double sided) rather than challenging the organisational structure of the business.  
 
 Individualism 
A discourse of individualism was probably the dominant discourse in the 
interviews. Individualism also promotes a self-interested account of human nature 
and the key values of growth and accumulation. However, in this discourse it is 
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individuals who are the key agents. The champions tried to motivate individual 
behaviour change through explaining the co-benefits of climate-protecting behaviour 
(better health, reduced energy bills) and providing incentives such as free tyre 
pressure gauges. 
They also encouraged their colleagues to engage in straightforward, 
individualistic actions such as recycling, turning off monitors and driving in a more 
energy efficient way. They promoted ‘green’ consumerism through the purchase of 
low energy light bulbs and cavity wall insulation. The market was again more 
important than the state but it was the responsibility of individuals to signal their 
climate-protecting preferences by purchasing ‘green’ products.  
This discourse was also important in the mode of delivery of the climate 
change message. In a discourse of individualism, two of the key values are 
knowledge and choice. The champions provided their colleagues with information 
about energy savings in the hope that they would choose to engage in climate-
protecting behaviour. In section 8.1 I argued that a discourse of neoliberalism 
constrained the delivery of the climate change message because individuals have a 
right to non-interference. Individualism, as a reformist discourse, does promote 
climate-protecting behaviour, but this must be consistent with neoliberal principles. 
Individuals have the right to engage in whatever behaviour they want to undertake. 
We must encourage climate-protecting behaviour by providing information and 
leading by example. The champions consistently used these techniques when they 
promoted behaviour change. 
 
Privatisation 
A discourse of privatisation played a much more minimal role in the accounts. 
Privatisation does share several components with other reformist discourses. For 
example, it is based on a self-interested account of human nature and the key values 
of growth and profit. It also incorporates the same construction of the 
environment/economy relationship. We should calculate the economic value of the 
natural world because the correct valuation of natural resources will ensure their 
protection. Therefore, when the champions appealed to self-interested ideas and 
reformist values this could have indicated a privatisation discourse.  
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However, there were very few actions that were consistent with the 
components of privatisation. When the champions appealed to self-interest they were 
talking about saving money through energy efficient technology or individualised 
actions. They drew on discourses of EM and individualism rather than privatisation. 
The market generally played a more important role than the state but most champions 
did not talk about the commodification of the atmosphere. They did not encourage 
their colleagues to ‘buy a tree’ or invest money in the protection of a forest. The only 
time the champions specifically drew on privatisation was when they discussed the 
importance of offsetting emissions. For example, some champions had implemented 
projects to offset emissions that the company could not reduce. In this example, the 
role of the market was to privatise emissions and charge for the protection of the 
atmosphere. In general, however, most of the champions did not draw on the main 
ideas and components of a privatisation discourse.  
 
8.2.2   Discourses of Revolution 
When the champions talked about the problem of climate change most of 
them did not construct it as a fundamental problem. This indicated that the champions 
would probably not draw on revolutionary discourses when they talked about dealing 
with climate change. However, revolutionary discourses did play some role in many 
of the accounts. In particular, most champions drew upon revolutionary accounts of 
human nature and revolutionary values when they discussed their own motivations 
for engaging in climate-protecting behaviour. Often, however, these revolutionary 
motivations were constrained by the dominance of reformist discourses, which 
constructed ‘appropriate’ actions and limited the influence of revolutionary ideas. In 
addition, most champions only discussed revolutionary motivations in the interview 
situation. They very rarely drew on these climate discourses when they 
communicated with other people.  
 
Sufficiency 
When the champions talked about motivations many of them drew on a 
revolutionary account of human nature that is consistent with a sufficiency discourse. 
They argued that individuals can look beyond their own self-interest and contribute to 
the common good of society. However, in general, this was the only component of a 
sufficiency discourse that was drawn upon by the champions. The other components 
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of a sufficiency discourse were often (explicitly or implicitly) rejected by the 
champions.  
When I enquired about the actions that the champions promoted, I specifically 
asked about a fundamental change in lifestyle. The account of social change in a 
sufficiency discourse is based on a complete re-evaluation of our goals and lifestyle. 
It introduces different definitions of progress and development, focusing on quality 
rather than quantity. The champions were reluctant to embrace this account of social 
change, which was contrary to dominant neoliberal and reformist values. Many of 
them claimed that this kind of lifestyle would mean going ‘backwards’. There was 
often some amusement with the idea of going back to living in caves, growing our 
own food and using a horse and cart. Indeed, several champions laughed about the 
prospect of a holiday in Blackpool when you can go anywhere in the world.  
A few champions did consider the possibility of a smaller, more localised 
lifestyle, but this was not a frequent theme in the interviews. A discourse of 
sufficiency was therefore limited by neoliberal constructions of ‘appropriate’ social 
change and the importance of growth as the measurement of ‘progress’.    
 
Justice 
A discourse of justice played an interesting role in the accounts. Champions 
mainly drew on the values of justice and a justice based account of human nature 
when they talked about their own motivations for engaging in climate protecting 
behaviour. They talked about responsibility and fairness in relation to future 
generations and the rest of the world. Many champions acknowledged the unequal 
distribution of the burdens of climate change and the fact that the West was 
responsible for a large proportion of global emissions. Some champions also talked 
about the importance of animals and the effect that climate change would have on the 
non-human world. In this way the champions drew on a more altruistic account of 
human nature and key revolutionary values. They also constructed individuals as 
citizens who had the capacity for moral reasoning.    
However, a discourse of justice was also constrained by the reformist 
construction of ‘appropriate’ actions. Individuals who talked about fairness and 
responsibility still advocated small, easy and time-limited actions. In a justice 
discourse we might expect a more prominent role for the state and a more radical 
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account of social change. The champions did not talk about fundamental change and 
they continued to emphasise the importance of the market in the facilitation of 
climate protecting behaviour.  
In addition, the champions who talked about future generations often linked 
this to a concern for ‘my family’. This motivation is revolutionary compared with a 
concern for economic prosperity, but it might suggest a more self-interested account 
of human nature alongside revolutionary motivations. 
 
Deep Ecology 
A discourse of deep ecology also played a less prominent role in the 
interviews. Some of the champions did talk about the importance of looking after the 
natural world when they promoted behaviour change to others. However, it is 
difficult to discern if this sentiment was about protecting the world because it is 
intrinsically important (deep ecology) or if it was about protecting the world as an 
economic resource (as would be the case with ecological modernisation). This idea 
was not used by many of the champions when they communicated with other people 
so it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions. 
The champions drew on a discourse of deep ecology more often when they 
discussed their own motivations. Participants talked about the importance of 
protecting the natural world and having a responsibility as temporary tenants of the 
Earth. In this case the construction of the environment/economy relationship was 
more consistent with deep ecology than EM. The climate was important beyond its 
value as an economic resource.  
However, champions did not tend to draw on a deep ecology account of 
human nature or social change. The account of social change in this discourse would 
focus on completely reconceptualising our relationship with the natural world and 
challenging the key values of neoliberalism. The champions rejected these 
components of deep ecology. They were reluctant to challenge neoliberal values and 
they very rarely drew on a selfless account of human nature. Often, participants 
would talk about the importance of the natural world alongside some kind of personal 
benefit such as enjoying country walks or appreciating the beauty of the nature. As 
with the champions’ use of a discourse of justice, self-interest often played a role 
alongside a revolutionary account of human nature.    
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Democratic Citizenship 
Finally, the champions often drew on a discourse of democratic citizenship 
when they talked about motivations and actions.  When they discussed their own 
motivations many participants referred to a sense of responsibility and the importance 
of ‘doing the right thing’ or ‘doing your bit’. They drew on the key values of 
democratic citizenship (responsibility, collectivism) and a more altruistic account of 
human nature. Champions also introduced some actions that drew on a more radical 
account of social change. They challenged the ‘normal’ lifestyle of their colleagues 
by promoting cycling to work and the use of public transport. 
In addition, some champions drew on a more revolutionary account of the 
state/market relationship. They proposed a more active role for the state in the 
facilitation of behaviour change and the provision of subsidies for environmental 
products. They also entertained the notion of enforced action on climate change. This 
account of the state/market relationship is most reflective of democratic citizenship 
because it constructs the state as the embodiment of our collective goals and interests. 
Consequently, the key agents are individuals as citizens who have a civic duty to act 
towards the common good. The champions made reference to this role when they 
talked about the importance of collective action and the role of ‘the people’.    
However, this discourse was also limited in several ways. Although the 
champions talked about a more active role for the state, they limited this to specific 
actions which were reformist in nature. The state should facilitate individual action or 
provide subsidies so that people can participate in the market. It should enforce action 
on climate change but it should do this through the use of economic disincentives. In 
addition, when the champions talked about the need for a collective response from 
‘the people’ they were often referring to the cumulative effect of individualistic 
actions rather than campaigning as a collective force. As with the other three 
revolutionary discourses, the overall account of social change was constrained by 
neoliberal conceptions of ‘appropriate’ actions.  
 
8.2.3   Summary 
Overall, the champions drew on all seven climate discourses when they talked 
about their communication with other people and their own beliefs and actions. 
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However, in general, reformist discourses played a much more dominant role in the 
accounts. The initial construction of the climate change problem was very reformist 
in nature (a small issue rather than a fundamental flaw) and this suggested that 
reformist discourses would play a dominant role in dealing with climate change. 
When the champions encouraged behaviour change in others they drew on 
reformist accounts of human nature and reformist accounts of social change. 
‘Appropriate’ motivations drew on neoliberal values such as progress, profit and 
accumulation. The champions did draw on revolutionary discourses when they talked 
about their own motivations but these were often combined with self-interest and 
limited to the interview situation. Similarly, champions who did draw on a more 
altruistic account of human nature and revolutionary values (fairness, responsibility) 
often still drew upon a reformist account of social change. Actions should be small 
and straightforward. They should not challenge the current neoliberal system. 
Reformist discourses were dominant and revolutionary sentiments were frequently 
‘diluted’ by the components of more reformist discourses.  
In chapter three I noted that there would inevitably be some overlap between 
discourses and that each discourse was subject to further distinctions. The analysis 
demonstrates that this was certainly the case when the champions talked about 
climate change. They drew on the components of many different discourses and 
combined them in a variety of ways. However, as I discussed in section 8.1, what I 
had not expected was the pervasiveness of neoliberalism more generally. Reformist 
and neoliberal discourses appeared to play a role in every aspect of climate change 
communication, including the process of the communication itself. This had 
significant implications for the role of the champions as ‘passive subjects’ or ‘active 
agents’. I will discuss these roles in sections 8.3 and 8.4. 
 
8.3   The Climate Champion as a ‘Passive Subject’  
Throughout the analysis I have argued that the champions mainly played the 
role of ‘passive subject’. Neoliberal and reformist discourses were dominant and, in 
the second half of the thesis, I outlined five main ways in which the champions 
reinforced these dominant discourses. First, they reproduced these ideas in their 
everyday communication. The champions were constrained by dominant discourses 
but every time they drew on a reformist discourse they were simultaneously 
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constructing this as the ‘normal’ way to think and act.  Second, many champions 
qualified their revolutionary sentiments. They talked about ‘doing the right thing’ but 
acknowledged that it was ‘silly’ or ‘cliché’. They claimed to be environmental but 
they rejected the revolutionary construction of a traditional environmentalist. They 
constructed their role as a reformist and ‘appropriate’ version of environmentalism. 
The qualification or rejection of revolutionary discourses depicted reformist 
discourses as ‘normal’ and revolutionary discourses as ‘abnormal’. 
Third, the champions talked about ‘success’ in terms of small reformist 
actions. They were successful if they had implemented reformist actions. They 
measured their success against the neoliberal definition of ‘appropriate’ social change 
and reinforced this as the only possible goal to strive towards. In addition, many 
champions explicitly rejected fundamental change. They did not consider this at all 
when they evaluated the success of their efforts. Fourth, many of the champions 
identified problems with self-interested motivations for climate-protecting behaviour. 
However, they continued to draw on self-interested motivations (e.g., co-benefits) to 
encourage action in others. Finally, the champions delivered the message of climate 
change in a way that was consistent with neoliberal values. They did not challenge 
other people’s beliefs about climate change and they did not tell them what they 
should be doing. As I pointed out in section 8.1, I did the same thing when it came to 
the delivery of the reports. We all acted as passive subjects in the delivery of the 
climate change message. 
It is important to note that the language used by the champions did vary 
according to context. During the interview many of the champions did talk about 
what should be done to tackle the problem of climate change. They mainly drew on 
revolutionary discourses when they discussed their personal motivations for engaging 
in climate protecting behaviour or becoming involved in the project. In contrast, 
when they communicated with their colleagues and managers, they did not ‘preach’ 
about what should be done and they mainly used reformist motivations as opposed to 
their own revolutionary beliefs. However, most of the champions reinforced reformist 
and neoliberal discourses in all contexts in one way or another. There were no 
champions who encouraged behaviour change in others purely on the basis of 
revolutionary motivations and no one talked about the promotion of purely 
revolutionary actions. Very few champions talked about their revolutionary 
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motivations in the interview without any qualification and most champions rejected 
the notion of fundamental change. 
We should not be surprised that the champions acted as ‘passive subjects’. 
They were promoting behaviour change in an institution at the very ‘heart’ of 
neoliberalism: the large corporation. The climate champion project itself was based 
on a neoliberal account of social change and the champions were responsible for 
promoting individual behaviour change in the workplace. They were constrained by 
dominant neoliberal and reformist discourses. In the reproduction of discourse there 
is always the possibility of resistance. However ‘in a great many cases, power 
relations are fixed in such a way that they are perpetually asymmetrical and allow an 
extremely limited margin of freedom’ (Foucault 1984a, p.35). The champions 
certainly appeared to have a very limited capacity for resistance.  
 
8.4   The Climate Champion as an ‘Active Agent’ 
 Given the dominance of neoliberal and reformist discourses and the general 
‘passivity’ of the champions, it was unlikely that there would be a significant 
challenge to dominant discourses. Throughout the analysis I have argued that 
resistance was evident but that it was very limited. Specifically, throughout the 
interviews, I identified four types of resistance. First, champions did draw on 
revolutionary discourses when they talked about their own motivations. I have 
acknowledged that these motivations were not communicated to colleagues and that 
they were often diluted with self-interested concerns. However, the champions did 
challenge dominant discourses at one site of interaction (their conversation with me) 
and some champions talked about revolutionary values and accounts of human nature 
without qualification. Second, the champions did acknowledge the problems 
associated with self-interest and climate-protecting behaviour. For example, they 
argued that some of their colleagues had joined the climate champion project for self-
interested reasons, such as improving their career prospects. In many case this had led 
to high attrition levels and a sense of territoriality within the network. Therefore some 
champions did question the ‘naturalness’ of self-interest as a motivation for climate-
protecting behaviour. However, this critique of neoliberal or reformist discourse was 
again limited to the interview situation. They continued to appeal to self-interest 
when they encouraged behaviour change in others.    
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Third, some champions did accept the need for fundamental change. They did 
not promote revolutionary accounts of social change to other people but they did 
consider the implications and feasibility of long term structural change. For example, 
some participants talked about the potential necessity of reducing air miles and the 
use of cars. Finally, some champions did talk about challenging mind-sets with 
reference to revolutionary ideas and actions. For example, champions in Business A 
introduced the use of a wormery. In both of these examples, however, the resistance 
was only evident in a small number of interviews. 
We must therefore consider the significance of these very limited examples of 
resistance. It could be argued that the constant reinforcement of reformist discourses 
does indeed ‘eliminate the threat’ of resistance (Taylor and Carroll 2009, p.53). 
Revolutionary discourses played a much less significant role in the interviews than 
neoliberal or reformist discourses and they were seldom used without some form of 
qualification. 
However, it could also be argued that the champions were introducing the 
(very slight) beginnings of more fundamental change. Some champions did talk about 
revolutionary motivations without qualification. Others entertained the possibility of 
fundamental change. These individuals were not promoting a reformist version of 
environmentalism; they were challenging the dominant neoliberal and reformist 
discourses. This kind of resistance was not evident in all of the interviews and 
revolutionary sentiments were often limited to the interview situation but resistance 
was there. Caldwell (2007) argues that even localised resistance contributes to the 
subversion of dominant discourses: 
 
Discursive resistance appears to be everywhere: it traverses all power relations, it flows through its 
networks and it assumes a multiplicity of localised and distributed forms. This allows the possibility of 
multiple subject positions to emerge within discourses and so discourses can be subverted by 
alternative subject discourses (p.776). 
 
Discursive resistance was not ‘everywhere’ in the interviews, it was very limited. 
However, it may be that the localised forms of resistance that I have identified are 
enough to trigger the beginnings of change and to pose a challenge to the dominant 
discourses. The champions were part of a network that was gradually spreading the 
message of climate change, including the examples of resistance. They were not 
changing the world, but they were operating in a very ‘limited margin of freedom’ 
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(Foucault 1984a, p.35). Given the dominance of neoliberalism, any form of resistance 
might be an important first step towards change. 
 
8.5   Final Considerations 
Overall, the project generated many interesting conclusions about the role of 
climate discourse in everyday communication. I took an empirical approach to the 
problem of climate change and used discourse analysis to address my research 
questions. In this final section I will reflect on the project more generally. In section 
8.5.1, I will evaluate the usefulness of a discursive approach in the context of the 
project. I will also consider the different discourses and components that I set out at 
the beginning and how these could be developed for future projects. In section 8.5.2, I 
will evaluate the methodology of the project. I will argue that the project was subject 
to some methodological limitations in terms of generalisations. In addition, I will 
discuss how the scope of the project could have been extended to strengthen the 
analysis. Finally, section 8.5.3 will consider some further research questions that have 
come out of the analysis and the normative implications of the project. 
 
8.5.1   A Discursive Approach 
A discursive approach to climate change proved to be a very useful way to 
analyse the issue. Drawing on the work of Dryzek (1997) I identified climate 
discourses through an analysis of their fundamental components. The components 
were the relationship between the state and the market, the relationship between the 
environment and the economy, the account of human nature, the role of key agents, 
key values and the account of social change. These components allowed me to carry 
out a systematic analysis of climate discourses in the interview data. In general, some 
components were used more than others and some components were particularly 
relevant to a specific aspect of the analysis. For example, the components ‘account of 
human nature’ and ‘key values’ were used frequently throughout the analysis and 
were drawn on in many different contexts. In contrast, the component ‘account of 
social change’ was more relevant to a specific context: the analysis of ‘appropriate’ 
actions. However, I did draw on all six components over the course of the analysis 
and this proved to be a useful way to investigate the everyday communication of 
climate change. 
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In section 8.2, I talked about the different combinations of discourse 
components. As predicted at the beginning of the thesis, there was overlap between 
the components of particular discourses and the seven discourses that I used were 
subject to further distinctions. There were two particular combinations that occurred 
several times. First, many champions drew on revolutionary components when they 
talked about their own motivations. They would draw on key values such as 
responsibility for the planet and the importance of the environment over the economy. 
However, they would also introduce a self-interested account of human nature (e.g., 
they enjoyed walking in the countryside). Self-interest in this case was not based on 
economic gain but it was still a reformist construction of human nature. I labelled this 
discourse ‘anthropocentric environmentalism’. In addition, many champions talked 
about the importance of collective action (where the key agent would be an active 
citizen) but then combined this with individualistic actions (where the key agent 
would act more like a passive consumer). I argued that this hybrid role of the citizen-
consumer indicated a ‘new’ discourse of ‘collective individualism’. There was, of 
course, further overlap of different discourses, but these were two prominent 
examples. If I was to carry out this kind of research in the future I would consider 
adding these two variations to my seven climate discourses. 
Overall, this discursive approach has made an important contribution to the 
theoretical literature on climate change. I have provided a systematic analysis of 
climate discourses in the same way that Dryzek (1997) categorised environmental 
discourses. For the purpose of the thesis, I used this analysis to investigate the role of 
‘climate champions’ in large corporations. However, the theoretical framework could 
be applied to a variety of other environmental contexts (e.g., analysis of 
environmental policy). In addition, the theoretical framework contributes to the 
current approaches to studying climate change and individual behaviour change.  It 
allows us to analyse the operation of discourse in everyday communication and 
understand how discourse contributes to ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ climate-
protecting behaviour.  
 
8.5.2   Methodological Limitations  
One of the main problems with the methodology was that the potential for 
generalisations was very limited. I discussed this issue in detail in chapter four. My 
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initial intention had been to interview champions in a wide range of business sectors. 
I had hoped to generate conclusions that could be applied to corporate climate 
champion schemes more generally. However, without prior contacts in the business 
sector, I found it difficult to gain access to the champions. My final sample of eight 
businesses only covered five different sectors (consultancy, energy, finance, 
construction and retail). Of course, the main purpose of a qualitative project is to 
produce a detailed picture of a particular social phenomenon. Qualitative work does 
not necessarily aim to offer broad generalisations. However, it would be useful to be 
able to apply the conclusions of this project to the wider business context. Ideally, the 
project would have included businesses across a wider range of sectors. 
The analysis might also have benefited from a wider range of perspectives. In 
hindsight, I could have extended the ‘scope’ of the project in two ways. First, if I had 
used interviews and participant observation this might have provided further insight 
into some important aspects of climate change communication. I discussed the role of 
participant observation in chapter four. Some researchers argue that the only way to 
obtain ‘valid and accurate data’ is to engage in participant observation (Becker and 
Greer 1969, p.323). I acknowledged that participant observation would provide a 
first-hand account of how the champions communicated with their colleagues. 
However, I argued that interviews would provide a first-hand account of how the 
champions communicated with me and, either way, I would have a first-hand account 
of the communication of climate change. In light of some of my findings, however, 
participant observation may indeed have been useful. When the champions talked to 
me about their motivations they generally drew on revolutionary ideas. They told me 
that when they promoted behaviour change in the workplace they talked about the co-
benefits of action (a reformist theme). Context appeared to play an important role in 
the construction of ‘appropriate’ language and behaviour. It would have been 
interesting to have directly analysed communication in the workplace as well as in the 
interview situation. 
In addition, it would have been useful to have interviewed the champions’ 
(non-champion) colleagues. The champions had very clear ideas about the messages 
that people would listen to and the behaviours that they would engage in. However, it 
might have been the case that non-champions had the same beliefs and motivations as 
the champions themselves. This kind of perspective would also have strengthened the 
analysis. Of course, any extension to the project would have required more time and 
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resources. Participant observation and non-champion interviews would have 
generated more data and required further transcription and analysis. This was beyond 
the scope of this project. However, it does introduce some potential issues for further 
research. I will discuss this in more detail in section 8.5.3. 
The methodology did have some limitations. However, it also had some 
important strengths. Most importantly, the project illustrates that discourse analysis is 
a useful approach for the study of climate change communication. The same approach 
could be usefully applied to research on climate champions in other contexts. 
 
8.5.3   Further Research and Normative Implications 
The conclusions of the project suggested many further questions. In this 
section I will consider three areas of further research including the potential 
normative implications of the project.  
The first area that would benefit from further investigation is the views of the 
non-champions. There were many points in the interviews where it would have been 
useful to hear the ‘other side of the story’. For example, the champions promoted 
reformist actions by appealing to reformist motivations. They argued that this was the 
most effective way to encourage behaviour change. If we were to ask non-champions 
about their motivations would they draw on reformist ideas or would they too talk 
about concern for future generations and the natural world? How would they have 
reacted to the champions’ personal motivations? The analysis showed that, in a few 
cases, the champions did promote actions that were a little out of the ordinary. The 
introduction of the wormery was gradually accepted by champions and non-
champions in Business A. Would non-champions have accepted other revolutionary 
actions and motivations if the champions had introduced them? In the previous 
section, I acknowledged that this kind of investigation was beyond the scope of the 
current project. However, it would be an interesting piece of research that would 
build on the conclusions of the thesis. 
It would also be interesting to apply this discursive perspective to climate 
champions in other businesses and sectors of society. Do all champions have the 
same ideas about ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ language and behaviour? It might 
be the case that champions in different business sectors promote different actions or 
that champions outside of the business context have a wider capacity for resistance. I 
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would argue that neoliberalism has a significant influence on the whole of society and 
therefore we would expect reformist discourses to be dominant in many different 
areas. It would be interesting to find out if this was actually the case.   
Finally, throughout the thesis I have argued that the conclusions of this 
empirical project could be used as the basis for more normative work. There are three 
main points to draw out here, which might provide suggestions of best practice for 
businesses as well as policy makers and NGOs. First, neoliberalism played an 
important role in the construction of barriers to climate-protecting behaviour. 
Empirically, this simply tells us that neoliberal discourse was having an important 
effect on the beliefs and actions of the champions and their colleagues. Normatively, 
it implies that the reformist version of neoliberalism is not dealing effectively with 
climate change. For example, despite the champions’ attempts to re-direct self-
interest towards climate-protecting behaviour, this neoliberal value still led to the 
prioritisation of other concerns above the climate. This conclusion provides the basis 
for one particular critique of neoliberal environmental governance. The use of self-
interest as a motivation does not necessarily lead to climate-protecting behaviour. In 
many cases it has proved to be an obstacle to behaviour change. Therefore, we might 
want to look for ‘better’ ways to motivate climate-protecting behaviour.  
Businesses, NGOs and policy makers may need to engage with concepts such 
as ‘environmental citizenship’ (Bell 2005) or ‘ecological citizenship’ (Dobson 2003), 
which I introduced as part of the discourse of ‘democratic citizenship’ in chapter 
three. Rather than focusing on self-interest, ‘the environmental citizen’s behaviour 
will be influenced by an attitude that is – in part, at least – informed by the 
knowledge that what is good for me as an individual is not necessarily good for me as 
a member of a social collectivity’ (Dobson and Bell 2006, p.5). Businesses and NGOs 
that wish to promote climate-protecting behaviour might consider introducing 
individuals to the moral arguments surrounding climate change. Similarly, 
government programmes for behaviour change might focus on environmental 
citizenship as part of the education of young people
33
.         
Second, the champions did demonstrate the capacity for resistance in the 
interview situation. They talked about revolutionary motivations and, as I discussed 
in the previous paragraph, they challenged some aspects of neoliberalism. The fact 
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 Hayward (2012) provides an interesting discussion of this in her recent book, ‘Children, Citizenship 
Environment’. 
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that resistance was limited to one site of interaction (their conversation with me) does 
limit the potential of the champions to be ‘active agents’. However, this resistance 
does have some normative implications. If the champions had the capacity to consider 
revolutionary ideas then we might assume that other people have the same capacity. 
Therefore, we might speculate that a more deliberative approach to behaviour change 
would have some merits. Getting people to talk about climate change and to engage 
with different climate discourses might be a ‘better’ way to deal with the problem34. 
This is another example of potential ‘best practice’ for organisations and policy 
makers. Climate champions in businesses and NGOs might consider the use of focus 
groups to allow staff to talk about their motivations for (not) acting to protect the 
climate. Similarly, new institutions such as citizen’s juries or deliberative forums 
might prove useful in the formulation of climate policy and the promotion of pro-
environmental behaviour more generally
35
.           
Finally, although resistance was very limited, neoliberal climate discourses are 
not without challenge. For critical commentators on neoliberal environmentalism, 
resistance is not futile. Resistance was limited to specific contexts and it was often 
constrained by neoliberal and reformist ideas, but it was still there. It may be that 
these ‘sites of resistance’ are the (very slight) beginnings of change and that 
cumulative action by these networks of individuals are an invaluable tool in tackling 
climate change. As suggested in my reports to the businesses (Appendix A), the 
networks of champions may be usefully expanded to further promote successful and 
long-term behaviour change. The climate champion ‘network’ model may be usefully 
applied to any organisation that does not currently employ this kind of approach.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34
 I have explored some of these deliberative issues in a collaborative paper (Swaffield and Bell 2012). 
Please see Appendix F. 
35
 For further discussion of some of these approaches see Baber and Bartlett 2005 and Backstrand et al 
2010. 
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Appendix A 
Summary of Analytical Categories and Climate Discourses 
Analytical 
Category 
 
Environment/ 
Economy 
 
State/Market 
 
Role of  
Key Agents 
 
Account of  
Human Nature 
 
Key Values 
 
Account of  
Social Change Climate Discourse 
 
Ecological  
Modernisation 
Harmonious, ‘win-win’ relationship 
Environment treated as society’s 
substance base 
Environmental problems taken seriously 
Co-operative but market is dominant 
Increased power of the market 
Command/control  
Economic Instruments 
 
Government, business and scientists as 
technical and managerial ‘experts’ 
Business providing ‘green’ innovation 
and products 
 
Individuals 
constructed as  
self-interested 
 
Growth  
Profit 
Progress 
 
Gradual 
Incremental 
 
Individualism 
Harmonious relationship 
Environment protected through the 
promotion and purchase of ‘green’ 
products and services 
 
Co-operative but market is dominant 
Focus on consumer ‘choice’ rather 
than state regulation  
 
Individual consumers acting as 
neoliberal subjects 
Business structuring the choice of 
products and services 
Individuals 
constructed as  
self-interested 
 
Growth 
Consumption 
Freedom/Choice 
Knowledge 
Gradual 
Incremental 
 
Privatisation 
Harmonious relationship 
Environment is protected through its 
valuation as an economic commodity 
Co-operative but market is dominant 
 Problem of climate change is 
transferred to the private sector 
Individuals and corporations who are 
involved in a system of property rigths 
Individuals 
constructed as  
self-interested 
 
 
Property Rights 
Profit 
 
Gradual 
Incremental 
 
Sufficiency 
Harmonious relationship 
Local economy leads to fewer emissions 
and less environmental impact 
Market still dominant but focus is on a 
local market supported by and 
supporting the community  
Individuals working towards the overall 
well-being of the community 
Beyond self-interest 
Considering good of 
the whole community 
Limits 
Well-being 
Quality of Life 
Redefining 
‘progress’ and 
‘development’ 
 
Justice 
Harmonious relationship where the 
protection of the planet and a stable, just 
economy go ‘hand in hand’ 
State is dominant 
State should ensure that the market is 
just and impose regulation  
Focus on individuals (incl. gender, race, 
socio-economic situation) 
Non-human nature, future generations 
Individuals are capable 
of acting justly 
Fairness 
Responsibility 
Human Rights 
Redefining goals 
and addressing 
climate change as 
‘ethical’ issue 
 
Deep  
Ecology 
Environment must be separated from the 
economy. Environment is intrinsically 
important and not a resource 
State is dominant. 
State should take responsibility for the 
protection of the natural world 
Focus on eco-systems, non-human 
nature and the natural world 
Individuals are capable 
of taking an eco-
centric perspective on 
nature 
Intrinsic value 
of the natural 
world 
Fundamental 
reconceptualization 
of our relationship 
with nature 
 
Democratic  
Citizenship 
Protection of the environment is a 
political issue. There is no real 
relationship between the environment 
and the economy 
State is dominant. 
Need for a collective response to 
climate change as represented by the 
state 
Focus on individuals as change agent or 
an active citizen 
Individuals are capable 
of being altruistic and 
thinking about the 
good of society 
Collectivism 
Responsibility 
Deliberation 
Common Good 
Fundamental 
challenge to 
neoliberal values 
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Appendix B 
Example Climate Champion Report 
 
Business/Case Study A (April 2010) 
 
Introduction/Overview 
This report summarises some preliminary findings of a Ph.D. project at Newcastle 
University. The overall purpose of the project is to investigate the communication of climate 
change in large corporations. As part of this, research questions have focused on the role of 
‘climate champions’ (individuals who have been given responsibility for communicating 
these issues in the workplace). Interviews have been conducted with ‘climate champions’ in 
three large corporations, including Business A. At Business A, ten champions took part in 
hour-long interviews which focused on the role itself and their own thoughts/ideas on how 
best to tackle climate change. These individuals included both office and field based staff. 
The sample also included representatives from the [Location X] offices and around the 
country. This report focuses mainly on the role itself, including successes, best practice in 
communication, obstacles and suggestions for future projects. 
 
Getting Involved 
The interviews began with a question about why the champions initially got involved 
in the project. The majority of respondents said that they had seen an email advertising the 
project. Their desire to be involved was either rooted in a pre-existing/personal commitment 
to tackling environmental problems or simply an ‘interest’ or ‘curiosity’ in what the project 
may involve. One champion stated that, ‘learning more about what you could do appealed to 
me’. Other champions said that they felt it made sense to be involved in this type of project 
given the type of work they were doing at Business A on a daily basis. 
 
Main Successes 
When asked about the main successes of the project, most champions referred to 
initiatives which are outlined in [Business A publication]. These included the ‘Food for 
Thought’ campaign, printing double sided and recycling. Field based champions also 
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mentioned the effort of drivers to check tyre pressure and remove unnecessary weight from 
vans. When talking about success, the majority of champions referred to an improvement in 
general awareness. One respondent said that they had ‘opened people’s eyes a little bit’. Staff 
who had not been directly involved in the project had been interested in both the initiatives 
and the outcomes. One champions reported ‘pleasant surprise’ when colleagues asked to see a 
copy of the audit. Several respondents also said that non-champion colleagues were quite 
proud of their own efforts and were eager to point out that they had recycled or remembered 
to turn monitors off. 
Another point made by one or two of the champions was that their involvement in the 
program had improved their personal climate-protecting behaviour. They reported being 
more aware of their actions at home as well as at work. This acknowledgement of an 
improvement in personal behaviour came mainly from those who had joined the program out 
of general interest rather than prior environmental concern. One such respondent suggested 
that perhaps it would be beneficial to give this role to people without prior environmental 
concern. Once they had ‘converted’, the role could be passed on. 
 
Keys to Success 
Given the many successes that came out of the project, respondents were then asked 
about the ‘keys to success’.  
‘Buy-in’ 
An important factor with most respondents was ‘buy-in’ from management. Several 
champions said that top management were very positive about the project but that middle 
management had not been as engaged. Therefore, when staff ‘on the ground’ wanted to 
implement a behaviour change initiative their line manager was not always co-operative. This 
problem was not mentioned by everyone and some champions reported very supportive line 
managers. However, for those who did have a problem in this area it was quite a significant 
challenge. Other champions reported that buy-in from areas such as facilities was also very 
important in the process of implementing change. 
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Communication 
Good communication was another area reported to be important for success. Being 
able to communicate effectively with both other champions and non-champion staff was 
imperative to making a change. A few of the respondents also mentioned the importance of 
getting feedback from non-champion staff, referring to a ‘two-way process’. They felt that it 
was important to not only provide guidance but also listen to what people thought and 
involve them in the process of change by taking their ideas and comments on board. 
 
‘Being Visible’ 
Many champions stated that their presence in an office was usually enough to 
remind people about their environmental behaviour. As mentioned above, many non-
champion employees were proud to show champions that they were engaging in climate-
protecting behaviour. However, some respondents reported the same response from people 
who thought they were being monitored. So, for example, at a printer they would get people 
who would say ‘look at me, I’m printing double sided (i.e. aren’t I good!)’ and also those 
who would say ‘you can check if you like, I am doing it (i.e. don’t tell me off!)’. The 
visibility of champions seemed to produce both of these responses and the result in both cases 
was more climate-protecting behaviour. 
Some respondents also suggested that their presence was important as a source of 
information. Staff would, for example, ask about material for recycling if they were unsure 
which bin to put it in. Finally, many respondents also stated that their presence in an office 
was important as an example to others. They would make sure they had recycled correctly 
and avoided unnecessary waste. They cited various reasons for the importance of this 
example. These included demonstrating that it was the ‘right thing to do’ and showing people 
that it was ‘not difficult to do’. 
The idea of visibility is not so straightforward in the case of field based champions. 
However, a few of the respondents who were field based reported that their involvement in 
helping with van audits made a difference to staff behaviour. 
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Targets 
The importance of targets was an idea which elicited varied responses. For many 
people having targets to work towards was a very important part of the climate champion 
process. They said that it was ‘motivating to have something to aim towards’ and that the 
audits gave ‘focus to the project’. A few people said that they had got involved primarily 
because the targets seemed achievable. One person also suggested that having targets was the 
key to the champion program, backed by company policy. 
However, for some champions, targets signalled an end to the project. Given that the 
focus of the project was the environment they did not feel that it should ‘end’ once the targets 
had been achieved. It was suggested that the targets should be re-set every year so that the 
process was on-going. 
 
Monitoring 
A few of the respondents referred to the importance of monitoring to ensure success. 
They said that they closely monitored staff performance in terms of turning off equipment, 
for example. They felt that this ensured staff compliance. This could possibly be linked to the 
idea of visibility where employees were conscious that their behaviour was being checked. 
However, those who did carry out close monitoring acknowledged that they worked in 
smaller offices where this was easier to do. 
 
‘Something Tangible’ 
Another point made by a few champions was the importance of having something to 
show people. So, one champion claimed that the presentation of facts was important. If staff 
were given facts about the environment and climate change then they had ‘something to grasp 
onto’; something they could see. Another champion referred to the wormery at the head 
office. They said that this was important because ‘you could see the end product...you could 
see the benefit to a community centre’.  
A few respondents also referred to posters that had been put up in offices. The poster 
would explain that, ‘lighting an office overnight wastes enough energy to heat water for 1000 
cups of tea’. The champions felt that this message was also tangible for people; they could 
see the potential effect of their efforts. 
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Getting the Message Across 
Given the overall focus of the Ph.D., champions were specifically asked about how 
they communicated with colleagues. A number of different ideas came out of this question. 
For many champions the key to success in this area was ‘not being too preachy’. Respondents 
said that they were not keen to pester people. This was especially true of respondents who 
expressed a personal commitment towards climate-protecting behaviour. One champion said 
that they did not want too ‘get high and mighty’ because people simply stop listening. 
Instead, most respondents reported that they tried to make the message ‘light-hearted’ and 
‘fun’. Those who used this approach said that they had made a lot of progress with staff who 
were previously disengaged. 
A frequently cited example of best practice in this area was the ‘Food for Thought’ 
campaign. This campaign ‘got people’s attention’ and therefore made that initial contact with 
staff who then came across to see what the champions were doing. 
 
The Climate Champion ‘Network’ 
Respondents were also asked about their views on the advantages of a ‘networked’ 
approach. Feedback on this was generally very positive. Respondents said that it was a good 
way to have different things happening in different places. They also reported that it was 
helpful to share ideas and to ‘know you had that support from other champions’. Simply 
knowing that there were other people, ‘fighting the same cause’ with the same level of 
enthusiasm was very important for many respondents.  
The network was referred to as a ‘chain reaction’ since the ‘message spreads very 
quickly’ through it. It was also said to be ‘infectious’ and that it ‘makes you feel included’ 
which is important for change. Some of the newer champions said that it was good for them 
to be able to connect with others and see what had been done and what had and had not 
worked well. 
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Improving the Network 
There were also suggestions about how the network might work better in the future.  
 
More Champions 
One of the main suggestions that came out of the interviews was the need for more 
champions. Many respondents felt that, given more support from a wider network, they could 
have been more successful. In relation to this one respondent suggested having different 
levels of engagement. So, for example having main climate champions who did most of the 
work, but then having other members of staff who had committed to a certain level of 
engagement and could help out with events or audits when further resources were required. 
 
Location of Champions 
There were also some suggestions about the importance of where champions are in 
relation to staff. A few respondents suggested that it would be beneficial to locate champions 
according to the numbers of staff in each office. For example, to have one champion per 100 
members of staff. One respondent also suggested it would useful to have the champions 
spread out around the country more to ensure that the network represented everyone. A final 
suggestion was based on the observation by one champion that it is difficult for a field based 
champion to look after field based staff. Although they have the advantage of knowing what 
field based staff are dealing with, the communication is difficult because they all have to take 
time after work to check emails etc. The suggestion was that an office based champion should 
be responsible for field based staff so that the communication was easier. 
 
Types of Champions 
Another suggestion was that it would be beneficial to have champions who 
represented different sectors and levels in the business. The network could then represent all 
levels of management and staff as well as the different parts of the company. The respondent 
who suggested this thought that it would help in three ways. First, it would provide the 
champion network with information about the needs of every sector and level. Second, it 
would allow effective communication to everyone. Finally, the respondent pointed out that 
different levels of staff have different capabilities. For example, junior staff may have ‘more 
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time on their hands’, whereas senior management have more power in terms of decision 
making. 
One respondent suggested that it may be important in the future to tailor messages to 
specific areas, for example the field or the office. They felt that many of the messages were 
aimed at office staff and therefore were not relevant to people in the field. It may be that 
ensuring wide representation in the network could overcome this problem. 
 
Attrition Levels 
Many respondents also pointed out that there have been champions who had joined 
and then left the network. Particularly in contact centres, one respondent said that attrition 
levels were as high as 20%. Most respondents felt that it was important to ensure that these 
champions are replaced.  
A few people suggested the importance of introducing the climate champion project 
as part of the induction process when new people joined the business. This would potentially 
bring in ‘new recruits’ for the project. One respondent also thought that it was important to 
have new champions every once in a while to generate ‘fresh ideas’. Introducing the climate 
champion programme to new starters would potentially produce this. 
 
Climate Champion Leads 
There were also suggestions about having a lead environment person in each 
office/part of the field. Different reasons for this were put forward by different people. Some 
champions felt that, although they were dedicated to the role, it would be helpful to have 
someone checking up on them and giving them a gentle nudge every now and again. One 
person stated that ‘if you don’t lead people they get complacent, even when they’re willing’. 
Others felt this would just give the project more structure. One respondent suggested that 
perhaps the environment lead in each office could be a full time position which every 
champion took on for a while. 
 
Sharing Best Practice 
The idea of sharing best practice was an issue with varied responses. Some 
champions felt that this was done very well and that they knew what was going on throughout 
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the network. Others, however, felt that this could have been done a lot better. There were 
suggestions about sharing the things that people were good at. For example, some champions 
had worked in marketing and had been able to create impressive posters and stickers. A few 
of the respondents felt that it would be good to have champions in marketing sharing the 
resources that they had created while other champions contributed things that they had access 
to or could do well. 
 
Meetings and Communication 
Many of the champions felt that increased communication would have been helpful. 
This was cited as important both within the network and with non-champion staff. Within the 
network many respondents felt there could have been more meetings. Particularly with 
champions based outside of [Location X] or in the field there was a sense that this would 
have been helpful. 
Regular communication in the form of newsletters or a web forum was also 
suggested as a way to improve the network. One champion thought that it was important to 
make communication as ‘human as possible’. They felt it was important for champions to use 
these mediums to demonstrate what they had done and how it had been successful both at 
work and at home.  
 
Obstacles 
Aside from improvements that could be made to the network, champions were also 
asked about general obstacles they had faced. 
 
People Problems 
Although attitudes in general were said to be quite positive, where there was an 
obstacle it was people’s attitudes that were given as the main example. People claimed they 
did not have time to recycle or that it was too complicated to print double-sided. Cynicism 
towards climate change was also reported to be a problem by some respondents. When asked 
about possible ways to overcome these problems, most respondents referred back to effective 
communication. They said that they tried to maintain a positive approach and persevere with 
people. Many respondents tried to lead by example and show people that it was easy to do 
these things. 
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Momentum 
A major obstacle for many of the respondents was keeping the momentum going 
with the project. Many respondents stated that since the launch of the initial project there has 
been some slippage back to old habits. One respondent suggested that it would be useful to 
have an audit before the launch of another project. This would show how patterns have 
changed since the success of the previous campaign. The main thought from most 
respondents was that there was the need for events every once in a while to ‘breathe life back 
into the project’. 
 
Financial Support 
For some respondents the issue of financial support was a very big obstacle. In one 
office, for example, there was no recycling at all due to lack of funds. Another champion 
talked about an idea to switch to china mugs instead of plastic cups in a vending machine. 
This was not followed through due to lack of finance. The majority of the respondents 
acknowledged that a business could not possibly invest in everything. However, many felt 
that there were small investments that could have been made and that these would have had a 
big impact on the project. One respondent also thought that small incentives were a good way 
to get ‘buy-in’ from a lot of the staff. 
 
The ‘Climate Champion’ Title 
For many people having designated climate champions was very important for 
tackling behaviour change. People knew who to go to when they had problems, they had 
someone monitoring their progress and encouraging them. However, a few respondents did 
point out a problem with the idea of specifically designating the role. One respondent felt that 
it was important that like-minded people had been brought together, but that this excluded 
those who had not volunteered and were therefore potentially not as committed in the first 
place. Also, if the role was specifically given to someone, others became complacent about 
what they had to do. For example, non-champions would suggest that a poster was made to 
encourage energy saving, but they would not make it themselves. They felt this was not their 
‘role’ and therefore did not do it. This does seem an important point but the benefits 
expressed in favour of having the designated role outnumbered the obstacles expressed 
against it. 
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Individual Time 
The respondents were asked how much time they felt they needed to commit to the 
role of climate champion. This question generated many different responses. The majority of 
respondents said that it was difficult to put a time stamp on it and that it depended on what 
they were engaged in at any given time. Many reported that they needed more time when it 
came to doing audits or setting up a new system or project. The majority of these respondents 
said that they would need less time if there was a wider network of champions supporting 
them. Those that did give an idea of the time needed suggested anywhere between 15 hours a 
month and one day every three months. 
For all respondents, however, having enough time was cited as an obstacle in itself. 
Given that they were mostly doing full time roles alongside the project, the majority felt they 
could not commit to the project 100%. A few respondents said it would be helpful if there 
was allocated time for the role. One person suggested that allocating specific time for the role 
would indicate ‘authentic buy in’ from the business.  
 
Project Length 
In terms of time, respondents were also asked about the timescale of the project 
itself. Some respondents felt that it had been a sensible length. One person said that ‘it didn’t 
drag and we didn’t feel rushed to hit deadlines’. Other respondents, however, felt it should 
have gone on for longer. One champion thought that a year was a more feasible length in 
terms of implementing change. However, for many of the champions, their role was 
something that did not end. It was said to be ‘on-going’ and that it ‘never stops’. One 
respondent claimed that it ‘must become intrinsic to everyday thinking’. For some 
respondents therefore the very idea of a ‘project’ was the wrong way to approach it because 
projects have to come to an end.  
 
Conclusion 
Overall, the climate champions at Business A appear to have been involved in a very 
successful project (programme, initiative, concept...). The ideas that were rolled out by the 
champions generated some real success in terms of changing behaviour and created a 
network where they could all turn for support and advice. There were many ideas put forward 
 231 
 
for improvements to this network and the project in general. These ideas have come out of 
experience and more lessons will be learned as the project develops further. This can only 
strengthen the process. The majority of the individuals that were involved said that they did 
feel they had made a positive difference in the workplace. For many of them this had 
extended into their personal lives with more climate-protecting behaviour, engagement in 
other environmental projects and further learning. 
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Appendix C 
Preliminary Research: Interviews and Observation 
 
 
Trialling Phase 
Informal interview with climate champion 1 
- 5
th
 May, 2009: 11.00 
Informal interview with climate champion 2 
- 28
th
 May, 2009: 09.30 
 
Pilot Study 
Interview with environmental co-ordinator 1 
29
th
 June, 2009: 15.00 
Interview with environmental co-ordinator 2 
30
th
 June, 2009: 11.00 
Interview with environmental co-ordinator 3 
30
th
 June, 2009: 14.00 
Interview with environmental co-ordinator 4 
1
st
 July, 2009: 14.30 
Interview with environmental co-ordinator 5 
6
th
 July, 2009: 09.30 
Interview with environmental co-ordinator 6 
10
th
 July, 2009: 10.30 
Interview with environmental co-ordinator 7 
16
th
 July, 2009: 15.00 
 
Observation 
Global Action Plan: Eco teams facilitator training event 
- 23
rd
 September, 2009: 13.00-17.00 
NUSSL: Student Footprints/Carbon Audit training event 
- 14
th
 October, 2009: 10.00-16.00 
Global Action Plan: Eco teams participant training event 
- 7
th
 November, 2009: 9.00-15.00 
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Appendix D 
Interview Questionnaire 
 
Part 1 
- How did you get involved in the champion role? 
- What are the main functions of the role? 
- How do you encourage behaviour change in the workplace? 
- What do you think are the main barriers to behaviour change? 
- What are your main successes to date? 
- What do you think are the advantages of a networked/champion approach? 
- How could the network be improved? 
- What kinds of obstacles have you faced in your role? 
- Do you have any thoughts on how these could be tackled? 
- How much time do you think needs to be committed to the role? 
- Would you take on the role again? 
Part 2 
- Do you consider yourself to be environmental? 
- If so, what do you think influenced this? 
- What were your personal motivations for taking on the role in the first place? 
- What did it mean to you to be a climate champion? 
- How did other people respond to you? 
- What are your views on climate change?  
- What do you think should be done about climate change? 
- Who do you think is responsible for climate change? 
- Do you feel as if you understand climate change as an issue? 
- Do you talk to other people about climate change? 
- If so, how do you talk to other people about climate change? 
- Do you think we have to change the way we live? 
- Do you think we can change the way we live? 
- How successful do you feel you have been? 
- Are you making a difference? 
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Appendix E: 
 Detailed Information on Interviews 
 
 
Managers 
 
Manager Business 
Sector 
Date Time Type Length 
A-manager Energy 2
nd
 December, 2009 10.00 In person 1.01.59 
B-manager Finance 13
th
 November, 2009 11.00 In person 52.06 
C-manager Consultancy 23
rd
 September, 2009 10.30 In person 57.46 
D-manager Finance 10
th
 August, 2009 13.00 In person 24.20 
E-manager Finance  23
rd
 October 2009 11.00 Telephone 33.51 
F-manager Retail 26
th
 October, 2009 14.00 Telephone 45.25 
G-manager Construction 6
th
 November, 2009 09.00 In person 1.22.46 
H-manager Construction 26
th
 January, 2010 10.30 In person 42.28 
 
 
Case Study A 
 
Champion Business Sector Date Time Type Length 
A-1 Energy 9
th
 March, 2010 14.00 In person 56.12 
A-2 Energy 16
th
 March, 2010 11.00 In person 1.01.54 
A-3 Energy 16
th
 March, 2010 14.00 In person 51.49 
A-4 Energy 17
th
 March, 2010 14.00 In person 1.13.40 
A-5 Energy 19
th
 March, 2010 12.00 Telephone 48.04 
A-6 Energy 22
nd
 March, 2010 11.30 In person 1.06.43 
A-7 Energy 25
th
 March, 2010 10.00 In person 50.18 
A-8 Energy 25
th
 March, 2010 11.15 In person 32.30 
A-9 Energy 14
th
 April, 2010 15.00 Telephone 54.10 
A-10 Energy 16
th
 April, 2010 14.00 In person 41.55 
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Case Study B 
 
Champion Business Sector Date Time Type Length 
B-1 Finance 7
th
 April, 2010 11.00 Telephone 1.05.20 
B-2 Finance 14
th
 April, 2010 17.30 Telephone 51.00 
B-3 Finance 21
st
 April, 2010 09.30 Telephone 47.51 
B-4 Finance 23
rd
 April, 2010 09.30 Telephone 1.00.50 
B-5 Finance 23
rd
 April, 2010 15.30 Telephone 58.49 
B-6 Finance 28
th
 April, 2010 15.00 Telephone 46.46 
B-7 Finance 30
th
 April, 2010 16.00 Telephone 31.16 
B-8 Finance 12
th
 May, 2010 09.00 Telephone 57.24 
 
 
Case Study C 
 
Champion Business Sector Date Time Type Length 
C-1 Consultancy 20
th
 April, 2010 09.00 In person 1.05.32 
C-2 Consultancy 20
th
 April, 2010 10.00 In person 53.45 
C-3 Consultancy 21
st
 April, 2010 17.30 Telephone 55.10 
C-4 Consultancy 22
nd
 April, 2010 11.00 Telephone 37.45 
C-5 Consultancy 1
st
 May, 2010 11.00 Telephone 49.04 
C-6 Consultancy 4
th
 May, 2010 11.30 In person 1.08.15 
C-7 Consultancy 17
th
 May, 2010 10.30 In person 59.58 
C-8 Consultancy 20
th
  May, 2010 15.00 In person 49.18 
C-9 Consultancy 10
th
 May, 2010 9.00 In person 57.44 
C-10 Consultancy 10
th
 May, 2010 10.00 In person 1.02.31 
 
Case Study D
36
 
 
Champions Business Sector Date Time Type Length 
D1-8 Finance 10
th
 August, 2009 13.30 In person 52.21 
 
 
  
                                                          
36
 This case study consisted of a one hour focus group. 
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Appendix F 
Research Paper 
 
 
 
 
Can ‘climate champions’ save the planet?  
A critical reflection on neoliberal social change 
 
Joanne Swaffield and Derek Bell 
Published in Environmental Politics, 21 (2), 248-267. 
 
Can ‘climate champions’ save the planet? A critical reflection on
neoliberal social change
Joanne Swaffield* and Derek Bell
Politics Department, Newcastle University, UK
Many organisations in both public and private sectors have recognised the
challenge posed by climate change and have developed ‘Climate
Champion’, ‘Green Team’ or ‘Environmental Coordinator’ schemes. On
the basis of interviews with 36 champions in large organisations and
analysis of their role as ‘environmental citizens’ in the workplace, it is
argued that, overall, the champions are thoroughly embedded in a
neoliberal understanding of social change. They conceived of their
colleagues (and their employers) as neoliberal agents and accepted that a
neoliberal ethic should govern their relations with others. However, when
asked about their own motivations for action, champions used a much
wider range of discourses. They often appealed to ideas of ‘justice’,
‘responsibility to future generations’ and ‘doing the right thing’. Encoura-
ging climate champions to engage in ‘ordinary moral reasoning’ about
climate change with their colleagues might be an important first step to
prompting critical reflection on the limits of a neoliberal approach to social
change.
Keywords: climate champion; climate change; discourse; environmental
citizenship; neoliberalism
International surveys on climate change report ‘consistently high and rising
public concern across all countries’ (Hale 2010, p. 262). In a survey of 16
nations an average of 60% of people said that they believed climate change to
be ‘very serious’, while a further 33% believed it to be ‘somewhat serious’
(World Bank 2010). There is widespread recognition of the threat posed by
climate change. However, public concern about climate change (in surveys) has
not been accompanied by significant social change to reduce energy
consumption or even to adapt to the likely effects of climate change. As a
result, there is considerable interest among academics and policymakers in
attempts to explain our failure to achieve social change (so far) and in
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developing proposals to stimulate climate-protecting social change in the
future.
We aim to contribute to the study of climate-protecting social change by
critically examining one way of promoting climate-protecting behaviour that
has become popular in large organisations. Many organisations in both public
and private sectors have developed ‘Climate Champion’, ‘Green Team’ or
‘Environmental Co-ordinator’ schemes. These schemes are designed to
‘establish a network of individuals to lead on environmental initiatives
throughout the business’, as stated in an anonymous business’s corporate
social responsibility (CSR) report. Ideally, these designated individuals are
strategically located across the company and it is expected that their collective
effort will help to reduce the overall greenhouse gas emissions of the
organisation and promote climate-friendly behaviour among employees. As
we understand them, climate champion schemes aim to facilitate a ‘bottom-up’
approach to stimulating climate-protecting change by mobilising ‘environ-
mental citizens’ inside organisations. Despite its increasing popularity, this type
of scheme has received very little attention from researchers.
We focus on climate champion schemes in multinational companies. Many
large companies, including Aviva, Coca Cola, EDF Energy, Tesco and Virgin,
have introduced climate champion schemes to promote pro-environmental
change from the ‘bottom-up’ but there have been very few academic studies of
these schemes. This is an important gap in the literature given the
environmental impact of large corporations. Multinational corporations are
among the major contributors to greenhouse gas emissions (Sæverud and
Skjærseth 2007). Large companies have therefore come under pressure to ‘do
their bit’ toward mitigating climate change by reducing their greenhouse gas
emissions (Weinhofer and Hoffmann 2010). They have responded to this
pressure in a number of ways. For example, some companies are voluntarily
improving their operations by ‘utilizing green materials and processes’
(Hoffman 2005, p. 24) and some are ‘going ‘‘carbon-neutral’’ by ‘‘offsetting’’
carbon emissions that they themselves cannot reduce’ (Llewellyn 2007, p. 55).
There is, of course, considerable disagreement about the significance of these
changes, with many commentators concerned about ‘greenwashing’ (Tokar
1997, Beder 2000).
We seek to understand how climate champions in large corporations
understand their own role and how they attempt to promote change within
their organisations. In particular, we are interested in their discursive
construction of the process of social change. How is language used to
construct ‘appropriate’ behavioural change? How do champions think about
changing the practices of their organisation or the behaviour of their
colleagues? What does that tell us about how they conceive of their own
values and motives and the values and motives of their colleagues and
managers?
Overall, we found that climate champions and their managers consistently
constructed the process of social change in neoliberal terms. They conceived of
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their colleagues (and their employers) as neoliberal agents and accepted a
neoliberal ethic in their relations with others. We should not be surprised by
the dominance of neoliberalism, especially in multinational corporations,
which are the institutions at the very ‘heart’ of the neoliberal project. However,
the dominance of neoliberal thinking among our climate champions suggests
that their potential as ‘environmental citizens’ is quite limited. They do not
challenge the limits that neoliberalism imposes on how we can tackle the
problem of climate change. However, we also found that climate champions
used a wider range of discourses when we asked them about their own reasons
for involvement in the scheme. For example, many champions appealed to
ideas of ‘justice’, ‘responsibility to future generations’ and ‘doing the right
thing’. They did not conceive of themselves as neoliberal agents. We argue that
this disjuncture between how climate champions conceive of themselves and
how they conceive of others is important. We suggest that encouraging climate
champions to engage in ‘ordinary moral reasoning’ about climate change with
their colleagues might be an important first step to prompting critical reflection
on the limits of a neoliberal approach to social change. More speculatively, we
suggest that a more deliberative model for climate champion schemes, which
aims to treat other employees as co-deliberators or co-investigators into the
problem of tackling climate change, might be more successful than current
schemes.
Our discussion is divided into five sections. In section one, we locate our
study in the existing literature on climate champions. In section two, we
describe our methods of data collection and analysis. In sections three and
four, we present our analysis. In section three, we argue that most of the
climate champions in our study had a neoliberal understanding of how climate-
protecting social change could and should be promoted. In particular, we
identify four recurrent themes in our data: business as usual and the pursuit of
profit; the sovereignty of individual choice; homo economicus and the appeal to
economic rationality; and ethical consumerism and the subjectivity of ethics.
We suggest that ‘neoliberal environmental citizens’ have a very limited
repertoire of strategies for promoting social change. In section four, we argue
that climate champions discursively construct their own values and motives in
quite different terms. They do not think about climate change as if they were
neoliberal agents but rather engage in ‘ordinary moral reasoning’. We consider
the implications of this disjuncture for the future development of climate
champion schemes and we propose an alternative model of environmental
citizenship.
Research context
The role of individuals in promoting change has been the subject of much
research. There has been considerable discussion of ‘change agents’ in
organisational studies and social psychologists, among others, have identified
various roles that individuals can play in the process of social and behaviour
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change (Caldwell 2003). The importance of change agents has been recognised
in an environmental context. For example, studies have considered the
importance of grassroots environmental activists (Horton 2006), environ-
mental citizens (Dobson and Bell 2006) and, more recently, celebrity role
models in climate campaigns (Boykoff et al. 2010).
A small number of studies have specifically examined the role of designated
climate or environmental champions in large organisations. In 2005, Alexander,
Ballard and Associates outlined the importance of key individuals in promoting
climate-protecting change in local authorities. They identified both formal (or
designated) and informal climate champions in Hampshire County Council and
interviewed 20 champions.1Their research focusedmainly on the attributes of the
champions and provided some useful conclusions about the characteristics of
climate champions who were successful in promoting some change in the
organisation. More recently, there have been two studies of environmental
champions in the private sector (Lewis and Juravle 2010, Gliedt et al. 2010).
Lewis and Juravle (2010) studied ‘sustainable investment champions’, while
Gliedt et al. (2010) studied ‘environment champions’. Both studies conducted in-
depth interviews and considered the influence that champions can have on
specific business decisions. Lewis and Juravle focused on the promotion of
sustainable investment, while Gliedt et al. investigated the corporate decision to
voluntarily purchase premium-priced green electricity. Both of these studies
conclude that champions can play an important role in encouraging pro-
environmental decisions in a business context. In addition, other studies have
focused on the techniques of ‘championing’ (Andersson and Bateman 2000).
Our study differs from these previous studies in three important respects.
First, we focus exclusively on designated climate champions involved in official
schemes set up by their companies. Each company advertised for individuals who
were interested in promoting climate-protecting behaviour in the workplace.
Employees volunteered for the role and were designated as ‘climate champions’.
Theproliferation of climate champion schemesmeans that there are an increasing
number of designated climate champions in the corporate sector.We believe that
this group of potential ‘environmental citizens’ may be sufficiently different to
justify independent study. Second, our aim is to study how designated climate
champions think about their role and how they approach the problem of
stimulating climate-protecting change in their company and among their
colleagues. Our intention is to try to understand their conception of social
change. Third, we aim to relate our discussion of the discourses used by climate
champions to the wider discursive politics of climate change.We are interested in
climate champions as potential ‘environmental citizens’ working to promote
climate-protecting social change inside multinational corporations.
Studying climate champions
We began by using web-based research to identify multinational corporations
that had climate champion schemes. We developed a list of 25 companies based
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on published league tables of ‘green’ companies, evidence of environmental
concern in annual reports and corporate social responsibility reports, and links
to environmental organisations (e.g. The Climate Group, WWF, together.
com). This provided a sample of companies operating in various sectors of the
economy, including construction, finance, retail, energy, consultancy, media
and transport.
We attempted to arrange interviews with the relevant senior manager,
typically, the CSR manager or a manager specifically responsible for the
environmental performance of the company. We explained the nature of the
project and our desire to interview climate champions in each company. Due to
the time constraints of the project, we were not able to pursue managers who
were unresponsive to three interview requests. Similarly, if a manager was
clearly unwilling to allow access to champions, we did not arrange an
interview. In total, we conducted eight interviews with managers who had
expressed a willingness to facilitate access to climate champions in their
company. The sample of companies was limited to five sectors (construction,
consultancy, energy, finance and retail). Each interview lasted between 30 and
90 minutes.
Four managers provided us with a list of climate champions and we were
able to select a sample of willing champions from each company. The four
companies that we studied were in the consultancy, energy and finance sectors.
In three companies, we conducted individual interviews (in person or by
telephone) with between eight and 10 champions. Each interview lasted
between 50 and 90 minutes. We conducted 28 individual interviews with
climate champions. In the fourth company, the manager preferred that we
conduct a single focus group with eight champions. In total, 36 climate
champions talked to us about their experience.
The final sample of champions included 21 women and 15 men. They were
variously located across the UK and represented many different job
descriptions within the relevant companies. They also occupied different levels
of seniority, although the majority identified themselves as being ‘on the
ground’.
Table 1. Interview sample.
Business Sector Number of champions interviewed
A Energy 10
B Finance 8
C Consultancy 10
D Finance 8
E Finance 0
F Retail 0
G Construction 0
H Construction 0
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All of the interviews were carried out by Swaffield and were semi-
structured. Each interview was split into two sections with questions about the
role itself (daily tasks, successes, obstacles) and general views on climate
change (What should be done? Who is responsible? Do we need to change the
way we live?). The interviewer adopted a flexible approach where necessary,
but every interview covered the same set of topics and questions. The manager
interviews were conducted between August 2009 and January 2010. The
interviews with the champions were conducted between March 2010 and May
2010. With the permission of the participants, all interviews were recorded and
the data was transcribed for analysis.
Both authors examined the discursive construction of the role of the climate
champion and the process of climate-protecting social change in each of the
interviews. We also examined how each of the climate champions discursively
constructed their own involvement in the scheme. Our analysis was informed
by previous research on environmental and climate change discourses (Dryzek
1997, Feindt and Oels 2005, Backstrand and Lovbrand 2006, Pettenger 2007).
We identified climate discourses and themes in the literature and used these to
code the transcripts. However, we tried to remain open to the possibility that
we would find new discourses or, at least, new variations on old discourses.
New themes emerged with each reading so analysis of the data was
necessarily an iterative process. We documented new ideas as they emerged and
revisited earlier transcripts to investigate themes that we had not recognised
upon initial analysis. In the next two sections, we present the results of our
analysis.
A neoliberal conception of social change
In this section, we highlight four themes that were repeated in our interviews
with climate champions and their managers. We believe that these themes
reflect important aspects of a neoliberal discourse. Neoliberalism is, of course,
a contested term. McCarthy and Prudham (2004, p. 276) claim that, ‘the notion
of a consistent set of defining material practices and outcomes that comprise
neoliberalism is problematic’. However, there are fundamental components
that appear in almost all accounts of neoliberalism. Turner (2008, p. 6) argues
that, ‘in many respects its various schools meet on common ground in terms of
their aims, arguments and assumptions, which makes them constitute a
coherent and distinctive ideology’.
Our discussion highlights four recurrent themes that we believe are
common to most accounts of neoliberalism: business as usual and the pursuit
of profit; the sovereignty of individual choice; homo economicus and the appeal
to economic rationality; and ethical consumerism and the subjectivity of ethics.
The key values of neoliberalism centre on growth, profit and efficiency. The
focus on ‘continual growth in both capacity (stock) and income (flow) is a
central part of the neoclassical growth paradigm’ (Daly 1996, p. 15). Indeed,
‘profit maximisation’ lies ‘at the centre of both the old and the new economic
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liberalism’ (von Werlhof 2008, p. 95). Businesses are therefore directed towards
growth, accumulation and profit. A neoliberal account of social change
maintains the importance of these key values. Hence, it addresses environ-
mental issues ‘without introducing the need for fundamental structural change’
(Young 2000, p. 20).
Neoliberalism also emphasises the importance of the freedom and rights of
individuals (Harvey 2005). Individuals should have sovereignty over their own
lives and choices. In a similar way to businesses, individuals should be ‘free to
pursue their interests in the market place’ (Humphreys 2009, p. 320). For
neoliberals, self-interest is a central human motive (Larner 2003). Moreover,
neoliberalism extends the domain of individual choice to ethics (Turner 2008,
von Werlhof 2008). Neoliberal freedom includes the freedom to choose our
own ethical doctrines. On a neoliberal account, ethical commitments are
subjective preferences.
Business as usual and the pursuit of profit
The neoliberal (and, more generally, capitalist) conception of economic
corporations is that their main objective should always be the pursuit of profit
(Friedman 1962). They should avoid adopting other aims that will hinder this
objective and should adopt secondary aims (such as climate protecting aims)
only when they will contribute positively to the corporation’s profits.
The companies in this study have all adopted environment-related aims.
This is evident in their annual reports, their CSR reports, and on their
corporate webpages. For example, all of the websites include a section on
climate change and what the companies are doing to tackle it. In addition, they
have all developed a version of the climate champion scheme. There is little
association of the champions with profit. Where the focus is not on climate
change itself, reference is to staff engagement and collegial spirit.
However, several managers in our study recognised the economic benefits
for their company of a green image. One manager talked about the increasing
prevalence of environmental questions in tendering contracts:
certainly stuff like this is massively helpful in winning contracts . . . we’re always
updating our kind . . . status reports . . . as regards to where we are in the whole
climate change arena. So, we’ve got kind of a whole band of people that just love
this stuff because more and more it’s becoming part of tender writing. (A-m)2
The climate champions were also aware of the economic imperatives behind
corporate environmental responsibility. As one champion pointed out, ‘a lot of
the clients have got their own green targets so if [we] seem to be like in sync
with them then we’ll be more attractive as a supplier’ (C-10).3 For some
champions, this encouraged a sceptical attitude to their company’s environ-
mental commitments. The same champion said, ‘a lot of the environment push
from the top is from erm a, like a PR perspective’ (C-10) and a champion in
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another company expressed the same thought, ‘a lot of it can be PR’ (A-4).
From a neoliberal perspective, the most successful corporate environmental
responsibility strategy is the one that maximises profit. The choice between
‘greenwash’ and (real) pro-environmental action is a purely instrumental one.
Therefore, we should not be surprised that climate champions, with an ‘insider’
view, might have doubts about the motives of their senior management.
Similarly, we should not expect climate champion schemes to produce
fundamental changes in the daily operations of companies. In most companies,
the climate champion scheme was seen as a self-contained ‘project’, which was
intended to run for a fixed period and had specific objectives. Global Action
Plan (GAP) was used by three out of the four companies. GAP offers a fixed
term programme for behavioural change. Champions are expected to take an
audit of areas such as waste and energy use and then spend a month promoting
good practice in each area. A second audit is taken at the end to determine the
success of the various initiatives. The general aim is to achieve a reduction in
carbon emissions through individual behavioural change.4 In the three
companies that used GAP, the champions reported that they had achieved
improvements in environmental performance between the two audits.
However, the time limited character of the schemes was not conducive to
fundamental or long-term changes in behaviour.5 One champion said that they
had successfully encouraged the use of mugs instead of plastic cups only to find
‘they’re still using loads of plastic cups’ a few weeks later (B-6). Another
champion said that once the project had finished ‘people just forget’ (A-1).
The sovereignty of individual choice
The climate champion schemes also reflected the neoliberal commitment to the
sovereignty of individual choice (Larner 2003, Turner 2008). In a neoliberal
framework, choice is important because ‘markets are supposed to work
through the dynamics of individual decision making in competitive settings’
(Mansfield 2004, p. 566). This commitment to individual choice was evident in
both the design of the schemes and the way that climate champions talked
about their approach to promoting change.
The involvement of climate champions was voluntary. One champion had
seen an advertisement for the scheme on an internal communication document.
He said, ‘it was all sort of my . . . sort of something that I did off my own back
really cos I thought well I’ll, I’ll give that a go, it sounds really, really good’ (B-
8). The role of climate champion was not part of the ‘normal’ management
structure of the company. Instead, climate champions were individuals
working on their own initiative and collaborating with other individual
climate champions from other parts of their company. The success of the
champions was not measured by progress reports or any specified targets.
Champions were not paid extra for their efforts and if an individual chose not
to devote time or energy to the role, they were not subject to the kinds of
sanctions that they would have faced for not doing their ‘job’.
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Climate champions approached the promotion of change in the same kind
of individualist and voluntarist way. They sought to encourage their colleagues
to perform environmentally-friendly acts, which did not require collective
action, such as recycling, switching their monitors off, turning off lights and
using hand driers instead of paper towels. Moreover, they regarded it as
important that their colleagues made their own choices. As one champion said,
‘it’s a choice isn’t it . . . it’s up to the individual’ (B-3). Another champion
explained that he had given out free energy efficient lights bulbs and provided an
internal communication document about energy savings and fuel bills. He
reflected on his efforts saying, ‘I think really you just need to give some people a
little bit of information and encouragement and let them make up their own
mind’ (B-5).
In part, the design of the climate champion scheme defined how the
champions understood their role. As individuals with no organisational
authority, the champions could not require changes in company practices or
infrastructure. Instead, they could only seek to encourage their colleagues to
voluntarily choose to act differently. Therefore, they focused mainly on
promoting small changes in the everyday behaviours of their colleagues.
However, the champions’ commitments to individualist and voluntarist
conceptions of change also reflected their more general understanding of
how change could and should be achieved. Consistently with neoliberalism, they
identified two main ways of promoting change: changing the actual or
perceived balance of costs and benefits; and encouraging ‘ethical’ preferences.
Homo economicus and the appeal to economic rationality
Neoliberalism expects individuals to think like businesses and to pursue
‘unlimited individual accumulation’ (McCarthy and Prudham 2004, p. 277). As
one manager said:
A measure of your success is money. And what do you do with your money? You
go and spend it. So, we cannot tell people not to spend their money, what’s the
point of coming to work if you can’t spend the money? (D-m)
A similar view was expressed by one of the champions:
You go to work to earn money so you can buy more stuff . . . [laughs] and you
know spend more money on getting more stuff. (D-3)
The interviewees recognised both the non-negotiable ‘materialism’ of contem-
porary UK culture and the role of ‘consumption’ as a ‘status marker’ (Hobson
2002, p. 99, Slocum 2004, p. 415). Consequently, champions emphasised the
economic co-benefits of pro-environmental behaviour.6One champion said, ‘you
try and give people the benefits, like whenwe do the environment day, if you have
your tyres pumped up you can save petrol’ (A-7). Another champion told us
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about her communication techniques with colleagues, ‘I’d be saying to them
‘‘well do you know how much money you’re losing or you’re wasting . . . you
know by keeping that appliance on overnight?’’’ (C-4). The interviewees had no
doubt that the appeal to economic self-interest could work. As onemanager said:
If I can really show people that just by being a little bit smarter you can save £50 a
quarter . . . on your electricity then . . . who wouldn’t jump on the like sustain-
ability, climate change bandwagon . . . you know. (G-m)
A champion expressed the same idea but more concisely: ‘almost everyone in
Western society cares about their pennies you know’ (C-10). The best way of
changing the behaviour of ‘homo economicus’ is by ‘showing’ him or her that
pro-environmental behaviours are more economically rational than his or her
current behaviours (McCarthy and Prudham 2004, p. 276). For some
champions, this was a matter of regret but for most it was merely a ‘fact of life’.
Ethical consumerism and the subjectivity of ethics
In a neoliberal context, individual choice is sovereign. Therefore, the only
alternative to persuading homo economicus that pro-environmental action is
economically rational is to encourage pro-environmental preferences and
lifestyles. Neoliberalism allows for the possibility that individuals are capable
of transcending the narrow economic rationality of homo economicus and the
single-minded pursuit of ‘unlimited accumulation’. However, neoliberalism
insists that ‘all individuals possess a utility function, which incorporates their
tastes and preferences’ and that each individual’s goal is to satisfy her
preferences and maximise her utility (Hobson 2002, p. 102). If we can promote
the ‘incorporation of environmental concern into [each individual’s] prefer-
ences’, those individuals might maximise their utility by performing pro-
environmental actions that satisfy their pro-environmental preferences
(Hobson 2002, p. 102). The ‘ethical’ consumer, who adopts (some aspects of)
a climate-friendly lifestyle, may not be the lead character in neoliberal
narratives. But she does play an important supporting role because she allows
the state to place responsibility for climate change and other environmental
problems on individuals. The ‘individualisation of responsibility’ for climate
change is only plausible if individuals are capable of making pro-environ-
mental choices but are currently failing to do so (Maniates 2001, Kent 2009).
Many of the champions that we interviewed said that their work was all
about ‘raising awareness’ (C-4), ‘creating that awareness’ (A-8) and ‘trying to
educate people’ (C-5). When asked about successes in terms of behavioural
change, one of the champions said:
The main purpose of everything we do is really to raise awareness. I mean, yes, we
want results . . . but the more you can raise people’s awareness you gradually
bring their habits up. (C-2)
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For many of the champions, raising awareness was a natural way to facilitate
behavioural change. The champions believed that by providing information
about climate change they might encourage people to ‘choose’ climate-friendly
lifestyles. In one case, we asked a champion what she thought people should be
doing to tackle climate change. Her response was: ‘to start with I’d never say
you should be’ (C-3). The role of the champion was ‘providing the information,
raising awareness but not telling people what they should be doing’ (C-2). This
reluctance to prescribe (and proscribe) actions reflected the champions’
neoliberal understanding of ethics as subjective – a matter of preference. In
the focus group with champions, a form of subjectivism about ‘morals and
principles’ was explicitly set out by one member of the group and endorsed by
others:
D8: What right do I have to try and persuade them to care? Everyone’s got a
different set of morals and principles so
D5: yeah
D8: no, because . . . no, honestly, because I know how bad like 4x 4s are and
things and . . . it would be a moral choice if, even if they were really nice to drive,
but you can’t expect other people to share the same views.
This over-states the position taken by many champions because many of them
were willing to try to persuade others to adopt some climate-friendly actions.
However, most of the champions shared the view that there were strict limits
on the approach that they should take because people had the right to choose
their own ethical ‘preferences’.
Neoliberal environmental citizens
In sum, we have argued that the champions in our study tended to adopt a
neoliberal conception of social change. In general, they did not challenge –
and were not encouraged to challenge – ‘business as usual’ in their
companies. They assumed that their colleagues were typical neoliberal
agents motivated by economic self-interest (just like the companies that
employed them). They adopted a neoliberal ethical framework, which
attributed an absolute priority to the right to individual choice while
adopting a subjectivist conception of other moral beliefs and principles. In
our view, most of the climate champions in our study are best understood
as neoliberal environmental citizens: they wanted to – and tried to –
promote pro-environmental behaviour but only in ways that were consistent
with a neoliberal account of how social or behavioural change can be and
should be achieved.7 As a result, the range of strategies for promoting pro-
environmental behaviour that they considered to be legitimate or appro-
priate was very limited.
A critic might object that the champions were constrained by the context
of the workplace.8 On this account, the champions may not have viewed
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their colleagues as typical neoliberal agents but simply adopted an approach
to promoting behavioural change that was appropriate in the business
environment. However, our interview data suggests that the champions
adopted a similar view of how behaviour change could and should be
promoted in other contexts beyond the workplace. Moreover, we would
argue that appealing to neoliberal values, such as self-interest and profit, is
seen as the ‘easiest’ or most effective way of changing behaviour in the
workplace precisely because neoliberalism is at its most pervasive in the
business environment.
Resisting neoliberalism
So far, our research with climate champions is consistent with the claim that
a neoliberal understanding of human motivations and the processes of
social change appears to many people to be the ‘inevitable and natural state’
of the world (Heynen and Robbins 2005, p. 6). In this section, we will argue
that when the climate champions talk about their own motives and
values and their own reasons for involvement in the climate champion
scheme, they provide evidence that the dominance of neoliberalism is
incomplete. We argue that the disjuncture between how they conceive of
their own values and motives and the values and motives of others suggests
that they may be capable of more radical forms of environmental
citizenship.
The dominance of neoliberalism and the inevitability of resistance
Elizabeth Shove has recently argued that a neoliberal understanding of
social change dominates climate policymaking and has a significant influence
on social science research on climate change. As Shove (2010, p. 1280)
suggests:
This interpretation both of the problem (one of consumer behaviour and choice)
and of potential policy responses (influencing choice) structures the meaning and
the method of useful social science.
Neoliberalism understands people as ‘autonomous agents of choice and
change’ (Shove 2010, p. 1279). Therefore, the study of social change is the
study of individual choice – and ‘methodological individualism’ is a
prerequisite for ‘useful’ social science (Lukes 2006, p. 6) Moreover, the
neoliberal conceptions of the autonomous agent (as an instrumentally rational
utility-maximiser) and of ethics (as a matter of subjective preference) further
restricts the sources of ‘useful’ social science – to particular branches of
psychology and economics, which share these assumptions about the nature of
the person. Neoliberalism is not just ‘the only economics in town’ but also ‘the
only social science in town’ (Slocum 2004, p. 416).9
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Shove (2010, p. 1283) claims that this narrow psychological or ‘behaviour
change’ approach to tackling climate change has ‘significant political
advantages’:
[In] this context, to probe further, to ask how options are structured or to inquire
into the ways in which governments maintain infrastructures and economic
institutions, is perhaps too challenging to be useful.
A neoliberal approach to social change protects the interests of those who
benefit from the material-discursive practices of neoliberalism by ensuring that
questions about the economic, political and social practices and structures of
neoliberalism are silenced. However, the dominance of any discourse is never
likely to be complete. As Downing (2008, p. ix) suggests, ‘the history of any
cultural phenomenon always involves, alongside the commonsensical or
authorized version of events, ulterior narratives, an unspoken set of truths’.
As a result, discourses are ‘in a state of constant reconstitution and
contestation’ (Carabine 2001, p. 279). We should always expect to find
evidence of resistance to a dominant discourse if we look hard enough. We
might anticipate that evidence of resistance is most likely in the ‘margins’ of
societies – in grassroots movements and local initiatives. However, we want to
suggest that even in our interviews with individuals, who were thoroughly
embedded in neoliberal material-discursive practices, there was an important
challenge to the dominance of neoliberalism.
Alternative discourses: the self-conception of the champions
We have argued that the champions certainly conceived of other people in
neoliberal terms: other people were, typically, economically rational but,
more fundamentally, they were autonomous utility-maximisers with the right
to choose their own (subjective) ethical commitments. However, the
champions frequently did not conceive of themselves in the same way. In
the interviews, many of the champions talked about future generations,
justice, responsibility and the value of the natural world when we asked
them why they had become involved in the climate champion scheme or
when we asked more generally about what they thought about climate
change. One champion talked about the unjust distribution of the impacts
of climate change:
I don’t like the fact that we just seem to forget about people in other parts of the
world and I mean climate change is . . . does look like it’s going to impact some of
the poorer parts of the world a lot worse than it impacts us, which is really very
unfair. (B-6)
Other champions referred to a ‘duty to do something’ (C-10), and ‘the morality
of having a social responsibility’ (C-3). This sense of responsibility was often
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felt in relation to future generations, particularly the champion’s own family.
One champion explained his own motivations for action:
I thought about my daughter growing up and . . . if I can’t tell her that I knew
about these issues and didn’t do everything I could to stop it, then I just couldn’t
live with that you know. (C-6)
Other champions identified motivations beyond humanity, referring to the
‘preservation of the earth’ (A-3) and the importance of ‘looking after the
world, looking after nature, looking after animals’ (C-8). These individuals did
not become climate champions (or try to reduce their personal carbon
emissions) because they thought it was the economically rational thing to do.
Instead, their understanding of their commitment to climate-friendly action
reflected an underlying ethical objectivism. For them, the threat of climate
change provided (objective) reasons that justified climate-friendly actions. One
champion said:
I find [it] . . . really hard to believe that we’re not having an impact when you look
at what’s going on and the kind of, you know, the industry and the cars and the
technology and everything that we’ve got now. I can’t believe that when you look
back a few hundred years we’ve not added to that . . . erm so I definitely feel that
we’re responsible and I think that we’re responsible for reducing it as well. (C-7)
Similarly, another champion said, ‘I think it’s just now I know the effects of
everything I just feel like I should do my bit and I think I’d feel quite guilty if I
didn’t’ (A-10). One champion talked about her own ‘realisation’ that ‘we do
need to change for the environment’ (A-9). For many champions it was
important to ‘do the right thing’ (e.g. A-2, A-4, D-3). Implicitly, the champions
understood themselves as autonomously choosing what to do but they
understood their choice as the outcome of a process of ethical or moral
reasoning informed by the facts. They understood their own choice to do
something about climate change as reason-directed – the ‘autonomous’ choice
of a moral agent, in the Kantian sense, rather than the subjective choice of a
neoliberal agent. In their practice of ethical reasoning, they rejected the ethical
subjectivism that both informed their conception of other people and limited
how they approached the promotion of climate-friendly action.
Beyond neoliberal environmental citizenship
We believe that the difference between the way that climate champions
conceive of other people’s motivations and their own motivations is potentially
important. In a recent paper, Walker et al. (2010) have argued that ‘imaginaries
of the public’ can influence policy- and decision-making in the renewable
energy sector. Their research indicates that decisions (e.g. about technology,
siting and public engagement) are influenced by the ways in which ‘actors in
technical-industrial and policy networks’ construct and imagine the
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motivations and (re)actions of the public (Walker et al. 2010, p. 943). They
suggest that it might even be possible for the ‘imagined public’ to be more
significant than ‘real’ publics:
Indeed, depending on how the subjectivity and agency of the public is anticipated
and internalised into organisational strategies and working practices of different
actors within and across sectoral networks, this imagined public might be of
greater long-term significance than the ‘real’ version of specific publics
encountered in meeting rooms and community halls. (Walker et al. 2010, p. 943)
Our research suggests that something similar may be occurring with the climate
champions in our study. Their ‘imagined public’ has a significant influence on
how they think the problem of climate change might be tackled and the
strategies that they employ as climate champions. Their approach is shaped by
their expectations of the ‘neoliberal person’ (the economically rational,
autonomous chooser who has the right to choose his ethical commitments)
that they imagine their colleagues and other people in the wider society to be.
Of course, Walker et al. (2010, p. 943) recognise that ‘[the] real and the
imagined are clearly not disconnected here, but neither are they necessarily the
same’. The champions’ imaginary neoliberal person is based, in part, on their
experience of their ‘real’ colleagues and other people that they have
encountered. However, it is also an imagined character – and perhaps, a
caricature – produced and reproduced through neoliberal narratives, and their
associated material-discursive practices, including (among many others) the
(neoliberal) practices that the champions use to promote climate-friendly
behaviour. If we treat other people as archetypal ‘neoliberal’ persons, we
should not be too surprised if they react in the way that we have anticipated. In
other words, the imagined ‘neoliberal’ person becomes ‘real’ partly as a
consequence of our acting as if it existed.
However, if we ‘scratch beneath the surface’ of a ‘neoliberal’ person, as we
did with our climate champions, we may find that their ‘inner life’ is much
richer and more complex than the neoliberal conception of the person allows.
Our research supports the claims of Barnett et al. (2008, p. 643) that the
neoliberal conception of the person does not take seriously the fact that ‘people
are argumentative subjects through and through’. In our interviews, the
champions displayed a ‘capacity for ordinary moral reasoning’ in response to
the moral ‘dilemmas and conundrums’ posed by climate change (Barnett et al.
2008, p. 649). In other words, they were able to recognise and reflect on the
moral issues raised by climate change, identify alternative moral responses, and
offer reasons to justify some responses or to reject other responses. Similar
observations have been made by other researchers who have examined the
discursive practices of people involved in climate-protection programmes
informed by a neoliberal understanding of social change (Hobson 2002,
Slocum 2004). If they are encouraged to reflect on climate change (or other
moral issues), most people do not think like the archetypal ‘neoliberal’ person.
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We believe that this suggests that it may be worth exploring an alternative
‘deliberative’ or ‘co-inquiry’ model for programmes aimed at mobilising action
on climate change. The neoliberal model of social change, used by Global
Action Plan and some other providers of training and resources for climate
action programmes, reproduces neoliberal social relations. More ‘deliberative’
models, which would train and encourage champions to facilitate ‘ordinary
moral reasoning’ about the ‘dilemmas and conundrums’ of climate change in
the workplace and elsewhere, might challenge neoliberal social relations. If we
imagine other people as moral agents, it is more likely that they will realise
their potential to think and act as if they are moral agents. It may also be more
likely that they will recognise the limitations of a neoliberal approach to
tackling the problem of climate change. In our view, the development of
climate champion schemes that encourage and train climate champions to
become deliberative environmental citizens, rather than neoliberal environ-
mental citizens, might promote more imaginative engagement with the
challenge of climate change.10 A neoliberal environmental citizen does not
question the limitations that a neoliberal understanding of social change
imposes on how we can address the problem of climate change. A deliberative
environmental citizen starts from the assumption that we can only understand
and respond effectively to the problem of climate change through collective
deliberation. If climate champions are encouraged to overcome their
(neoliberal) reluctance to engage their colleagues in serious discussions about
the moral (and the political, social, cultural, economic and technological) issues
raised by climate change, they might find that their colleagues are moral agents
too.
Conclusion
There is an increasing number of designated climate champions in organisa-
tions in both the public and private sectors. We conducted in-depth interviews
with a small number of climate champions in four large corporations and
found that most of our climate champions were neoliberal environmental
citizens: they sought to promote pro-environmental behaviour without
violating the constraints imposed by a neoliberal conception of how social
change could and should be promoted. They accepted the sovereignty of
individual choice. They assumed that their colleagues (like their companies)
were motivated primarily (or wholly) by economic self-interest. They refused to
engage in challenging moral discussions with their colleagues about climate
change because they believed that the sovereignty of individual choice extends
to subjectively choosing one’s ethical principles.
However, we also found that the moral reasoning of most of our climate
champions was not consistent with neoliberalism. Their involvement in the
climate champion scheme and their own pro-environmental behaviour was
hardly ever motivated only, or even primarily, by economic self-interest. They
believed that climate change posed a threat to people in developing countries,
Environmental Politics 263
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 N
ew
ca
stl
e U
po
n T
yn
e] 
at 
04
:59
 09
 M
arc
h 2
01
2 
future generations, and the natural world – and they believed that it would be
wrong to ignore that threat. They engaged in ‘ordinary moral reasoning’ about
climate change – and it was through moral reasoning that they had come to
believe in the importance of promoting climate-protecting social change. We
have suggested that this disjuncture between how climate champions under-
stand their own values and motives and how they understand the motives and
values of others may be important. Climate champions may imagine that other
people are neoliberal agents – and their neoliberal approach to promoting
social change may even encourage neoliberal motives among their colleagues –
but it is possible that other people are also capable of ‘ordinary moral
reasoning’. Therefore, we have proposed that climate champion schemes might
be re-designed so that climate champions are strongly encouraged to start from
the assumption that their colleagues are moral agents too. The aim of such
schemes should be to promote both the capacity for deliberative environmental
citizenship and the willingness to act as deliberative environmental citizens
among climate champions so that they can promote ‘ordinary moral reasoning’
about climate change among their colleagues.
Ours is one of the first studies of designated climate champions. We do not
know whether the champions we interviewed were representative of champions
in their companies, in other companies in the same sectors of the economy, or
in multinational corporations more generally. Similarly, we do not know
whether climate champions in the public sector are very different from climate
champions in the private sector. If we want climate champions to play a key
leadership role in promoting climate-protecting social change, we need to
develop a better understanding of their possibilities and limits as environ-
mental citizens. Therefore, we believe that more research on climate champions
in various contexts could make a valuable contribution to the development of
new and better climate champion schemes. We would also be keen to see more
experimental action research that seeks to promote alternative models of
environmental citizenship, including the kind of deliberative model that we
have suggested, among climate champions. High quality action research should
begin to tell us whether climate champion schemes can be designed to challenge
the dominance of neoliberalism and to promote more radical forms of
environmental citizenship. We do not know whether some form of deliberative
environmental citizenship is a genuine possibility for climate champions – or
how effective it might be in promoting climate-protecting social change – but
we believe that it is worth trying to find out.
Notes
1. ‘Formal’ (or designated) champions were appointed as ‘champions’ by their
organisation. ‘Informal’ champions worked to promote environmental issues, but
they did this independently without being appointed. Our study focuses exclusively
on designated champions.
2. ‘A’ refers to the company and ‘m’ indicates the interviewee was the manager
responsible for the climate champion programme. We refer to champions by
number.
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3. Lewis and Juravle (2010) also note the importance of a ‘business case’ for
environmental action.
4. For further information on Global Action Plan see Hobson (2002).
5. Hobson (2002) notes that this is an unfortunate outcome of the GAP initiatives.
6. Lewis and Juravle (2010) also suggest the importance of a ‘business case’ for
action.
7. ‘Neoliberal environmental citizenship’ should not be confused with other forms of
‘liberal environmental citizenship’ (Bell 2005).
8. Our thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
9. On economics, see also Massey (2000).
10. ‘Deliberative’ environmental citizenship might be consistent with various forms of
environmental citizenship, including both ‘ecological citizenship’ (Dobson 2003)
and ‘liberal environmental citizenship’ (Bell 2005). However, it might have a
particular affinity with Barry‘s emphasis on ‘resistance’ in his account of
‘sustainability citizenship’ (Barry 2006). Further development of the idea of
deliberative environmental citizenship would need to draw on work linking
deliberative democracy and the environment to identify the particular character-
istics of this form of citizenship and to respond to common criticisms of
deliberative theories (Baber and Bartlett 2005, Backstrand et al. 2010). For us, the
central idea is minimal: it is simply that the deliberative environmental citizen
actively seeks to engage others in serious discussions about the whole range of
issues raised by climate change.
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